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authorJoel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>2019-10-14 13:03:08 -0400
committerPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>2019-10-17 21:31:55 +0200
commitda97e18458fb42d7c00fac5fd1c56a3896ec666e (patch)
tree0e74fd18802e470e1ec42148bd278a28c99d1655 /security
parent39b656ee9f2ce41eb969c86525f9a2a63fefac5b (diff)
perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks
In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/security.c27
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c69
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/objsec.h6
4 files changed, 103 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1bc000f834e2..cd2d18d2d279 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2404,3 +2404,30 @@ int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type);
+}
+
+int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event);
+}
+
+void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event);
+}
+
+int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event);
+}
+
+int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9625b99e677f..28eb05490d59 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6795,6 +6795,67 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
};
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+{
+ u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
+
+ if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
+ else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
+ else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
+ else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
+ requested, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
+
+ perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!perfsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ perfsec->sid = current_sid();
+ event->security = perfsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
+
+ event->security = NULL;
+ kfree(perfsec);
+}
+
+static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
@@ -7030,6 +7091,14 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
+#endif
};
static __init int selinux_init(void)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 32e9b03be3dd..7db24855e12d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -244,6 +244,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{"map_create", "map_read", "map_write", "prog_load", "prog_run"} },
{ "xdp_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "perf_event",
+ {"open", "cpu", "kernel", "tracepoint", "read", "write"} },
{ NULL }
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 586b7abd0aa7..a4a86cbcfb0a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -141,7 +141,11 @@ struct pkey_security_struct {
};
struct bpf_security_struct {
- u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
+ u32 sid; /* SID of bpf obj creator */
+};
+
+struct perf_event_security_struct {
+ u32 sid; /* SID of perf_event obj creator */
};
extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes;