Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm

Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:

 - Promote IMA/EVM to a proper LSM

   This is the bulk of the diffstat, and the source of all the changes
   in the VFS code. Prior to the start of the LSM stacking work it was
   important that IMA/EVM were separate from the rest of the LSMs,
   complete with their own hooks, infrastructure, etc. as it was the
   only way to enable IMA/EVM at the same time as a LSM.

   However, now that the bulk of the LSM infrastructure supports
   multiple simultaneous LSMs, we can simplify things greatly by
   bringing IMA/EVM into the LSM infrastructure as proper LSMs. This is
   something I've wanted to see happen for quite some time and Roberto
   was kind enough to put in the work to make it happen.

 - Use the LSM hook default values to simplify the call_int_hook() macro

   Previously the call_int_hook() macro required callers to supply a
   default return value, despite a default value being specified when
   the LSM hook was defined.

   This simplifies the macro by using the defined default return value
   which makes life easier for callers and should also reduce the number
   of return value bugs in the future (we've had a few pop up recently,
   hence this work).

 - Use the KMEM_CACHE() macro instead of kmem_cache_create()

   The guidance appears to be to use the KMEM_CACHE() macro when
   possible and there is no reason why we can't use the macro, so let's
   use it.

 - Fix a number of comment typos in the LSM hook comment blocks

   Not much to say here, we fixed some questionable grammar decisions in
   the LSM hook comment blocks.

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (28 commits)
  cred: Use KMEM_CACHE() instead of kmem_cache_create()
  lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook()
  lsm: fix typos in security/security.c comment headers
  integrity: Remove LSM
  ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM
  evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM
  evm: Move to LSM infrastructure
  ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure
  ima: Move to LSM infrastructure
  integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA
  security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook
  security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook
  security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook
  security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook
  security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook
  security: Introduce file_release hook
  security: Introduce file_post_open hook
  security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook
  security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook
  security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM
  ...

21 files changed, 1020 insertions, 832 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index d0ffe37dc1d6..92b63039c654 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -18,5 +18,6 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o
 integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
                                      platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \
                                      platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
+# The relative order of the 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs depends on the order below.
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima/
 obj-$(CONFIG_EVM)			+= evm/
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index 895f4b9ce8c6..de603cf42ac7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -132,26 +132,3 @@ out:
 	pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
 	return ret;
 }
-
-/**
- * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
- * @kmod_name: kernel module name
- *
- * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA
- * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to
- * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try
- * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name.
- * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
- * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup().
- *
- * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification
- * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies
- * also signed with digsig.
- */
-int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
-{
-	if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	return 0;
-}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index fba9ee359bc9..861b3bacab82 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ config EVM
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+	select SECURITY_PATH
 	default n
 	help
 	  EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 53bd7fec93fa..eb1a2c343bd7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -32,6 +32,25 @@ struct xattr_list {
 	bool enabled;
 };
 
+#define EVM_NEW_FILE			0x00000001
+#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG		0x00000002
+
+/* EVM integrity metadata associated with an inode */
+struct evm_iint_cache {
+	unsigned long flags;
+	enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
+};
+
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes evm_blob_sizes;
+
+static inline struct evm_iint_cache *evm_iint_inode(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return inode->i_security + evm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+}
+
 extern int evm_initialized;
 
 #define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID		0x0001
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index b1ffd4cc0b44..7552d49d0725 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -322,10 +322,10 @@ int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
 static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
 {
 	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
 	if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG))
 		return 1;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index cc7956d7878b..81dbade5b9b3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -178,14 +178,14 @@ static int is_unsupported_fs(struct dentry *dentry)
 static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 					     const char *xattr_name,
 					     char *xattr_value,
-					     size_t xattr_value_len,
-					     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+					     size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
 	struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
 	struct evm_digest digest;
-	struct inode *inode;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
 	int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0;
 
 	if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ||
@@ -254,8 +254,6 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 					(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
 					digest.digest, digest.hdr.length);
 		if (!rc) {
-			inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
-
 			if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
 				if (iint)
 					iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG;
@@ -403,7 +401,6 @@ int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
  * @xattr_name: requested xattr
  * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
  * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
- * @iint: inode integrity metadata
  *
  * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored
  * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length
@@ -416,8 +413,7 @@ int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
  */
 enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 				      const char *xattr_name,
-				      void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
-				      struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+				      void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
 	if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
 		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
@@ -425,13 +421,8 @@ enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry))
 		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 
-	if (!iint) {
-		iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
-		if (!iint)
-			return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	}
 	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
-				 xattr_value_len, iint);
+				 xattr_value_len);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr);
 
@@ -448,7 +439,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
 
 	if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
 		return INTEGRITY_PASS;
-	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
+	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -526,14 +517,14 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 
 	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
 	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
-		struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+		struct evm_iint_cache *iint;
 
 		/* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
 		if (evm_hmac_disabled())
 			return 0;
 
-		iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
-		if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
+		iint = evm_iint_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
+		if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_NEW_FILE))
 			return 0;
 
 		/* exception for pseudo filesystems */
@@ -581,6 +572,7 @@ out:
  * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
  * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
  * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
+ * @flags: flags to pass into filesystem operations
  *
  * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated,
  * verify the existing value is valid.  As only the kernel should have
@@ -588,9 +580,9 @@ out:
  * userspace from writing HMAC value.  Writing 'security.evm' requires
  * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
  */
-int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
-		       const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
-		       size_t xattr_value_len)
+static int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			      const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
+			      size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
 {
 	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
 
@@ -620,8 +612,8 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
  * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
  * the current value is valid.
  */
-int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			  struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+static int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				 const char *xattr_name)
 {
 	/* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
 	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
@@ -671,9 +663,11 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  * Prevent modifying posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
  * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
  * valid.
+ *
+ * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
  */
-int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
-		      const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
 	enum integrity_status evm_status;
 
@@ -712,11 +706,29 @@ int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
+/**
+ * evm_inode_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ *
+ * Prevent removing posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
+ * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
+ * valid.
+ *
+ * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
+ */
+static int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				const char *acl_name)
+{
+	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
+}
+
 static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint;
 
-	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
 	if (iint)
 		iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
@@ -752,6 +764,7 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
  * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
  * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
  * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
+ * @flags: flags to pass into filesystem operations
  *
  * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change.
  *
@@ -759,8 +772,11 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
  * __vfs_setxattr_noperm().  The caller of which has taken the inode's
  * i_mutex lock.
  */
-void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
-			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+static void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				    const char *xattr_name,
+				    const void *xattr_value,
+				    size_t xattr_value_len,
+				    int flags)
 {
 	if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
 		return;
@@ -780,6 +796,21 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 }
 
 /**
+ * evm_inode_post_set_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls
+ *
+ * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after setting
+ * posix acls.
+ */
+static void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+				   struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/**
  * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
  * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
@@ -789,7 +820,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
  * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
  * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex.
  */
-void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+static void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				       const char *xattr_name)
 {
 	if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
 		return;
@@ -805,6 +837,22 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 }
 
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_remove_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ *
+ * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after
+ * removing posix acls.
+ */
+static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+					     struct dentry *dentry,
+					     const char *acl_name)
+{
+	evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name);
+}
+
 static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 {
@@ -828,8 +876,8 @@ static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
  * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
  */
-int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
-		      struct iattr *attr)
+static int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     struct iattr *attr)
 {
 	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status;
@@ -870,6 +918,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 
 /**
  * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata
+ * @idmap: idmap of the idmapped mount
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
  * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status
  *
@@ -879,7 +928,8 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
  * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
  * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
  */
-void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
+static void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				   struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
 {
 	if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL))
 		return;
@@ -896,7 +946,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
 		evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
 }
 
-int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+static int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
 {
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0)
 		return 1; /* Discard */
@@ -960,6 +1010,42 @@ out:
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security);
 
