diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/tpm')
30 files changed, 2001 insertions, 302 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig index 927088b2c3d3..0fc9a510e059 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig @@ -27,6 +27,20 @@ menuconfig TCG_TPM if TCG_TPM +config TCG_TPM2_HMAC + bool "Use HMAC and encrypted transactions on the TPM bus" + default X86_64 + select CRYPTO_ECDH + select CRYPTO_LIB_AESCFB + select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 + help + Setting this causes us to deploy a scheme which uses request + and response HMACs in addition to encryption for + communicating with the TPM to prevent or detect bus snooping + and interposer attacks (see tpm-security.rst). Saying Y + here adds some encryption overhead to all kernel to TPM + transactions. + config HW_RANDOM_TPM bool "TPM HW Random Number Generator support" depends on TCG_TPM && HW_RANDOM && !(TCG_TPM=y && HW_RANDOM=m) @@ -148,7 +162,8 @@ config TCG_NSC config TCG_ATMEL tristate "Atmel TPM Interface" - depends on PPC64 || HAS_IOPORT_MAP + depends on HAS_IOPORT_MAP + depends on HAS_IOPORT help If you have a TPM security chip from Atmel say Yes and it will be accessible from within Linux. To compile this driver @@ -156,7 +171,7 @@ config TCG_ATMEL config TCG_INFINEON tristate "Infineon Technologies TPM Interface" - depends on PNP + depends on PNP || COMPILE_TEST help If you have a TPM security chip from Infineon Technologies (either SLD 9630 TT 1.1 or SLB 9635 TT 1.2) say Yes and it diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile index 0222b1ddb310..9bb142c75243 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ tpm-y += tpm-sysfs.o tpm-y += eventlog/common.o tpm-y += eventlog/tpm1.o tpm-y += eventlog/tpm2.o +tpm-y += tpm-buf.o +tpm-y += tpm2-sessions.o tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o eventlog/acpi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_EFI) += eventlog/efi.o diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c index bd757d836c5c..cf02ec646f46 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c @@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ static bool tpm_is_tpm2_log(void *bios_event_log, u64 len) return n == 0; } +static void tpm_bios_log_free(void *data) +{ + kvfree(data); +} + /* read binary bios log */ int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip) { @@ -136,13 +141,12 @@ int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip) } /* malloc EventLog space */ - log->bios_event_log = devm_kmalloc(&chip->dev, len, GFP_KERNEL); + log->bios_event_log = kvmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!log->bios_event_log) return -ENOMEM; log->bios_event_log_end = log->bios_event_log + len; - ret = -EIO; virt = acpi_os_map_iomem(start, len); if (!virt) { dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: Failed to map ACPI memory\n", __func__); @@ -162,10 +166,16 @@ int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip) goto err; } + ret = devm_add_action(&chip->dev, tpm_bios_log_free, log->bios_event_log); + if (ret) { + log->bios_event_log = NULL; + goto err; + } + return format; err: - devm_kfree(&chip->dev, log->bios_event_log); + tpm_bios_log_free(log->bios_event_log); log->bios_event_log = NULL; return ret; } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c index 639c3f395a5a..4c0bbba64ee5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ static int tpm_bios_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, if (!err) { seq = file->private_data; seq->private = chip; + } else { + put_device(&chip->dev); } return err; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/i2c.c b/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/i2c.c index 45ca33b3dcb2..81348487c125 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/i2c.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/i2c.c @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static void st33zp24_i2c_remove(struct i2c_client *client) } static const struct i2c_device_id st33zp24_i2c_id[] = { - {TPM_ST33_I2C, 0}, + { TPM_ST33_I2C }, {} }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(i2c, st33zp24_i2c_id); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e49a19fea3bd --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Handling of TPM command and other buffers. + */ + +#include <linux/tpm_command.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/tpm.h> + +/** + * tpm_buf_init() - Allocate and initialize a TPM command + * @buf: A &tpm_buf + * @tag: TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS or TPM2_ST_SESSIONS + * @ordinal: A command ordinal + * + * Return: 0 or -ENOMEM + */ +int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) +{ + buf->data = (u8 *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf->data) + return -ENOMEM; + + tpm_buf_reset(buf, tag, ordinal); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_init); + +/** + * tpm_buf_reset() - Initialize a TPM command + * @buf: A &tpm_buf + * @tag: TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS or TPM2_ST_SESSIONS + * @ordinal: A command ordinal + */ +void tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + + WARN_ON(tag != TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND && tag != TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS && + tag != TPM2_ST_SESSIONS && tag != 0); + + buf->flags = 0; + buf->length = sizeof(*head); + head->tag = cpu_to_be16(tag); + head->length = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(*head)); + head->ordinal = cpu_to_be32(ordinal); + buf->handles = 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_reset); + +/** + * tpm_buf_init_sized() - Allocate and initialize a sized (TPM2B) buffer + * @buf: A @tpm_buf + * + * Return: 0 or -ENOMEM + */ +int tpm_buf_init_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + buf->data = (u8 *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf->data) + return -ENOMEM; + + tpm_buf_reset_sized(buf); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_init_sized); + +/** + * tpm_buf_reset_sized() - Initialize a sized buffer + * @buf: A &tpm_buf + */ +void tpm_buf_reset_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + buf->flags = TPM_BUF_TPM2B; + buf->length = 2; + buf->data[0] = 0; + buf->data[1] = 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_reset_sized); + +void tpm_buf_destroy(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + free_page((unsigned long)buf->data); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_destroy); + +/** + * tpm_buf_length() - Return the number of bytes consumed by the data + * @buf: A &tpm_buf + * + * Return: The number of bytes consumed by the buffer + */ +u32 tpm_buf_length(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + return buf->length; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_length); + +/** + * tpm_buf_append() - Append data to an initialized buffer + * @buf: A &tpm_buf + * @new_data: A data blob + * @new_length: Size of the appended data + */ +void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 *new_data, u16 new_length) +{ + /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) + return; + + if ((buf->length + new_length) > PAGE_SIZE) { + WARN(1, "tpm_buf: write overflow\n"); + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW; + return; + } + + memcpy(&buf->data[buf->length], new_data, new_length); + buf->length += new_length; + + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_TPM2B) + ((__be16 *)buf->data)[0] = cpu_to_be16(buf->length - 2); + else + ((struct tpm_header *)buf->data)->length = cpu_to_be32(buf->length); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append); + +void tpm_buf_append_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 value) +{ + tpm_buf_append(buf, &value, 1); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u8); + +void tpm_buf_append_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u16 value) +{ + __be16 value2 = cpu_to_be16(value); + + tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *)&value2, 2); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u16); + +void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value) +{ + __be32 value2 = cpu_to_be32(value); + + tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *)&value2, 4); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u32); + +/** + * tpm_buf_append_handle() - Add a handle + * @chip: &tpm_chip instance + * @buf: &tpm_buf instance + * @handle: a TPM object handle + * + * Add a handle to the buffer, and increase the count tracking the number of + * handles in the command buffer. Works only for command buffers. + */ +void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle) +{ + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_TPM2B) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "Invalid buffer type (TPM2B)\n"); + return; + } + + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); + buf->handles++; +} + +/** + * tpm_buf_read() - Read from a TPM buffer + * @buf: &tpm_buf instance + * @offset: offset within the buffer + * @count: the number of bytes to read + * @output: the output buffer + */ +static void tpm_buf_read(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, size_t count, void *output) +{ + off_t next_offset; + + /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) + return; + + next_offset = *offset + count; + if (next_offset > buf->length) { + WARN(1, "tpm_buf: read out of boundary\n"); + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR; + return; + } + + memcpy(output, &buf->data[*offset], count); + *offset = next_offset; +} + +/** + * tpm_buf_read_u8() - Read 8-bit word from a TPM buffer + * @buf: &tpm_buf instance + * @offset: offset within the buffer + * + * Return: next 8-bit word + */ +u8 tpm_buf_read_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset) +{ + u8 value; + + tpm_buf_read(buf, offset, sizeof(value), &value); + + return value; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_read_u8); + +/** + * tpm_buf_read_u16() - Read 16-bit word from a TPM buffer + * @buf: &tpm_buf instance + * @offset: offset within the buffer + * + * Return: next 16-bit word + */ +u16 tpm_buf_read_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset) +{ + u16 value; + + tpm_buf_read(buf, offset, sizeof(value), &value); + + return be16_to_cpu(value); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_read_u16); + +/** + * tpm_buf_read_u32() - Read 32-bit word from a TPM buffer + * @buf: &tpm_buf instance + * @offset: offset within the buffer + * + * Return: next 32-bit word + */ +u32 tpm_buf_read_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset) +{ + u32 value; + + tpm_buf_read(buf, offset, sizeof(value), &value); + + return be32_to_cpu(value); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_read_u32); + + diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 42b1062e33cd..7df7abaf3e52 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) { int rc = -EIO; + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLE) + return rc; + get_device(&chip->dev); down_read(&chip->ops_sem); @@ -275,6 +278,9 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev) kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf); kfree(chip->work_space.session_buf); kfree(chip->allocated_banks); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + kfree(chip->auth); +#endif kfree(chip); } @@ -519,10 +525,6 @@ static int tpm_hwrng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait) { struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(rng, struct tpm_chip, hwrng); - /* Give back zero bytes, as TPM chip has not yet fully resumed: */ - if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_SUSPENDED) - return 0; - return tpm_get_random(chip, data, max); } @@ -668,6 +670,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_chip_register); */ void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip) { +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + int rc; + + rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); + if (!rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + tpm_put_ops(chip); + } +#endif + tpm_del_legacy_sysfs(chip); if (tpm_is_hwrng_enabled(chip)) hwrng_unregister(&chip->hwrng); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c index 30b4c288c1bb..48ff87444f85 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ static ssize_t tpm_dev_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, struct tpm_header *header = (void *)buf; ssize_t ret, len; + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + ret = tpm2_prepare_space(chip, space, buf, bufsiz); /* If the command is not implemented by the TPM, synthesize a * response with a TPM2_RC_COMMAND_CODE return for user-space. @@ -47,6 +50,8 @@ static ssize_t tpm_dev_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, if (!ret) ret = tpm2_commit_space(chip, space, buf, &len); + else + tpm2_flush_space(chip); out_rc: return ret ? ret : len; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c index e2c0baa69fef..97c94b5e9340 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c @@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ static int tpm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) const struct file_operations tpm_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, - .llseek = no_llseek, .open = tpm_open, .read = tpm_common_read, .write = tpm_common_write, diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c index 757336324c90..b1daa0d7b341 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c @@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, if (len < min_rsp_body_length + TPM_HEADER_SIZE) return -EFAULT; + buf->length = len; return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_transmit_cmd); @@ -342,31 +343,6 @@ out: } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_extend); -/** - * tpm_send - send a TPM command - * @chip: a &struct tpm_chip instance, %NULL for the default chip - * @cmd: a TPM command buffer - * @buflen: the length of the TPM command buffer - * - * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd() - */ -int tpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, void *cmd, size_t buflen) -{ - struct tpm_buf buf; - int rc; - - chip = tpm_find_get_ops(chip); - if (!chip) - return -ENODEV; - - buf.data = cmd; - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting to a send a command"); - - tpm_put_ops(chip); - return rc; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_send); - int tpm_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip) { int rc; @@ -394,6 +370,13 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev) if (!chip) return -ENODEV; + rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); + if (rc) { + /* Can be safely set out of locks, as no action cannot race: */ + chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_SUSPENDED; + goto out; + } + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_ALWAYS_POWERED) goto suspended; @@ -401,19 +384,19 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev) !pm_suspend_via_firmware()) goto suspended; - rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); - if (!rc) { - if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) - tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_STATE); - else - rc = tpm1_pm_suspend(chip, tpm_suspend_pcr); - - tpm_put_ops(chip); + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_STATE); + goto suspended; } + rc = tpm1_pm_suspend(chip, tpm_suspend_pcr); + suspended: chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_SUSPENDED; + tpm_put_ops(chip); +out: if (rc) dev_err(dev, "Ignoring error %d while suspending\n", rc); return 0; @@ -462,11 +445,18 @@ int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max) if (!chip) return -ENODEV; + /* Give back zero bytes, as TPM chip has not yet fully resumed: */ + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_SUSPENDED) { + rc = 0; + goto out; + } + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) rc = tpm2_get_random(chip, out, max); else rc = tpm1_get_random(chip, out, max); +out: tpm_put_ops(chip); return rc; } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c index 54c71473aa29..94231f052ea7 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c @@ -309,6 +309,21 @@ static ssize_t tpm_version_major_show(struct device *dev, } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(tpm_version_major); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC +static ssize_t null_name_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev); + int size = TPM2_NAME_SIZE; + + bin2hex(buf, chip->null_key_name, size); + size *= 2; + buf[size++] = '\n'; + return size; +} +static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(null_name); +#endif + static struct attribute *tpm1_dev_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_pubek.attr, &dev_attr_pcrs.attr, @@ -326,6 +341,9 @@ static struct attribute *tpm1_dev_attrs[] = { static struct attribute *tpm2_dev_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_tpm_version_major.attr, +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + &dev_attr_null_name.attr, +#endif NULL }; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index 61445f1dc46d..7bb87fa5f7a1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ #include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86 -#include <asm/intel-family.h> +#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #endif #define TPM_MINOR 224 /* officially assigned */ @@ -312,9 +312,23 @@ int tpm2_commit_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, void *buf, size_t *bufsiz); int tpm_devs_add(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_devs_remove(struct tpm_chip *chip); +int tpm2_save_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, u8 *buf, + unsigned int buf_size, unsigned int *offset); +int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, + unsigned int *offset, u32 *handle); void tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct tpm_chip *chip); int tpm_dev_common_init(void); void tpm_dev_common_exit(void); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC +int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip); +#else +static inline int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + #endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 93545be190a5..dfdcbd009720 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ #include "tpm.h" #include <crypto/hash_info.h> +static bool disable_pcr_integrity; +module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(disable_pcr_integrity, "Disable integrity protection of TPM2_PCR_Extend"); + static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256}, @@ -216,13 +220,6 @@ out: return rc; } -struct tpm2_null_auth_area { - __be32 handle; - __be16 nonce_size; - u8 attributes; - __be16 auth_size; -} __packed; - /** * tpm2_pcr_extend() - extend a PCR value * @@ -236,24 +233,30 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digests) { struct tpm_buf buf; - struct tpm2_null_auth_area auth_area; int rc; int i; + if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { + rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND); - if (rc) + if (rc) { + if (!disable_pcr_integrity) + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); return rc; + } - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, pcr_idx); - - auth_area.handle = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_RS_PW); - auth_area.nonce_size = 0; - auth_area.attributes = 0; - auth_area.auth_size = 0; + if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { + tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, &buf, pcr_idx); + tpm_buf_append_auth(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0); + } - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, sizeof(struct tpm2_null_auth_area)); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char *)&auth_area, - sizeof(auth_area)); tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, chip->nr_allocated_banks); for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) { @@ -262,7 +265,11 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size); } + if (!disable_pcr_integrity) + tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value"); + if (!disable_pcr_integrity) + rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); @@ -288,6 +295,7 @@ struct tpm2_get_random_out { int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) { struct tpm2_get_random_out *out; + struct tpm_header *head; struct tpm_buf buf; u32 recd; u32 num_bytes = max; @@ -295,29 +303,46 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) int total = 0; int retries = 5; u8 *dest_ptr = dest; + off_t offset; if (!num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA) return -EINVAL; - err = tpm_buf_init(&buf, 0, 0); + err = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip); if (err) return err; + err = tpm_buf_init(&buf, 0, 0); + if (err) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return err; + } + do { - tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM); + tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM); + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT + | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, + NULL, 0); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes); + tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer), "attempting get random"); + err = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, err); if (err) { if (err > 0) err = -EIO; goto out; } - out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *) - &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; + head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data; + offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + /* Skip the parameter size field: */ + if (be16_to_cpu(head->tag) == TPM2_ST_SESSIONS) + offset += 4; + + out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *)&buf.data[offset]; recd = min_t(u32, be16_to_cpu(out->size), num_bytes); if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + @@ -334,9 +359,12 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) } while (retries-- && total < max); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return total ? total : -EIO; out: tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); return err; } @@ -759,6 +787,11 @@ int tpm2_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip) rc = 0; } + if (rc) + goto out; + + rc = tpm2_sessions_init(chip); + out: /* * Infineon TPM in field upgrade mode will return no data for the number diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b70165b588ec --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -0,0 +1,1393 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +/* + * Copyright (C) 2018 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com + * + * Cryptographic helper routines for handling TPM2 sessions for + * authorization HMAC and request response encryption. + * + * The idea is to ensure that every TPM command is HMAC protected by a + * session, meaning in-flight tampering would be detected and in + * addition all sensitive inputs and responses should be encrypted. + * + * The basic way this works is to use a TPM feature called salted + * sessions where a random secret used in session construction is + * encrypted to the public part of a known TPM key. The problem is we + * have no known keys, so initially a primary Elliptic Curve key is + * derived from the NULL seed (we use EC because most TPMs generate + * these keys much faster than RSA ones). The curve used is NIST_P256 + * because that's now mandated to be present in 'TCG TPM v2.0 + * Provisioning Guidance' + * + * Threat problems: the initial TPM2_CreatePrimary is not (and cannot + * be) session protected, so a clever Man in the Middle could return a + * public key they control to this command and from there intercept + * and decode all subsequent session based transactions. The kernel + * cannot mitigate this threat but, after boot, userspace can get + * proof this has not happened by asking the TPM to certify the NULL + * key. This certification would chain back to