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Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c247
1 files changed, 205 insertions, 42 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
index 787dccca3715..7c880cf34c52 100644
--- a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
+++ b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter --
* Linux Kernel Crypto API specific code
*
- * Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2015
+ * Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2015 - 2023
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -37,53 +37,41 @@
* DAMAGE.
*/
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha3.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/fips.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <crypto/internal/rng.h>
-struct rand_data;
-int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned char *data,
- unsigned int len);
-int jent_entropy_init(void);
-struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr,
- unsigned int flags);
-void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector);
+#include "jitterentropy.h"
+
+#define JENT_CONDITIONING_HASH "sha3-256"
/***************************************************************************
* Helper function
***************************************************************************/
-__u64 jent_rol64(__u64 word, unsigned int shift)
-{
- return rol64(word, shift);
-}
-
-void *jent_zalloc(unsigned int len)
-{
- return kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
-}
-
-void jent_zfree(void *ptr)
+void *jent_kvzalloc(unsigned int len)
{
- kzfree(ptr);
+ return kvzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
}
-int jent_fips_enabled(void)
+void jent_kvzfree(void *ptr, unsigned int len)
{
- return fips_enabled;
+ kvfree_sensitive(ptr, len);
}
-void jent_panic(char *s)
+void *jent_zalloc(unsigned int len)
{
- panic("%s", s);
+ return kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
}
-void jent_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, unsigned int n)
+void jent_zfree(void *ptr)
{
- memcpy(dest, src, n);
+ kfree_sensitive(ptr);
}
/*
@@ -110,6 +98,94 @@ void jent_get_nstime(__u64 *out)
tmp = ktime_get_ns();
*out = tmp;
+ jent_raw_hires_entropy_store(tmp);
+}
+
+int jent_hash_time(void *hash_state, __u64 time, u8 *addtl,
+ unsigned int addtl_len, __u64 hash_loop_cnt,
+ unsigned int stuck)
+{
+ struct shash_desc *hash_state_desc = (struct shash_desc *)hash_state;
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, hash_state_desc->tfm);
+ u8 intermediary[SHA3_256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ __u64 j = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ desc->tfm = hash_state_desc->tfm;
+
+ if (sizeof(intermediary) != crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm)) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("Unexpected digest size\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ kmsan_unpoison_memory(intermediary, sizeof(intermediary));
+
+ /*
+ * This loop fills a buffer which is injected into the entropy pool.
+ * The main reason for this loop is to execute something over which we
+ * can perform a timing measurement. The injection of the resulting
+ * data into the pool is performed to ensure the result is used and
+ * the compiler cannot optimize the loop away in case the result is not
+ * used at all. Yet that data is considered "additional information"
+ * considering the terminology from SP800-90A without any entropy.
+ *
+ * Note, it does not matter which or how much data you inject, we are
+ * interested in one Keccack1600 compression operation performed with
+ * the crypto_shash_final.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < hash_loop_cnt; j++) {
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc) ?:
+ crypto_shash_update(desc, intermediary,
+ sizeof(intermediary)) ?:
+ crypto_shash_finup(desc, addtl, addtl_len, intermediary);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Inject the data from the previous loop into the pool. This data is
+ * not considered to contain any entropy, but it stirs the pool a bit.
+ */
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(hash_state_desc, intermediary, sizeof(intermediary));
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * Insert the time stamp into the hash context representing the pool.
+ *
+ * If the time stamp is stuck, do not finally insert the value into the
+ * entropy pool. Although this operation should not do any harm even
+ * when the time stamp has no entropy, SP800-90B requires that any
+ * conditioning operation to have an identical amount of input data
+ * according to section 3.1.5.
