diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1461 |
1 files changed, 879 insertions, 582 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 9cfca3d7d0e2..e7ab22fce3b5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/kvm_types.h> #include <linux/percpu.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/ctype.h> @@ -18,13 +19,19 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kprobes.h> #include <linux/kgdb.h> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> #include <linux/smp.h> +#include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/syscore_ops.h> #include <linux/pgtable.h> #include <linux/stackprotector.h> +#include <linux/utsname.h> +#include <linux/efi.h> +#include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> +#include <asm/cpuid/api.h> #include <asm/perf_event.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> #include <asm/doublefault.h> @@ -55,41 +62,44 @@ #include <asm/cacheinfo.h> #include <asm/memtype.h> #include <asm/microcode.h> -#include <asm/microcode_intel.h> #include <asm/intel-family.h> #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> +#include <asm/fred.h> #include <asm/uv/uv.h> -#include <asm/sigframe.h> +#include <asm/ia32.h> +#include <asm/set_memory.h> #include <asm/traps.h> #include <asm/sev.h> +#include <asm/tdx.h> +#include <asm/posted_intr.h> +#include <asm/runtime-const.h> #include "cpu.h" -u32 elf_hwcap2 __read_mostly; +DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct cpuinfo_x86, cpu_info); +EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_info); -/* all of these masks are initialized in setup_cpu_local_masks() */ -cpumask_var_t cpu_initialized_mask; -cpumask_var_t cpu_callout_mask; -cpumask_var_t cpu_callin_mask; +/* Used for modules: built-in code uses runtime constants */ +unsigned long USER_PTR_MAX; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(USER_PTR_MAX); -/* representing cpus for which sibling maps can be computed */ -cpumask_var_t cpu_sibling_setup_mask; +u32 elf_hwcap2 __read_mostly; /* Number of siblings per CPU package */ -int smp_num_siblings = 1; -EXPORT_SYMBOL(smp_num_siblings); +unsigned int __max_threads_per_core __ro_after_init = 1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__max_threads_per_core); -/* Last level cache ID of each logical CPU */ -DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u16, cpu_llc_id) = BAD_APICID; +unsigned int __max_dies_per_package __ro_after_init = 1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__max_dies_per_package); -u16 get_llc_id(unsigned int cpu) -{ - return per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_llc_id); +unsigned int __max_logical_packages __ro_after_init = 1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__max_logical_packages); -/* L2 cache ID of each logical CPU */ -DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u16, cpu_l2c_id) = BAD_APICID; +unsigned int __num_cores_per_package __ro_after_init = 1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__num_cores_per_package); + +unsigned int __num_threads_per_package __ro_after_init = 1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__num_threads_per_package); static struct ppin_info { int feature; @@ -113,16 +123,17 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id ppin_cpuids[] = { X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), /* Legacy models without CPUID enumeration */ - X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(IVYBRIDGE_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), - X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(HASWELL_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), - X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(BROADWELL_D, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), - X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(BROADWELL_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), - X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(SKYLAKE_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), - X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ICELAKE_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), - X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ICELAKE_D, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), - X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), - X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), - X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), + X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), + X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_HASWELL_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), + X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_BROADWELL_D, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), + X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_BROADWELL_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), + X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), + X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_ICELAKE_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), + X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_ICELAKE_D, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), + X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), + X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_EMERALDRAPIDS_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), + X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_XEON_PHI_KNL, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), + X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_XEON_PHI_KNM, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]), {} }; @@ -143,7 +154,7 @@ static void ppin_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) */ info = (struct ppin_info *)id->driver_data; - if (rdmsrl_safe(info->msr_ppin_ctl, &val)) + if (rdmsrq_safe(info->msr_ppin_ctl, &val)) goto clear_ppin; if ((val & 3UL) == 1UL) { @@ -153,28 +164,19 @@ static void ppin_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* If PPIN is disabled, try to enable */ if (!(val & 2UL)) { - wrmsrl_safe(info->msr_ppin_ctl, val | 2UL); - rdmsrl_safe(info->msr_ppin_ctl, &val); + wrmsrq_safe(info->msr_ppin_ctl, val | 2UL); + rdmsrq_safe(info->msr_ppin_ctl, &val); } /* Is the enable bit set? */ if (val & 2UL) { - c->ppin = __rdmsr(info->msr_ppin); + c->ppin = native_rdmsrq(info->msr_ppin); set_cpu_cap(c, info->feature); return; } clear_ppin: - clear_cpu_cap(c, info->feature); -} - -/* correctly size the local cpu masks */ -void __init setup_cpu_local_masks(void) -{ - alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&cpu_initialized_mask); - alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&cpu_callin_mask); - alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&cpu_callout_mask); - alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&cpu_sibling_setup_mask); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(info->feature); } static void default_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) @@ -212,48 +214,41 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct gdt_page, gdt_page) = { .gdt = { * TLS descriptors are currently at a different place compared to i386. * Hopefully nobody expects them at a fixed place (Wine?) */ - [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL32_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc09b, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xa09b, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc093, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER32_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0fb, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0f3, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xa0fb, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL32_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE64, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA64, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER32_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32 | DESC_USER, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA64 | DESC_USER, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE64 | DESC_USER, 0, 0xfffff), #else - [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc09a, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc092, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0fa, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0f2, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA32, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32 | DESC_USER, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA32 | DESC_USER, 0, 0xfffff), /* * Segments used for calling PnP BIOS have byte granularity. * They code segments and data segments have fixed 64k limits, * the transfer segment sizes are set at run time. */ - /* 32-bit code */ - [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS32] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x409a, 0, 0xffff), - /* 16-bit code */ - [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS16] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x009a, 0, 0xffff), - /* 16-bit data */ - [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x0092, 0, 0xffff), - /* 16-bit data */ - [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS1] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x0092, 0, 0), - /* 16-bit data */ - [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS2] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x0092, 0, 0), + [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS32] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32_BIOS, 0, 0xffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS16] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE16, 0, 0xffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA16, 0, 0xffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS1] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA16, 0, 0), + [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS2] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA16, 0, 0), /* * The APM segments have byte granularity and their bases * are set at run time. All have 64k limits. */ - /* 32-bit code */ - [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x409a, 0, 0xffff), - /* 16-bit code */ - [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+1] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x009a, 0, 0xffff), - /* data */ - [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+2] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x4092, 0, 0xffff), - - [GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc092, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_PERCPU] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc092, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32_BIOS, 0, 0xffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+1] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE16, 0, 0xffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+2] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA32_BIOS, 0, 0xffff), + + [GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA32, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_PERCPU] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA32, 0, 0xfffff), #endif } }; EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(gdt_page); +SYM_PIC_ALIAS(gdt_page); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 static int __init x86_nopcid_setup(char *s) @@ -289,21 +284,13 @@ static int __init x86_noinvpcid_setup(char *s) } early_param("noinvpcid", x86_noinvpcid_setup); -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 -static int cachesize_override = -1; -static int disable_x86_serial_nr = 1; - -static int __init cachesize_setup(char *str) -{ - get_option(&str, &cachesize_override); - return 1; -} -__setup("cachesize=", cachesize_setup); - /* Standard macro to see if a specific flag is changeable */ -static inline int flag_is_changeable_p(u32 flag) +static inline bool flag_is_changeable_p(unsigned long flag) { - u32 f1, f2; + unsigned long f1, f2; + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) + return true; /* * Cyrix and IDT cpus allow disabling of CPUID @@ -326,11 +313,22 @@ static inline int flag_is_changeable_p(u32 flag) : "=&r" (f1), "=&r" (f2) : "ir" (flag)); - return ((f1^f2) & flag) != 0; + return (f1 ^ f2) & flag; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 +static int cachesize_override = -1; +static int disable_x86_serial_nr = 1; + +static int __init cachesize_setup(char *str) +{ + get_option(&str, &cachesize_override); + return 1; } +__setup("cachesize=", cachesize_setup); /* Probe for the CPUID instruction */ -int have_cpuid_p(void) +bool cpuid_feature(void) { return flag_is_changeable_p(X86_EFLAGS_ID); } @@ -362,10 +360,6 @@ static int __init x86_serial_nr_setup(char *s) } __setup("serialnumber", x86_serial_nr_setup); #else -static inline int flag_is_changeable_p(u32 flag) -{ - return 1; -} static inline void squash_the_stupid_serial_number(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { } @@ -412,10 +406,31 @@ out: cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP); } +static __always_inline void setup_lass(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LASS)) + return; + + /* + * Legacy vsyscall page access causes a #GP when LASS is active. + * Disable LASS because the #GP handler doesn't support vsyscall + * emulation. + * + * Also disable LASS when running under EFI, as some runtime and + * boot services rely on 1:1 mappings in the lower half. + */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION) || + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI)) { + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LASS); + return; + } + + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_LASS); +} + /* These bits should not change their value after CPU init is finished. */ -static const unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask = - X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_UMIP | - X86_CR4_FSGSBASE | X86_CR4_CET; +static const unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask = X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_UMIP | + X86_CR4_FSGSBASE | X86_CR4_CET | X86_CR4_FRED; static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(cr_pinning); static unsigned long cr4_pinned_bits __ro_after_init; @@ -472,14 +487,14 @@ void cr4_update_irqsoff(unsigned long set, unsigned long clear) __write_cr4(newval); } } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(cr4_update_irqsoff); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(cr4_update_irqsoff); /* Read the CR4 shadow. */ unsigned long cr4_read_shadow(void) { return this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cr4_read_shadow); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(cr4_read_shadow); void cr4_init(void) { @@ -567,17 +582,18 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg) return 1; } __setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku); -#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT -__noendbr u64 ibt_save(void) +__noendbr u64 ibt_save(bool disable) { u64 msr = 0; if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) { - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr); - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr & ~CET_ENDBR_EN); + rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr); + if (disable) + wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr & ~CET_ENDBR_EN); } return msr; @@ -588,10 +604,10 @@ __noendbr void ibt_restore(u64 save) u64 msr; if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) { - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr); + rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr); msr &= ~CET_ENDBR_EN; msr |= (save & CET_ENDBR_EN); - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr); + wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr); } } @@ -599,27 +615,43 @@ __noendbr void ibt_restore(u64 save) static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { - u64 msr = CET_ENDBR_EN; + bool user_shstk, kernel_ibt; - if (!HAS_KERNEL_IBT || - !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_CET)) return; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr); + kernel_ibt = HAS_KERNEL_IBT && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT); + user_shstk = cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK); + + if (!kernel_ibt && !user_shstk) + return; + + if (user_shstk) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK); + + if (kernel_ibt) + wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, CET_ENDBR_EN); + else + wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, 0); + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET); - if (!ibt_selftest()) { + if (kernel_ibt && ibt_selftest()) { pr_err("IBT selftest: Failed!\n"); - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, 0); + wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, 0); setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBT); - return; } } __noendbr void cet_disable(void) { - if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, 0); + if (!