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Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c317
1 files changed, 175 insertions, 142 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
index bfce41c2a53b..80a580e019c5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
@@ -91,12 +91,7 @@ early_param("nospectre_v2", parse_spectre_v2_param);
static bool spectre_v2_mitigations_off(void)
{
- bool ret = __nospectre_v2 || cpu_mitigations_off();
-
- if (ret)
- pr_info_once("spectre-v2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
-
- return ret;
+ return __nospectre_v2 || cpu_mitigations_off();
}
static const char *get_bhb_affected_string(enum mitigation_state bhb_state)
@@ -172,7 +167,7 @@ static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state(void)
return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
/* Alternatively, we have a list of unaffected CPUs */
- if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_v2_safe_list))
+ if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_v2_safe_list))
return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
@@ -331,7 +326,7 @@ bool has_spectre_v3a(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
};
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
- return is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_v3a_unsafe_list);
+ return is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_v3a_unsafe_list);
}
void spectre_v3a_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
@@ -421,13 +416,8 @@ early_param("ssbd", parse_spectre_v4_param);
*/
static bool spectre_v4_mitigations_off(void)
{
- bool ret = cpu_mitigations_off() ||
- __spectre_v4_policy == SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_DISABLED;
-
- if (ret)
- pr_info_once("spectre-v4 mitigation disabled by command-line option\n");
-
- return ret;
+ return cpu_mitigations_off() ||
+ __spectre_v4_policy == SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_DISABLED;
}
/* Do we need to toggle the mitigation state on entry to/exit from the kernel? */
@@ -475,7 +465,7 @@ static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state(void)
{ /* sentinel */ },
};
- if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_v4_safe_list))
+ if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_v4_safe_list))
return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
/* CPU features are detected first */
@@ -521,10 +511,13 @@ bool has_spectre_v4(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope)
return state != SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
}
-static int ssbs_emulation_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 instr)
+bool try_emulate_el1_ssbs(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 instr)
{
- if (user_mode(regs))
- return 1;
+ const u32 instr_mask = ~(1U << PSTATE_Imm_shift);
+ const u32 instr_val = 0xd500401f | PSTATE_SSBS;
+
+ if ((instr & instr_mask) != instr_val)
+ return false;
if (instr & BIT(PSTATE_Imm_shift))
regs->pstate |= PSR_SSBS_BIT;
@@ -532,19 +525,11 @@ static int ssbs_emulation_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 instr)
regs->pstate &= ~PSR_SSBS_BIT;
arm64_skip_faulting_instruction(regs, 4);
- return 0;
+ return true;
}
-static struct undef_hook ssbs_emulation_hook = {
- .instr_mask = ~(1U << PSTATE_Imm_shift),
- .instr_val = 0xd500401f | PSTATE_SSBS,
- .fn = ssbs_emulation_handler,
-};
-
static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_enable_hw_mitigation(void)
{
- static bool undef_hook_registered = false;
- static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(hook_lock);
enum mitigation_state state;
/*
@@ -555,13 +540,6 @@ static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_enable_hw_mitigation(void)
if (state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED || !this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
return state;
- raw_spin_lock(&hook_lock);
- if (!undef_hook_registered) {
- register_undef_hook(&ssbs_emulation_hook);
- undef_hook_registered = true;
- }
- raw_spin_unlock(&hook_lock);
-
if (spectre_v4_mitigations_off()) {
sysreg_clear_set(sctlr_el1, 0, SCTLR_ELx_DSSBS);
set_pstate_ssbs(1);
@@ -570,6 +548,18 @@ static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_enable_hw_mitigation(void)
/* SCTLR_EL1.DSSBS was initialised to 0 during boot */
set_pstate_ssbs(0);
+
+ /*
+ * SSBS is self-synchronizing and is intended to affect subsequent
+ * speculative instructions, but some CPUs can speculate with a stale
+ * value of SSBS.
+ *
+ * Mitigate this with an unconditional speculation barrier, as CPUs
+ * could mis-speculate branches and bypass a conditional barrier.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386))
+ spec_bar();
+
return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
}
@@ -845,52 +835,91 @@ static unsigned long system_bhb_mitigations;
* This must be called with SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU for each type of CPU, before any
* SCOPE_SYSTEM call will give the right answer.
