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Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h42
1 files changed, 42 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
index 34cffcef7375..07a25753e85c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
@@ -89,4 +89,46 @@ extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
void set_kernel_text_ro(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ unsigned long decoy_addr;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Mark the linear address as UC to make sure we don't log more
+ * errors because of speculative access to the page.
+ * We would like to just call:
+ * set_memory_uc((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
+ * but doing that would radically increase the odds of a
+ * speculative access to the poison page because we'd have
+ * the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting
+ * around in registers.
+ * Instead we get tricky. We create a non-canonical address
+ * that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped.
+ * This relies on set_memory_uc() properly sanitizing any __pa()
+ * results with __PHYSICAL_MASK or PTE_PFN_MASK.
+ */
+ decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63));
+
+ rc = set_memory_uc(decoy_addr, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn);
+ return rc;
+}
+#define set_mce_nospec set_mce_nospec
+
+/* Restore full speculative operation to the pfn. */
+static inline int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ return set_memory_wb((unsigned long) pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
+}
+#define clear_mce_nospec clear_mce_nospec
+#else
+/*
+ * Few people would run a 32-bit kernel on a machine that supports
+ * recoverable errors because they have too much memory to boot 32-bit.
+ */
+#endif
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_SET_MEMORY_H */