(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT) || + cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))) + return; + + wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, 0); + wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_U_CET, 0); } /* @@ -634,9 +666,9 @@ struct cpuid_dependent_feature { static const struct cpuid_dependent_feature cpuid_dependent_features[] = { - { X86_FEATURE_MWAIT, 0x00000005 }, - { X86_FEATURE_DCA, 0x00000009 }, - { X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, 0x0000000d }, + { X86_FEATURE_MWAIT, CPUID_LEAF_MWAIT }, + { X86_FEATURE_DCA, CPUID_LEAF_DCA }, + { X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, CPUID_LEAF_XSTATE }, { 0, 0 } }; @@ -664,8 +696,8 @@ static void filter_cpuid_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, bool warn) if (!warn) continue; - pr_warn("CPU: CPU feature " X86_CAP_FMT " disabled, no CPUID level 0x%x\n", - x86_cap_flag(df->feature), df->level); + pr_warn("CPU: CPU feature %s disabled, no CPUID level 0x%x\n", + x86_cap_flags[df->feature], df->level); } } @@ -717,7 +749,7 @@ void load_direct_gdt(int cpu) gdt_descr.size = GDT_SIZE - 1; load_gdt(&gdt_descr); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(load_direct_gdt); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(load_direct_gdt); /* Load a fixmap remapping of the per-cpu GDT */ void load_fixmap_gdt(int cpu) @@ -748,9 +780,9 @@ void __init switch_gdt_and_percpu_base(int cpu) * No need to load %gs. It is already correct. * * Writing %gs on 64bit would zero GSBASE which would make any per - * CPU operation up to the point of the wrmsrl() fault. + * CPU operation up to the point of the wrmsrq() fault. * - * Set GSBASE to the new offset. Until the wrmsrl() happens the + * Set GSBASE to the new offset. Until the wrmsrq() happens the * early mapping is still valid. That means the GSBASE update will * lose any prior per CPU data which was not copied over in * setup_per_cpu_areas(). @@ -758,7 +790,7 @@ void __init switch_gdt_and_percpu_base(int cpu) * This works even with stackprotector enabled because the * per CPU stack canary is 0 in both per CPU areas. */ - wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, cpu_kernelmode_gs_base(cpu)); + wrmsrq(MSR_GS_BASE, cpu_kernelmode_gs_base(cpu)); #else /* * %fs is already set to __KERNEL_PERCPU, but after switching GDT @@ -804,19 +836,6 @@ static void get_model_name(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) *(s + 1) = '\0'; } -void detect_num_cpu_cores(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) -{ - unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; - - c->x86_max_cores = 1; - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) || c->cpuid_level < 4) - return; - - cpuid_count(4, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); - if (eax & 0x1f) - c->x86_max_cores = (eax >> 26) + 1; -} - void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { unsigned int n, dummy, ebx, ecx, edx, l2size; @@ -856,13 +875,13 @@ void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_cache_size = l2size; } -u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_4k[NR_INFO]; -u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_2m[NR_INFO]; -u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_4m[NR_INFO]; -u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_4k[NR_INFO]; -u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_2m[NR_INFO]; -u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_4m[NR_INFO]; -u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_1g[NR_INFO]; +u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_4k; +u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_2m; +u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_4m; +u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_4k; +u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_2m; +u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_4m; +u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_1g; static void cpu_detect_tlb(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { @@ -870,60 +889,13 @@ static void cpu_detect_tlb(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) this_cpu->c_detect_tlb(c); pr_info("Last level iTLB entries: 4KB %d, 2MB %d, 4MB %d\n", - tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES], tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES], - tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES]); + tlb_lli_4k, tlb_lli_2m, tlb_lli_4m); pr_info("Last level dTLB entries: 4KB %d, 2MB %d, 4MB %d, 1GB %d\n", - tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES], tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES], - tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES], tlb_lld_1g[ENTRIES]); -} - -int detect_ht_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_SMP - u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; - - if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HT)) - return -1; - - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CMP_LEGACY)) - return -1; - - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XTOPOLOGY)) - return -1; - - cpuid(1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); - - smp_num_siblings = (ebx & 0xff0000) >> 16; - if (smp_num_siblings == 1) - pr_info_once("CPU0: Hyper-Threading is disabled\n"); -#endif - return 0; -} - -void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_SMP - int index_msb, core_bits; - - if (detect_ht_early(c) < 0) - return; - - index_msb = get_count_order(smp_num_siblings); - c->phys_proc_id = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, index_msb); - - smp_num_siblings = smp_num_siblings / c->x86_max_cores; - - index_msb = get_count_order(smp_num_siblings); - - core_bits = get_count_order(c->x86_max_cores); - - c->cpu_core_id = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, index_msb) & - ((1 << core_bits) - 1); -#endif + tlb_lld_4k, tlb_lld_2m, tlb_lld_4m, tlb_lld_1g); } -static void get_cpu_vendor(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +void get_cpu_vendor(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { char *v = c->x86_vendor_id; int i; @@ -1062,25 +1034,22 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_capability[CPUID_D_1_EAX] = eax; } - /* AMD-defined flags: level 0x80000001 */ + /* + * Check if extended CPUID leaves are implemented: Max extended + * CPUID leaf must be in the 0x80000001-0x8000ffff range. + */ eax = cpuid_eax(0x80000000); - c->extended_cpuid_level = eax; + c->extended_cpuid_level = ((eax & 0xffff0000) == 0x80000000) ? eax : 0; - if ((eax & 0xffff0000) == 0x80000000) { - if (eax >= 0x80000001) { - cpuid(0x80000001, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000001) { + cpuid(0x80000001, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); - c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0001_ECX] = ecx; - c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0001_EDX] = edx; - } + c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0001_ECX] = ecx; + c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0001_EDX] = edx; } - if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000007) { - cpuid(0x80000007, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); - - c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = ebx; - c->x86_power = edx; - } + if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000007) + c->x86_power = cpuid_edx(0x80000007); if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008) { cpuid(0x80000008, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); @@ -1093,6 +1062,9 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f) c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x8000001f); + if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000021) + c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x80000021); + init_scattered_cpuid_features(c); init_speculation_control(c); @@ -1108,22 +1080,38 @@ void get_cpu_address_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; - if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008) { + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPUID) || + (c->extended_cpuid_level < 0x80000008)) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) { + c->x86_clflush_size = 64; + c->x86_phys_bits = 36; + c->x86_virt_bits = 48; + } else { + c->x86_clflush_size = 32; + c->x86_virt_bits = 32; + c->x86_phys_bits = 32; + + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PAE) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PSE36)) + c->x86_phys_bits = 36; + } + } else { cpuid(0x80000008, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); c->x86_virt_bits = (eax >> 8) & 0xff; c->x86_phys_bits = eax & 0xff; + + /* Provide a sane default if not enumerated: */ + if (!c->x86_clflush_size) + c->x86_clflush_size = 32; } -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 - else if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PAE) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PSE36)) - c->x86_phys_bits = 36; -#endif + c->x86_cache_bits = c->x86_phys_bits; + c->x86_cache_alignment = c->x86_clflush_size; } static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 int i; /* @@ -1144,7 +1132,6 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) break; } } -#endif } #define NO_SPECULATION BIT(0) @@ -1158,12 +1145,13 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) #define NO_SPECTRE_V2 BIT(8) #define NO_MMIO BIT(9) #define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB BIT(10) +#define NO_BHI BIT(11) #define VULNWL(vendor, family, model, whitelist) \ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, whitelist) -#define VULNWL_INTEL(model, whitelist) \ - VULNWL(INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_##model, whitelist) +#define VULNWL_INTEL(vfm, whitelist) \ + X86_MATCH_VFM(vfm, whitelist) #define VULNWL_AMD(family, whitelist) \ VULNWL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, whitelist) @@ -1180,32 +1168,32 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { VULNWL(VORTEX, 6, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION), /* Intel Family 6 */ - VULNWL_INTEL(TIGERLAKE, NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_INTEL(TIGERLAKE_L, NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_INTEL(ALDERLAKE, NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_INTEL(ALDERLAKE_L, NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_TIGERLAKE, NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L, NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ALDERLAKE, NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L, NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_SALTWELL, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_SALTWELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_BONNELL, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_BONNELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_D, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_SILVERMONT_D, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH, NO_SSB), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_CORE_YONAH, NO_SSB), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_NP, NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID2,NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | MSBDS_ONLY), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_AIRMONT_NP, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), /* * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously @@ -1215,33 +1203,34 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { * good enough for our purposes. */ - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_L, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT_L, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), + VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT_D, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */ - VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), + VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), + VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), + VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), /* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */ - VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB | NO_BHI), + VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB | NO_BHI), /* Zhaoxin Family 7 */ - VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL(ZHAOXIN, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), + VULNWL(ZHAOXIN, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), {} }; #define VULNBL(vendor, family, model, blacklist) \ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, blacklist) -#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \ - X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \ - INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \ - X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues) +#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(vfm, max_stepping, issues) \ + X86_MATCH_VFM_STEPS(vfm, X86_STEP_MIN, max_stepping, issues) + +#define VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(vfm, cpu_type, issues) \ + X86_MATCH_VFM_CPU_TYPE(vfm, INTEL_CPU_TYPE_##cpu_type, issues) #define VULNBL_AMD(family, blacklist) \ VULNBL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist) @@ -1256,39 +1245,85 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { #define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2) /* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */ #define RETBLEED BIT(3) +/* CPU is affected by SMT (cross-thread) return predictions */ +#define SMT_RSB BIT(4) +/* CPU is affected by SRSO */ +#define SRSO BIT(5) +/* CPU is affected by GDS */ +#define GDS BIT(6) +/* CPU is affected by Register File Data Sampling */ +#define RFDS BIT(7) +/* CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */ +#define ITS BIT(8) +/* CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection, but guest-host isolation is not affected */ +#define ITS_NATIVE_ONLY BIT(9) +/* CPU is affected by Transient Scheduler Attacks */ +#define TSA BIT(10) +/* CPU is affected by VMSCAPE */ +#define VMSCAPE BIT(11) static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SANDYBRIDGE_X, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SANDYBRIDGE, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE_X, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEP_MAX, SRBDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL, X86_STEP_MAX, SRBDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL_L, X86_STEP_MAX, SRBDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL_G, X86_STEP_MAX, SRBDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_D, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_G, X86_STEP_MAX, SRBDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL, X86_STEP_MAX, SRBDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X, 0x5, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L, 0xb, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE, 0xc, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, RETBLEED | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L, 0x0, MMIO | RETBLEED | ITS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_LAKEFIELD, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY), + VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_ALDERLAKE, ATOM, RFDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE, ATOM, RFDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_P, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_S, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_METEORLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ARROWLAKE_H, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ARROWLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ARROWLAKE_U, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_LUNARLAKE_M, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_GRANITERAPIDS_X, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_EMERALDRAPIDS_X, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GRACEMONT, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_CRESTMONT_X, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE), VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED), VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED), - VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED), - VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO | TSA | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_AMD(0x1a, SRSO | VMSCAPE), {} }; @@ -1301,28 +1336,114 @@ static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long whi u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void) { - u64 ia32_cap = 0; + u64 x86_arch_cap_msr = 0; if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap); + rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, x86_arch_cap_msr); + + return x86_arch_cap_msr; +} + +static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr) +{ + return (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO && + x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO && + x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO); +} + +static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr) +{ + /* The "immunity" bit trumps everything else: */ + if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO) + return false; + + /* + * VMMs set ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR for processors not in the blacklist to + * indicate that mitigation is needed because guest is running on a + * vulnerable hardware or may migrate to such hardware: + */ + if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR) + return true; - return ia32_cap; + /* Only consult the blacklist when there is no enumeration: */ + return cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RFDS); } -static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap) +static bool __init vulnerable_to_its(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr) { - return (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO && - ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO && - ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO); + /* The "immunity" bit trumps everything else: */ + if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_ITS_NO) + return false; + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) + return false; + + /* None of the affected CPUs have BHI_CTRL */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL)) + return false; + + /* + * If a VMM did not expose ITS_NO, assume that a guest could + * be running on a vulnerable hardware or may migrate to such + * hardware. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) + return true; + + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, ITS)) + return true; + + return false; +} + +static struct x86_cpu_id cpu_latest_microcode[] = { +#include "microcode/intel-ucode-defs.h" + {} +}; + +static bool __init cpu_has_old_microcode(void) +{ + const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_latest_microcode); + + /* Give unknown CPUs a pass: */ + if (!m) { + /* Intel CPUs should be in the list. Warn if not: */ + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) + pr_info("x86/CPU: Model not found in latest microcode list\n"); + return false; + } + + /* + * Hosts usually lie to guests with a super high microcode + * version. Just ignore what hosts tell guests: + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) + return false; + + /* Consider all debug microcode to be old: */ + if (boot_cpu_data.microcode & BIT(31)) + return true; + + /* Give new microcode a pass: */ + if (boot_cpu_data.microcode >= m->driver_data) + return false; + + /* Uh oh, too old: */ + return true; } static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { - u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); + u64 x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); + + if (cpu_has_old_microcode()) { + pr_warn("x86/CPU: Running old microcode\n"); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_OLD_MICROCODE); + add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); + } /* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && - !