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path: root/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
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Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c767
1 files changed, 500 insertions, 267 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
index bb5da66da4c1..3c427f18a04b 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#define DM_MSG_PREFIX "verity"
@@ -29,25 +30,40 @@
#define DM_VERITY_ENV_VAR_NAME "DM_VERITY_ERR_BLOCK_NR"
#define DM_VERITY_DEFAULT_PREFETCH_SIZE 262144
+#define DM_VERITY_USE_BH_DEFAULT_BYTES 8192
#define DM_VERITY_MAX_CORRUPTED_ERRS 100
#define DM_VERITY_OPT_LOGGING "ignore_corruption"
#define DM_VERITY_OPT_RESTART "restart_on_corruption"
#define DM_VERITY_OPT_PANIC "panic_on_corruption"
+#define DM_VERITY_OPT_ERROR_RESTART "restart_on_error"
+#define DM_VERITY_OPT_ERROR_PANIC "panic_on_error"
#define DM_VERITY_OPT_IGN_ZEROES "ignore_zero_blocks"
#define DM_VERITY_OPT_AT_MOST_ONCE "check_at_most_once"
#define DM_VERITY_OPT_TASKLET_VERIFY "try_verify_in_tasklet"
-#define DM_VERITY_OPTS_MAX (4 + DM_VERITY_OPTS_FEC + \
+#define DM_VERITY_OPTS_MAX (5 + DM_VERITY_OPTS_FEC + \
DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPTS)
static unsigned int dm_verity_prefetch_cluster = DM_VERITY_DEFAULT_PREFETCH_SIZE;
module_param_named(prefetch_cluster, dm_verity_prefetch_cluster, uint, 0644);
+static unsigned int dm_verity_use_bh_bytes[4] = {
+ DM_VERITY_USE_BH_DEFAULT_BYTES, // IOPRIO_CLASS_NONE
+ DM_VERITY_USE_BH_DEFAULT_BYTES, // IOPRIO_CLASS_RT
+ DM_VERITY_USE_BH_DEFAULT_BYTES, // IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
+ 0 // IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE
+};
+
+module_param_array_named(use_bh_bytes, dm_verity_use_bh_bytes, uint, NULL, 0644);
+
static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(use_bh_wq_enabled);
+/* Is at least one dm-verity instance using ahash_tfm instead of shash_tfm? */
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(ahash_enabled);
+
struct dm_verity_prefetch_work {
struct work_struct work;
struct dm_verity *v;
@@ -87,7 +103,7 @@ static void dm_bufio_alloc_callback(struct dm_buffer *buf)
*/
static sector_t verity_map_sector(struct dm_verity *v, sector_t bi_sector)
{
- return v->data_start + dm_target_offset(v->ti, bi_sector);
+ return dm_target_offset(v->ti, bi_sector);
}
/*
@@ -102,7 +118,7 @@ static sector_t verity_position_at_level(struct dm_verity *v, sector_t block,
return block >> (level * v->hash_per_block_bits);
}
-static int verity_hash_update(struct dm_verity *v, struct ahash_request *req,
+static int verity_ahash_update(struct dm_verity *v, struct ahash_request *req,
const u8 *data, size_t len,
struct crypto_wait *wait)
{
@@ -135,12 +151,12 @@ static int verity_hash_update(struct dm_verity *v, struct ahash_request *req,
/*
* Wrapper for crypto_ahash_init, which handles verity salting.
