diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/apic/Makefile | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 2 |
16 files changed, 31 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index 95e21596e2f9..55e205b21271 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -1906,7 +1906,7 @@ static void *__text_poke(text_poke_f func, void *addr, const void *src, size_t l * Note that the caller must ensure that if the modified code is part of a * module, the module would not be removed during poking. This can be achieved * by registering a module notifier, and ordering module removal and patching - * trough a mutex. + * through a mutex. */ void *text_poke(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c index 56a917df410d..2ae98f754e59 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c @@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ int __init gart_iommu_init(void) iommu_size >> PAGE_SHIFT); /* * Tricky. The GART table remaps the physical memory range, - * so the CPU wont notice potential aliases and if the memory + * so the CPU won't notice potential aliases and if the memory * is remapped to UC later on, we might surprise the PCI devices * with a stray writeout of a cacheline. So play it sure and * do an explicit, full-scale wbinvd() _after_ having marked all diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/Makefile index 2ee867d796d9..3bf0487cf3b7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/Makefile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # # Leads to non-deterministic coverage that is not a function of syscall inputs. -# In particualr, smp_apic_timer_interrupt() is called in random places. +# In particular, smp_apic_timer_interrupt() is called in random places. KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n obj-$(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) += apic.o apic_common.o apic_noop.o ipi.o vector.o init.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c index 41093cf20acd..4667bc4b00ab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c @@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ bool __init apic_needs_pit(void) /* * If interrupt delivery mode is legacy PIC or virtual wire without - * configuration, the local APIC timer wont be set up. Make sure + * configuration, the local APIC timer won't be set up. Make sure * that the PIT is initialized. */ if (apic_intr_mode == APIC_PIC || diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c index 319448d87b99..185738c72766 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c @@ -738,8 +738,8 @@ int __init arch_probe_nr_irqs(void) void lapic_assign_legacy_vector(unsigned int irq, bool replace) { /* - * Use assign system here so it wont get accounted as allocated - * and moveable in the cpu hotplug check and it prevents managed + * Use assign system here so it won't get accounted as allocated + * and movable in the cpu hotplug check and it prevents managed * irq reservation from touching it. */ irq_matrix_assign_system(vector_matrix, ISA_IRQ_VECTOR(irq), replace); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c index 2d6aa5d2e3d7..d3524778a545 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c @@ -428,6 +428,10 @@ void __init mtrr_copy_map(void) * from the x86_init.hyper.init_platform() hook. It can be called only once. * The MTRR state can't be changed afterwards. To ensure that, X86_FEATURE_MTRR * is cleared. + * + * @var: MTRR variable range array to use + * @num_var: length of the @var array + * @def_type: default caching type */ void mtrr_overwrite_state(struct mtrr_var_range *var, unsigned int num_var, mtrr_type def_type) @@ -492,13 +496,15 @@ static u8 type_merge(u8 type, u8 new_type, u8 *uniform) /** * mtrr_type_lookup - look up memory type in MTRR * + * @start: Begin of the physical address range + * @end: End of the physical address range + * @uniform: output argument: + * - 1: the returned MTRR type is valid for the whole region + * - 0: otherwise + * * Return Values: * MTRR_TYPE_(type) - The effective MTRR type for the region * MTRR_TYPE_INVALID - MTRR is disabled - * - * Output Argument: - * uniform - Set to 1 when the returned MTRR type is valid for the whole - * region, set to 0 else. */ u8 mtrr_type_lookup(u64 start, u64 end, u8 *uniform) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 5d390df21440..b65ab214bdf5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ err_out: * * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match - * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct. + * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is calculated from the provided sigstruct. * * Return: * - 0: Success. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c index a21a4d0ecc34..520deb411a70 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c @@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_update_guest_xfd); * Must be invoked from KVM after a VMEXIT before enabling interrupts when * XFD write emulation is disabled. This is required because the guest can * freely modify XFD and the state at VMEXIT is not guaranteed to be the - * same as the state on VMENTER. So software state has to be udpated before + * same as the state on VMENTER. So software state has to be updated before * any operation which depends on it can take place. * * Note: It can be invoked unconditionally even when write emulation is diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S index f479e5e793a2..d4918d03efb4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) /* Enable PAE mode, PSE, PGE and LA57 */ orl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PGE), %ecx #ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL - testl $1, __pgtable_l5_enabled(%rip) + testb $1, __pgtable_l5_enabled(%rip) jz 