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO)) + !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT); if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION)) @@ -1330,19 +1451,34 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); - if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECTRE_V2)) + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECTRE_V2)) { setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER); + } if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) && - !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) && + !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS); - if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) + /* + * AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the Intel feature + * flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the whitelist. + * + * Don't use AutoIBRS when SNP is enabled because it degrades host + * userspace indirect branch performance. + */ + if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) || + (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS) && + !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED); + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) && + !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB); + } if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) && - !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) { + !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) { setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS); if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY); @@ -1361,9 +1497,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * TSX_CTRL check alone is not sufficient for cases when the microcode * update is not present or running as guest that don't get TSX_CTRL. */ - if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) && + if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) && (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RTM) || - (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))) + (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA); /* @@ -1385,32 +1521,80 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability, * but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may * not want the guest to enumerate the bug. - * - * Set X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN for CPUs that are neither in the blacklist, - * nor in the whitelist and also don't enumerate MSR ARCH_CAP MMIO bits. */ - if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) { + if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(x86_arch_cap_msr)) { if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); - else if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MMIO)) - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN); } if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) { - if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA)) + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RSBA)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED); } - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) && - !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) && - !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)) - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SMT_RSB)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB); + + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) { + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRSO)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO); + } + + /* + * Check if CPU is vulnerable to GDS. If running in a virtual machine on + * an affected processor, the VMM may have disabled the use of GATHER by + * disabling AVX2. The only way to do this in HW is to clear XCR0[2], + * which means that AVX will be disabled. + */ + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, GDS) && !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) && + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS); + + if (vulnerable_to_rfds(x86_arch_cap_msr)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS); + + /* + * Intel parts with eIBRS are vulnerable to BHI attacks. Parts with + * BHI_NO still need to use the BHI mitigation to prevent Intra-mode + * attacks. When virtualized, eIBRS could be hidden, assume vulnerable. + */ + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_BHI) && + (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_BHI); + + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET); + + if (vulnerable_to_its(x86_arch_cap_msr)) { + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, ITS_NATIVE_ONLY)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY); + } + + if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) { + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO) || + !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO)) { + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, TSA) || + /* Enable bug on Zen guests to allow for live migration. */ + (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN))) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TSA); + } + } + + /* + * Set the bug only on bare-metal. A nested hypervisor should already be + * deploying IBPB to isolate itself from nested guests. + */ + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, VMSCAPE) && + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE); if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; /* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */ - if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO) + if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO) return; setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN); @@ -1439,65 +1623,38 @@ static void detect_nopl(void) #endif } -/* - * We parse cpu parameters early because fpu__init_system() is executed - * before parse_early_param(). - */ -static void __init cpu_parse_early_param(void) +static inline bool parse_set_clear_cpuid(char *arg, bool set) { - char arg[128]; - char *argptr = arg, *opt; - int arglen, taint = 0; - -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 - if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "no387")) -#ifdef CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION - setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FPU); -#else - pr_err("Option 'no387' required CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION enabled.\n"); -#endif - - if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nofxsr")) - setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FXSR); -#endif - - if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsave")) - setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE); - - if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsaveopt")) - setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT); - - if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsaves")) - setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES); - - arglen = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "clearcpuid", arg, sizeof(arg)); - if (arglen <= 0) - return; - - pr_info("Clearing CPUID bits:"); + char *opt; + int taint = 0; - while (argptr) { + while (arg) { bool found __maybe_unused = false; unsigned int bit; - opt = strsep(&argptr, ","); + opt = strsep(&arg, ","); /* * Handle naked numbers first for feature flags which don't - * have names. + * have names. It doesn't make sense for a bug not to have a + * name so don't handle bug flags here. */ if (!kstrtouint(opt, 10, &bit)) { if (bit < NCAPINTS * 32) { -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES + if (set) { + pr_warn("setcpuid: force-enabling CPU feature flag:"); + setup_force_cpu_cap(bit); + } else { + pr_warn("clearcpuid: force-disabling CPU feature flag:"); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(bit); + } /* empty-string, i.e., ""-defined feature flags */ if (!x86_cap_flags[bit]) - pr_cont(" " X86_CAP_FMT_NUM, x86_cap_flag_num(bit)); + pr_cont(" %d:%d\n", bit >> 5, bit & 31); else -#endif - pr_cont(" " X86_CAP_FMT, x86_cap_flag(bit)); + pr_cont(" %s\n", x86_cap_flags[bit]); - setup_clear_cpu_cap(bit); taint++; } /* @@ -1507,29 +1664,97 @@ static void __init cpu_parse_early_param(void) continue; } -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES - for (bit = 0; bit < 32 * NCAPINTS; bit++) { - if (!x86_cap_flag(bit)) + for (bit = 0; bit < 32 * (NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS); bit++) { + const char *flag; + const char *kind; + + if (bit < 32 * NCAPINTS) { + flag = x86_cap_flags[bit]; + kind = "feature"; + } else { + kind = "bug"; + flag = x86_bug_flags[bit - (32 * NCAPINTS)]; + } + + if (!flag) continue; - if (strcmp(x86_cap_flag(bit), opt)) + if (strcmp(flag, opt)) continue; - pr_cont(" %s", opt); - setup_clear_cpu_cap(bit); + if (set) { + pr_warn("setcpuid: force-enabling CPU %s flag: %s\n", + kind, flag); + setup_force_cpu_cap(bit); + } else { + pr_warn("clearcpuid: force-disabling CPU %s flag: %s\n", + kind, flag); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(bit); + } taint++; found = true; break; } if (!found) - pr_cont(" (unknown: %s)", opt); -#endif + pr_warn("%s: unknown CPU flag: %s", set ? "setcpuid" : "clearcpuid", opt); } - pr_cont("\n"); - if (taint) + return taint; +} + + +/* + * We parse cpu parameters early because fpu__init_system() is executed + * before parse_early_param(). + */ +static void __init cpu_parse_early_param(void) +{ + bool cpuid_taint = false; + char arg[128]; + int arglen; + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "no387")) +#ifdef CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FPU); +#else + pr_err("Option 'no387' required CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION enabled.