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Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c454
1 files changed, 252 insertions, 202 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 4fefb219bfdc..e5b177c8e842 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -8,18 +8,17 @@
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKEY: "fmt
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <crypto/sig.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
-#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
-#include <linux/asn1.h>
-#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
-#include <crypto/public_key.h>
-#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
-#include <crypto/sm2.h>
-#include <crypto/sm3_base.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("In-software asymmetric public-key subtype");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
@@ -43,7 +42,7 @@ static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key,
void public_key_free(struct public_key *key)
{
if (key) {
- kfree(key->key);
+ kfree_sensitive(key->key);
kfree(key->params);
kfree(key);
}
@@ -60,39 +59,96 @@ static void public_key_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3)
}
/*
- * Determine the crypto algorithm name.
+ * Given a public_key, and an encoding and hash_algo to be used for signing
+ * and/or verification with that key, determine the name of the corresponding
+ * akcipher algorithm. Also check that encoding and hash_algo are allowed.
*/
-static
-int software_key_determine_akcipher(const char *encoding,
- const char *hash_algo,
- const struct public_key *pkey,
- char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME])
+static int
+software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey,
+ const char *encoding, const char *hash_algo,
+ char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME], bool *sig,
+ enum kernel_pkey_operation op)
{
int n;
- if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) {
- /* The data wangled by the RSA algorithm is typically padded
- * and encoded in some manner, such as EMSA-PKCS1-1_5 [RFC3447
- * sec 8.2].
+ *sig = true;
+
+ if (!encoding)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "rsa") == 0) {
+ /*
+ * RSA signatures usually use EMSA-PKCS1-1_5 [RFC3447 sec 8.2].
+ */
+ if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) {
+ *sig = op == kernel_pkey_sign ||
+ op == kernel_pkey_verify;
+ if (!*sig) {
+ /*
+ * For encrypt/decrypt, hash_algo is not used
+ * but allowed to be set for historic reasons.
+ */
+ n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+ "pkcs1pad(%s)",
+ pkey->pkey_algo);
+ } else {
+ if (!hash_algo)
+ hash_algo = "none";
+ n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+ "pkcs1(%s,%s)",
+ pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo);
+ }
+ return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * Raw RSA cannot differentiate between different hash
+ * algorithms.
+ */
+ if (hash_algo)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *sig = false;
+ } else if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(encoding, "x962") != 0 &&
+ strcmp(encoding, "p1363") != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * ECDSA signatures are taken over a raw hash, so they don't
+ * differentiate between different hash algorithms. That means
+ * that the verifier should hard-code a specific hash algorithm.
+ * Unfortunately, in practice ECDSA is used with multiple SHAs,
+ * so we have to allow all of them and not just one.
*/
if (!hash_algo)
- n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
- "pkcs1pad(%s)",
- pkey->pkey_algo);
- else
- n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
- "pkcs1pad(%s,%s)",
- pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sha1") != 0 &&
+ strcmp(hash_algo, "sha224") != 0 &&
+ strcmp(hash_algo, "sha256") != 0 &&
+ strcmp(hash_algo, "sha384") != 0 &&
+ strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0 &&
+ strcmp(hash_algo, "sha3-256") != 0 &&
+ strcmp(hash_algo, "sha3-384") != 0 &&
+ strcmp(hash_algo, "sha3-512") != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s(%s)",
+ encoding, pkey->pkey_algo);
return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0;
+ } else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!hash_algo)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog256") != 0 &&
+ strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog512") != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ /* Unknown public key algorithm */
+ return -ENOPKG;
}
-
- if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") == 0 ||
- strcmp(encoding, "x962") == 0) {
- strcpy(alg_name, pkey->pkey_algo);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return -ENOPKG;
+ if (strscpy(alg_name, pkey->pkey_algo, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
}
static u8 *pkey_pack_u32(u8 *dst, u32 val)
@@ -107,57 +163,100 @@ static u8 *pkey_pack_u32(u8 *dst, u32 val)
static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
struct kernel_pkey_query *info)
{
- struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
struct public_key *pkey = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
u8 *key, *ptr;
int ret, len;
+ bool issig;
- ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(params->encoding,
- params->hash_algo,
- pkey, alg_name);
+ ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding,
+ params->hash_algo, alg_name,
+ &issig, kernel_pkey_sign);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm))
- return PTR_ERR(tfm);
-
- ret = -ENOMEM;
key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key)
- goto error_free_tfm;