+ */
+ if (stuck) {
+ time = 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(hash_state_desc, (u8 *)&time, sizeof(__u64));
+
+err:
+ shash_desc_zero(desc);
+ memzero_explicit(intermediary, sizeof(intermediary));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int jent_read_random_block(void *hash_state, char *dst, unsigned int dst_len)
+{
+ struct shash_desc *hash_state_desc = (struct shash_desc *)hash_state;
+ u8 jent_block[SHA3_256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ /* Obtain data from entropy pool and re-initialize it */
+ int ret = crypto_shash_final(hash_state_desc, jent_block) ?:
+ crypto_shash_init(hash_state_desc) ?:
+ crypto_shash_update(hash_state_desc, jent_block,
+ sizeof(jent_block));
+
+ if (!ret && dst_len)
+ memcpy(dst, jent_block, dst_len);
+
+ memzero_explicit(jent_block, sizeof(jent_block));
+ return ret;
}
/***************************************************************************
@@ -119,32 +195,76 @@ void jent_get_nstime(__u64 *out)
struct jitterentropy {
spinlock_t jent_lock;
struct rand_data *entropy_collector;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ struct shash_desc *sdesc;
};
-static int jent_kcapi_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+static void jent_kcapi_cleanup(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct jitterentropy *rng = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
- int ret = 0;
- rng->entropy_collector = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(1, 0);
- if (!rng->entropy_collector)
- ret = -ENOMEM;
+ spin_lock(&rng->jent_lock);
- spin_lock_init(&rng->jent_lock);
- return ret;
-}
+ if (rng->sdesc) {
+ shash_desc_zero(rng->sdesc);
+ kfree(rng->sdesc);
+ }
+ rng->sdesc = NULL;
-static void jent_kcapi_cleanup(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
-{
- struct jitterentropy *rng = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ if (rng->tfm)
+ crypto_free_shash(rng->tfm);
+ rng->tfm = NULL;
- spin_lock(&rng->jent_lock);
if (rng->entropy_collector)
jent_entropy_collector_free(rng->entropy_collector);
rng->entropy_collector = NULL;
spin_unlock(&rng->jent_lock);
}
+static int jent_kcapi_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct jitterentropy *rng = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ struct crypto_shash *hash;
+ struct shash_desc *sdesc;
+ int size, ret = 0;
+
+ spin_lock_init(&rng->jent_lock);
+
+ /* Use SHA3-256 as conditioner */
+ hash = crypto_alloc_shash(JENT_CONDITIONING_HASH, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(hash)) {
+ pr_err("Cannot allocate conditioning digest\n");
+ return PTR_ERR(hash);
+ }
+ rng->tfm = hash;
+
+ size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(hash);
+ sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sdesc) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ sdesc->tfm = hash;
+ crypto_shash_init(sdesc);
+ rng->sdesc = sdesc;
+
+ rng->entropy_collector =
+ jent_entropy_collector_alloc(CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_OSR, 0,
+ sdesc);
+ if (!rng->entropy_collector) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ spin_lock_init(&rng->jent_lock);
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ jent_kcapi_cleanup(tfm);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int jent_kcapi_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
u8 *rdata, unsigned int dlen)
@@ -153,7 +273,31 @@ static int jent_kcapi_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
int ret = 0;
spin_lock(&rng->jent_lock);
+
ret = jent_read_entropy(rng->entropy_collector, rdata, dlen);
+
+ if (ret == -3) {
+ /* Handle permanent health test error */
+ /*
+ * If the kernel was booted with fips=1, it implies that
+ * the entire kernel acts as a FIPS 140 module. In this case
+ * an SP800-90B permanent health test error is treated as
+ * a FIPS module error.
+ */
+ if (fips_enabled)
+ panic("Jitter RNG permanent health test failure\n");
+
+ pr_err("Jitter RNG permanent health test failure\n");
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ } else if (ret == -2) {
+ /* Handle intermittent health test error */
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("Reset Jitter RNG due to intermittent health test failure\n");
+ ret = -EAGAIN;
+ } else if (ret == -1) {
+ /* Handle other errors */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
spin_unlock(&rng->jent_lock);
return ret;
@@ -177,16 +321,34 @@ static struct rng_alg jent_alg = {
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
.cra_init = jent_kcapi_init,
.cra_exit = jent_kcapi_cleanup,
-
}
};
static int __init jent_mod_init(void)
{
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
int ret = 0;
- ret = jent_entropy_init();
+ jent_testing_init();
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(JENT_CONDITIONING_HASH, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ jent_testing_exit();
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+ crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ ret = jent_entropy_init(CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_OSR, 0, desc, NULL);
+ shash_desc_zero(desc);
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
if (ret) {
+ /* Handle permanent health test error */
+ if (fips_enabled)
+ panic("jitterentropy: Initialization failed with host not compliant with requirements: %d\n", ret);
+
+ jent_testing_exit();
pr_info("jitterentropy: Initialization failed with host not compliant with requirements: %d\n", ret);
return -EFAULT;
}
@@ -195,6 +357,7 @@ static int __init jent_mod_init(void)
static void __exit jent_mod_exit(void)
{
+ jent_testing_exit();
crypto_unregister_rng(&jent_alg);
}