+static int evm_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+
+	/* Called by security_inode_alloc(), it cannot be NULL. */
+	iint->flags = 0UL;
+	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void evm_file_release(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+
+	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
+		return;
+
+	if (iint && atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1)
+		iint->flags &= ~EVM_NEW_FILE;
+}
+
+static void evm_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+
+	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return;
+
+	if (iint)
+		iint->flags |= EVM_NEW_FILE;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509
 void __init evm_load_x509(void)
 {
@@ -999,4 +1085,45 @@ error:
 	return error;
 }
 
+static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, evm_inode_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, evm_inode_post_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, evm_inode_copy_up_xattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, evm_inode_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, evm_inode_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_set_acl, evm_inode_post_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, evm_inode_remove_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_remove_acl, evm_inode_post_remove_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, evm_inode_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, evm_inode_init_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, evm_inode_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, evm_file_release),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, evm_post_path_mknod),
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id evm_lsmid = {
+	.name = "evm",
+	.id = LSM_ID_EVM,
+};
+
+static int __init init_evm_lsm(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(evm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(evm_hooks), &evm_lsmid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes evm_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct evm_iint_cache),
+	.lbs_xattr_count = 1,
+};
+
+DEFINE_LSM(evm) = {
+	.name = "evm",
+	.init = init_evm_lsm,
+	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
+	.blobs = &evm_blob_sizes,
+};
+
 late_initcall(init_evm);
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index d4419a2a1e24..068ac6c2ae1e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -6,208 +6,15 @@
  * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
  *
  * File: integrity_iint.c
- *	- implements the integrity hooks: integrity_inode_alloc,
- *	  integrity_inode_free
- *	- cache integrity information associated with an inode
- *	  using a rbtree tree.
+ *	- initialize the integrity directory in securityfs
+ *	- load IMA and EVM keys
  */
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/spinlock.h>
-#include <linux/rbtree.h>
-#include <linux/file.h>
-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include "integrity.h"
 
-static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
-static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
-static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __ro_after_init;
-
 struct dentry *integrity_dir;
 
 /*
- * __integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode
- */
-static struct integrity_iint_cache *__integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
-	struct rb_node *n = integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;
-
-	while (n) {
-		iint = rb_entry(n, struct integrity_iint_cache, rb_node);
-
-		if (inode < iint->inode)
-			n = n->rb_left;
-		else if (inode > iint->inode)
-			n = n->rb_right;
-		else
-			return iint;
-	}
-
-	return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode
- */
-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
-
-	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
-		return NULL;
-
-	read_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-	iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
-	read_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-
-	return iint;
-}
-
-#define IMA_MAX_NESTING (FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH+1)
-
-/*
- * It is not clear that IMA should be nested at all, but as long is it measures
- * files both on overlayfs and on underlying fs, we need to annotate the iint
- * mutex to avoid lockdep false positives related to IMA + overlayfs.
- * See ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() for more details.
- */
-static inline void iint_lockdep_annotate(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-					 struct inode *inode)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
-	static struct lock_class_key iint_mutex_key[IMA_MAX_NESTING];
-
-	int depth = inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth;
-
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0 || depth >= IMA_MAX_NESTING))
-		depth = 0;
-
-	lockdep_set_class(&iint->mutex, &iint_mutex_key[depth]);
-#endif
-}
-
-static void iint_init_always(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			     struct inode *inode)
-{
-	iint->ima_hash = NULL;
-	iint->version = 0;
-	iint->flags = 0UL;
-	iint->atomic_flags = 0UL;
-	iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->ima_creds_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
-	mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
-	iint_lockdep_annotate(iint, inode);
-}
-
-static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
-{
-	kfree(iint->ima_hash);
-	mutex_destroy(&iint->mutex);
-	kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
-}
-
-/**
- * integrity_inode_get - find or allocate an iint associated with an inode
- * @inode: pointer to the inode
- * @return: allocated iint
- *
- * Caller must lock i_mutex
- */
-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	struct rb_node **p;
-	struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL;
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, *test_iint;
-
-	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
-	if (iint)
-		return iint;
-
-	iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
-	if (!iint)
-		return NULL;
-
-	iint_init_always(iint, inode);
-
-	write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-
-	p = &integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;
-	while (*p) {
-		parent = *p;
-		test_iint = rb_entry(parent, struct integrity_iint_cache,
-				     rb_node);
-		if (inode < test_iint->inode) {
-			p = &(*p)->rb_left;
-		} else if (inode > test_iint->inode) {
-			p = &(*p)->rb_right;
-		} else {
-			write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-			kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
-			return test_iint;
-		}
-	}
-
-	iint->inode = inode;
-	node = &iint->rb_node;
-	inode->i_flags |= S_IMA;
-	rb_link_node(node, parent, p);
-	rb_insert_color(node, &integrity_iint_tree);
-
-	write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-	return iint;
-}
-
-/**
- * integrity_inode_free - called on security_inode_free
- * @inode: pointer to the inode
- *
- * Free the integrity information(iint) associated with an inode.
- */
-void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
-
-	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
-		return;
-
-	write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-	iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
-	rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &integrity_iint_tree);
-	write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-
-	iint_free(iint);
-}
-
-static void iint_init_once(void *foo)
-{
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = (struct integrity_iint_cache *) foo;
-
-	memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
-}
-
-static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
-{
-	iint_cache =
-	    kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache),
-			      0, SLAB_PANIC, iint_init_once);
-	return 0;
-}
-DEFINE_LSM(integrity) = {
-	.name = "integrity",
-	.init = integrity_iintcache_init,
-	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
-};
-
-
-/*
  * integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file
  *
  * This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read().
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index b98bfe9efd0c..475c32615006 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ config IMA
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+	select SECURITY_PATH
 	select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM
 	select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
 	select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 2499f2485c04..b376d38b4ee6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 # Measurement Architecture(IMA).
 #
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima_iint.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
 	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index c29db699c996..11d7c0332207 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ extern const char boot_aggregate_name[];
 
 /* IMA event related data */
 struct ima_event_data {
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 	struct file *file;
 	const unsigned char *filename;
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value;
@@ -119,6 +119,107 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {
 	u64 count;
 };
 