*/
-static int verity_hash_init(struct dm_verity *v, struct ahash_request *req,
+static int verity_ahash_init(struct dm_verity *v, struct ahash_request *req,
struct crypto_wait *wait, bool may_sleep)
{
int r;
- ahash_request_set_tfm(req, v->tfm);
+ ahash_request_set_tfm(req, v->ahash_tfm);
ahash_request_set_callback(req,
may_sleep ? CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG : 0,
crypto_req_done, (void *)wait);
@@ -155,18 +171,18 @@ static int verity_hash_init(struct dm_verity *v, struct ahash_request *req,
}
if (likely(v->salt_size && (v->version >= 1)))
- r = verity_hash_update(v, req, v->salt, v->salt_size, wait);
+ r = verity_ahash_update(v, req, v->salt, v->salt_size, wait);
return r;
}
-static int verity_hash_final(struct dm_verity *v, struct ahash_request *req,
- u8 *digest, struct crypto_wait *wait)
+static int verity_ahash_final(struct dm_verity *v, struct ahash_request *req,
+ u8 *digest, struct crypto_wait *wait)
{
int r;
if (unlikely(v->salt_size && (!v->version))) {
- r = verity_hash_update(v, req, v->salt, v->salt_size, wait);
+ r = verity_ahash_update(v, req, v->salt, v->salt_size, wait);
if (r < 0) {
DMERR("%s failed updating salt: %d", __func__, r);
@@ -180,23 +196,27 @@ out:
return r;
}
-int verity_hash(struct dm_verity *v, struct ahash_request *req,
+int verity_hash(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 *digest, bool may_sleep)
{
int r;
- struct crypto_wait wait;
-
- r = verity_hash_init(v, req, &wait, may_sleep);
- if (unlikely(r < 0))
- goto out;
- r = verity_hash_update(v, req, data, len, &wait);
- if (unlikely(r < 0))
- goto out;
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&ahash_enabled) && !v->shash_tfm) {
+ struct ahash_request *req = verity_io_hash_req(v, io);
+ struct crypto_wait wait;
- r = verity_hash_final(v, req, digest, &wait);
+ r = verity_ahash_init(v, req, &wait, may_sleep) ?:
+ verity_ahash_update(v, req, data, len, &wait) ?:
+ verity_ahash_final(v, req, digest, &wait);
+ } else {
+ struct shash_desc *desc = verity_io_hash_req(v, io);
-out:
+ desc->tfm = v->shash_tfm;
+ r = crypto_shash_import(desc, v->initial_hashstate) ?:
+ crypto_shash_finup(desc, data, len, digest);
+ }
+ if (unlikely(r))
+ DMERR("Error hashing block: %d", r);
return r;
}
@@ -301,7 +321,7 @@ static int verity_verify_level(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
if (static_branch_unlikely(&use_bh_wq_enabled) && io->in_bh) {
data = dm_bufio_get(v->bufio, hash_block, &buf);
- if (data == NULL) {
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(data)) {
/*
* In tasklet and the hash was not in the bufio cache.
* Return early and resume execution from a work-queue
@@ -311,11 +331,27 @@ static int verity_verify_level(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
}
} else {
data = dm_bufio_read_with_ioprio(v->bufio, hash_block,
- &buf, bio_prio(bio));
+ &buf, bio->bi_ioprio);
}
- if (IS_ERR(data))
- return PTR_ERR(data);
+ if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+ if (skip_unverified)
+ return 1;
+ r = PTR_ERR(data);
+ data = dm_bufio_new(v->bufio, hash_block, &buf);
+ if (IS_ERR(data))
+ return r;
+ if (verity_fec_decode(v, io, DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_METADATA,
+ hash_block, data) == 0) {
+ aux = dm_bufio_get_aux_data(buf);
+ aux->hash_verified = 1;
+ goto release_ok;
+ } else {
+ dm_bufio_release(buf);
+ dm_bufio_forget(v->bufio, hash_block);
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
aux = dm_bufio_get_aux_data(buf);
@@ -325,8 +361,7 @@ static int verity_verify_level(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
goto release_ret_r;
}
- r = verity_hash(v, verity_io_hash_req(v, io),
- data, 1 << v->hash_dev_block_bits,
+ r = verity_hash(v, io, data, 1 << v->hash_dev_block_bits,
verity_io_real_digest(v, io), !io->in_bh);
if (unlikely(r < 0))
goto release_ret_r;
@@ -342,14 +377,14 @@ static int verity_verify_level(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
r = -EAGAIN;
goto release_ret_r;
} else if (verity_fec_decode(v, io, DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_METADATA,
- hash_block, data, NULL) == 0)
+ hash_block, data) == 0)
aux->hash_verified = 1;
else if (verity_handle_err(v,
DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_METADATA,
hash_block)) {
- struct bio *bio =
- dm_bio_from_per_bio_data(io,
- v->ti->per_io_data_size);
+ struct bio *bio;
+ io->had_mismatch = true;
+ bio = dm_bio_from_per_bio_data(io, v->ti->per_io_data_size);
dm_audit_log_bio(DM_MSG_PREFIX, "verify-metadata", bio,
block, 0);
r = -EIO;
@@ -357,6 +392,7 @@ static int verity_verify_level(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
}
}
+release_ok:
data += offset;
memcpy(want_digest, data, v->digest_size);
r = 0;
@@ -404,98 +440,8 @@ out:
return r;
}
-/*
- * Calculates the digest for the given bio
- */
-static int verity_for_io_block(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
- struct bvec_iter *iter, struct crypto_wait *wait)
-{
- unsigned int todo = 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits;
- struct bio *bio = dm_bio_from_per_bio_data(io, v->ti->per_io_data_size);
- struct scatterlist sg;
- struct ahash_request *req = verity_io_hash_req(v, io);
-
- do {
- int r;
- unsigned int len;
- struct bio_vec bv = bio_iter_iovec(bio, *iter);
-
- sg_init_table(&sg, 1);
-
- len = bv.bv_len;
-
- if (likely(len >= todo))
- len = todo;
- /*
- * Operating on a single page at a time looks suboptimal
- * until you consider the typical block size is 4,096B.
