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-rw-r--r--Documentation/security/self-protection.rst5
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
index f584fb74b4ff..a32ca23c21b0 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
@@ -81,8 +81,7 @@ of the kernel, gaining the protection of the kernel's strict memory
permissions as described above.
For variables that are initialized once at ``__init`` time, these can
-be marked with the (new and under development) ``__ro_after_init``
-attribute.
+be marked with the ``__ro_after_init`` attribute.
What remains are variables that are updated rarely (e.g. GDT). These
will need another infrastructure (similar to the temporary exceptions
@@ -304,7 +303,7 @@ Memory poisoning
When releasing memory, it is best to poison the contents, to avoid reuse
attacks that rely on the old contents of memory. E.g., clear stack on a
-syscall return (``CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK``), wipe heap memory on a
+syscall return (``CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE``), wipe heap memory on a
free. This frustrates many uninitialized variable attacks, stack content
exposures, heap content exposures, and use-after-free attacks.