+/* IMA iint action cache flags */
+#define IMA_MEASURE		0x00000001
+#define IMA_MEASURED		0x00000002
+#define IMA_APPRAISE		0x00000004
+#define IMA_APPRAISED		0x00000008
+/*#define IMA_COLLECT		0x00000010  do not use this flag */
+#define IMA_COLLECTED		0x00000020
+#define IMA_AUDIT		0x00000040
+#define IMA_AUDITED		0x00000080
+#define IMA_HASH		0x00000100
+#define IMA_HASHED		0x00000200
+
+/* IMA iint policy rule cache flags */
+#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS	0xff000000
+#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED	0x01000000
+#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO	0x02000000
+#define IMA_NEW_FILE		0x04000000
+#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS	0x10000000
+#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED	0x20000000
+#define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST	0x40000000
+#define IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED	0x80000000
+
+#define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
+				 IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+#define IMA_DONE_MASK		(IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \
+				 IMA_HASHED | IMA_COLLECTED | \
+				 IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK)
+
+/* IMA iint subaction appraise cache flags */
+#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE	0x00001000
+#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED	0x00002000
+#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE	0x00004000
+#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED	0x00008000
+#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE	0x00010000
+#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED	0x00020000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE	0x00040000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED	0x00080000
+#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE	0x00100000
+#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED	0x00200000
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
+				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE | \
+				 IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE)
+#define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
+				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED | \
+				 IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED)
+
+/* IMA iint cache atomic_flags */
+#define IMA_CHANGE_XATTR	0
+#define IMA_UPDATE_XATTR	1
+#define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR		2
+#define IMA_DIGSIG		3
+#define IMA_MUST_MEASURE	4
+
+/* IMA integrity metadata associated with an inode */
+struct ima_iint_cache {
+	struct mutex mutex;	/* protects: version, flags, digest */
+	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
+	unsigned long flags;
+	unsigned long measured_pcrs;
+	unsigned long atomic_flags;
+	unsigned long real_ino;
+	dev_t real_dev;
+	enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_creds_status:4;
+	struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
+};
+
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes ima_blob_sizes;
+
+static inline struct ima_iint_cache *
+ima_inode_get_iint(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache **iint_sec;
+
+	if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+		return NULL;
+
+	iint_sec = inode->i_security + ima_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+	return *iint_sec;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_inode_set_iint(const struct inode *inode,
+				      struct ima_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache **iint_sec;
+
+	if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+		return;
+
+	iint_sec = inode->i_security + ima_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+	*iint_sec = iint;
+}
+
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
+void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
+void __init ima_iintcache_init(void);
+
 extern const int read_idmap[];
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
@@ -127,6 +228,12 @@ void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void);
 static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {}
 #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+				   const void *payload, size_t plen,
+				   unsigned long flags, bool create);
+#endif
+
 /*
  * The default binary_runtime_measurements list format is defined as the
  * platform native format.  The canonical format is defined as little-endian.
@@ -146,8 +253,8 @@ int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
 			      struct ima_template_entry *entry);
 int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-		       struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-		       const char *op, const char *cause);
+		       struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const char *op,
+		       const char *cause);
 int ima_init_crypto(void);
 void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
 void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size);
@@ -261,10 +368,10 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		   const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
-int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
-			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig);
-void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			    void *buf, loff_t size, enum hash_algo algo,
+			    struct modsig *modsig);
+void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			   int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
@@ -274,7 +381,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			       const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
 			       int pcr, const char *func_data,
 			       bool buf_hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len);
-void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+void ima_audit_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			    struct ima_template_entry **entry,
@@ -312,32 +419,32 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC	0x40
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
-int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 			const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr);
-int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
-			     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			     int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig);
 int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 		      int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
-void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
-enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
+enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 					   enum ima_hooks func);
 enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 				 int xattr_len);
 int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 		   struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, int xattr_len);
+void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid);
 
 #else
-static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 				      const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
-					   struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+					   struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 					   struct file *file,
 					   const unsigned char *filename,
 					   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
@@ -354,14 +461,13 @@ static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 				    struct file *file)
 {
 }
 
-static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache
-							 *iint,
-							 enum ima_hooks func)
+static inline enum integrity_status
+ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
@@ -379,6 +485,10 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid)
+{
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 597ea0c4d72f..b37d043d5748 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
  * value is invalidated.
  */
 void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-		       struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-		       const char *op, const char *cause)
+		       struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const char *op,
+		       const char *cause)
 {
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -201,7 +201,8 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 				allowed_algos);
 }
 
-static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+				  struct inode *inode,
 				  struct ima_max_digest_data *hash)
 {
 	enum hash_algo alg;
@@ -211,7 +212,7 @@ static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	 * On failure, 'measure' policy rules will result in a file data
 	 * hash containing 0's.
 	 */
-	digest_len = fsverity_get_digest(iint->inode, hash->digest, NULL, &alg);
+	digest_len = fsverity_get_digest(inode, hash->digest, NULL, &alg);
 	if (digest_len == 0)
 		return false;
 
@@ -237,9 +238,9 @@ static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  *
  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
  */
-int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
-			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig)
+int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			    void *buf, loff_t size, enum hash_algo algo,
+			    struct modsig *modsig)
 {
 	const char *audit_cause = "failed";
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -280,7 +281,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest));
 
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) {
-		if (!ima_get_verity_digest(iint, &hash)) {
+		if (!ima_get_verity_digest(iint, inode, &hash)) {
 			audit_cause = "no-verity-digest";
 			result = -ENODATA;
 		}
@@ -338,8 +339,8 @@ out:
  *
  * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
  */
-void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			   struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			   const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			   int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
 			   struct ima_template_desc *template_desc)
@@ -382,7 +383,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
 }
 
-void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+void ima_audit_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 870dde67707b..3497741caea9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -84,8 +84,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 				NULL, NULL, NULL);
 }
 
-static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-			 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct ima_iint_cache *iint)
 {
 	int rc, offset;
 	u8 algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
@@ -106,7 +105,7 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 }
 
 /* Return specific func appraised cached result */
-enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 					   enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	switch (func) {
@@ -126,7 +125,7 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	}
 }
 
-static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static void ima_set_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 				 enum ima_hooks func,
 				 enum integrity_status status)
 {
@@ -152,8 +151,7 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	}
 }
 
-static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			     enum ima_hooks func)
+static void ima_cache_flags(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	switch (func) {
 	case MMAP_CHECK:
@@ -276,7 +274,7 @@ static int calc_file_id_hash(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type,
  *
  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
  */
-static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 			struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 			enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause)
 {
@@ -443,7 +441,7 @@ static int modsig_verify(enum ima_hooks func, const struct modsig *modsig,
  *
  * Returns -EPERM if the hash is blacklisted.
  */
-int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 			const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr)
 {
 	enum hash_algo hash_algo;
@@ -477,8 +475,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  *
  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
  */
-int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
-			     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			     int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig)
@@ -520,7 +517,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 	}
 
 	status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value,
-				 rc < 0 ? 0 : rc, iint);
+				 rc < 0 ? 0 : rc);
 	switch (status) {
 	case INTEGRITY_PASS:
 	case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE:
@@ -603,7 +600,7 @@ out:
 /*
  * ima_update_xattr - update 'security.ima' hash value
  */
-void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
+void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -629,17 +626,18 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
  * ima_inode_post_setattr - reflect file metadata changes
  * @idmap:  idmap of the mount the inode was found from
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status
  *
  * Changes to a dentry's metadata might result in needing to appraise.
  *
  * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
  * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
  */
-void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			    struct dentry *dentry)
+static void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				   struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 	int action;
 
 	if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
@@ -647,7 +645,7 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 		return;
 
 	action = ima_must_appraise(idmap, inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
-	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
 	if (iint) {
 		set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
 		if (!action)
@@ -673,12 +671,12 @@ static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 
 static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig)
 {
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 
 	if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return;
 
-	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
 	if (!iint)
 		return;
 	iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
@@ -749,8 +747,9 @@ static int validate_hash_algo(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
-int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
-		       const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+static int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			      const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
+			      size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
 {
 	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value;
 	int digsig = 0;
@@ -779,8 +778,8 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 	return result;
 }
 
-int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
-		      const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+static int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
 	if (evm_revalidate_status(acl_name))
 		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0);
@@ -788,7 +787,8 @@ int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+static int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				 const char *xattr_name)
 {
 	int result;
 
@@ -800,3 +800,23 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	}
 	return result;
 }
+
+static int ima_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				const char *acl_name)
+{
+	return ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list ima_appraise_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, ima_inode_post_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, ima_inode_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, ima_inode_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, ima_inode_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, ima_inode_remove_acl),
+};
+
+void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(ima_appraise_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_appraise_hooks),
+			   lsmid);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e7c9c216c1c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: ima_iint.c
+ *	- implements the IMA hook: ima_inode_free
+ *	- cache integrity information in the inode security blob
+ */
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static struct kmem_cache *ima_iint_cache __ro_after_init;
+
+/**
+ * ima_iint_find - Return the iint associated with an inode
+ * @inode: Pointer to the inode
+ *
+ * Return the IMA integrity information (iint) associated with an inode, if the
+ * inode was processed by IMA.
+ *
+ * Return: Found iint or NULL.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return ima_inode_get_iint(inode);
+}
+
+#define IMA_MAX_NESTING (FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH + 1)
+
+/*
+ * It is not clear that IMA should be nested at all, but as long is it measures
+ * files both on overlayfs and on underlying fs, we need to annotate the iint
+ * mutex to avoid lockdep false positives related to IMA + overlayfs.
+ * See ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() for more details.
+ */
+static inline void ima_iint_lockdep_annotate(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+					     struct inode *inode)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
+	static struct lock_class_key ima_iint_mutex_key[IMA_MAX_NESTING];
+
+	int depth = inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0 || depth >= IMA_MAX_NESTING))
+		depth = 0;
+
+	lockdep_set_class(&iint->mutex, &ima_iint_mutex_key[depth]);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void ima_iint_init_always(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+				 struct inode *inode)
+{
+	iint->ima_hash = NULL;
+	iint->version = 0;
+	iint->flags = 0UL;
+	iint->atomic_flags = 0UL;
+	iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_creds_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+	mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
+	ima_iint_lockdep_annotate(iint, inode);
+}
+
+static void ima_iint_free(struct ima_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	kfree(iint->ima_hash);
+	mutex_destroy(&iint->mutex);
+	kmem_cache_free(ima_iint_cache, iint);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_inode_get - Find or allocate an iint associated with an inode
+ * @inode: Pointer to the inode
+ *
+ * Find an iint associated with an inode, and allocate a new one if not found.
+ * Caller must lock i_mutex.
+ *
+ * Return: An iint on success, NULL on error.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+	if (iint)
+		return iint;
+
+	iint = kmem_cache_alloc(ima_iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!iint)
+		return NULL;
+
+	ima_iint_init_always(iint, inode);
+
+	inode->i_flags |= S_IMA;
+	ima_inode_set_iint(inode, iint);
+
+	return iint;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_inode_free - Called on inode free
+ * @inode: Pointer to the inode
+ *
+ * Free the iint associated with an inode.
+ */
+void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
+		return;
+
+	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+	ima_inode_set_iint(inode, NULL);
+
+	ima_iint_free(iint);
+}
+
+static void ima_iint_init_once(void *foo)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = (struct ima_iint_cache *)foo;
+
+	memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
+}
+
+void __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
+{
+	ima_iint_cache =
+	    kmem_cache_create("ima_iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache),
+			      0, SLAB_PANIC, ima_iint_init_once);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 63979aefc95f..393f5c7912d5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 	static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate";
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
-	struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
 	struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
 					     .filename = boot_aggregate_name };
 	struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index cc1217ac2c6f..c84e8c55333d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file,
  *
  */
 static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
-				     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+				     struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 				     int must_measure,
 				     char **pathbuf,
 				     const char **pathname,
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
 	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
 		if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
 			if (!iint)
-				iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+				iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
 			/* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */
 			if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE,
 						&iint->atomic_flags))
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
 				  "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
 }
 
-static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 				  struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
@@ -189,15 +189,15 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  *
  * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
  */
-void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
+static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 
 	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return;
 
-	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
 	if (!iint)
 		return;
 
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 			       enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	struct inode *backing_inode, *inode = file_inode(file);
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL;
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	char filename[NAME_MAX];
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	inode_lock(inode);
 
 	if (action) {
-		iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+		iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
 		if (!iint)
 			rc = -ENOMEM;
 	}
@@ -427,8 +427,8 @@ out:
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-		  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
 	u32 secid;
 	int ret;
@@ -455,7 +455,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 /**
  * ima_file_mprotect - based on policy, limit mprotect change
  * @vma: vm_area_struct protection is set to
- * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @reqprot: protection requested by the application
+ * @prot: protection that will be applied by the kernel
  *
  * Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent
  * IMA's mmap appraisal policy rules.  Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore
@@ -465,7 +466,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
  *
  * On mprotect change success, return 0.  On failure, return -EACESS.
  */
-int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
+static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+			     unsigned long prot)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
 	struct file *file;
@@ -523,7 +525,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	int ret;
 	u32 secid;
@@ -549,7 +551,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	u32 secid;
 
@@ -558,16 +560,15 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
 					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
 
 static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
 			    size_t buf_size)
 {
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL, tmp_iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL, tmp_iint;
 	int rc, hash_algo;
 
 	if (ima_policy_flag) {
-		iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+		iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
 		if (iint)
 			mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
 	}
@@ -577,7 +578,6 @@ static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
 			mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
 
 		memset(&tmp_iint, 0, sizeof(tmp_iint));
-		tmp_iint.inode = inode;
 		mutex_init(&tmp_iint.mutex);
 
 		rc = ima_collect_measurement(&tmp_iint, file, NULL, 0,
@@ -683,10 +683,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash);
  * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created
  * tmpfiles are in policy.
  */
-void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			     struct inode *inode)
+static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				    struct inode *inode)
+
 {
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 	int must_appraise;
 
 	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
@@ -698,7 +699,7 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 		return;
 
 	/* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
-	iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+	iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
 	if (!iint)
 		return;
 
@@ -715,10 +716,9 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the
  * file data can be written later.
  */
-void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			 struct dentry *dentry)
+static void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	int must_appraise;
 
@@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 		return;
 
 	/* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
-	iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+	iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
 	if (!iint)
 		return;
 
@@ -751,8 +751,8 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  *
  * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
-		  bool contents)
+static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+			 bool contents)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
 	u32 secid;
@@ -801,8 +801,8 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
-		       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
 	u32 secid;
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
  *
  * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
 	bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
 
@@ -889,9 +889,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
-		       enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
-		       char *description)
+static int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
+			      char *description)
 {
 	if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
 		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	int ret = 0;
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
-	struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {};
+	struct ima_iint_cache iint = {};
 	struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
 					    .filename = eventname,
 					    .buf = buf,
@@ -1089,6 +1089,39 @@ int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+
+/**
+ * ima_kernel_module_request - Prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
+ * @kmod_name: kernel module name
+ *
+ * Avoid a verification loop where verifying the signature of the modprobe
+ * binary requires executing modprobe itself. Since the modprobe iint->mutex
+ * is already held when the signature verification is performed, a deadlock
+ * occurs as soon as modprobe is executed within the critical region, since
+ * the same lock cannot be taken again.
+ *
+ * This happens when public_key_verify_signature(), in case of RSA algorithm,
+ * use alg_name to store internal information in order to construct an
+ * algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use alg_name
+ * in order to load a kernel module with same name.
+ *
+ * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
+ * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(), and
+ * avoid the verification loop.
+ *
+ * Return: Zero if it is safe to load the kernel module, -EINVAL otherwise.
+ */
+static int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+	if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
+
 static int __init init_ima(void)
 {
 	int error;
@@ -1120,4 +1153,49 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
 	return error;
 }
 
+static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_post_open, ima_file_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_create_tmpfile, ima_post_create_tmpfile),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, ima_file_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ima_file_mmap),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ima_file_mprotect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ima_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_load_data, ima_post_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ima_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_read_file, ima_post_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, ima_post_path_mknod),
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_post_create_or_update, ima_post_key_create_or_update),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, ima_kernel_module_request),
+#endif
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, ima_inode_free),
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = {
+	.name = "ima",
+	.id = LSM_ID_IMA,
+};
+
+static int __init init_ima_lsm(void)
+{
+	ima_iintcache_init();
+	security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid);
+	init_ima_appraise_lsm(&ima_lsmid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes ima_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache *),
+};
+
+DEFINE_LSM(ima) = {
+	.name = "ima",
+	.init = init_ima_lsm,
+	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
+	.blobs = &ima_blob_sizes,
+};
+
 late_initcall(init_ima);	/* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index f69062617754..c0556907c2e6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
 #define DONT_HASH	0x0200
 