the TPM Endorsement + * Certificate and prove the NULL seed primary had not been tampered + * with and thus all sessions must have been cryptographically secure. + * To assist with this, the initial NULL seed public key name is made + * available in a sysfs file. + * + * Use of these functions: + * + * The design is all the crypto, hash and hmac gunk is confined in this + * file and never needs to be seen even by the kernel internal user. To + * the user there's an init function tpm2_sessions_init() that needs to + * be called once per TPM which generates the NULL seed primary key. + * + * These are the usage functions: + * + * tpm2_start_auth_session() which allocates the opaque auth structure + * and gets a session from the TPM. This must be called before + * any of the following functions. The session is protected by a + * session_key which is derived from a random salt value + * encrypted to the NULL seed. + * tpm2_end_auth_session() kills the session and frees the resources. + * Under normal operation this function is done by + * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), so this is only to be used on + * error legs where the latter is not executed. + * tpm_buf_append_name() to add a handle to the buffer. This must be + * used in place of the usual tpm_buf_append_u32() for adding + * handles because handles have to be processed specially when + * calculating the HMAC. In particular, for NV, volatile and + * permanent objects you now need to provide the name. + * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() which appends the hmac session to the + * buf in the same way tpm_buf_append_auth does(). + * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() This calculates the correct hash and + * places it in the buffer. It must be called after the complete + * command buffer is finalized so it can fill in the correct HMAC + * based on the parameters. + * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() which checks the session response in + * the buffer and calculates what it should be. If there's a + * mismatch it will log a warning and return an error. If + * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() did not specify + * TPM_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION then the session will be closed (if it + * hasn't been consumed) and the auth structure freed. + */ + +#include "tpm.h" +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h> +#include <linux/unaligned.h> +#include <crypto/kpp.h> +#include <crypto/ecdh.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/hmac.h> + +/* maximum number of names the TPM must remember for authorization */ +#define AUTH_MAX_NAMES 3 + +#define AES_KEY_BYTES AES_KEYSIZE_128 +#define AES_KEY_BITS (AES_KEY_BYTES*8) + +/* + * This is the structure that carries all the auth information (like + * session handle, nonces, session key and auth) from use to use it is + * designed to be opaque to anything outside. + */ +struct tpm2_auth { + u32 handle; + /* + * This has two meanings: before tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() + * it marks the offset in the buffer of the start of the + * sessions (i.e. after all the handles). Once the buffer has + * been filled it markes the session number of our auth + * session so we can find it again in the response buffer. + * + * The two cases are distinguished because the first offset + * must always be greater than TPM_HEADER_SIZE and the second + * must be less than or equal to 5. + */ + u32 session; + /* + * the size here is variable and set by the size of our_nonce + * which must be between 16 and the name hash length. we set + * the maximum sha256 size for the greatest protection + */ + u8 our_nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 tpm_nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + /* + * the salt is only used across the session command/response + * after that it can be used as a scratch area + */ + union { + u8 salt[EC_PT_SZ]; + /* scratch for key + IV */ + u8 scratch[AES_KEY_BYTES + AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + }; + /* + * the session key and passphrase are the same size as the + * name digest (sha256 again). The session key is constant + * for the use of the session and the passphrase can change + * with every invocation. + * + * Note: these fields must be adjacent and in this order + * because several HMAC/KDF schemes use the combination of the + * session_key and passphrase. + */ + u8 session_key[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 passphrase[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + int passphrase_len; + struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_ctx; + /* saved session attributes: */ + u8 attrs; + __be32 ordinal; + + /* + * memory for three authorization handles. We know them by + * handle, but they are part of the session by name, which + * we must compute and remember + */ + u32 name_h[AUTH_MAX_NAMES]; + u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][2 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC +/* + * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255) + */ +static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) +{ + static u8 size_map[] = { + [TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + [TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, + [TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, + [TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, + }; + u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); + return size_map[alg] + 2; +} + +static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + u32 val; + + /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ + tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + /* skip public */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val > tot_len) + return -EINVAL; + offset += val; + /* name */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); + /* forget the rest */ + return 0; +} + +static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + int rc; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) + rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); + + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + return rc; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ + +/** + * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * @handle: The handle to be appended + * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL) + * + * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the + * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply + * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name + * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV + * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name + * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to + * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these + * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is + * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called + * on the handle to obtain the name. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); + struct tpm2_auth *auth; + int slot; +#endif + + if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { + tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, buf, handle); + return; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; + if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); + return; + } + auth = chip->auth; + WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), + "name added in wrong place\n"); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); + auth->session += 4; + + if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || + mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || + mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { + if (!name) + tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + } else { + if (name) + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + } + + auth->name_h[slot] = handle; + if (name) + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); +#endif +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); + +void tpm_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphrase_len) +{ + /* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */ + int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 len = 9 + passphrase_len; + + if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) { + /* not the first session so update the existing length */ + len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]); + put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len); + } + /* auth handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW); + /* nonce */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0); + /* attributes */ + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0); + /* passphrase */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphrase_len); + tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphrase_len); +} + +/** + * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * @attributes: The session attributes + * @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none) + * @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none) + * + * This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except + * for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is + * complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes, + * the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the + * session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), + * TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be + * encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the + * response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing, + * but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM). + * + * Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling + * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect + * and the TPM will reject the command. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, + int passphrase_len) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct tpm2_auth *auth; + u32 len; +#endif + + if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { + tpm_buf_append_auth(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase, + passphrase_len); + return; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + /* The first write to /dev/tpm{rm0} will flush the session. */ + attributes |= TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION; + + /* + * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros + * before computing the HMAC + */ + while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0 && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0') + passphrase_len--; + + auth = chip->auth; + auth->attrs = attributes; + auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len; + if (passphrase_len) + memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len); + + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + /* we're not the first session */ + len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]); + if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append"); + return; + } + + /* add our new session */ + len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + } + + /* random number for our nonce */ + get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle); + /* our new nonce */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs); + /* and put a placeholder for the hmac */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); +#endif +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + +static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy, + u32 *handle, u8 *name); + +/* + * It turns out the crypto hmac(sha256) is hard for us to consume + * because it assumes a fixed key and the TPM seems to change the key + * on every operation, so we weld the hmac init and final functions in + * here to give it the same usage characteristics as a regular hash + */ +static void tpm2_hmac_init(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *key, u32 key_len) +{ + u8 pad[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]; + int