*/
-u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(int scope)
+static bool is_spectre_bhb_safe(int scope)
+{
+ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_safe_list[] = {
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A510),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A520),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_2XX_SILVER),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_3XX_SILVER),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_SILVER),
+ {},
+ };
+ static bool all_safe = true;
+
+ if (scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
+ return all_safe;
+
+ if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_bhb_safe_list))
+ return true;
+
+ all_safe = false;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(void)
{
u8 k = 0;
- static u8 max_bhb_k;
-
- if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) {
- static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k32_list[] = {
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78AE),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78C),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X1),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A710),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X2),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1),
- {},
- };
- static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k24_list[] = {
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A77),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1),
- {},
- };
- static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k11_list[] = {
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_AMPERE1),
- {},
- };
- static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k8_list[] = {
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
- {},
- };
-
- if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k32_list))
- k = 32;
- else if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k24_list))
- k = 24;
- else if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k11_list))
- k = 11;
- else if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k8_list))
- k = 8;
-
- max_bhb_k = max(max_bhb_k, k);
- } else {
- k = max_bhb_k;
- }
+
+ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k132_list[] = {
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X3),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V2),
+ {},
+ };
+ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k38_list[] = {
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A715),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A720),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A720AE),
+ {},
+ };
+ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k32_list[] = {
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78AE),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78C),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X1),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X1C),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A710),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X2),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1),
+ {},
+ };
+ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k24_list[] = {
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76AE),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A77),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_GOLD),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_HISI_HIP09),
+ {},
+ };
+ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k11_list[] = {
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_AMPERE1),
+ {},
+ };
+ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k8_list[] = {
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
+ {},
+ };
+
+ if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_bhb_k132_list))
+ k = 132;
+ else if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_bhb_k38_list))
+ k = 38;
+ else if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_bhb_k32_list))
+ k = 32;
+ else if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_bhb_k24_list))
+ k = 24;
+ else if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_bhb_k11_list))
+ k = 11;
+ else if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_bhb_k8_list))
+ k = 8;
return k;
}
@@ -916,29 +945,13 @@ static enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void)
}
}
-static bool is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected(int scope)
+static bool has_spectre_bhb_fw_mitigation(void)
{
- static bool system_affected;
enum mitigation_state fw_state;
bool has_smccc = arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() != SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE;
- static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_firmware_mitigated_list[] = {
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
- MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75),
- {},
- };
- bool cpu_in_list = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(),
- spectre_bhb_firmware_mitigated_list);
-
- if (scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
- return system_affected;
fw_state = spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state();
- if (cpu_in_list || (has_smccc && fw_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED)) {
- system_affected = true;
- return true;
- }
-
- return false;
+ return has_smccc && fw_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
}
static bool supports_ecbhb(int scope)
@@ -954,6 +967,8 @@ static bool supports_ecbhb(int scope)
ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_ECBHB_SHIFT);
}
+static u8 max_bhb_k;
+
bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
int scope)
{
@@ -962,39 +977,43 @@ bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
if (supports_csv2p3(scope))
return false;
- if (supports_clearbhb(scope))
- return true;
+ if (is_spectre_bhb_safe(scope))
+ return false;
- if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(scope))
- return true;
+ /*
+ * At this point the core isn't known to be "safe" so we're going to
+ * assume it's vulnerable. We still need to update `max_bhb_k` though,
+ * but only if we aren't mitigating with clearbhb though.
+ */
+ if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU && !supports_clearbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
+ max_bhb_k = max(max_bhb_k, spectre_bhb_loop_affected());
- if (is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected(scope))
- return true;
+ return true;
+}
- return false;
+u8 get_spectre_bhb_loop_value(void)
+{
+ return max_bhb_k;
}
static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
{
const char *v = arm64_get_bp_hardening_vector(slot);
- if (slot < 0)
- return;
-
__this_cpu_write(this_cpu_vector, v);
/*
* When KPTI is in use, the vectors are switched when exiting to
* user-space.