 #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
-	(a) >= (sizeof_field(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
+	(a) >= (sizeof_field(struct ima_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
 
 int ima_policy_flag;
 static int temp_ima_appraise;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 9561db7cf6b4..50d6f798e613 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -18,60 +18,7 @@
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <linux/key.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
-
-/* iint action cache flags */
-#define IMA_MEASURE		0x00000001
-#define IMA_MEASURED		0x00000002
-#define IMA_APPRAISE		0x00000004
-#define IMA_APPRAISED		0x00000008
-/*#define IMA_COLLECT		0x00000010  do not use this flag */
-#define IMA_COLLECTED		0x00000020
-#define IMA_AUDIT		0x00000040
-#define IMA_AUDITED		0x00000080
-#define IMA_HASH		0x00000100
-#define IMA_HASHED		0x00000200
-
-/* iint policy rule cache flags */
-#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS	0xff000000
-#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED	0x01000000
-#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO	0x02000000
-#define IMA_NEW_FILE		0x04000000
-#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG	0x08000000
-#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS	0x10000000
-#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED	0x20000000
-#define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST	0x40000000
-#define IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED	0x80000000
-
-#define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
-				 IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
-#define IMA_DONE_MASK		(IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \
-				 IMA_HASHED | IMA_COLLECTED | \
-				 IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK)
-
-/* iint subaction appraise cache flags */
-#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE	0x00001000
-#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED	0x00002000
-#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE	0x00004000
-#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED	0x00008000
-#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE	0x00010000
-#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED	0x00020000
-#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE	0x00040000
-#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED	0x00080000
-#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE	0x00100000
-#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED	0x00200000
-#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
-				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE | \
-				 IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE)
-#define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
-				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED | \
-				 IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED)
-
-/* iint cache atomic_flags */
-#define IMA_CHANGE_XATTR	0
-#define IMA_UPDATE_XATTR	1
-#define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR		2
-#define IMA_DIGSIG		3
-#define IMA_MUST_MEASURE	4
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 
 enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
 	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
@@ -155,31 +102,6 @@ struct ima_file_id {
 	__u8 hash[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
 } __packed;
 
-/* integrity data associated with an inode */
-struct integrity_iint_cache {
-	struct rb_node rb_node;	/* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
-	struct mutex mutex;	/* protects: version, flags, digest */
-	struct inode *inode;	/* back pointer to inode in question */
-	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
-	unsigned long flags;
-	unsigned long measured_pcrs;
-	unsigned long atomic_flags;
-	unsigned long real_ino;
-	dev_t real_dev;
-	enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
-	enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
-	enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
-	enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4;
-	enum integrity_status ima_creds_status:4;
-	enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
-	struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
-};
-
-/* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
- * integrity data associated with an inode.
- */
-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
-
 int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
 			  void *addr, unsigned long count);
 
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 5b10641debd5..560790038329 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -930,8 +929,8 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 		goto error_link_end;
 	}
 
-	ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
-				      flags, true);
+	security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags,
+					   true);
 
 	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
 
@@ -964,9 +963,8 @@ error:
 	key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
 
 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
-		ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key,
-					      payload, plen,
-					      flags, false);
+		security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
+						   flags, false);
 
 	goto error_free_prep;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index aef69632d0a9..a07f43c58d65 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -19,15 +19,13 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
-#include <linux/integrity.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
-#include <linux/evm.h>
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/msg.h>
 #include <linux/overflow.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
@@ -51,7 +49,9 @@
 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \
 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
-	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0))
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0) + \
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0))
 
 /*
  * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
@@ -856,14 +856,14 @@ out:
 			P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);		\
 	} while (0)
 
-#define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({			\
-	int RC = IRC;						\
+#define call_int_hook(FUNC, ...) ({				\
+	int RC = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(FUNC);				\
 	do {							\
 		struct security_hook_list *P;			\
 								\
 		hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
 			RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);		\
-			if (RC != 0)				\
+			if (RC != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(FUNC))	\
 				break;				\
 		}						\
 	} while (0);						\
@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ out:
  */
 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
+	return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, mgr);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
 int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
 				const struct cred *to)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
+	return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, from, to);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
 int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
 				    const struct cred *to)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to);
+	return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, from, to);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
 int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
 				  const struct cred *to, const struct file *file)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file);
+	return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, from, to, file);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
  */
 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, child, mode);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
  */
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent);
+	return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, parent);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -984,8 +984,7 @@ int security_capget(const struct task_struct *target,
 		    kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
 		    kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target,
-			     effective, inheritable, permitted);
+	return call_int_hook(capget, target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1006,8 +1005,8 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 		    const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
 		    const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old,
-			     effective, inheritable, permitted);
+	return call_int_hook(capset, new, old, effective, inheritable,
+			     permitted);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1028,7 +1027,7 @@ int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
 		     int cap,
 		     unsigned int opts)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts);
+	return call_int_hook(capable, cred, ns, cap, opts);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1044,7 +1043,7 @@ int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
  */
 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, const struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb);
+	return call_int_hook(quotactl, cmds, type, id, sb);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1057,7 +1056,7 @@ int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, const struct super_block *sb)
  */
 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(quota_on, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1072,7 +1071,7 @@ int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
  */
 int security_syslog(int type)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type);
+	return call_int_hook(syslog, type);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1087,7 +1086,7 @@ int security_syslog(int type)
  */
 int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz);
+	return call_int_hook(settime, ts, tz);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1142,7 +1141,7 @@ int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
  */
 int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm);
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, bprm);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1166,7 +1165,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  */
 int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file);
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, bprm, file);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1183,12 +1182,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *
  */
 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, bprm);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1235,7 +1229,7 @@ void security_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  */
 int security_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *reference)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(fs_context_submount, 0, fc, reference);
+	return call_int_hook(fs_context_submount, fc, reference);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1251,7 +1245,7 @@ int security_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *refe
  */
 int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc);
+	return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, fc, src_fc);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1300,7 +1294,7 @@ int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
 
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
+	rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, sb);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_sb_free(sb);
 	return rc;
@@ -1358,7 +1352,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts);
  */
 int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, options, mnt_opts);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts);
 
@@ -1375,7 +1369,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts);
 int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb,
 				void *mnt_opts)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, 0, sb, mnt_opts);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, sb, mnt_opts);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat);
 
@@ -1392,7 +1386,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat);
 int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb,
 			void *mnt_opts)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, mnt_opts);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_remount, sb, mnt_opts);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount);
 
@@ -1406,7 +1400,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount);
  */
 int security_sb_kern_mount(const struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, sb);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1420,7 +1414,7 @@ int security_sb_kern_mount(const struct super_block *sb)
  */
 int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, m, sb);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1434,7 +1428,7 @@ int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
  */
 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1457,7 +1451,7 @@ int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
 		      const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_mount, dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1471,7 +1465,7 @@ int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
  */
 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_umount, mnt, flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1486,7 +1480,7 @@ int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
 			  const struct path *new_path)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, old_path, new_path);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1505,9 +1499,17 @@ int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 			     unsigned long kern_flags,
 			     unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts,
-			     mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb,
-			     mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	int rc = mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : LSM_RET_DEFAULT(sb_set_mnt_opts);
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.sb_set_mnt_opts,
+			     list) {
+		rc = hp->hook.sb_set_mnt_opts(sb, mnt_opts, kern_flags,
+					      set_kern_flags);
+		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(sb_set_mnt_opts))
+			break;
+	}
+	return rc;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
 
@@ -1527,7 +1529,7 @@ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 			       unsigned long kern_flags,
 			       unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb,
+	return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, oldsb, newsb,
 			     kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
@@ -1544,7 +1546,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
 int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
 			const struct path *to_path)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path);
+	return call_int_hook(move_mount, from_path, to_path);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1561,7 +1563,7 @@ int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
 int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
 			 unsigned int obj_type)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type);
+	return call_int_hook(path_notify, path, mask, obj_type);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1580,7 +1582,7 @@ int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
 
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
+	rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, inode);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_inode_free(inode);
 	return rc;
@@ -1602,7 +1604,6 @@ static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
  */
 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	integrity_inode_free(inode);
 	call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
 	/*
 	 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
@@ -1638,20 +1639,8 @@ int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 				  const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
 				  u32 *ctxlen)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
-
-	/*
-	 * Only one module will provide a security context.
-	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security,
-			     list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name,
-						   xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security))
-			return rc;
-	}
-	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security);
+	return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, dentry, mode, name,
+			     xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
 
@@ -1674,7 +1663,7 @@ int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 				    struct qstr *name,
 				    const struct cred *old, struct cred *new)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode,
+	return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, dentry, mode,
 			     name, old, new);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as);
@@ -1721,8 +1710,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 		return 0;
 
 	if (initxattrs) {
-		/* Allocate +1 for EVM and +1 as terminator. */
-		new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 2,
+		/* Allocate +1 as terminator. */
+		new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 1,
 				     sizeof(*new_xattrs), GFP_NOFS);
 		if (!new_xattrs)
 			return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1746,10 +1735,6 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	if (!xattr_count)
 		goto out;
 
-	ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs,
-				      &xattr_count);
-	if (ret)
-		goto out;
 	ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
 out:
 	for (; xattr_count > 0; xattr_count--)
@@ -1775,7 +1760,7 @@ int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
 				      const struct qstr *name,
 				      const struct inode *context_inode)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, name,
+	return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, inode, name,
 			     context_inode);
 }
 
@@ -1797,11 +1782,25 @@ int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+	return call_int_hook(path_mknod, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
 
 /**
+ * security_path_post_mknod() - Update inode security field after file creation
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: new file
+ *
+ * Update inode security field after a file has been created.
+ */
+void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(path_post_mknod, idmap, dentry);
+}
+
+/**
  * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed
  * @dir: parent directory
  * @dentry: new directory
@@ -1816,7 +1815,7 @@ int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, dir, dentry, mode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
 
@@ -1833,7 +1832,7 @@ int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, dir, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1849,7 +1848,7 @@ int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(path_unlink, dir, dentry);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
 
@@ -1868,7 +1867,7 @@ int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
+	return call_int_hook(path_symlink, dir, dentry, old_name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1886,7 +1885,7 @@ int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(path_link, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1910,7 +1909,7 @@ int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 		      IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
 		return 0;
 
-	return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
+	return call_int_hook(path_rename, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
 			     new_dentry, flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
@@ -1929,7 +1928,7 @@ int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path);
+	return call_int_hook(path_truncate, path);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1947,7 +1946,7 @@ int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(path_chmod, path, mode);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1964,7 +1963,7 @@ int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid);
+	return call_int_hook(path_chown, path, uid, gid);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1977,7 +1976,7 @@ int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
  */
 int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path);
+	return call_int_hook(path_chroot, path);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
 
@@ -1996,11 +1995,26 @@ int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_create, dir, dentry, mode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
 
 /**
+ * security_inode_post_create_tmpfile() - Update inode security of new tmpfile
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @inode: inode of the new tmpfile
+ *
+ * Update inode security data after a tmpfile has been created.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+					struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_create_tmpfile, idmap, inode);
+}
+
+/**
  * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed
  * @old_dentry: existing file
  * @dir: new parent directory
@@ -2015,7 +2029,7 @@ int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_link, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2031,7 +2045,7 @@ int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, dir, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2049,7 +2063,7 @@ int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, dir, dentry, old_name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2067,7 +2081,7 @@ int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, dir, dentry, mode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir);
 
@@ -2084,7 +2098,7 @@ int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, dir, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2106,7 +2120,7 @@ int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2131,13 +2145,13 @@ int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 		return 0;
 
 	if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
-		int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry,
+		int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, new_dir, new_dentry,
 					old_dir, old_dentry);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 	}
 
-	return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry,
+	return call_int_hook(inode_rename, old_dir, old_dentry,
 			     new_dir, new_dentry);
 }
 
@@ -2153,7 +2167,7 @@ int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2172,7 +2186,7 @@ int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, dentry, inode, rcu);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2193,7 +2207,7 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_permission, inode, mask);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2212,18 +2226,29 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 {
-	int ret;
-
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, idmap, dentry, attr);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
 
 /**
+ * security_inode_post_setattr() - Update the inode after a setattr operation
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @ia_valid: file attributes set
+ *
+ * Update inode security field after successful setting file attributes.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				 int ia_valid)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_setattr, idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
+}
+
+/**
  * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed
  * @path: file
  *
@@ -2235,7 +2260,7 @@ int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, path);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2263,17 +2288,12 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
 	 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
 	 */
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name, value,
-			    size, flags);
+	ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, idmap, dentry, name, value, size,
+			    flags);
 
 	if (ret == 1)
 		ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2292,18 +2312,26 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
 			   struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
-	int ret;
-
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name,
-			    kacl);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	ret = ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_set_acl() - Update inode security from posix acls set
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @acl_name: acl name
+ * @kacl: acl struct
+ *
+ * Update inode security data after successfully setting posix acls on @dentry.
+ * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+				 struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_set_acl, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2322,7 +2350,7 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2339,17 +2367,26 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			      struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
 {
-	int ret;
-
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	ret = ima_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_remove_acl() - Update inode security after rm posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @acl_name: acl name
+ *
+ * Update inode security data after successfully removing posix acls on
+ * @dentry in @idmap. The posix acls are identified by @acl_name.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				    struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_remove_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2368,7 +2405,6 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return;
 	call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
-	evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2385,7 +2421,7 @@ int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, dentry, name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2401,7 +2437,7 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2426,15 +2462,24 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
 	 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
 	 */
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name);
+	ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, idmap, dentry, name);
 	if (ret == 1)
 		ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_removexattr() - Update the inode after a removexattr op
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @name: xattr name
+ *
+ * Update the inode after a successful removexattr operation.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_removexattr, dentry, name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2450,7 +2495,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  */
 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2467,7 +2512,7 @@ int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			    struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, idmap, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, idmap, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2490,21 +2535,11 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			       struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 			       void **buffer, bool alloc)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
-
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity);
-	/*
-	 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
-	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name, buffer,
-						alloc);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity))
-			return rc;
-	}
-	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity);
+
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getsecurity, idmap, inode, name, buffer,
+			     alloc);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2525,21 +2560,11 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 			       const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
-
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity);
-	/*
-	 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
-	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size,
-						flags);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity))
-			return rc;
-	}
-	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity);
+
+	return call_int_hook(inode_setsecurity, inode, name, value, size,
+			     flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2560,7 +2585,7 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, inode, buffer, buffer_size);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
 
@@ -2591,7 +2616,7 @@ void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
  */
 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, src, new);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
 
@@ -2609,7 +2634,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
  */
 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
 	int rc;
 
 	/*
@@ -2617,14 +2641,11 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
 	 * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or
 	 * any other error code in case of an error.
 	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
-			     &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr))
-			return rc;
-	}
+	rc = call_int_hook(inode_copy_up_xattr, name);
+	if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr))
+		return rc;
 
-	return evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
+	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
 
@@ -2641,7 +2662,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
 int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
 				  struct kernfs_node *kn)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn);
+	return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, kn_dir, kn);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2665,7 +2686,7 @@ int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
  */
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask);
+	return call_int_hook(file_permission, file, mask);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2683,13 +2704,24 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
+	rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, file);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_file_free(file);
 	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
+ * security_file_release() - Perform actions before releasing the file ref
+ * @file: the file
+ *
+ * Perform actions before releasing the last reference to a file.
+ */
+void security_file_release(struct file *file)
+{
+	call_void_hook(file_release, file);
+}
+
+/**
  * security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob
  * @file: the file
  *
@@ -2723,7 +2755,7 @@ void security_file_free(struct file *file)
  */
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
+	return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, file, cmd, arg);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl);
 
@@ -2741,7 +2773,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl);
 int security_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			       unsigned long arg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_ioctl_compat, 0, file, cmd, arg);
+	return call_int_hook(file_ioctl_compat, file, cmd, arg);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl_compat);
 