- * Going through this loops twice should be very rare.
- */
- sg_set_page(&sg, bv.bv_page, len, bv.bv_offset);
- ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, NULL, len);
- r = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_update(req), wait);
-
- if (unlikely(r < 0)) {
- DMERR("%s crypto op failed: %d", __func__, r);
- return r;
- }
-
- bio_advance_iter(bio, iter, len);
- todo -= len;
- } while (todo);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Calls function process for 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits bytes in the bio_vec
- * starting from iter.
- */
-int verity_for_bv_block(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
- struct bvec_iter *iter,
- int (*process)(struct dm_verity *v,
- struct dm_verity_io *io, u8 *data,
- size_t len))
-{
- unsigned int todo = 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits;
- struct bio *bio = dm_bio_from_per_bio_data(io, v->ti->per_io_data_size);
-
- do {
- int r;
- u8 *page;
- unsigned int len;
- struct bio_vec bv = bio_iter_iovec(bio, *iter);
-
- page = bvec_kmap_local(&bv);
- len = bv.bv_len;
-
- if (likely(len >= todo))
- len = todo;
-
- r = process(v, io, page, len);
- kunmap_local(page);
-
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
-
- bio_advance_iter(bio, iter, len);
- todo -= len;
- } while (todo);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int verity_recheck_copy(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
- u8 *data, size_t len)
-{
- memcpy(data, io->recheck_buffer, len);
- io->recheck_buffer += len;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
static noinline int verity_recheck(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
- struct bvec_iter start, sector_t cur_block)
+ sector_t cur_block, u8 *dest)
{
struct page *page;
void *buffer;
@@ -518,8 +464,7 @@ static noinline int verity_recheck(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
if (unlikely(r))
goto free_ret;
- r = verity_hash(v, verity_io_hash_req(v, io), buffer,
- 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits,
+ r = verity_hash(v, io, buffer, 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits,
verity_io_real_digest(v, io), true);
if (unlikely(r))
goto free_ret;
@@ -530,11 +475,7 @@ static noinline int verity_recheck(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
goto free_ret;
}
- io->recheck_buffer = buffer;
- r = verity_for_bv_block(v, io, &start, verity_recheck_copy);
- if (unlikely(r))
- goto free_ret;
-
+ memcpy(dest, buffer, 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits);
r = 0;
free_ret:
mempool_free(page, &v->recheck_pool);
@@ -542,23 +483,37 @@ free_ret:
return r;
}
-static int verity_bv_zero(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
- u8 *data, size_t len)
+static int verity_handle_data_hash_mismatch(struct dm_verity *v,
+ struct dm_verity_io *io,
+ struct bio *bio, sector_t blkno,
+ u8 *data)
{
- memset(data, 0, len);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Moves the bio iter one data block forward.
- */
-static inline void verity_bv_skip_block(struct dm_verity *v,
- struct dm_verity_io *io,
- struct bvec_iter *iter)
-{
- struct bio *bio = dm_bio_from_per_bio_data(io, v->ti->per_io_data_size);
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&use_bh_wq_enabled) && io->in_bh) {
+ /*
+ * Error handling code (FEC included) cannot be run in the
+ * BH workqueue, so fallback to a standard workqueue.