*/
- if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
+ if (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0))
return;
write_sysreg(v, vbar_el1);
isb();
}
-static bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb;
+bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb;
static int __init parse_spectre_bhb_param(char *str)
{
__nospectre_bhb = true;
@@ -1005,7 +1024,7 @@ early_param("nospectre_bhb", parse_spectre_bhb_param);
void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
{
bp_hardening_cb_t cpu_cb;
- enum mitigation_state fw_state, state = SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+ enum mitigation_state state = SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
struct bp_hardening_data *data = this_cpu_ptr(&bp_hardening_data);
if (!is_spectre_bhb_affected(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
@@ -1014,9 +1033,7 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
if (arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) {
/* No point mitigating Spectre-BHB alone. */
} else if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY)) {
- pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by compile time option\n");
- } else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || __nospectre_bhb) {
- pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
+ /* Do nothing */
} else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
set_bit(BHB_HW, &system_bhb_mitigations);
@@ -1031,7 +1048,7 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN);
state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
set_bit(BHB_INSN, &system_bhb_mitigations);
- } else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
+ } else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected()) {
/*
* Ensure KVM uses the indirect vector which will have the
* branchy-loop added. A57/A72-r0 will already have selected
@@ -1044,37 +1061,39 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP);
state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
set_bit(BHB_LOOP, &system_bhb_mitigations);
- } else if (is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
- fw_state = spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state();
- if (fw_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED) {
- /*
- * Ensure KVM uses one of the spectre bp_hardening
- * vectors. The indirect vector doesn't include the EL3
- * call, so needs upgrading to
- * HYP_VECTOR_SPECTRE_INDIRECT.
- */
- if (!data->slot || data->slot == HYP_VECTOR_INDIRECT)
- data->slot += 1;
-
- this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW);
-
- /*
- * The WA3 call in the vectors supersedes the WA1 call
- * made during context-switch. Uninstall any firmware
- * bp_hardening callback.
- */
- cpu_cb = spectre_v2_get_sw_mitigation_cb();
- if (__this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.fn) != cpu_cb)
- __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, NULL);
-
- state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
- set_bit(BHB_FW, &system_bhb_mitigations);
- }
+ } else if (has_spectre_bhb_fw_mitigation()) {
+ /*
+ * Ensure KVM uses one of the spectre bp_hardening
+ * vectors. The indirect vector doesn't include the EL3
+ * call, so needs upgrading to
+ * HYP_VECTOR_SPECTRE_INDIRECT.
+ */
+ if (!data->slot || data->slot == HYP_VECTOR_INDIRECT)
+ data->slot += 1;
+
+ this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW);
+
+ /*
+ * The WA3 call in the vectors supersedes the WA1 call
+ * made during context-switch. Uninstall any firmware
+ * bp_hardening callback.
+ */
+ cpu_cb = spectre_v2_get_sw_mitigation_cb();
+ if (__this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.fn) != cpu_cb)
+ __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, NULL);
+
+ state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+ set_bit(BHB_FW, &system_bhb_mitigations);
}
update_mitigation_state(&spectre_bhb_state, state);
}
+bool is_spectre_bhb_fw_mitigated(void)
+{
+ return test_bit(BHB_FW, &system_bhb_mitigations);
+}
+
/* Patched to NOP when enabled */
void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_loop_mitigation_enable(struct alt_instr *alt,
__le32 *origptr,
@@ -1103,7 +1122,6 @@ void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_loop_iter(struct alt_instr *alt,
{
u8 rd;
u32 insn;
- u16 loop_count = spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM);
BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1); /* MOV -> MOV */
@@ -1112,7 +1130,7 @@ void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_loop_iter(struct alt_instr *alt,
insn = le32_to_cpu(*origptr);
rd = aarch64_insn_decode_register(AARCH64_INSN_REGTYPE_RD, insn);
- insn = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, loop_count, 0,
+ insn = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, max_bhb_k, 0,
AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_ZERO);
*updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(insn);
@@ -1169,3 +1187,18 @@ void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
pr_err("WARNING: %s", EBPF_WARN);
}
#endif
+
+void spectre_print_disabled_mitigations(void)
+{
+ /* Keep a single copy of the common message suffix to avoid duplication. */
+ const char *spectre_disabled_suffix = "mitigation disabled by command-line option\n";
+
+ if (spectre_v2_mitigations_off())
+ pr_info("spectre-v2 %s", spectre_disabled_suffix);
+
+ if (spectre_v4_mitigations_off())
+ pr_info("spectre-v4 %s", spectre_disabled_suffix);
+
+ if (__nospectre_bhb || cpu_mitigations_off())
+ pr_info("spectre-bhb %s", spectre_disabled_suffix);
+}