@@ -2792,13 +2824,8 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 		       unsigned long flags)
 {
-	unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot);
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(mmap_file, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot),
+			     flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2811,7 +2838,7 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
  */
 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr);
+	return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, addr);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2827,12 +2854,7 @@ int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			   unsigned long prot)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot);
+	return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, vma, reqprot, prot);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2847,7 +2869,7 @@ int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
  */
 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);
+	return call_int_hook(file_lock, file, cmd);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2866,7 +2888,7 @@ int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
  */
 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
+	return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, file, cmd, arg);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2900,11 +2922,11 @@ void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
 int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				 struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig);
+	return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, tsk, fown, sig);
 }
 
 /**
- * security_file_receive() - Check is receiving a file via IPC is allowed
+ * security_file_receive() - Check if receiving a file via IPC is allowed
  * @file: file being received
  *
  * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process to
@@ -2914,7 +2936,7 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
  */
 int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file);
+	return call_int_hook(file_receive, file);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2930,7 +2952,7 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file);
+	ret = call_int_hook(file_open, file);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -2938,6 +2960,23 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
 }
 
 /**
+ * security_file_post_open() - Evaluate a file after it has been opened
+ * @file: the file
+ * @mask: access mask
+ *
+ * Evaluate an opened file and the access mask requested with open(). The hook
+ * is useful for LSMs that require the file content to be available in order to
+ * make decisions.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(file_post_open, file, mask);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_post_open);
+
+/**
  * security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed
  * @file: file
  *
@@ -2949,7 +2988,7 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
  */
 int security_file_truncate(struct file *file)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_truncate, 0, file);
+	return call_int_hook(file_truncate, file);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2967,7 +3006,7 @@ int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
 
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
+	rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, task, clone_flags);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_task_free(task);
 	return rc;
@@ -3005,7 +3044,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
+	rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, cred, gfp);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_cred_free(cred);
 	return rc;
@@ -3049,7 +3088,7 @@ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
+	rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, new, old, gfp);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_cred_free(new);
 	return rc;
@@ -3094,7 +3133,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
  */
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, new, secid);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3110,11 +3149,11 @@ int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
  */
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, new, inode);
 }
 
 /**
- * security_kernel_module_request() - Check is loading a module is allowed
+ * security_kernel_module_request() - Check if loading a module is allowed
  * @kmod_name: module name
  *
  * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
@@ -3124,12 +3163,7 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
  */
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, kmod_name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3145,12 +3179,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
 			      bool contents)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_read_file(file, id, contents);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, file, id, contents);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
 
@@ -3170,12 +3199,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, file, buf, size, id);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
 
@@ -3190,12 +3214,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
  */
 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_load_data(id, contents);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, id, contents);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
 
@@ -3217,13 +3236,7 @@ int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_load_data_id id,
 				   char *description)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
-			    description);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, buf, size, id, description);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
 
@@ -3244,7 +3257,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, new, old, flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3264,7 +3277,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, new, old, flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3281,7 +3294,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
  */
 int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, 0, new, old);
+	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, new, old);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3296,7 +3309,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
  */
 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid);
+	return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, p, pgid);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3310,7 +3323,7 @@ int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
  */
 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, p);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3323,7 +3336,7 @@ int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
  */
 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_getsid, p);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3366,7 +3379,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
  */
 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice);
+	return call_int_hook(task_setnice, p, nice);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3380,7 +3393,7 @@ int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
  */
 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio);
+	return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, p, ioprio);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3393,7 +3406,7 @@ int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
  */
 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, p);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3410,7 +3423,7 @@ int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
 int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
 			  unsigned int flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, cred, tcred, flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3428,7 +3441,7 @@ int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
 int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
 			    struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim);
+	return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, p, resource, new_rlim);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3442,7 +3455,7 @@ int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
  */
 int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, p);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3455,7 +3468,7 @@ int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
  */
 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, p);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3468,7 +3481,7 @@ int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
  */
 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_movememory, p);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3489,7 +3502,7 @@ int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
 		       int sig, const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred);
+	return call_int_hook(task_kill, p, info, sig, cred);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3547,7 +3560,7 @@ void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
  */
 int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(userns_create, 0, cred);
+	return call_int_hook(userns_create, cred);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3561,7 +3574,7 @@ int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred)
  */
 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
+	return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, ipcp, flag);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3593,7 +3606,7 @@ int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
 
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg);
+	rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, msg);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_msg_msg_free(msg);
 	return rc;
@@ -3627,7 +3640,7 @@ int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
 
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq);
+	rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, msq);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_msg_queue_free(msq);
 	return rc;
@@ -3659,7 +3672,7 @@ void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
  */
 int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg);
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, msq, msqflg);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3674,7 +3687,7 @@ int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
  */
 int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd);
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, msq, cmd);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3691,7 +3704,7 @@ int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
 int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq,
 			      struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg);
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, msq, msg, msqflg);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3712,7 +3725,7 @@ int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq,
 int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 			      struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, msq, msg, target, type, mode);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3730,7 +3743,7 @@ int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
 
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp);
+	rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, shp);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_shm_free(shp);
 	return rc;
@@ -3763,7 +3776,7 @@ void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
  */
 int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg);
+	return call_int_hook(shm_associate, shp, shmflg);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3778,7 +3791,7 @@ int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
  */
 int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd);
+	return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, shp, cmd);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3796,7 +3809,7 @@ int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
 int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
 		       char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
+	return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3814,7 +3827,7 @@ int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
 
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma);
+	rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, sma);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_sem_free(sma);
 	return rc;
@@ -3846,7 +3859,7 @@ void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
  */
 int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg);
+	return call_int_hook(sem_associate, sma, semflg);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3861,7 +3874,7 @@ int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
  */
 int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd);
+	return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, sma, cmd);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3879,7 +3892,7 @@ int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
 int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
 		       unsigned nsops, int alter)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter);
+	return call_int_hook(sem_semop, sma, sops, nsops, alter);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4110,11 +4123,11 @@ int security_setprocattr(int lsmid, const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
  */
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb);
+	return call_int_hook(netlink_send, sk, skb);
 }
 
 /**
- * security_ismaclabel() - Check is the named attribute is a MAC label
+ * security_ismaclabel() - Check if the named attribute is a MAC label
  * @name: full extended attribute name
  *
  * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name represents a MAC label.
@@ -4123,7 +4136,7 @@ int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
  */
 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name);
+	return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, name);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
 
@@ -4142,20 +4155,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
  */
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
-
-	/*
-	 * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this
-	 * LSM hook is not "stackable").
-	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
-			return rc;
-	}
-
-	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
+	return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, secid, secdata, seclen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
 
@@ -4172,7 +4172,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 {
 	*secid = 0;
-	return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+	return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, secdata, seclen, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
 
@@ -4219,7 +4219,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);
  */
 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
 
@@ -4241,7 +4241,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
  */
 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
 
@@ -4258,19 +4258,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
  */
 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
-
-	/*
-	 * Only one module will provide a security context.
-	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecctx))
-			return rc;
-	}
-
-	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecctx);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
 
@@ -4289,7 +4277,7 @@ int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
 			       const struct cred *cred,
 			       struct watch_notification *n)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(post_notification, 0, w_cred, cred, n);
+	return call_int_hook(post_notification, w_cred, cred, n);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */
 
@@ -4305,7 +4293,7 @@ int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
  */
 int security_watch_key(struct key *key)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key);
+	return call_int_hook(watch_key, key);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
 
@@ -4334,7 +4322,7 @@ int security_watch_key(struct key *key)
 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
 				 struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk);
+	return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, sock, other, newsk);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
 
@@ -4360,7 +4348,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
  */
 int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,  struct socket *other)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other);
+	return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, sock, other);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
 