\n"); +#endif + + if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nofxsr")) + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FXSR); +#endif + + if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsave")) + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE); + + if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsaveopt")) + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT); + + if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsaves")) + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES); + + if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nousershstk")) + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK); + + /* Minimize the gap between FRED is available and available but disabled. */ + arglen = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "fred", arg, sizeof(arg)); + if (arglen != 2 || strncmp(arg, "on", 2)) + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FRED); + + arglen = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "clearcpuid", arg, sizeof(arg)); + if (arglen > 0) + cpuid_taint |= parse_set_clear_cpuid(arg, false); + + arglen = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "setcpuid", arg, sizeof(arg)); + if (arglen > 0) + cpuid_taint |= parse_set_clear_cpuid(arg, true); + + if (cpuid_taint) { + pr_warn("!!! setcpuid=/clearcpuid= in use, this is for TESTING ONLY, may break things horribly. Tainting kernel.\n"); add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); + } } /* @@ -1543,42 +1768,37 @@ static void __init cpu_parse_early_param(void) */ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - c->x86_clflush_size = 64; - c->x86_phys_bits = 36; - c->x86_virt_bits = 48; -#else - c->x86_clflush_size = 32; - c->x86_phys_bits = 32; - c->x86_virt_bits = 32; -#endif - c->x86_cache_alignment = c->x86_clflush_size; - memset(&c->x86_capability, 0, sizeof(c->x86_capability)); c->extended_cpuid_level = 0; - if (!have_cpuid_p()) + if (!cpuid_feature()) identify_cpu_without_cpuid(c); /* cyrix could have cpuid enabled via c_identify()*/ - if (have_cpuid_p()) { + if (cpuid_feature()) { cpu_detect(c); get_cpu_vendor(c); + intel_unlock_cpuid_leafs(c); get_cpu_cap(c); - get_cpu_address_sizes(c); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID); + get_cpu_address_sizes(c); cpu_parse_early_param(); + cpu_init_topology(c); + if (this_cpu->c_early_init) this_cpu->c_early_init(c); c->cpu_index = 0; filter_cpuid_features(c, false); + check_cpufeature_deps(c); if (this_cpu->c_bsp_init) this_cpu->c_bsp_init(c); } else { setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID); + get_cpu_address_sizes(c); + cpu_init_topology(c); } setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS); @@ -1587,10 +1807,6 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) sld_setup(c); - fpu__init_system(c); - - init_sigframe_size(); - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 /* * Regardless of whether PCID is enumerated, the SDM says @@ -1615,17 +1831,14 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LA57); detect_nopl(); + mca_bsp_init(c); } -void __init early_cpu_init(void) +void __init init_cpu_devs(void) { const struct cpu_dev *const *cdev; int count = 0; -#ifdef CONFIG_PROCESSOR_SELECT - pr_info("KERNEL supported cpus:\n"); -#endif - for (cdev = __x86_cpu_dev_start; cdev < __x86_cpu_dev_end; cdev++) { const struct cpu_dev *cpudev = *cdev; @@ -1633,20 +1846,30 @@ void __init early_cpu_init(void) break; cpu_devs[count] = cpudev; count++; + } +} +void __init early_cpu_init(void) +{ #ifdef CONFIG_PROCESSOR_SELECT - { - unsigned int j; - - for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { - if (!cpudev->c_ident[j]) - continue; - pr_info(" %s %s\n", cpudev->c_vendor, - cpudev->c_ident[j]); - } - } + unsigned int i, j; + + pr_info("KERNEL supported cpus:\n"); #endif + + init_cpu_devs(); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PROCESSOR_SELECT + for (i = 0; i < X86_VENDOR_NUM && cpu_devs[i]; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { + if (!cpu_devs[i]->c_ident[j]) + continue; + pr_info(" %s %s\n", cpu_devs[i]->c_vendor, + cpu_devs[i]->c_ident[j]); + } } +#endif + early_identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data); } @@ -1668,11 +1891,11 @@ static bool detect_null_seg_behavior(void) */ unsigned long old_base, tmp; - rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, old_base); - wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, 1); + rdmsrq(MSR_FS_BASE, old_base); + wrmsrq(MSR_FS_BASE, 1); loadsegment(fs, 0); - rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, tmp); - wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, old_base); + rdmsrq(MSR_FS_BASE, tmp); + wrmsrq(MSR_FS_BASE, old_base); return tmp == 0; } @@ -1682,9 +1905,7 @@ void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) return; - /* Zen3 CPUs advertise Null Selector Clears Base in CPUID. */ - if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000021 && - cpuid_eax(0x80000021) & BIT(6)) + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE)) return; /* @@ -1715,33 +1936,21 @@ static void generic_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { c->extended_cpuid_level = 0; - if (!have_cpuid_p()) + if (!cpuid_feature()) identify_cpu_without_cpuid(c); /* cyrix could have cpuid enabled via c_identify()*/ - if (!have_cpuid_p()) + if (!cpuid_feature()) return; cpu_detect(c); get_cpu_vendor(c); - + intel_unlock_cpuid_leafs(c); get_cpu_cap(c); get_cpu_address_sizes(c); - if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000001) { - c->initial_apicid = (cpuid_ebx(1) >> 24) & 0xFF; -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 -# ifdef CONFIG_SMP - c->apicid = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, 0); -# else - c->apicid = c->initial_apicid; -# endif -#endif - c->phys_proc_id = c->initial_apicid; - } - get_model_name(c); /* Default name */ /* @@ -1763,28 +1972,6 @@ static void generic_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } /* - * Validate that ACPI/mptables have the same information about the - * effective APIC id and update the package map. - */ -static void validate_apic_and_package_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_SMP - unsigned int apicid, cpu = smp_processor_id(); - - apicid = apic->cpu_present_to_apicid(cpu); - - if (apicid != c->apicid) { - pr_err(FW_BUG "CPU%u: APIC id mismatch. Firmware: %x APIC: %x\n", - cpu, apicid, c->initial_apicid); - } - BUG_ON(topology_update_package_map(c->phys_proc_id, cpu)); - BUG_ON(topology_update_die_map(c->cpu_die_id, cpu)); -#else - c->logical_proc_id = 0; -#endif -} - -/* * This does the hard work of actually picking apart the CPU stuff... */ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) @@ -1797,9 +1984,6 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_model = c->x86_stepping = 0; /* So far unknown... */ c->x86_vendor_id[0] = '\0'; /* Unset */ c->x86_model_id[0] = '\0'; /* Unset */ - c->x86_max_cores = 1; - c->x86_coreid_bits = 0; - c->cu_id = 0xff; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 c->x86_clflush_size = 64; c->x86_phys_bits = 36; @@ -1818,15 +2002,19 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) generic_identify(c); + cpu_parse_topology(c); + if (this_cpu->c_identify) this_cpu->c_identify(c); /* Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, after probe */ apply_forced_caps(c); -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - c->apicid = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, 0); -#endif + /* + * Set default APIC and TSC_DEADLINE MSR fencing flag. AMD and + * Hygon will clear it in ->c_init() below. + */ + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_APIC_MSRS_FENCE); /* * Vendor-specific initialization. In this section we @@ -1841,13 +2029,15 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (this_cpu->c_init) this_cpu->c_init(c); + bus_lock_init(); + /* Disable the PN if appropriate */ squash_the_stupid_serial_number(c); - /* Set up SMEP/SMAP/UMIP */ setup_smep(c); setup_smap(c); setup_umip(c); + setup_lass(c); /* Enable FSGSBASE instructions if available. */ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) { @@ -1863,6 +2053,9 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* Filter out anything that depends on CPUID levels we don't have */ filter_cpuid_features(c, true); + /* Check for unmet dependencies based on the CPUID dependency table */ + check_cpufeature_deps(c); + /* If