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
ptr = key + pkey->keylen;
ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo);
ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen);
memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen);
- if (pkey->key_is_private)
- ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
- else
- ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error_free_key;
+ memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
- len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
- info->key_size = len * 8;
- info->max_data_size = len;
- info->max_sig_size = len;
- info->max_enc_size = len;
- info->max_dec_size = len;
- info->supported_ops = (KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT |
- KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_VERIFY);
- if (pkey->key_is_private)
- info->supported_ops |= (KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT |
- KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_SIGN);
- ret = 0;
+ if (issig) {
+ struct crypto_sig *sig;
+
+ sig = crypto_alloc_sig(alg_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(sig)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(sig);
+ goto error_free_key;
+ }
+
+ if (pkey->key_is_private)
+ ret = crypto_sig_set_privkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
+ else
+ ret = crypto_sig_set_pubkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_free_sig;
+
+ len = crypto_sig_keysize(sig);
+ info->key_size = len;
+ info->max_sig_size = crypto_sig_maxsize(sig);
+ info->max_data_size = crypto_sig_digestsize(sig);
+
+ info->supported_ops = KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_VERIFY;
+ if (pkey->key_is_private)
+ info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_SIGN;
+
+ if (strcmp(params->encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) {
+ info->max_enc_size = len / BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ info->max_dec_size = len / BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+ info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT;
+ if (pkey->key_is_private)
+ info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT;
+ }
+
+error_free_sig:
+ crypto_free_sig(sig);
+ } else {
+ struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ goto error_free_key;
+ }
+
+ if (pkey->key_is_private)
+ ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
+ else
+ ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_free_akcipher;
+
+ len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
+ info->key_size = len * BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ info->max_sig_size = len;
+ info->max_data_size = len;
+ info->max_enc_size = len;
+ info->max_dec_size = len;
+
+ info->supported_ops = KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT;
+ if (pkey->key_is_private)
+ info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT;
+
+error_free_akcipher:
+ crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
+ }
error_free_key:
- kfree(key);
-error_free_tfm:
- crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
+ kfree_sensitive(key);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -169,35 +268,25 @@ static int software_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, void *out)
{
const struct public_key *pkey = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
- struct akcipher_request *req;
- struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
- struct crypto_wait cwait;
- struct scatterlist in_sg, out_sg;
char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
+ struct crypto_sig *sig;
char *key, *ptr;
+ bool issig;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
- ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(params->encoding,
- params->hash_algo,
- pkey, alg_name);
+ ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding,
+ params->hash_algo, alg_name,
+ &issig, params->op);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm))
- return PTR_ERR(tfm);
-
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req)
- goto error_free_tfm;
-
key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key)
- goto error_free_req;
+ return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
ptr = key + pkey->keylen;
@@ -205,118 +294,84 @@ static int software_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen);
memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen);
- if (pkey->key_is_private)
- ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
- else
- ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
- if (ret)
- goto error_free_key;
+ if (issig) {
+ sig = crypto_alloc_sig(alg_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(sig)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(sig);
+ goto error_free_key;
+ }
- sg_init_one(&in_sg, in, params->in_len);
- sg_init_one(&out_sg, out, params->out_len);
- akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &in_sg, &out_sg, params->in_len,
- params->out_len);
- crypto_init_wait(&cwait);
- akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
- CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
- crypto_req_done, &cwait);
+ if (pkey->key_is_private)
+ ret = crypto_sig_set_privkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
+ else
+ ret = crypto_sig_set_pubkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto error_free_tfm;
+ } else {
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ goto error_free_key;
+ }
+
+ if (pkey->key_is_private)
+ ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
+ else
+ ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto error_free_tfm;
+ }
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
/* Perform the encryption calculation. */