@@ -4377,7 +4365,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
  */
 int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_create, family, type, protocol, kern);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4401,7 +4389,7 @@ int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
 int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 				int type, int protocol, int kern)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type,
+	return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, sock, family, type,
 			     protocol, kern);
 }
 
@@ -4417,7 +4405,7 @@ int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
  */
 int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, socka, sockb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair);
 
@@ -4436,7 +4424,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair);
 int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
 			 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_bind, sock, address, addrlen);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4453,7 +4441,7 @@ int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
 int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
 			    struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_connect, sock, address, addrlen);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4467,7 +4455,7 @@ int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
  */
 int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_listen, sock, backlog);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4483,11 +4471,11 @@ int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
  */
 int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_accept, sock, newsock);
 }
 
 /**
- * security_socket_sendmsg() - Check is sending a message is allowed
+ * security_socket_sendmsg() - Check if sending a message is allowed
  * @sock: sending socket
  * @msg: message to send
  * @size: size of message
@@ -4498,7 +4486,7 @@ int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
  */
 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, sock, msg, size);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4515,7 +4503,7 @@ int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 			    int size, int flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, sock, msg, size, flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4529,7 +4517,7 @@ int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
  */
 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, sock);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4542,7 +4530,7 @@ int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
  */
 int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, sock);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4558,7 +4546,7 @@ int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
  */
 int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, sock, level, optname);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4573,7 +4561,7 @@ int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
  */
 int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, sock, level, optname);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4588,7 +4576,7 @@ int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
  */
 int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, sock, how);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4605,7 +4593,7 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
  */
 int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, sk, skb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
 
@@ -4627,20 +4615,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval,
 				      sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
-
-	/*
-	 * Only one module will provide a security context.
-	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
-			     list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval, optlen,
-						       len);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(socket_getpeersec_stream))
-			return rc;
-	}
-	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(socket_getpeersec_stream);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, sock, optval, optlen,
+			     len);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4660,19 +4636,7 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval,
 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
 				     struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
-
-	/*
-	 * Only one module will provide a security context.
-	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
-			     list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(socket_getpeersec_dgram))
-			return rc;
-	}
-	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(socket_getpeersec_dgram);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, sock, skb, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
 
@@ -4689,7 +4653,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
  */
 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+	return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, sk, family, priority);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4770,7 +4734,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft);
 int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk,
 			       struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req);
+	return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, sk, skb, req);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request);
 
@@ -4811,7 +4775,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
  */
 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
+	return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
 
@@ -4848,7 +4812,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
  */
 int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security);
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security);
 
@@ -4873,7 +4837,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security);
  */
 int security_tun_dev_create(void)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0);
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
 
@@ -4887,7 +4851,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
  */
 int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security);
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue);
 
@@ -4903,7 +4867,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue);
  */
 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security);
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, sk, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
 
@@ -4918,7 +4882,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
  */
 int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security);
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
 
@@ -4934,7 +4898,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
 int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 				struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, asoc, skb);
+	return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, asoc, skb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request);
 
@@ -4955,8 +4919,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request);
 int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
 			       struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname,
-			     address, addrlen);
+	return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, sk, optname, address, addrlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect);
 
@@ -4990,7 +4953,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone);
 int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 				    struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, 0, asoc, skb);
+	return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, asoc, skb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established);
 
@@ -5008,7 +4971,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established);
  */
 int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(mptcp_add_subflow, 0, sk, ssk);
+	return call_int_hook(mptcp_add_subflow, sk, ssk);
 }
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
@@ -5026,7 +4989,7 @@ int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
  */
 int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey);
+	return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access);
 
@@ -5043,8 +5006,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access);
 int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec,
 				      const char *dev_name, u8 port_num)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec,
-			     dev_name, port_num);
+	return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, sec, dev_name, port_num);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet);
 
@@ -5058,7 +5020,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet);
  */
 int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec);
+	return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, sec);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security);
 
@@ -5091,7 +5053,7 @@ int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 			       struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
 			       gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
 
@@ -5108,7 +5070,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
 int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
 			       struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, old_ctx, new_ctxp);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5133,7 +5095,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free);
  */
 int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, ctx);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5150,7 +5112,7 @@ int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
 			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, x, sec_ctx);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
 
@@ -5169,7 +5131,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
 				      struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, x, polsec, secid);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5182,7 +5144,7 @@ int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
  */
 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, x);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete);
 
@@ -5211,7 +5173,7 @@ void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
  */
 int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, ctx, fl_secid);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5259,12 +5221,12 @@ int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
  */
 int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, skb, secid, 1);
 }
 
 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic)
 {
-	int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid,
+	int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, skb, &flic->flowic_secid,
 			       0);
 
 	BUG_ON(rc);
@@ -5287,7 +5249,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
 		       unsigned long flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(key_alloc, key, cred, flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5314,7 +5276,7 @@ void security_key_free(struct key *key)
 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
 			    enum key_need_perm need_perm)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm);
+	return call_int_hook(key_permission, key_ref, cred, need_perm);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5333,7 +5295,26 @@ int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer)
 {
 	*buffer = NULL;
-	return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, buffer);
+	return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, key, buffer);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_key_post_create_or_update() - Notification of key create or update
+ * @keyring: keyring to which the key is linked to
+ * @key: created or updated key
+ * @payload: data used to instantiate or update the key
+ * @payload_len: length of payload
+ * @flags: key flags
+ * @create: flag indicating whether the key was created or updated
+ *
+ * Notify the caller of a key creation or update.
+ */
+void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+					const void *payload, size_t payload_len,
+					unsigned long flags, bool create)
+{
+	call_void_hook(key_post_create_or_update, keyring, key, payload,
+		       payload_len, flags, create);
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
@@ -5352,7 +5333,7 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer)
  */
 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5366,7 +5347,7 @@ int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
  */
 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, krule);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5396,7 +5377,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
  */
 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
@@ -5415,7 +5396,7 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
  */
 int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf, cmd, attr, size);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5430,7 +5411,7 @@ int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
  */
 int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_map, map, fmode);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5444,7 +5425,7 @@ int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
  */
 int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, prog);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5461,7 +5442,7 @@ int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
 			    struct bpf_token *token)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf_map_create, 0, map, attr, token);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_map_create, map, attr, token);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5479,7 +5460,7 @@ int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
 int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
 			   struct bpf_token *token)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, 0, prog, attr, token);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, prog, attr, token);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5496,7 +5477,7 @@ int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
 int security_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
 			      struct path *path)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf_token_create, 0, token, attr, path);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_token_create, token, attr, path);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5512,7 +5493,7 @@ int security_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
  */
 int security_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf_token_cmd, 0, token, cmd);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_token_cmd, token, cmd);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5528,7 +5509,7 @@ int security_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
  */
 int security_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf_token_capable, 0, token, cap);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_token_capable, token, cap);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5576,7 +5557,7 @@ void security_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
  */
 int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what);
+	return call_int_hook(locked_down, what);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
 
@@ -5592,7 +5573,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
  */
 int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type);
+	return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, attr, type);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5605,7 +5586,7 @@ int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
  */
 int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event);
+	return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, event);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5629,7 +5610,7 @@ void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
  */
 int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event);
+	return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, event);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5642,7 +5623,7 @@ int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
  */
 int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event);
+	return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, event);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
 
@@ -5658,7 +5639,7 @@ int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
  */
 int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, 0, new);
+	return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, new);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5671,7 +5652,7 @@ int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
  */
 int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0);
+	return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5684,6 +5665,6 @@ int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
  */
 int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd);
+	return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, ioucmd);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 860e558e9fd5..8db4875164ab 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3135,7 +3135,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				 struct iattr *iattr)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index b18b50232947..28be26712396 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1238,12 +1238,14 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 
 /**
  * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: the object
  * @iattr: for the force flag
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
  */
-static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+static int smack_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			       struct iattr *iattr)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;