+ */
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+ if (verity_recheck(v, io, blkno, data) == 0) {
+ if (v->validated_blocks)
+ set_bit(blkno, v->validated_blocks);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#if defined(CONFIG_DM_VERITY_FEC)
+ if (verity_fec_decode(v, io, DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_DATA, blkno,
+ data) == 0)
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ if (bio->bi_status)
+ return -EIO; /* Error correction failed; Just return error */
- bio_advance_iter(bio, iter, 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits);
+ if (verity_handle_err(v, DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_DATA, blkno)) {
+ io->had_mismatch = true;
+ dm_audit_log_bio(DM_MSG_PREFIX, "verify-data", bio, blkno, 0);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -566,12 +521,10 @@ static inline void verity_bv_skip_block(struct dm_verity *v,
*/
static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
{
- bool is_zero;
struct dm_verity *v = io->v;
- struct bvec_iter start;
+ const unsigned int block_size = 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits;
struct bvec_iter iter_copy;
struct bvec_iter *iter;
- struct crypto_wait wait;
struct bio *bio = dm_bio_from_per_bio_data(io, v->ti->per_io_data_size);
unsigned int b;
@@ -585,16 +538,17 @@ static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
} else
iter = &io->iter;
- for (b = 0; b < io->n_blocks; b++) {
+ for (b = 0; b < io->n_blocks;
+ b++, bio_advance_iter(bio, iter, block_size)) {
int r;
sector_t cur_block = io->block + b;
- struct ahash_request *req = verity_io_hash_req(v, io);
+ bool is_zero;
+ struct bio_vec bv;
+ void *data;
if (v->validated_blocks && bio->bi_status == BLK_STS_OK &&
- likely(test_bit(cur_block, v->validated_blocks))) {
- verity_bv_skip_block(v, io, iter);
+ likely(test_bit(cur_block, v->validated_blocks)))
continue;
- }
r = verity_hash_for_block(v, io, cur_block,
verity_io_want_digest(v, io),
@@ -602,67 +556,49 @@ static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
if (unlikely(r < 0))
return r;
+ bv = bio_iter_iovec(bio, *iter);
+ if (unlikely(bv.bv_len < block_size)) {
+ /*
+ * Data block spans pages. This should not happen,
+ * since dm-verity sets dma_alignment to the data block
+ * size minus 1, and dm-verity also doesn't allow the
+ * data block size to be greater than PAGE_SIZE.
+ */
+ DMERR_LIMIT("unaligned io (data block spans pages)");
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ data = bvec_kmap_local(&bv);
+
if (is_zero) {
/*
* If we expect a zero block, don't validate, just
* return zeros.
*/
- r = verity_for_bv_block(v, io, iter,
- verity_bv_zero);
- if (unlikely(r < 0))
- return r;
-
+ memset(data, 0, block_size);
+ kunmap_local(data);
continue;
}
- r = verity_hash_init(v, req, &wait, !io->in_bh);
- if (unlikely(r < 0))
- return r;
-
- start = *iter;
- r = verity_for_io_block(v, io, iter, &wait);
- if (unlikely(r < 0))
- return r;
-
- r = verity_hash_final(v, req, verity_io_real_digest(v, io),
- &wait);
- if (unlikely(r < 0))
+ r = verity_hash(v, io, data, block_size,
+ verity_io_real_digest(v, io), !io->in_bh);
+ if (unlikely(r < 0)) {
+ kunmap_local(data);
return r;
+ }
if (likely(memcmp(verity_io_real_digest(v, io),
verity_io_want_digest(v, io), v->digest_size) == 0)) {
if (v->validated_blocks)
set_bit(cur_block, v->validated_blocks);
+ kunmap_local(data);
continue;
- } else if (static_branch_unlikely(&use_bh_wq_enabled) && io->in_bh) {
- /*
- * Error handling code (FEC included) cannot be run in a
- * tasklet since it may sleep, so fallback to work-queue.
- */
- return -EAGAIN;
- } else if (verity_recheck(v, io, start, cur_block) == 0) {
- if (v->validated_blocks)
- set_bit(cur_block, v->validated_blocks);
- continue;
-#if defined(CONFIG_DM_VERITY_FEC)
- } else if (verity_fec_decode(v, io, DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_DATA,
- cur_block, NULL, &start) == 0) {
- continue;
-#endif
- } else {
- if (bio->bi_status) {
- /*
- * Error correction failed; Just return error
- */
- return -EIO;
- }
- if (verity_handle_err(v, DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_DATA,
- cur_block)) {
- dm_audit_log_bio(DM_MSG_PREFIX, "verify-data",
- bio, cur_block, 0);
- return -EIO;
- }
}
+ r = verity_handle_data_hash_mismatch(v, io, bio, cur_block,
+ data);
+ kunmap_local(data);
+ if (unlikely(r))
+ return r;
}
return 0;
@@ -677,6 +613,11 @@ static inline bool verity_is_system_shutting_down(void)
|| system_state == SYSTEM_RESTART;
}
+static void restart_io_error(struct work_struct *w)
+{
+ kernel_restart("dm-verity device has I/O error");
+}
+
/*
* End one "io" structure with a given error.
