summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat
-rw-r--r--include/linux/kasan-checks.h6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/kasan.h17
-rw-r--r--lib/test_kasan.c20
-rw-r--r--mm/kasan/common.c11
-rw-r--r--mm/kasan/generic.c4
-rw-r--r--mm/kasan/kasan.h10
-rw-r--r--mm/kasan/sw_tags.c6
-rw-r--r--mm/slab_common.c16
8 files changed, 72 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan-checks.h b/include/linux/kasan-checks.h
index ca5e89fb10d3..3d6d22a25bdc 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan-checks.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan-checks.h
@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
/*
+ * The annotations present in this file are only relevant for the software
+ * KASAN modes that rely on compiler instrumentation, and will be optimized
+ * away for the hardware tag-based KASAN mode. Use kasan_check_byte() instead.
+ */
+
+/*
* __kasan_check_*: Always available when KASAN is enabled. This may be used
* even in compilation units that selectively disable KASAN, but must use KASAN
* to validate access to an address. Never use these in header files!
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index a7254186558a..7eaf2d9effb4 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -246,6 +246,19 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr)
__kasan_kfree_large(ptr, _RET_IP_);
}
+/*
+ * Unlike kasan_check_read/write(), kasan_check_byte() is performed even for
+ * the hardware tag-based mode that doesn't rely on compiler instrumentation.
+ */
+bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *addr, unsigned long ip);
+static __always_inline bool kasan_check_byte(const void *addr)
+{
+ if (kasan_enabled())
+ return __kasan_check_byte(addr, _RET_IP_);
+ return true;
+}
+
+
bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot(void);
void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
@@ -301,6 +314,10 @@ static inline void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size,
return (void *)object;
}
static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr) {}
+static inline bool kasan_check_byte(const void *address)
+{
+ return true;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
index e59f185b8075..3f771fabd0ec 100644
--- a/lib/test_kasan.c
+++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ static void kasan_global_oob(struct kunit *test)
KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)p);
}
+/* Check that ksize() makes the whole object accessible. */
static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
{
char *ptr;
@@ -514,6 +515,24 @@ static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
kfree(ptr);
}
+/*
+ * Check that a use-after-free is detected by ksize() and via normal accesses
+ * after it.
+ */
+static void ksize_uaf(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ char *ptr;
+ int size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+
+ ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+ kfree(ptr);
+
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ksize(ptr));
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kasan_int_result = *ptr);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kasan_int_result = *(ptr + size));
+}
+
static void kasan_stack_oob(struct kunit *test)
{
char stack_array[10];
@@ -907,6 +926,7 @@ static struct kunit_case kasan_kunit_test_cases[] = {
KUNIT_CASE(kasan_alloca_oob_left),
KUNIT_CASE(kasan_alloca_oob_right),
KUNIT_CASE(ksize_unpoisons_memory),
+ KUNIT_CASE(ksize_uaf),
KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_double_free),
KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_invalid_free),
KUNIT_CASE(kasan_memchr),
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index eedc3e0fe365..b18189ef3a92 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
if (unlikely(cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
return false;
- if (kasan_check_invalid_free(tagged_object)) {
+ if (!kasan_byte_accessible(tagged_object)) {
kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip);
return true;
}
@@ -490,3 +490,12 @@ void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
/* The object will be poisoned by kasan_free_pages(). */
}
+
+bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip)
+{
+ if (!kasan_byte_accessible(address)) {
+ kasan_report((unsigned long)address, 1, false, ip);
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
index acab8862dc67..3f17a1218055 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
@@ -185,11 +185,11 @@ bool kasan_check_range(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
return check_region_inline(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
}
-bool kasan_check_invalid_free(void *addr)
+bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr)
{
s8 shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr));
- return shadow_byte < 0 || shadow_byte >= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+ return shadow_byte >= 0 && shadow_byte < KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
}
void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index 1298b79f9518..cc14b6e6c14c 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -341,20 +341,20 @@ static inline void kasan_unpoison(const void *address, size_t size)
round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
}
-static inline bool kasan_check_invalid_free(void *addr)
+static inline bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr)
{
u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr);
- u8 mem_tag = hw_get_mem_tag(addr);
+ u8 mem_tag = hw_get_mem_tag((void *)addr);
- return (mem_tag == KASAN_TAG_INVALID) ||
- (ptr_tag != KASAN_TAG_KERNEL && ptr_tag != mem_tag);
+ return (mem_tag != KASAN_TAG_INVALID) &&
+ (ptr_tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL || ptr_tag == mem_tag);
}
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
void kasan_poison(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
void kasan_unpoison(const void *address, size_t size);
-bool kasan_check_invalid_free(void *addr);
+bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr);
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
diff --git a/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
index cc271fceb5d5..94c2d33be333 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
@@ -118,13 +118,13 @@ bool kasan_check_range(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
return true;
}
-bool kasan_check_invalid_free(void *addr)
+bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr)
{
u8 tag = get_tag(addr);
u8 shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(kasan_reset_tag(addr)));
- return (shadow_byte == KASAN_TAG_INVALID) ||
- (tag != KASAN_TAG_KERNEL && tag != shadow_byte);
+ return (shadow_byte != KASAN_TAG_INVALID) &&
+ (tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL || tag == shadow_byte);
}
#define DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(size) \
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 5be7825ad3ce..7c8298c17145 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1218,19 +1218,21 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
size_t size;
/*
- * We need to check that the pointed to object is valid, and only then
- * unpoison the shadow memory below. We use __kasan_check_read(), to
- * generate a more useful report at the time ksize() is called (rather
- * than later where behaviour is undefined due to potential
- * use-after-free or double-free).
+ * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid, and
+ * only then unpoison the memory. The report printed from ksize() is
+ * more useful, then when it's printed later when the behaviour could
+ * be undefined due to a potential use-after-free or double-free.
*
- * If the pointed to memory is invalid we return 0, to avoid users of
+ * We use kasan_check_byte(), which is supported for the hardware
+ * tag-based KASAN mode, unlike kasan_check_read/write().
+ *
+ * If the pointed to memory is invalid, we return 0 to avoid users of
* ksize() writing to and potentially corrupting the memory region.
*
* We want to perform the check before __ksize(), to avoid potentially
* crashing in __ksize() due to accessing invalid metadata.
*/
- if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !__kasan_check_read(objp, 1))
+ if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !kasan_check_byte(objp))
return 0;
size = __ksize(objp);
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2024-05-30 17:42:58 +0000