i; + + sha256_init(sctx); + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(pad); i++) { + if (i < key_len) + pad[i] = key[i]; + else + pad[i] = 0; + pad[i] ^= HMAC_IPAD_VALUE; + } + sha256_update(sctx, pad, sizeof(pad)); +} + +static void tpm2_hmac_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *key, u32 key_len, + u8 *out) +{ + u8 pad[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(pad); i++) { + if (i < key_len) + pad[i] = key[i]; + else + pad[i] = 0; + pad[i] ^= HMAC_OPAD_VALUE; + } + + /* collect the final hash; use out as temporary storage */ + sha256_final(sctx, out); + + sha256_init(sctx); + sha256_update(sctx, pad, sizeof(pad)); + sha256_update(sctx, out, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + sha256_final(sctx, out); +} + +/* + * assume hash sha256 and nonces u, v of size SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE but + * otherwise standard tpm2_KDFa. Note output is in bytes not bits. + */ +static void tpm2_KDFa(u8 *key, u32 key_len, const char *label, u8 *u, + u8 *v, u32 bytes, u8 *out) +{ + u32 counter = 1; + const __be32 bits = cpu_to_be32(bytes * 8); + + while (bytes > 0) { + struct sha256_state sctx; + __be32 c = cpu_to_be32(counter); + + tpm2_hmac_init(&sctx, key, key_len); + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&c, sizeof(c)); + sha256_update(&sctx, label, strlen(label)+1); + sha256_update(&sctx, u, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + sha256_update(&sctx, v, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&bits, sizeof(bits)); + tpm2_hmac_final(&sctx, key, key_len, out); + + bytes -= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + counter++; + out += SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + } +} + +/* + * Somewhat of a bastardization of the real KDFe. We're assuming + * we're working with known point sizes for the input parameters and + * the hash algorithm is fixed at sha256. Because we know that the + * point size is 32 bytes like the hash size, there's no need to loop + * in this KDF. + */ +static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v, + u8 *out) +{ + struct sha256_state sctx; + /* + * this should be an iterative counter, but because we know + * we're only taking 32 bytes for the point using a sha256 + * hash which is also 32 bytes, there's only one loop + */ + __be32 c = cpu_to_be32(1); + + sha256_init(&sctx); + /* counter (BE) */ + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&c, sizeof(c)); + /* secret value */ + sha256_update(&sctx, z, EC_PT_SZ); + /* string including trailing zero */ + sha256_update(&sctx, str, strlen(str)+1); + sha256_update(&sctx, pt_u, EC_PT_SZ); + sha256_update(&sctx, pt_v, EC_PT_SZ); + sha256_final(&sctx, out); +} + +static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct tpm2_auth *auth) +{ + struct crypto_kpp *kpp; + struct kpp_request *req; + struct scatterlist s[2], d[1]; + struct ecdh p = {0}; + u8 encoded_key[EC_PT_SZ], *x, *y; + unsigned int buf_len; + + /* secret is two sized points */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, (EC_PT_SZ + 2)*2); + /* + * we cheat here and append uninitialized data to form + * the points. All we care about is getting the two + * co-ordinate pointers, which will be used to overwrite + * the uninitialized data + */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, EC_PT_SZ); + x = &buf->data[tpm_buf_length(buf)]; + tpm_buf_append(buf, encoded_key, EC_PT_SZ); + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, EC_PT_SZ); + y = &buf->data[tpm_buf_length(buf)]; + tpm_buf_append(buf, encoded_key, EC_PT_SZ); + sg_init_table(s, 2); + sg_set_buf(&s[0], x, EC_PT_SZ); + sg_set_buf(&s[1], y, EC_PT_SZ); + + kpp = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0); + if (IS_ERR(kpp)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "crypto ecdh allocation failed\n"); + return; + } + + buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p); + if (sizeof(encoded_key) < buf_len) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "salt buffer too small needs %d\n", + buf_len); + goto out; + } + crypto_ecdh_encode_key(encoded_key, buf_len, &p); + /* this generates a random private key */ + crypto_kpp_set_secret(kpp, encoded_key, buf_len); + + /* salt is now the public point of this private key */ + req = kpp_request_alloc(kpp, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + goto out; + kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0); + kpp_request_set_output(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2); + crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req); + /* + * we're not done: now we have to compute the shared secret + * which is our private key multiplied by the tpm_key public + * point, we actually only take the x point and discard the y + * point and feed it through KDFe to get the final secret salt + */ + sg_set_buf(&s[0], chip->null_ec_key_x, EC_PT_SZ); + sg_set_buf(&s[1], chip->null_ec_key_y, EC_PT_SZ); + kpp_request_set_input(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2); + sg_init_one(d, auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); + kpp_request_set_output(req, d, EC_PT_SZ); + crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req); + kpp_request_free(req); + + /* + * pass the shared secret through KDFe for salt. Note salt + * area is used both for input shared secret and output salt. + * This works because KDFe fully consumes the secret before it + * writes the salt + */ + tpm2_KDFe(auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, auth->salt); + + out: + crypto_free_kpp(kpp); +} + +/** + * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() - finalize the session HMAC + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * + * This command must not be called until all of the parameters have + * been appended to @buf otherwise the computed HMAC will be + * incorrect. + * + * This function computes and fills in the session HMAC using the + * session key and, if TPM2_SA_DECRYPT was specified, computes the + * encryption key and encrypts the first parameter of the command + * buffer with it. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + u32 cc, handles, val; + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + int i; + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + off_t offset_s = TPM_HEADER_SIZE, offset_p; + u8 *hmac = NULL; + u32 attrs; + u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct sha256_state sctx; + + if (!auth) + return; + + /* save the command code in BE format */ + auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; + + cc = be32_to_cpu(head->ordinal); + + i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc); + if (i < 0) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "Command 0x%x not found in TPM\n", cc); + return; + } + attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i]; + + handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0); + + /* + * just check the names, it's easy to make mistakes. This + * would happen if someone added a handle via + * tpm_buf_append_u32() instead of tpm_buf_append_name() + */ + for (i = 0; i < handles; i++) { + u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); + + if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: handle %d wrong for name\n", + i); + return; + } + } + /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); + /* point offset_p to the start of the parameters */ + offset_p = offset_s + val; + for (i = 1; offset_s < offset_p; i++) { + u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); + u16 len; + u8 a; + + /* nonce (already in auth) */ + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s); + offset_s += len; + + a = tpm_buf_read_u8(buf, &offset_s); + + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s); + if (handle == auth->handle && auth->attrs == a) { + hmac = &buf->data[offset_s]; + /* + * save our session number so we know which + * session in the response belongs to us + */ + auth->session = i; + } + + offset_s += len; + } + if (offset_s != offset_p) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM session length is incorrect\n"); + return; + } + if (!hmac) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM could not find HMAC session\n"); + return; + } + + /* encrypt before HMAC */ + if (auth->attrs & TPM2_SA_DECRYPT) { + u16 len; + + /* need key and IV */ + tpm2_KDFa(auth->session_key, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + + auth->passphrase_len, "CFB", auth->our_nonce, + auth->tpm_nonce, AES_KEY_BYTES + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + auth->scratch); + + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_p); + aes_expandkey(&auth->aes_ctx, auth->scratch, AES_KEY_BYTES); + aescfb_encrypt(&auth->aes_ctx, &buf->data[offset_p], + &buf->data[offset_p], len, + auth->scratch + AES_KEY_BYTES); + /* reset p to beginning of parameters for HMAC */ + offset_p -= 2; + } + + sha256_init(&sctx); + /* ordinal is already BE */ + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&head->ordinal, sizeof(head->ordinal)); + /* add the handle names */ + for (i = 0; i < handles; i++) { + enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(auth->name_h[i]); + + if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || + mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || + mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], + name_size(auth->name[i])); + } else { + __be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]); + + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&h, 4); + } + } + if (offset_s != tpm_buf_length(buf)) + sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_s], + tpm_buf_length(buf) - offset_s); + sha256_final(&sctx, cphash); + + /* now calculate the hmac */ + tpm2_hmac_init(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key) + + auth->passphrase_len); + sha256_update(&sctx, cphash, sizeof(cphash)); + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)); + sha256_update(&sctx, &auth->attrs, 1); + tpm2_hmac_final(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key) + + auth->passphrase_len, hmac); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); + +/** + * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() - check the TPM return HMAC for correctness + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: the original command buffer (which now contains the response) + * @rc: the return code from tpm_transmit_cmd + * + * If @rc is non zero, @buf may not contain an actual return, so @rc + * is passed through as the return and the session cleaned up and + * de-allocated if required (this is required if + * TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION was not specified as a session flag). + * + * If @rc is zero, the response HMAC is computed against the returned + * @buf and matched to the TPM one in the session area. If there is a + * mismatch, an error is logged and -EINVAL returned. + * + * The reason for this is that the command issue and HMAC check + * sequence should look like: + * + * rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(...); + * rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(&buf, auth, rc); + * if (rc) + * ... + * + * Which is easily layered into the current contrl flow. + * + * Returns: 0 on success or an error. + */ +int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + int rc) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + off_t offset_s, offset_p; + u8 rphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u32 attrs, cc; + struct sha256_state sctx; + u16 tag = be16_to_cpu(head->tag); + int parm_len, len, i, handles; + + if (!auth) + return rc; + + cc = be32_to_cpu(auth->ordinal); + + if (auth->session >= TPM_HEADER_SIZE) { + WARN(1, "tpm session not filled correctly\n"); + goto out; + } + + if (rc != 0) + /* pass non success rc through and close the session */ + goto out; + + rc = -EINVAL; + if (tag != TPM2_ST_SESSIONS) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: HMAC response check has no sessions tag\n"); + goto out; + } + + i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc); + if (i < 0) + goto out; + attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i]; + handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_RHANDLE) & 1; + + /* point to area beyond handles */ + offset_s = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + handles * 4; + parm_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); + offset_p = offset_s; + offset_s += parm_len; + /* skip over any sessions before ours */ + for (i = 0; i < auth->session - 1; i++) { + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s); + offset_s += len + 1; + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s); + offset_s += len; + } + /* TPM nonce */ + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s); + if (offset_s + len > tpm_buf_length(buf)) + goto out; + if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) + goto out; + memcpy(auth->tpm_nonce, &buf->data[offset_s], len); + offset_s += len; + attrs = tpm_buf_read_u8(buf, &offset_s); + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s); + if (offset_s + len != tpm_buf_length(buf)) + goto out; + if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) + goto out; + /* + * offset_s points to the HMAC. now calculate comparison, beginning + * with rphash + */ + sha256_init(&sctx); + /* yes, I know this is now zero, but it's what the standard says */ + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&head->return_code, + sizeof(head->return_code)); + /* ordinal is already BE */ + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&auth->ordinal, sizeof(auth->ordinal)); + sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_p], parm_len); + sha256_final(&sctx, rphash); + + /* now calculate the hmac */ + tpm2_hmac_init(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key) + + auth->passphrase_len); + sha256_update(&sctx, rphash, sizeof(rphash)); + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)); + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); + sha256_update(&sctx, &auth->attrs, 1); + /* we're done with the rphash, so put our idea of the hmac there */ + tpm2_hmac_final(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key) + + auth->passphrase_len, rphash); + if (memcmp(rphash, &buf->data[offset_s], SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) == 0) { + rc = 0; + } else { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: HMAC check failed\n"); + goto out; + } + + /* now do response decryption */ + if (auth->attrs & TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT) { + /* need key and IV */ + tpm2_KDFa(auth->session_key, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + + auth->passphrase_len, "CFB", auth->tpm_nonce, + auth->our_nonce, AES_KEY_BYTES + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + auth->scratch); + + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_p); + aes_expandkey(&auth->aes_ctx, auth->scratch, AES_KEY_BYTES); + aescfb_decrypt(&auth->aes_ctx, &buf->data[offset_p], + &buf->data[offset_p], len, + auth->scratch + AES_KEY_BYTES); + } + + out: + if ((auth->attrs & TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION) == 0) { + if (rc) + /* manually close the session if it wasn't consumed */ + tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); + + kfree_sensitive(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; + } else { + /* reset for next use */ + auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + } + + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_check_hmac_response); + +/** + * tpm2_end_auth_session() - kill the allocated auth session + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * + * ends the session started by tpm2_start_auth_session and frees all + * the resources. Under normal conditions, + * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() will correctly end the session if + * required, so this function is only for use in error legs that will + * bypass the normal invocation of tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(). + */ +void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + + if (!auth) + return; + + tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); + kfree_sensitive(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session); + +static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct tpm2_auth *auth, + struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 val; + + /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ + tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + /* should have handle plus nonce */ + if (tot_len != 4 + 2 + sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)) + return -EINVAL; + + auth->handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset); + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val != sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(auth->tpm_nonce, &buf->data[offset], sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)); + /* now compute the session key from the nonces */ + tpm2_KDFa(auth->salt, sizeof(auth->salt), "ATH", auth->tpm_nonce, + auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->session_key), + auth->session_key); + + return 0; +} + +static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) +{ + unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null seed context */ + u8 name[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2]; + u32 tmp_null_key; + int rc; + + rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset, + &tmp_null_key); + if (rc != -EINVAL) { + if (!rc) + *null_key = tmp_null_key; + goto err; + } + + /* Try to re-create null key, given the integrity failure: */ + rc = tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, &tmp_null_key, name); + if (rc) + goto err; + + /* Return null key if the name has not been changed: */ + if (!memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name))) { + *null_key = tmp_null_key; + return 0; + } + + /* Deduce from the name change TPM interference: */ + dev_err(&chip->dev, "null key integrity check failed\n"); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, tmp_null_key); + +err: + if (rc) { + chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLE; + rc = -ENODEV; + } + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm2_start_auth_session() - create a HMAC authentication session with the TPM + * @chip: the TPM chip structure to create the session with + * + * This function loads the NULL seed from its saved context and starts + * an authentication session on the null seed, fills in the + * @chip->auth structure to contain all the session details necessary + * for performing the HMAC, encrypt and decrypt operations and + * returns. The NULL seed is flushed before this function returns. + * + * Return: zero on success or actual error encountered. + */ +int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + struct tpm2_auth *auth; + struct tpm_buf buf; + u32 null_key; + int rc; + + if (chip->auth) { + dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is active\n"); + return 0; + } + + auth = kzalloc(sizeof(*auth), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!auth) + return -ENOMEM; + + rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key); + if (rc) + goto out; + + auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS); + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* salt key handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, null_key); + /* bind key handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RH_NULL); + /* nonce caller */ + get_random_bytes(auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); + + /* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */ + tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip, auth); + /* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */ + tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC); + + /* symmetric encryption parameters */ + /* symmetric algorithm */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_AES); + /* bits for symmetric algorithm */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, AES_KEY_BITS); + /* symmetric algorithm mode (must be CFB) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_CFB); + /* hash algorithm for session */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256); + + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "start auth session"); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key); + + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) + rc = tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(auth, &buf); + + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) { + chip->auth = auth; + return 0; + } + +out: + kfree_sensitive(auth); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_start_auth_session); + +/* + * A mask containing the object attributes for the kernel held null primary key + * used in HMAC encryption. For more information on specific attributes look up + * to "8.3 TPMA_OBJECT (Object Attributes)". + */ +#define TPM2_OA_NULL_KEY ( \ + TPM2_OA_NO_DA | \ + TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | \ + TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT | \ + TPM2_OA_SENSITIVE_DATA_ORIGIN | \ + TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH | \ + TPM2_OA_DECRYPT | \ + TPM2_OA_RESTRICTED) + +/** + * tpm2_parse_create_primary() - parse the data returned from TPM_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY + * + * @chip: The TPM the primary was created under + * @buf: The response buffer from the chip + * @handle: pointer to be filled in with the return handle of the primary + * @hierarchy: The hierarchy the primary was created for + * @name: pointer to be filled in with the primary key name + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * -errno - A system error + * * TPM_RC - A TPM error + */ +static int tpm2_parse_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 *handle, u32 hierarchy, u8 *name) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + off_t offset_r = TPM_HEADER_SIZE, offset_t; + u16 len = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 total_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + u32 val, param_len, keyhandle; + + keyhandle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_r); + if (handle) + *handle = keyhandle; + else + tpm2_flush_context(chip, keyhandle); + + param_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_r); + /* + * param_len doesn't include the header, but all the other + * lengths and offsets do, so add it to parm len to make + * the comparisons easier + */ + param_len += TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + if (param_len + 8 > total_len) + return -EINVAL; + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r); + offset_t = offset_r; + if (name) { + /* + * now we have the public area, compute the name of + * the object + */ + put_unaligned_be16(TPM_ALG_SHA256, name); + sha256(&buf->data[offset_r], len, name + 2); + } + + /* validate the public key */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + + /* key type (must be what we asked for) */ + if (val != TPM_ALG_ECC) + return -EINVAL; + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + + /* name algorithm */ + if (val != TPM_ALG_SHA256) + return -EINVAL; + val = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_t); + + /* object properties */ + if (val != TPM2_OA_NULL_KEY) + return -EINVAL; + + /* auth policy (empty) */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + /* symmetric key parameters */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != TPM_ALG_AES) + return -EINVAL; + + /* symmetric key length */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != AES_KEY_BITS) + return -EINVAL; + + /* symmetric encryption scheme */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != TPM_ALG_CFB) + return -EINVAL; + + /* signing scheme */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != TPM_ALG_NULL) + return -EINVAL; + + /* ECC Curve */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != TPM2_ECC_NIST_P256) + return -EINVAL; + + /* KDF Scheme */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != TPM_ALG_NULL) + return -EINVAL; + + /* extract public key (x and y points) */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != EC_PT_SZ) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(chip->null_ec_key_x, &buf->data[offset_t], val); + offset_t += val; + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t); + if (val != EC_PT_SZ) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(chip->null_ec_key_y, &buf->data[offset_t], val); + offset_t += val; + + /* original length of the whole TPM2B */ + offset_r += len; + + /* should have exactly consumed the TPM2B public structure */ + if (offset_t != offset_r) + return -EINVAL; + if (offset_r > param_len) + return -EINVAL; + + /* creation data (skip) */ + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r); + offset_r += len; + if (offset_r > param_len) + return -EINVAL; + + /* creation digest (must be sha256) */ + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r); + offset_r += len; + if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE || offset_r > param_len) + return -EINVAL; + + /* TPMT_TK_CREATION follows */ + /* tag, must be TPM_ST_CREATION (0x8021) */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r); + if (val != TPM2_ST_CREATION || offset_r > param_len) + return -EINVAL; + + /* hierarchy */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_r); + if (val != hierarchy || offset_r > param_len) + return -EINVAL; + + /* the ticket digest HMAC (might not be sha256) */ + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r); + offset_r += len; + if (offset_r > param_len) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * finally we have the name, which is a sha256 digest plus a 2 + * byte algorithm type + */ + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r); + if (offset_r + len != param_len + 8) + return -EINVAL; + if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2) + return -EINVAL; + + if (memcmp(chip->null_key_name, &buf->data[offset_r], + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2) != 0) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL Seed name comparison failed\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * tpm2_create_primary() - create a primary key using a fixed P-256 template + * + * @chip: the TPM chip to create under + * @hierarchy: The hierarchy handle to create under + * @handle: The returned volatile handle on success + * @name: The name of the returned key + * + * For platforms that might not have a persistent primary, this can be + * used to create one quickly on the fly (it uses Elliptic Curve not + * RSA, so even slow TPMs can create one fast). The template uses the + * TCG mandated H one for non-endorsement ECC primaries, i.e. P-256 + * elliptic curve (the only current one all TPM2s are required to + * have) a sha256 name hash and no policy. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * -errno - A system error + * * TPM_RC - A TPM error + */ +static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy, + u32 *handle, u8 *name) +{ + int rc; + struct tpm_buf buf; + struct tpm_buf template; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = tpm_buf_init_sized(&template); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; + } + + /* + * create the template. Note: in order for userspace to + * verify the security of the system, it will have to create + * and certify this NULL primary, meaning all the template + * parameters will have to be identical, so conform exactly to + * the TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning Guidance for the SRK ECC + * key H template (H has zero size unique points) + */ + + /* key type */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_ECC); + + /* name algorithm */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_SHA256); + + /* object properties */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&template, TPM2_OA_NULL_KEY); + + /* sauth policy (empty) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, 0); + + /* BEGIN parameters: key specific; for ECC*/ + + /* symmetric algorithm */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_AES); + + /* bits for symmetric algorithm */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, AES_KEY_BITS); + + /* algorithm mode (must be CFB) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_CFB); + + /* scheme (NULL means any scheme) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_NULL); + + /* ECC Curve ID */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM2_ECC_NIST_P256); + + /* KDF Scheme */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_NULL); + + /* unique: key specific; for ECC it is two zero size points */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, 0); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, 0); + + /* END parameters */ + + /* primary handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, hierarchy); + tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW); + + /* sensitive create size is 4 for two empty buffers */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4); + + /* sensitive create auth data (empty) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + + /* sensitive create sensitive data (empty) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + + /* the public template */ + tpm_buf_append(&buf, template.data, template.length); + tpm_buf_destroy(&template); + + /* outside info (empty) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + + /* creation PCR (none) */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); + + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, + "attempting to create NULL primary"); + + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) + rc = tpm2_parse_create_primary(chip, &buf, handle, hierarchy, + name); + + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + return rc; +} + +static int tpm2_create_null_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + u32 null_key; + int rc; + + rc = tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, &null_key, + chip->null_key_name); + + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) { + unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null key context */ + + rc = tpm2_save_context(chip, null_key, chip->null_key_context, + sizeof(chip->null_key_context), &offset); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key); + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm2_sessions_init() - start of day initialization for the sessions code + * @chip: TPM chip + * + * Derive and context save the null primary and allocate memory in the + * struct tpm_chip for the authorizations. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * -errno - A system error + * * TPM_RC - A TPM error + */ +int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + int rc; + + rc = tpm2_create_null_primary(chip); + if (rc) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "null key creation failed with %d\n", rc); + return rc; + } + + return rc; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c index 363afdd4d1d3..60354cd53b5c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ */ #include <linux/gfp.h> -#include <asm/unaligned.h> +#include <linux/unaligned.h> #include "tpm.h" enum tpm2_handle_types { @@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space) kfree(space->session_buf); } -static int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, - unsigned int *offset, u32 *handle) +int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, + unsigned int *offset, u32 *handle) { struct tpm_buf tbuf; struct tpm2_context *ctx; @@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, *handle = 0; tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf); return -ENOENT; + } else if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_INTEGRITY) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf); + return -EINVAL; } else if (rc > 0) { dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a TPM error 0x%04X\n", __func__, rc); @@ -119,8 +122,8 @@ static int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, return 0; } -static int tpm2_save_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, u8 *buf, - unsigned int buf_size, unsigned int *offset) +int tpm2_save_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, u8 *buf, + unsigned int buf_size, unsigned int *offset) { struct tpm_buf tbuf; unsigned int body_size; @@ -166,6 +169,9 @@ void tpm2_flush_space(struct tpm_chip *chip) struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space; int i; + if (!space) + return; + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->context_tbl); i++) if (space->context_tbl[i] && ~space->context_tbl[i]) tpm2_flush_context(chip, space->context_tbl[i]); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_atmel.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_atmel.c index 9fb2defa9dc4..54a0360a3c95 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_atmel.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_atmel.c @@ -15,7 +15,66 @@ */ #include "tpm.h" -#include "tpm_atmel.h" + +struct tpm_atmel_priv { + int region_size; + int have_region; + unsigned long base; + void __iomem *iobase; +}; + +#define atmel_getb(chip, offset) inb(atmel_get_priv(chip)->base + (offset)) +#define atmel_putb(val, chip, offset) \ + outb(val, atmel_get_priv(chip)->base + (offset)) +#define atmel_request_region request_region +#define atmel_release_region release_region +/* Atmel definitions */ +enum tpm_atmel_addr { + TPM_ATMEL_BASE_ADDR_LO = 0x08, + TPM_ATMEL_BASE_ADDR_HI = 0x09 +}; + +static inline int tpm_read_index(int base, int index) +{ + outb(index, base); + return inb(base + 1) & 0xFF; +} + +/* Verify this is a 1.1 Atmel TPM */ +static int atmel_verify_tpm11(void) +{ + /* verify that it is an Atmel part */ + if (tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, 4) != 'A' || + tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, 5) != 'T' || + tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, 6) != 'M' || + tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, 7) != 'L') + return 1; + + /* query chip for its version number */ + if (tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, 0x00) != 1 || + tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, 0x01) != 1) + return 1; + + /* This is an atmel supported part */ + return 0; +} + +/* Determine where to talk to device */ +static void __iomem *atmel_get_base_addr(unsigned long *base, int *region_size) +{ + int lo, hi; + + if (atmel_verify_tpm11() != 0) + return NULL; + + lo = tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, TPM_ATMEL_BASE_ADDR_LO); + hi = tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, TPM_ATMEL_BASE_ADDR_HI); + + *base = (hi << 8) | lo; + *region_size = 2; + + return ioport_map(*base, *region_size); +} /* write status bits */ enum tpm_atmel_write_status { @@ -142,7 +201,6 @@ static void atml_plat_remove(void) tpm_chip_unregister(chip); if (priv->have_region) atmel_release_region(priv->base, priv->region_size); - atmel_put_base_addr(priv->iobase); platform_device_unregister(pdev); } @@ -211,7 +269,6 @@ static int __init init_atmel(void) err_unreg_dev: platform_device_unregister(pdev); err_rel_reg: - atmel_put_base_addr(iobase); if (have_region) atmel_release_region(base, region_size); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_atmel.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_atmel.h deleted file mode 100644 index 7ac3f69dcf0f..000000000000 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_atmel.