*/
@@ -691,6 +632,24 @@ static void verity_finish_io(struct dm_verity_io *io, blk_status_t status)
if (!static_branch_unlikely(&use_bh_wq_enabled) || !io->in_bh)
verity_fec_finish_io(io);
+ if (unlikely(status != BLK_STS_OK) &&
+ unlikely(!(bio->bi_opf & REQ_RAHEAD)) &&
+ !io->had_mismatch &&
+ !verity_is_system_shutting_down()) {
+ if (v->error_mode == DM_VERITY_MODE_PANIC) {
+ panic("dm-verity device has I/O error");
+ }
+ if (v->error_mode == DM_VERITY_MODE_RESTART) {
+ static DECLARE_WORK(restart_work, restart_io_error);
+ queue_work(v->verify_wq, &restart_work);
+ /*
+ * We deliberately don't call bio_endio here, because
+ * the machine will be restarted anyway.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
bio_endio(bio);
}
@@ -720,9 +679,17 @@ static void verity_bh_work(struct work_struct *w)
verity_finish_io(io, errno_to_blk_status(err));
}
+static inline bool verity_use_bh(unsigned int bytes, unsigned short ioprio)
+{
+ return ioprio <= IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE &&
+ bytes <= READ_ONCE(dm_verity_use_bh_bytes[ioprio]);
+}
+
static void verity_end_io(struct bio *bio)
{
struct dm_verity_io *io = bio->bi_private;
+ unsigned short ioprio = IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(bio->bi_ioprio);
+ unsigned int bytes = io->n_blocks << io->v->data_dev_block_bits;
if (bio->bi_status &&
(!verity_fec_is_enabled(io->v) ||
@@ -732,9 +699,14 @@ static void verity_end_io(struct bio *bio)
return;
}
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&use_bh_wq_enabled) && io->v->use_bh_wq) {
- INIT_WORK(&io->bh_work, verity_bh_work);
- queue_work(system_bh_wq, &io->bh_work);
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&use_bh_wq_enabled) && io->v->use_bh_wq &&
+ verity_use_bh(bytes, ioprio)) {
+ if (in_hardirq() || irqs_disabled()) {
+ INIT_WORK(&io->bh_work, verity_bh_work);
+ queue_work(system_bh_wq, &io->bh_work);
+ } else {
+ verity_bh_work(&io->bh_work);
+ }
} else {
INIT_WORK(&io->work, verity_work);
queue_work(io->v->verify_wq, &io->work);
@@ -849,6 +821,7 @@ static int verity_map(struct dm_target *ti, struct bio *bio)
io->orig_bi_end_io = bio->bi_end_io;
io->block = bio->bi_iter.bi_sector >> (v->data_dev_block_bits - SECTOR_SHIFT);
io->n_blocks = bio->bi_iter.bi_size >> v->data_dev_block_bits;
+ io->had_mismatch = false;
bio->bi_end_io = verity_end_io;
bio->bi_private = io;
@@ -856,13 +829,20 @@ static int verity_map(struct dm_target *ti, struct bio *bio)
verity_fec_init_io(io);
- verity_submit_prefetch(v, io, bio_prio(bio));
+ verity_submit_prefetch(v, io, bio->bi_ioprio);
submit_bio_noacct(bio);
return DM_MAPIO_SUBMITTED;
}
+static void verity_postsuspend(struct dm_target *ti)
+{
+ struct dm_verity *v = ti->private;
+ flush_workqueue(v->verify_wq);
+ dm_bufio_client_reset(v->bufio);
+}
+
/*
* Status: V (valid) or C (corruption found)
*/
@@ -899,6 +879,8 @@ static void verity_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
DMEMIT("%02x", v->salt[x]);
if (v->mode != DM_VERITY_MODE_EIO)
args++;
+ if (v->error_mode != DM_VERITY_MODE_EIO)
+ args++;
if (verity_fec_is_enabled(v))
args += DM_VERITY_OPTS_FEC;
if (v->zero_digest)
@@ -928,6 +910,19 @@ static void verity_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
BUG();
}
}
+ if (v->error_mode != DM_VERITY_MODE_EIO) {
+ DMEMIT(" ");
+ switch (v->error_mode) {
+ case DM_VERITY_MODE_RESTART:
+ DMEMIT(DM_VERITY_OPT_ERROR_RESTART);
+ break;
+ case DM_VERITY_MODE_PANIC:
+ DMEMIT(DM_VERITY_OPT_ERROR_PANIC);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+ }
if (v->zero_digest)
DMEMIT(" " DM_VERITY_OPT_IGN_ZEROES);
if (v->validated_blocks)
@@ -980,6 +975,19 @@ static void verity_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
DMEMIT("invalid");
}
}
+ if (v->error_mode != DM_VERITY_MODE_EIO) {
+ DMEMIT(",verity_error_mode=");
+ switch (v->error_mode) {
+ case DM_VERITY_MODE_RESTART:
+ DMEMIT(DM_VERITY_OPT_ERROR_RESTART);
+ break;
+ case DM_VERITY_MODE_PANIC:
+ DMEMIT(DM_VERITY_OPT_ERROR_PANIC);
+ break;
+ default:
+ DMEMIT("invalid");
+ }
+ }
DMEMIT(";");
break;
}
@@ -991,7 +999,7 @@ static int verity_prepare_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti, struct block_device **bdev
*bdev = v->data_dev->bdev;
- if (v->data_start || ti->len != bdev_nr_sectors(v->data_dev->bdev))
+ if (ti->len != bdev_nr_sectors(v->data_dev->bdev))
return 1;
return 0;
}
@@ -1001,7 +1009,7 @@ static int verity_iterate_devices(struct dm_target *ti,
{
struct dm_verity *v = ti->private;
- return fn(ti, v->data_dev, v->data_start, ti->len, data);
+ return fn(ti, v->data_dev, 0, ti->len, data);
}
static void verity_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti, struct queue_limits *limits)
@@ -1014,9 +1022,52 @@ static void verity_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti, struct queue_limits *limits)
if (limits->physical_block_size < 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits)
limits->physical_block_size = 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits;
- blk_limits_io_min(limits, limits->logical_block_size);
+ limits->io_min = limits->logical_block_size;
+
+ /*
+ * Similar to what dm-crypt does, opt dm-verity out of support for
+ * direct I/O that is aligned to less than the traditional direct I/O
+ * alignment requirement of logical_block_size. This prevents dm-verity
+ * data blocks from crossing pages, eliminating various edge cases.
+ */
+ limits->dma_alignment = limits->logical_block_size - 1;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+
+static int verity_init_sig(struct dm_verity *v, const void *sig,
+ size_t sig_size)
+{
+ v->sig_size = sig_size;
+
+ if (sig) {
+ v->root_digest_sig = kmemdup(sig, v->sig_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!v->root_digest_sig)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
+static void verity_free_sig(struct dm_verity *v)
+{
+ kfree(v->root_digest_sig);
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline int verity_init_sig(struct dm_verity *v, const void *sig,
+ size_t sig_size)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void verity_free_sig(struct dm_verity *v)
+{
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+
static void verity_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
{
struct dm_verity *v = ti->private;
@@ -1033,11 +1084,17 @@ static void verity_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
kvfree(v->validated_blocks);
kfree(v->salt);
+ kfree(v->initial_hashstate);
kfree(v->root_digest);
kfree(v->zero_digest);
+ verity_free_sig(v);
- if (v->tfm)
- crypto_free_ahash(v->tfm);
+ if (v->ahash_tfm) {
+ static_branch_dec(&ahash_enabled);
+ crypto_free_ahash(v->ahash_tfm);
+ } else {
+ crypto_free_shash(v->shash_tfm);
+ }
kfree(v->alg_name);
@@ -1083,7 +1140,7 @@ static int verity_alloc_most_once(struct dm_verity *v)
static int verity_alloc_zero_digest(struct dm_verity *v)
{
int r = -ENOMEM;
- struct ahash_request *req;
+ struct dm_verity_io *io;
u8 *zero_data;
v->zero_digest = kmalloc(v->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1091,9 +1148,9 @@ static int verity_alloc_zero_digest(struct dm_verity *v)
if (!v->zero_digest)
return r;
- req = kmalloc(v->ahash_reqsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ io = kmalloc(sizeof(*io) + v->hash_reqsize, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req)
+ if (!io)
return r; /* verity_dtr will free zero_digest */
zero_data = kzalloc(1 << v->data_dev_block_bits, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1101,11 +1158,11 @@ static int verity_alloc_zero_digest(struct dm_verity *v)
if (!zero_data)
goto out;
- r = verity_hash(v, req, zero_data, 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits,
+ r = verity_hash(v, io, zero_data, 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits,