1f orl $X86_CR4_LA57, %ecx 1: @@ -218,9 +218,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) * Switch to new page-table * * For the boot CPU this switches to early_top_pgt which still has the - * indentity mappings present. The secondary CPUs will switch to the + * identity mappings present. The secondary CPUs will switch to the * init_top_pgt here, away from the trampoline_pgd and unmap the - * indentity mapped ranges. + * identity mapped ranges. */ movq %rax, %cr3 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c index 41eecf180b7f..8ff2bf921519 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c @@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ static void __init hpet_select_clockevents(void) hpet_base.nr_clockevents = 0; - /* No point if MSI is disabled or CPU has an Always Runing APIC Timer */ + /* No point if MSI is disabled or CPU has an Always Running APIC Timer */ if (hpet_msi_disable || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARAT)) return; @@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ static bool __init mwait_pc10_supported(void) * and per CPU timer interrupts. * * The probability that this problem is going to be solved in the - * forseeable future is close to zero, so the kernel has to be cluttered + * foreseeable future is close to zero, so the kernel has to be cluttered * with heuristics to keep up with the ever growing amount of hardware and * firmware trainwrecks. Hopefully some day hardware people will understand * that the approach of "This can be fixed in software" is not sustainable. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c index c461c1a4b6af..dfe9945b9bec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c @@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ static void __init kvm_init_platform(void) * Reset the host's shared pages list related to kernel * specific page encryption status settings before we load a * new kernel by kexec. Reset the page encryption status - * during early boot intead of just before kexec to avoid SMP + * during early boot instead of just before kexec to avoid SMP * races during kvm_pv_guest_cpu_reboot(). * NOTE: We cannot reset the complete shared pages list * here as we need to retain the UEFI/OVMF firmware diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c index fb8f52149be9..a95d0900e8c6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static int __init parse_no_kvmclock_vsyscall(char *arg) } early_param("no-kvmclock-vsyscall", parse_no_kvmclock_vsyscall); -/* Aligned to page sizes to match whats mapped via vsyscalls to userspace */ +/* Aligned to page sizes to match what's mapped via vsyscalls to userspace */ #define HVC_BOOT_ARRAY_SIZE \ (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info)) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c index adc67f98819a..7a814b41402d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ * This handles calls from both 32bit and 64bit mode. * * Lock order: - * contex.ldt_usr_sem + * context.ldt_usr_sem * mmap_lock * context.lock */ @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ void load_mm_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm) /* * Any change to mm->context.ldt is followed by an IPI to all * CPUs with the mm active. The LDT will not be freed until - * after the IPI is handled by all such CPUs. This means that, + * after the IPI is handled by all such CPUs. This means that * if the ldt_struct changes before we return, the values we see * will be safe, and the new values will be loaded before we run * any user code. @@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(modify_ldt, int , func , void __user * , ptr , } /* * The SYSCALL_DEFINE() macros give us an 'unsigned long' - * return type, but tht ABI for sys_modify_ldt() expects + * return type, but the ABI for sys_modify_ldt() expects * 'int'. This cast gives us an int-sized value in %rax * for the return code. The 'unsigned' is necessary so * the compiler does not try to sign-extend the negative diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index b6f4e8399fca..ab49ade31b0d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ void native_tss_update_io_bitmap(void) /* * Make sure that the TSS limit is covering the IO bitmap. It might have * been cut down by a VMEXIT to 0x67 which would cause a subsequent I/O - * access from user space to trigger a #GP because tbe bitmap is outside + * access from user space to trigger a #GP because the bitmap is outside * the TSS limit. */ refresh_tss_limit(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index 1526747bedf2..ec2c21a1844e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -226,8 +226,6 @@ static void __init reserve_brk(void) _brk_start = 0; } -u64 relocated_ramdisk; - #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD static u64 __init get_ramdisk_image(void) @@ -261,7 +259,7 @@ static void __init relocate_initrd(void) u64 area_size = PAGE_ALIGN(ramdisk_size); /* We need to move the initrd down into directly mapped mem */ - relocated_ramdisk = memblock_phys_alloc_range(area_size, PAGE_SIZE, 0, + u64 relocated_ramdisk = memblock_phys_alloc_range(area_size, PAGE_SIZE, 0, PFN_PHYS(max_pfn_mapped)); if (!relocated_ramdisk) panic("Cannot find place for new RAMDISK of size %lld\n", diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c index ccb0915e84e1..1d24ec679915 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static void __noreturn sev_es_terminate(unsigned int set, unsigned int reason) /* Tell the hypervisor what went wrong. */ val |= GHCB_SEV_TERM_REASON(set, reason); - /* Request Guest Termination from Hypvervisor */ + /* Request Guest Termination from Hypervisor */ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(val); VMGEXIT(); |