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,140 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation - * - * Authors: - * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com> - * - * Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net> - * - * Device driver for TCG/TCPA TPM (trusted platform module). - * Specifications at www.trustedcomputinggroup.org - * - * These difference are required on power because the device must be - * discovered through the device tree and iomap must be used to get - * around the need for holes in the io_page_mask. This does not happen - * automatically because the tpm is not a normal pci device and lives - * under the root node. - */ - -struct tpm_atmel_priv { - int region_size; - int have_region; - unsigned long base; - void __iomem *iobase; -}; - -#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 - -#include <linux/of.h> - -#define atmel_getb(priv, offset) readb(priv->iobase + offset) -#define atmel_putb(val, priv, offset) writeb(val, priv->iobase + offset) -#define atmel_request_region request_mem_region -#define atmel_release_region release_mem_region - -static inline void atmel_put_base_addr(void __iomem *iobase) -{ - iounmap(iobase); -} - -static void __iomem * atmel_get_base_addr(unsigned long *base, int *region_size) -{ - struct device_node *dn; - unsigned long address, size; - const unsigned int *reg; - int reglen; - int naddrc; - int nsizec; - - dn = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "tpm"); - - if (!dn) - return NULL; - - if (!of_device_is_compatible(dn, "AT97SC3201")) { - of_node_put(dn); - return NULL; - } - - reg = of_get_property(dn, "reg", ®len); - naddrc = of_n_addr_cells(dn); - nsizec = of_n_size_cells(dn); - - of_node_put(dn); - - - if (naddrc == 2) - address = ((unsigned long) reg[0] << 32) | reg[1]; - else - address = reg[0]; - - if (nsizec == 2) - size = - ((unsigned long) reg[naddrc] << 32) | reg[naddrc + 1]; - else - size = reg[naddrc]; - - *base = address; - *region_size = size; - return ioremap(*base, *region_size); -} -#else -#define atmel_getb(chip, offset) inb(atmel_get_priv(chip)->base + offset) -#define atmel_putb(val, chip, offset) \ - outb(val, atmel_get_priv(chip)->base + offset) -#define atmel_request_region request_region -#define atmel_release_region release_region -/* Atmel definitions */ -enum tpm_atmel_addr { - TPM_ATMEL_BASE_ADDR_LO = 0x08, - TPM_ATMEL_BASE_ADDR_HI = 0x09 -}; - -static inline int tpm_read_index(int base, int index) -{ - outb(index, base); - return inb(base+1) & 0xFF; -} - -/* Verify this is a 1.1 Atmel TPM */ -static int atmel_verify_tpm11(void) -{ - - /* verify that it is an Atmel part */ - if (tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, 4) != 'A' || - tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, 5) != 'T' || - tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, 6) != 'M' || - tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, 7) != 'L') - return 1; - - /* query chip for its version number */ - if (tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, 0x00) != 1 || - tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, 0x01) != 1) - return 1; - - /* This is an atmel supported part */ - return 0; -} - -static inline void atmel_put_base_addr(void __iomem *iobase) -{ -} - -/* Determine where to talk to device */ -static void __iomem * atmel_get_base_addr(unsigned long *base, int *region_size) -{ - int lo, hi; - - if (atmel_verify_tpm11() != 0) - return NULL; - - lo = tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, TPM_ATMEL_BASE_ADDR_LO); - hi = tpm_read_index(TPM_ADDR, TPM_ATMEL_BASE_ADDR_HI); - - *base = (hi << 8) | lo; - *region_size = 2; - - return ioport_map(*base, *region_size); -} -#endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c index 2ea4882251cf..139556b21cc6 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static struct platform_driver ftpm_tee_plat_driver = { }, .shutdown = ftpm_plat_tee_shutdown, .probe = ftpm_plat_tee_probe, - .remove_new = ftpm_plat_tee_remove, + .remove = ftpm_plat_tee_remove, }; /* UUID of the fTPM TA */ diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel.c index 301a95b3734f..d1d27fdfe523 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel.c @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static void i2c_atmel_remove(struct i2c_client *client) } static const struct i2c_device_id i2c_atmel_id[] = { - {I2C_DRIVER_NAME, 0}, + { I2C_DRIVER_NAME }, {} }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(i2c, i2c_atmel_id); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c index d3989b257f42..76d048f63d55 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ static bool tpm_ibmvtpm_req_canceled(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 status) } static const struct tpm_class_ops tpm_ibmvtpm = { + .flags = TPM_OPS_AUTO_STARTUP, .recv = tpm_ibmvtpm_recv, .send = tpm_ibmvtpm_send, .cancel = tpm_ibmvtpm_cancel, @@ -690,16 +691,6 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev, if (!strcmp(id->compat, "IBM,vtpm20")) chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2; - rc = tpm_get_timeouts(chip); - if (rc) - goto init_irq_cleanup; - - if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { - rc = tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(chip); - if (rc) - goto init_irq_cleanup; - } - return tpm_chip_register(chip); init_irq_cleanup: do { diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c index 9c924a1440a9..2d2ae37153ba 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c @@ -51,34 +51,40 @@ static struct tpm_inf_dev tpm_dev; static inline void tpm_data_out(unsigned char data, unsigned char offset) { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT if (tpm_dev.iotype == TPM_INF_IO_PORT) outb(data, tpm_dev.data_regs + offset); else +#endif writeb(data, tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.data_regs + offset); } static inline unsigned char tpm_data_in(unsigned char offset) { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT if (tpm_dev.iotype == TPM_INF_IO_PORT) return inb(tpm_dev.data_regs + offset); - else - return readb(tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.data_regs + offset); +#endif + return readb(tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.data_regs + offset); } static inline void tpm_config_out(unsigned char data, unsigned char offset) { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT if (tpm_dev.iotype == TPM_INF_IO_PORT) outb(data, tpm_dev.config_port + offset); else +#endif writeb(data, tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.index_off + offset); } static inline unsigned char tpm_config_in(unsigned char offset) { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT if (tpm_dev.iotype == TPM_INF_IO_PORT) return inb(tpm_dev.config_port + offset); - else - return readb(tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.index_off + offset); +#endif + return readb(tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.index_off + offset); } /* TPM header definitions */ diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c index 2f7326d297ad..9aa230a63616 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c @@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, tis_of_platform_match); static struct platform_driver tis_drv = { .probe = tpm_tis_plat_probe, - .remove_new = tpm_tis_plat_remove, + .remove = tpm_tis_plat_remove, .driver = { .name = "tpm_tis", .pm = &tpm_tis_pm, diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c index 714070ebb6e7..fdef214b9f6b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c @@ -1020,7 +1020,8 @@ void tpm_tis_remove(struct tpm_chip *chip) interrupt = 0; tpm_tis_write32(priv, reg, ~TPM_GLOBAL_INT_ENABLE & interrupt); - flush_work(&priv->free_irq_work); + if (priv->free_irq_work.func) + flush_work(&priv->free_irq_work); tpm_tis_clkrun_enable(chip, false); @@ -1057,11 +1058,6 @@ static void tpm_tis_clkrun_enable(struct tpm_chip *chip, bool value) clkrun_val &= ~LPC_CLKRUN_EN; iowrite32(clkrun_val, data->ilb_base_addr + LPC_CNTRL_OFFSET); - /* - * Write any random value on port 0x80 which is on LPC, to make - * sure LPC clock is running before sending any TPM command. - */ - outb(0xCC, 0x80); } else { data->clkrun_enabled--; if (data->clkrun_enabled) @@ -1072,13 +1068,15 @@ static void tpm_tis_clkrun_enable(struct tpm_chip *chip, bool value) /* Enable LPC CLKRUN# */ clkrun_val |= LPC_CLKRUN_EN; iowrite32(clkrun_val, data->ilb_base_addr + LPC_CNTRL_OFFSET); - - /* - * Write any random value on port 0x80 which is on LPC, to make - * sure LPC clock is running before sending any TPM command. - */ - outb(0xCC, 0x80); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT + /* + * Write any random value on port 0x80 which is on LPC, to make + * sure LPC clock is running before sending any TPM command. + */ + outb(0xCC, 0x80); +#endif } static const struct tpm_class_ops tpm_tis = { diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h index 13e99cf65efe..690ad8e9b731 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static inline int tpm_tis_verify_crc(struct tpm_tis_data *data, size_t len, static inline bool is_bsw(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_X86 - return ((boot_cpu_data.x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT) ? 1 : 0); + return (boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm == INTEL_ATOM_AIRMONT) ? 1 : 0; #else return false; #endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_i2c.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_i2c.c index 9511c0d50185..6cd07dd34507 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_i2c.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_i2c.c @@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ static void tpm_tis_i2c_remove(struct i2c_client *client) } static const struct i2c_device_id tpm_tis_i2c_id[] = { - { "tpm_tis_i2c", 0 }, + { "tpm_tis_i2c" }, {} }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(i2c, tpm_tis_i2c_id); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_i2c_cr50.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_i2c_cr50.c index adf22992138e..3b55a7b05c46 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_i2c_cr50.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_i2c_cr50.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ */ #include <linux/acpi.h> +#include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/completion.h> #include <linux/i2c.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> @@ -30,11 +31,13 @@ #define TPM_CR50_MAX_BUFSIZE 64 #define TPM_CR50_TIMEOUT_SHORT_MS 2 /* Short timeout during transactions */ #define TPM_CR50_TIMEOUT_NOIRQ_MS 20 /* Timeout for TPM ready without IRQ */ -#define TPM_CR50_I2C_DID_VID 0x00281ae0L /* Device and vendor ID reg value */ -#define TPM_TI50_I2C_DID_VID 0x504a6666L /* Device and vendor ID reg value */ +#define TPM_CR50_I2C_DID_VID 0x00281ae0L /* Device and vendor ID for Cr50 H1 */ +#define TPM_TI50_DT_I2C_DID_VID 0x504a6666L /* Device and vendor ID for Ti50 DT */ +#define TPM_TI50_OT_I2C_DID_VID 0x50666666L /* Device and vendor ID for TI50 OT */ #define TPM_CR50_I2C_MAX_RETRIES 3 /* Max retries due to I2C errors */ #define TPM_CR50_I2C_RETRY_DELAY_LO 55 /* Min usecs between retries on I2C */ #define TPM_CR50_I2C_RETRY_DELAY_HI 65 /* Max usecs between retries on I2C */ +#define TPM_CR50_I2C_DEFAULT_LOC 0 #define TPM_I2C_ACCESS(l) (0x0000 | ((l) << 4)) #define TPM_I2C_STS(l) (0x0001 | ((l) << 4)) @@ -199,8 +202,6 @@ static int tpm_cr50_i2c_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 addr, u8 *buffer, size_t }; int rc; - i2c_lock_bus(client->adapter, I2C_LOCK_SEGMENT); - /* Prepare for completion interrupt */ tpm_cr50_i2c_enable_tpm_irq(chip); @@ -219,7 +220,6 @@ static int tpm_cr50_i2c_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 addr, u8 *buffer, size_t out: tpm_cr50_i2c_disable_tpm_irq(chip); - i2c_unlock_bus(client->adapter, I2C_LOCK_SEGMENT); if (rc < 0) return rc; @@ -261,8 +261,6 @@ static int tpm_cr50_i2c_write(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 addr, u8 *buffer, priv->buf[0] = addr; memcpy(priv->buf + 1, buffer, len); - i2c_lock_bus(client->adapter, I2C_LOCK_SEGMENT); - /* Prepare for completion interrupt */ tpm_cr50_i2c_enable_tpm_irq(chip); @@ -276,7 +274,6 @@ static int tpm_cr50_i2c_write(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 addr, u8 *buffer, out: tpm_cr50_i2c_disable_tpm_irq(chip); - i2c_unlock_bus(client->adapter, I2C_LOCK_SEGMENT); if (rc < 0) return rc; @@ -285,25 +282,26 @@ out: } /** - * tpm_cr50_check_locality() - Verify TPM locality 0 is active. + * tpm_cr50_check_locality() - Verify if required TPM locality is