switch (params->op) {
case kernel_pkey_encrypt:
- ret = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(req);
+ if (issig)
+ break;
+ ret = crypto_akcipher_sync_encrypt(tfm, in, params->in_len,
+ out, params->out_len);
break;
case kernel_pkey_decrypt:
- ret = crypto_akcipher_decrypt(req);
+ if (issig)
+ break;
+ ret = crypto_akcipher_sync_decrypt(tfm, in, params->in_len,
+ out, params->out_len);
break;
case kernel_pkey_sign:
- ret = crypto_akcipher_sign(req);
+ if (!issig)
+ break;
+ ret = crypto_sig_sign(sig, in, params->in_len,
+ out, params->out_len);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
- ret = crypto_wait_req(ret, &cwait);
- if (ret == 0)
- ret = req->dst_len;
+ if (!issig && ret == 0)
+ ret = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
-error_free_key:
- kfree(key);
-error_free_req:
- akcipher_request_free(req);
error_free_tfm:
- crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
+ if (issig)
+ crypto_free_sig(sig);
+ else
+ crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
+error_free_key:
+ kfree_sensitive(key);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
-#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2)
-static int cert_sig_digest_update(const struct public_key_signature *sig,
- struct crypto_akcipher *tfm_pkey)
-{
- struct crypto_shash *tfm;
- struct shash_desc *desc;
- size_t desc_size;
- unsigned char dgst[SM3_DIGEST_SIZE];
- int ret;
-
- BUG_ON(!sig->data);
-
- ret = sm2_compute_z_digest(tfm_pkey, SM2_DEFAULT_USERID,
- SM2_DEFAULT_USERID_LEN, dgst);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm))
- return PTR_ERR(tfm);
-
- desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
- desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!desc) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto error_free_tfm;
- }
-
- desc->tfm = tfm;
-
- ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error_free_desc;
-
- ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, dgst, SM3_DIGEST_SIZE);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error_free_desc;
-
- ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sig->data, sig->data_size, sig->digest);
-
-error_free_desc:
- kfree(desc);
-error_free_tfm:
- crypto_free_shash(tfm);
- return ret;
-}
-#else
-static inline int cert_sig_digest_update(
- const struct public_key_signature *sig,
- struct crypto_akcipher *tfm_pkey)
-{
- return -ENOTSUPP;
-}
-#endif /* ! IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2) */
-
/*
* Verify a signature using a public key.
*/
int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
const struct public_key_signature *sig)
{
- struct crypto_wait cwait;
- struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
- struct akcipher_request *req;
- struct scatterlist src_sg[2];
char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ struct crypto_sig *tfm;
char *key, *ptr;
+ bool issig;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
@@ -325,25 +380,37 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
BUG_ON(!sig);
BUG_ON(!sig->s);
- ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(sig->encoding,
- sig->hash_algo,
- pkey, alg_name);
+ /*
+ * If the signature specifies a public key algorithm, it *must* match
+ * the key's actual public key algorithm.
+ *
+ * Small exception: ECDSA signatures don't specify the curve, but ECDSA
+ * keys do. So the strings can mismatch slightly in that case:
+ * "ecdsa-nist-*" for the key, but "ecdsa" for the signature.
+ */
+ if (sig->pkey_algo) {
+ if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, sig->pkey_algo) != 0 &&
+ (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6) != 0 ||
+ strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") != 0))
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, sig->encoding,
+ sig->hash_algo, alg_name,
+ &issig, kernel_pkey_verify);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_sig(alg_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req)
- goto error_free_tfm;
-
key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key)
- goto error_free_req;
+ if (!key) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto error_free_tfm;
+ }
memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
ptr = key + pkey->keylen;
@@ -352,36 +419,19 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen);
if (pkey->key_is_private)
- ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
+ ret = crypto_sig_set_privkey(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
else
- ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
+ ret = crypto_sig_set_pubkey(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
if (ret)
goto error_free_key;
- if (sig->pkey_algo && strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 &&
- sig->data_size) {
- ret = cert_sig_digest_update(sig, tfm);
- if (ret)
- goto error_free_key;
- }
-
- sg_init_table(src_sg, 2);
- sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size);
- sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
- akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size,
- sig->digest_size);
- crypto_init_wait(&cwait);
- akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
- CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
- crypto_req_done, &cwait);
- ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait);
+ ret = crypto_sig_verify(tfm, sig->s, sig->s_size,
+ sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
error_free_key:
- kfree(key);
-error_free_req:
- akcipher_request_free(req);
+ kfree_sensitive(key);
error_free_tfm:
- crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
+ crypto_free_sig(tfm);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret > 0))
ret = -EINVAL;