the model name is still unset, do table lookup. */ if (!c->x86_model_id[0]) { const char *p; @@ -1875,10 +2068,6 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86, c->x86_model); } -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - detect_ht(c); -#endif - x86_init_rdrand(c); setup_pku(c); setup_cet(c); @@ -1910,11 +2099,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* Init Machine Check Exception if available. */ mcheck_cpu_init(c); - select_idle_routine(c); - -#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA numa_add_cpu(smp_processor_id()); -#endif } /* @@ -1939,41 +2124,50 @@ void enable_sep_cpu(void) */ tss->x86_tss.ss1 = __KERNEL_CS; - wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, tss->x86_tss.ss1, 0); - wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1), 0); - wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, (unsigned long)entry_SYSENTER_32, 0); + wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, tss->x86_tss.ss1); + wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1)); + wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, (unsigned long)entry_SYSENTER_32); put_cpu(); } #endif -void __init identify_boot_cpu(void) +static __init void identify_boot_cpu(void) { identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data); if (HAS_KERNEL_IBT && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) pr_info("CET detected: Indirect Branch Tracking enabled\n"); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 - sysenter_setup(); enable_sep_cpu(); #endif cpu_detect_tlb(&boot_cpu_data); setup_cr_pinning(); tsx_init(); + tdx_init(); + lkgs_init(); } -void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +void identify_secondary_cpu(unsigned int cpu) { - BUG_ON(c == &boot_cpu_data); + struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu); + + /* Copy boot_cpu_data only on the first bringup */ + if (!c->initialized) + *c = boot_cpu_data; + c->cpu_index = cpu; + identify_cpu(c); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 enable_sep_cpu(); #endif - validate_apic_and_package_id(c); x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(); update_srbds_msr(); + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS)) + update_gds_msr(); tsx_ap_init(); + c->initialized = true; } void print_cpu_info(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) @@ -2004,28 +2198,42 @@ void print_cpu_info(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } /* - * clearcpuid= was already parsed in cpu_parse_early_param(). This dummy - * function prevents it from becoming an environment variable for init. + * clearcpuid= and setcpuid= were already parsed in cpu_parse_early_param(). + * These dummy functions prevent them from becoming an environment variable for + * init. */ + static __init int setup_clearcpuid(char *arg) { return 1; } __setup("clearcpuid=", setup_clearcpuid); -DEFINE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(struct pcpu_hot, pcpu_hot) = { - .current_task = &init_task, - .preempt_count = INIT_PREEMPT_COUNT, - .top_of_stack = TOP_OF_INIT_STACK, -}; -EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(pcpu_hot); +static __init int setup_setcpuid(char *arg) +{ + return 1; +} +__setup("setcpuid=", setup_setcpuid); + +DEFINE_PER_CPU_CACHE_HOT(struct task_struct *, current_task) = &init_task; +EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(current_task); +EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(const_current_task); + +DEFINE_PER_CPU_CACHE_HOT(int, __preempt_count) = INIT_PREEMPT_COUNT; +EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__preempt_count); + +DEFINE_PER_CPU_CACHE_HOT(unsigned long, cpu_current_top_of_stack) = TOP_OF_INIT_STACK; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -DEFINE_PER_CPU_FIRST(struct fixed_percpu_data, - fixed_percpu_data) __aligned(PAGE_SIZE) __visible; -EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(fixed_percpu_data); +/* + * Note: Do not make this dependant on CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING + * so that this space is reserved in the hot cache section even when the + * mitigation is disabled. + */ +DEFINE_PER_CPU_CACHE_HOT(u64, __x86_call_depth); +EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__x86_call_depth); -static void wrmsrl_cstar(unsigned long val) +static void wrmsrq_cstar(unsigned long val) { /* * Intel CPUs do not support 32-bit SYSCALL. Writing to MSR_CSTAR @@ -2033,39 +2241,37 @@ static void wrmsrl_cstar(unsigned long val) * guest. Avoid the pointless write on all Intel CPUs. */ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) - wrmsrl(MSR_CSTAR, val); + wrmsrq(MSR_CSTAR, val); } -/* May not be marked __init: used by software suspend */ -void syscall_init(void) +static inline void idt_syscall_init(void) { - wrmsr(MSR_STAR, 0, (__USER32_CS << 16) | __KERNEL_CS); - wrmsrl(MSR_LSTAR, (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64); + wrmsrq(MSR_LSTAR, (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64); -#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - wrmsrl_cstar((unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_compat); - /* - * This only works on Intel CPUs. - * On AMD CPUs these MSRs are 32-bit, CPU truncates MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP. - * This does not cause SYSENTER to jump to the wrong location, because - * AMD doesn't allow SYSENTER in long mode (either 32- or 64-bit). - */ - wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, (u64)__KERNEL_CS); - wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, - (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(smp_processor_id()) + 1)); - wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, (u64)entry_SYSENTER_compat); -#else - wrmsrl_cstar((unsigned long)ignore_sysret); - wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, (u64)GDT_ENTRY_INVALID_SEG); - wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 0ULL); - wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 0ULL); -#endif + if (ia32_enabled()) { + wrmsrq_cstar((unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_compat); + /* + * This only works on Intel CPUs. + * On AMD CPUs these MSRs are 32-bit, CPU truncates MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP. + * This does not cause SYSENTER to jump to the wrong location, because + * AMD doesn't allow SYSENTER in long mode (either 32- or 64-bit). + */ + wrmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, (u64)__KERNEL_CS); + wrmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, + (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(smp_processor_id()) + 1)); + wrmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, (u64)entry_SYSENTER_compat); + } else { + wrmsrq_cstar((unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL32_ignore); + wrmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, (u64)GDT_ENTRY_INVALID_SEG); + wrmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 0ULL); + wrmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 0ULL); + } /* * Flags to clear on syscall; clear as much as possible * to minimize user space-kernel interference. */ - wrmsrl(MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, + wrmsrq(MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, X86_EFLAGS_CF|X86_EFLAGS_PF|X86_EFLAGS_AF| X86_EFLAGS_ZF|X86_EFLAGS_SF|X86_EFLAGS_TF| X86_EFLAGS_IF|X86_EFLAGS_DF|X86_EFLAGS_OF| @@ -2073,29 +2279,41 @@ void syscall_init(void) X86_EFLAGS_AC|X86_EFLAGS_ID); } -#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ +/* May not be marked __init: used by software suspend */ +void syscall_init(void) +{ + /* The default user and kernel segments */ + wrmsr(MSR_STAR, 0, (__USER32_CS << 16) | __KERNEL_CS); + + /* + * Except the IA32_STAR MSR, there is NO need to setup SYSCALL and + * SYSENTER MSRs for FRED, because FRED uses the ring 3 FRED + * entrypoint for SYSCALL and SYSENTER, and ERETU is the only legit + * instruction to return to ring 3 (both sysexit and sysret cause + * #UD when FRED is enabled). + */ + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) + idt_syscall_init(); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ #ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR -DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, __stack_chk_guard); +DEFINE_PER_CPU_CACHE_HOT(unsigned long, __stack_chk_guard); +#ifndef CONFIG_SMP EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_guard); #endif +#endif -#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ - -/* - * Clear all 6 debug registers: - */ -static void clear_all_debug_regs(void) +static void initialize_debug_regs(void) { - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - /* Ignore db4, db5 */ - if ((i == 4) || (i == 5)) - continue; - - set_debugreg(0, i); - } + /* Control register first -- to make sure everything is disabled. */ + set_debugreg(DR7_FIXED_1, 7); + set_debugreg(DR6_RESERVED, 6); + /* dr5 and dr4 don't exist */ + set_debugreg(0, 3); + set_debugreg(0, 2); + set_debugreg(0, 1); + set_debugreg(0, 0); } #ifdef CONFIG_KGDB @@ -2112,27 +2330,13 @@ static void dbg_restore_debug_regs(void) #define dbg_restore_debug_regs() #endif /* ! CONFIG_KGDB */ -static void