active. * @chip: A TPM chip. + * @loc: Locality to be verified * * Return: - * - 0: Success. + * - loc: Success. * - -errno: A POSIX error code. */ -static int tpm_cr50_check_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip) +static int tpm_cr50_check_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip, int loc) { u8 mask = TPM_ACCESS_VALID | TPM_ACCESS_ACTIVE_LOCALITY; u8 buf; int rc; - rc = tpm_cr50_i2c_read(chip, TPM_I2C_ACCESS(0), &buf, sizeof(buf)); + rc = tpm_cr50_i2c_read(chip, TPM_I2C_ACCESS(loc), &buf, sizeof(buf)); if (rc < 0) return rc; if ((buf & mask) == mask) - return 0; + return loc; return -EIO; } @@ -311,53 +309,72 @@ static int tpm_cr50_check_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip) /** * tpm_cr50_release_locality() - Release TPM locality. * @chip: A TPM chip. - * @force: Flag to force release if set. + * @loc: Locality to be released + * + * Return: + * - 0: Success. + * - -errno: A POSIX error code. */ -static void tpm_cr50_release_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip, bool force) +static int tpm_cr50_release_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip, int loc) { + struct i2c_client *client = to_i2c_client(chip->dev.parent); u8 mask = TPM_ACCESS_VALID | TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_PENDING; - u8 addr = TPM_I2C_ACCESS(0); + u8 addr = TPM_I2C_ACCESS(loc); u8 buf; + int rc; - if (tpm_cr50_i2c_read(chip, addr, &buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) - return; + rc = tpm_cr50_i2c_read(chip, addr, &buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (rc < 0) + goto unlock_out; - if (force || (buf & mask) == mask) { + if ((buf & mask) == mask) { buf = TPM_ACCESS_ACTIVE_LOCALITY; - tpm_cr50_i2c_write(chip, addr, &buf, sizeof(buf)); + rc = tpm_cr50_i2c_write(chip, addr, &buf, sizeof(buf)); } + +unlock_out: + i2c_unlock_bus(client->adapter, I2C_LOCK_SEGMENT); + return rc; } /** - * tpm_cr50_request_locality() - Request TPM locality 0. + * tpm_cr50_request_locality() - Request TPM locality. * @chip: A TPM chip. + * @loc: Locality to be requested. * * Return: - * - 0: Success. + * - loc: Success. * - -errno: A POSIX error code. */ -static int tpm_cr50_request_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip) +static int tpm_cr50_request_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip, int loc) { + struct i2c_client *client = to_i2c_client(chip->dev.parent); u8 buf = TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_USE; unsigned long stop; int rc; - if (!tpm_cr50_check_locality(chip)) - return 0; + i2c_lock_bus(client->adapter, I2C_LOCK_SEGMENT); - rc = tpm_cr50_i2c_write(chip, TPM_I2C_ACCESS(0), &buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (tpm_cr50_check_locality(chip, loc) == loc) + return loc; + + rc = tpm_cr50_i2c_write(chip, TPM_I2C_ACCESS(loc), &buf, sizeof(buf)); if (rc < 0) - return rc; + goto unlock_out; stop = jiffies + chip->timeout_a; do { - if (!tpm_cr50_check_locality(chip)) - return 0; + if (tpm_cr50_check_locality(chip, loc) == loc) + return loc; msleep(TPM_CR50_TIMEOUT_SHORT_MS); } while (time_before(jiffies, stop)); - return -ETIMEDOUT; + rc = -ETIMEDOUT; + +unlock_out: + i2c_unlock_bus(client->adapter, I2C_LOCK_SEGMENT); + return rc; } /** @@ -373,7 +390,7 @@ static u8 tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_status(struct tpm_chip *chip) { u8 buf[4]; - if (tpm_cr50_i2c_read(chip, TPM_I2C_STS(0), buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) + if (tpm_cr50_i2c_read(chip, TPM_I2C_STS(chip->locality), buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) return 0; return buf[0]; @@ -389,7 +406,7 @@ static void tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_set_ready(struct tpm_chip *chip) { u8 buf[4] = { TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY }; - tpm_cr50_i2c_write(chip, TPM_I2C_STS(0), buf, sizeof(buf)); + tpm_cr50_i2c_write(chip, TPM_I2C_STS(chip->locality), buf, sizeof(buf)); msleep(TPM_CR50_TIMEOUT_SHORT_MS); } @@ -419,7 +436,7 @@ static int tpm_cr50_i2c_get_burst_and_status(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 mask, stop = jiffies + chip->timeout_b; do { - if (tpm_cr50_i2c_read(chip, TPM_I2C_STS(0), buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) { + if (tpm_cr50_i2c_read(chip, TPM_I2C_STS(chip->locality), buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) { msleep(TPM_CR50_TIMEOUT_SHORT_MS); continue; } @@ -453,7 +470,7 @@ static int tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t buf_len) u8 mask = TPM_STS_VALID | TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL; size_t burstcnt, cur, len, expected; - u8 addr = TPM_I2C_DATA_FIFO(0); + u8 addr = TPM_I2C_DATA_FIFO(chip->locality); u32 status; int rc; @@ -515,7 +532,6 @@ static int tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t buf_len) goto out_err; } - tpm_cr50_release_locality(chip, false); return cur; out_err: @@ -523,7 +539,6 @@ out_err: if (tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_status(chip) & TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY) tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_set_ready(chip); - tpm_cr50_release_locality(chip, false); return rc; } @@ -545,10 +560,6 @@ static int tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len) u32 status; int rc; - rc = tpm_cr50_request_locality(chip); - if (rc < 0) - return rc; - /* Wait until TPM is ready for a command */ stop = jiffies + chip->timeout_b; while (!(tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_status(chip) & TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY)) { @@ -577,7 +588,8 @@ static int tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len) * that is inserted by tpm_cr50_i2c_write() */ limit = min_t(size_t, burstcnt - 1, len); - rc = tpm_cr50_i2c_write(chip, TPM_I2C_DATA_FIFO(0), &buf[sent], limit); + rc = tpm_cr50_i2c_write(chip, TPM_I2C_DATA_FIFO(chip->locality), + &buf[sent], limit); if (rc < 0) { dev_err(&chip->dev, "Write failed\n"); goto out_err; @@ -598,7 +610,7 @@ static int tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len) } /* Start the TPM command */ - rc = tpm_cr50_i2c_write(chip, TPM_I2C_STS(0), tpm_go, + rc = tpm_cr50_i2c_write(chip, TPM_I2C_STS(chip->locality), tpm_go, sizeof(tpm_go)); if (rc < 0) { dev_err(&chip->dev, "Start command failed\n"); @@ -611,7 +623,6 @@ out_err: if (tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_status(chip) & TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY) tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_set_ready(chip); - tpm_cr50_release_locality(chip, false); return rc; } @@ -650,6 +661,8 @@ static const struct tpm_class_ops cr50_i2c = { .req_complete_mask = TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL | TPM_STS_VALID, .req_complete_val = TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL | TPM_STS_VALID, .req_canceled = &tpm_cr50_i2c_req_canceled, + .request_locality = &tpm_cr50_request_locality, + .relinquish_locality = &tpm_cr50_release_locality, }; #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI @@ -669,6 +682,27 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, of_cr50_i2c_match); #endif /** + * tpm_cr50_vid_to_name() - Maps VID to name. + * @vendor: Vendor identifier to map to name + * + * Return: + * A valid string for the vendor or empty string + */ +static const char *tpm_cr50_vid_to_name(u32 vendor) +{ + switch (vendor) { + case TPM_CR50_I2C_DID_VID: + return "cr50"; + case TPM_TI50_DT_I2C_DID_VID: + return "ti50 DT"; + case TPM_TI50_OT_I2C_DID_VID: + return "ti50 OT"; + default: + return "unknown"; + } +} + +/** * tpm_cr50_i2c_probe() - Driver probe function. * @client: I2C client information. * @@ -684,6 +718,7 @@ static int tpm_cr50_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *client) u32 vendor; u8 buf[4]; int rc; + int loc; if (!i2c_check_functionality(client->adapter, I2C_FUNC_I2C)) return -ENODEV; @@ -726,29 +761,37 @@ static int tpm_cr50_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *client) TPM_CR50_TIMEOUT_NOIRQ_MS); } - rc = tpm_cr50_request_locality(chip); - if (rc < 0) { + loc = tpm_cr50_request_locality(chip, TPM_CR50_I2C_DEFAULT_LOC); + if (loc < 0) { dev_err(dev, "Could not request locality\n"); - return rc; + return loc; } /* Read four bytes from DID_VID register */ - rc = tpm_cr50_i2c_read(chip, TPM_I2C_DID_VID(0), buf, sizeof(buf)); + rc = tpm_cr50_i2c_read(chip, TPM_I2C_DID_VID(loc), buf, sizeof(buf)); if (rc < 0) { dev_err(dev, "Could not read vendor id\n"); - tpm_cr50_release_locality(chip, true); + if (tpm_cr50_release_locality(chip, loc)) + dev_err(dev, "Could not release locality\n"); + return rc; + } + + rc = tpm_cr50_release_locality(chip, loc); + if (rc) { + dev_err(dev, "Could not release locality\n"); return rc; } vendor = le32_to_cpup((__le32 *)buf); - if (vendor != TPM_CR50_I2C_DID_VID && vendor != TPM_TI50_I2C_DID_VID) { + if (vendor != TPM_CR50_I2C_DID_VID && + vendor != TPM_TI50_DT_I2C_DID_VID && + vendor != TPM_TI50_OT_I2C_DID_VID) { dev_err(dev, "Vendor ID did not match! ID was %08x\n", vendor); - tpm_cr50_release_locality(chip, true); return -ENODEV; } dev_info(dev, "%s TPM 2.0 (i2c 0x%02x irq %d id 0x%x)\n", - vendor == TPM_TI50_I2C_DID_VID ? "ti50" : "cr50", + tpm_cr50_vid_to_name(vendor), client->addr, client->irq, vendor >> 16); return tpm_chip_register(chip); } @@ -772,7 +815,6 @@ static void tpm_cr50_i2c_remove(struct i2c_client *client) } tpm_chip_unregister(chip); - tpm_cr50_release_locality(chip, true); } static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(cr50_i2c_pm, tpm_pm_suspend, tpm_pm_resume); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c index 3f9eaf27b41b..61b42c83ced8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include "tpm_tis_spi.h" #define MAX_SPI_FRAMESIZE 64 +#define SPI_HDRSIZE 4 /* * TCG SPI flow control is documented in section 6.4 of the spec[1]. In short, @@ -247,7 +248,7 @@ static int tpm_tis_spi_write_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, int tpm_tis_spi_init(struct spi_device *spi, struct tpm_tis_spi_phy *phy, int irq, const struct tpm_tis_phy_ops *phy_ops) { - phy->iobuf = devm_kmalloc(&spi->dev, MAX_SPI_FRAMESIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + phy->iobuf = devm_kmalloc(&spi->dev, SPI_HDRSIZE + MAX_SPI_FRAMESIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!phy->iobuf) return -ENOMEM; @@ -317,6 +318,7 @@ static void tpm_tis_spi_remove(struct spi_device *dev) } static const struct spi_device_id tpm_tis_spi_id[] = { + { "attpm20p", (unsigned long)tpm_tis_spi_probe }, { "st33htpm-spi", (unsigned long)tpm_tis_spi_probe }, { "slb9670", (unsigned long)tpm_tis_spi_probe }, { "tpm_tis_spi", (unsigned long)tpm_tis_spi_probe }, diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer.c index 0621ebec530b..4927714d277a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer.c @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(acpi, tpm_synquacer_acpi_tbl); static struct platform_driver tis_synquacer_drv = { .probe = tpm_tis_synquacer_probe, - .remove_new = tpm_tis_synquacer_remove, + .remove = tpm_tis_synquacer_remove, .driver = { .name = "tpm_tis_synquacer", .pm = &tpm_tis_synquacer_pm, diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c index 11c502039faf..8fe4a01eea12 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c @@ -243,7 +243,6 @@ static int vtpm_proxy_fops_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) static const struct file_operations vtpm_proxy_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, - .llseek = no_llseek, .read = vtpm_proxy_fops_read, .write = vtpm_proxy_fops_write, .poll = vtpm_proxy_fops_poll, diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c index eef0fb06ea83..c25df7ea064e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c @@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ static int tpmrm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) const struct file_operations tpmrm_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, - .llseek = no_llseek, .open = tpmrm_open, .read = tpm_common_read, .write = tpm_common_write, |