wait_for_master_cpu(int cpu) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_SMP - /* - * wait for ACK from master CPU before continuing - * with AP initialization - */ - WARN_ON(cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(cpu, cpu_initialized_mask)); - while (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpu_callout_mask)) - cpu_relax(); -#endif -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 static inline void setup_getcpu(int cpu) { unsigned long cpudata = vdso_encode_cpunode(cpu, early_cpu_to_node(cpu)); struct desc_struct d = { }; if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDPID)) - wrmsr(MSR_TSC_AUX, cpudata, 0); + wrmsrq(MSR_TSC_AUX, cpudata); /* Store CPU and node number in limit. */ d.limit0 = cpudata; @@ -2147,12 +2351,7 @@ static inline void setup_getcpu(int cpu) write_gdt_entry(get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu), GDT_ENTRY_CPUNODE, &d, DESCTYPE_S); } -static inline void ucode_cpu_init(int cpu) -{ - if (cpu) - load_ucode_ap(); -} - +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 static inline void tss_setup_ist(struct tss_struct *tss) { /* Set up the per-CPU TSS IST stacks */ @@ -2163,18 +2362,8 @@ static inline void tss_setup_ist(struct tss_struct *tss) /* Only mapped when SEV-ES is active */ tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC); } - #else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ - -static inline void setup_getcpu(int cpu) { } - -static inline void ucode_cpu_init(int cpu) -{ - show_ucode_info_early(); -} - static inline void tss_setup_ist(struct tss_struct *tss) { } - #endif /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */ static inline void tss_setup_io_bitmap(struct tss_struct *tss) @@ -2197,7 +2386,7 @@ static inline void tss_setup_io_bitmap(struct tss_struct *tss) * Setup everything needed to handle exceptions from the IDT, including the IST * exceptions which use paranoid_entry(). */ -void cpu_init_exception_handling(void) +void cpu_init_exception_handling(bool boot_cpu) { struct tss_struct *tss = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tss_rw); int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); @@ -2205,8 +2394,9 @@ void cpu_init_exception_handling(void) /* paranoid_entry() gets the CPU number from the GDT */ setup_getcpu(cpu); - /* IST vectors need TSS to be set up. */ - tss_setup_ist(tss); + /* For IDT mode, IST vectors need to be set in TSS. */ + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) + tss_setup_ist(tss); tss_setup_io_bitmap(tss); set_tss_desc(cpu, &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss.x86_tss); @@ -2215,8 +2405,23 @@ void cpu_init_exception_handling(void) /* GHCB needs to be setup to handle #VC. */ setup_ghcb(); - /* Finally load the IDT */ - load_current_idt(); + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) { + /* The boot CPU has enabled FRED during early boot */ + if (!boot_cpu) + cpu_init_fred_exceptions(); + + cpu_init_fred_rsps(); + } else { + load_current_idt(); + } +} + +void __init cpu_init_replace_early_idt(void) +{ + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) + cpu_init_fred_exceptions(); + else + idt_setup_early_pf(); } /* @@ -2230,10 +2435,6 @@ void cpu_init(void) struct task_struct *cur = current; int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); - wait_for_master_cpu(cpu); - - ucode_cpu_init(cpu); - #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA if (this_cpu_read(numa_node) == 0 && early_cpu_to_node(cpu) != NUMA_NO_NODE) @@ -2250,11 +2451,13 @@ void cpu_init(void) memset(cur->thread.tls_array, 0, GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * 8); syscall_init(); - wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, 0); - wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, 0); + wrmsrq(MSR_FS_BASE, 0); + wrmsrq(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, 0); barrier(); x2apic_setup(); + + intel_posted_msi_init(); } mmgrab(&init_mm); @@ -2271,56 +2474,58 @@ void cpu_init(void) load_mm_ldt(&init_mm); - clear_all_debug_regs(); + initialize_debug_regs(); dbg_restore_debug_regs(); doublefault_init_cpu_tss(); - fpu__init_cpu(); - if (is_uv_system()) uv_cpu_init(); load_fixmap_gdt(cpu); } -#ifdef CONFIG_SMP -void cpu_init_secondary(void) +#ifdef CONFIG_MICROCODE_LATE_LOADING +/** + * store_cpu_caps() - Store a snapshot of CPU capabilities + * @curr_info: Pointer where to store it + * + * Returns: None + */ +void store_cpu_caps(struct cpuinfo_x86 *curr_info) { - /* - * Relies on the BP having set-up the IDT tables, which are loaded - * on this CPU in cpu_init_exception_handling(). - */ - cpu_init_exception_handling(); - cpu_init(); + /* Reload CPUID max function as it might've changed. */ + curr_info->cpuid_level = cpuid_eax(0); + + /* Copy all capability leafs and pick up the synthetic ones. */ + memcpy(&curr_info->x86_capability, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability, + sizeof(curr_info->x86_capability)); + + /* Get the hardware CPUID leafs */ + get_cpu_cap(curr_info); } -#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_MICROCODE_LATE_LOADING -/* +/** + * microcode_check() - Check if any CPU capabilities changed after an update. + * @prev_info: CPU capabilities stored before an update. + * * The microcode loader calls this upon late microcode load to recheck features, - * only when microcode has been updated. Caller holds microcode_mutex and CPU - * hotplug lock. + * only when microcode has been updated. Caller holds and CPU hotplug lock. + * + * Return: None */ -void microcode_check(void) +void microcode_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *prev_info) { - struct cpuinfo_x86 info; + struct cpuinfo_x86 curr_info; perf_check_microcode(); - /* Reload CPUID max function as it might've changed. */ - info.cpuid_level = cpuid_eax(0); + amd_check_microcode(); - /* - * Copy all capability leafs to pick up the synthetic ones so that - * memcmp() below doesn't fail on that. The ones coming from CPUID will - * get overwritten in get_cpu_cap(). - */ - memcpy(&info.x86_capability, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability, sizeof(info.x86_capability)); - - get_cpu_cap(&info); + store_cpu_caps(&curr_info); - if (!memcmp(&info.x86_capability, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability, sizeof(info.x86_capability))) + if (!memcmp(&prev_info->x86_capability, &curr_info.x86_capability, + sizeof(prev_info->x86_capability))) return; pr_warn("x86/CPU: CPU features have changed after loading microcode, but might not take effect.\n"); @@ -2338,3 +2543,95 @@ void arch_smt_update(void) /* Check whether IPI broadcasting can be enabled */ apic_smt_update(); } + +void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) +{ + struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_info); + + identify_boot_cpu(); + + select_idle_routine(); + + /* + * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the + * core code know. + */ + cpu_smt_set_num_threads(__max_threads_per_core, __max_threads_per_core); + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) { + pr_info("CPU: "); + print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data); + } + + cpu_select_mitigations(); + + arch_smt_update(); + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) { + /* + * Check whether this is a real i386 which is not longer + * supported and fixup the utsname. + */ + if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4) + panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features"); + + init_utsname()->machine[1] = + '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86); + } + + /* + * Must be before alternatives because it might set or clear + * feature bits. + */ + fpu__init_system(); + fpu__init_cpu(); + + /* + * This needs to follow the FPU initializtion, since EFI depends on it. + */ + if (efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES)) + efi_enter_virtual_mode(); + + /* + * Ensure that access to the per CPU representation has the initial + * boot CPU configuration. + */ + *c = boot_cpu_data; + c->initialized = true; + + alternative_instructions(); + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) { + USER_PTR_MAX = TASK_SIZE_MAX; + + /* + * Enable this when LAM is gated on LASS support + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LAM)) + USER_PTR_MAX = (1ul << 63) - PAGE_SIZE; + */ + runtime_const_init(ptr, USER_PTR_MAX); + + /* + * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages + * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping + * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs. + * + * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems + * very little benefit for that case. + */ + if (!direct_gbpages) + set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1); + } else { + fpu__init_check_bugs(); + } + + /* + * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA + * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will + * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will + * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It + * must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64 + * hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted. + */ + mem_encrypt_init(); +} |