v->zero_digest, true);
out:
- kfree(req);
+ kfree(io);
kfree(zero_data);
return r;
@@ -1133,6 +1190,25 @@ static int verity_parse_verity_mode(struct dm_verity *v, const char *arg_name)
return 0;
}
+static inline bool verity_is_verity_error_mode(const char *arg_name)
+{
+ return (!strcasecmp(arg_name, DM_VERITY_OPT_ERROR_RESTART) ||
+ !strcasecmp(arg_name, DM_VERITY_OPT_ERROR_PANIC));
+}
+
+static int verity_parse_verity_error_mode(struct dm_verity *v, const char *arg_name)
+{
+ if (v->error_mode)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcasecmp(arg_name, DM_VERITY_OPT_ERROR_RESTART))
+ v->error_mode = DM_VERITY_MODE_RESTART;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(arg_name, DM_VERITY_OPT_ERROR_PANIC))
+ v->error_mode = DM_VERITY_MODE_PANIC;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v,
struct dm_verity_sig_opts *verify_args,
bool only_modifier_opts)
@@ -1167,6 +1243,16 @@ static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v,
}
continue;
+ } else if (verity_is_verity_error_mode(arg_name)) {
+ if (only_modifier_opts)
+ continue;
+ r = verity_parse_verity_error_mode(v, arg_name);
+ if (r) {
+ ti->error = "Conflicting error handling parameters";
+ return r;
+ }
+ continue;
+
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg_name, DM_VERITY_OPT_IGN_ZEROES)) {
if (only_modifier_opts)
continue;
@@ -1226,6 +1312,113 @@ static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v,
return r;
}
+static int verity_setup_hash_alg(struct dm_verity *v, const char *alg_name)
+{
+ struct dm_target *ti = v->ti;
+ struct crypto_ahash *ahash;
+ struct crypto_shash *shash = NULL;
+ const char *driver_name;
+
+ v->alg_name = kstrdup(alg_name, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!v->alg_name) {
+ ti->error = "Cannot allocate algorithm name";
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate the hash transformation object that this dm-verity instance
+ * will use. The vast majority of dm-verity users use CPU-based
+ * hashing, so when possible use the shash API to minimize the crypto
+ * API overhead. If the ahash API resolves to a different driver
+ * (likely an off-CPU hardware offload), use ahash instead. Also use
+ * ahash if the obsolete dm-verity format with the appended salt is
+ * being used, so that quirk only needs to be handled in one place.
+ */
+ ahash = crypto_alloc_ahash(alg_name, 0,
+ v->use_bh_wq ? CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC : 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(ahash)) {
+ ti->error = "Cannot initialize hash function";
+ return PTR_ERR(ahash);
+ }
+ driver_name = crypto_ahash_driver_name(ahash);
+ if (v->version >= 1 /* salt prepended, not appended? */) {
+ shash = crypto_alloc_shash(alg_name, 0, 0);
+ if (!IS_ERR(shash) &&
+ strcmp(crypto_shash_driver_name(shash), driver_name) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * ahash gave a different driver than shash, so probably
+ * this is a case of real hardware offload. Use ahash.
+ */
+ crypto_free_shash(shash);
+ shash = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(shash)) {
+ crypto_free_ahash(ahash);
+ ahash = NULL;
+ v->shash_tfm = shash;
+ v->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(shash);
+ v->hash_reqsize = sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+ crypto_shash_descsize(shash);
+ DMINFO("%s using shash \"%s\"", alg_name, driver_name);
+ } else {
+ v->ahash_tfm = ahash;
+ static_branch_inc(&ahash_enabled);
+ v->digest_size = crypto_ahash_digestsize(ahash);
+ v->hash_reqsize = sizeof(struct ahash_request) +
+ crypto_ahash_reqsize(ahash);
+ DMINFO("%s using ahash \"%s\"", alg_name, driver_name);
+ }
+ if ((1 << v->hash_dev_block_bits) < v->digest_size * 2) {
+ ti->error = "Digest size too big";
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int verity_setup_salt_and_hashstate(struct dm_verity *v, const char *arg)
+{
+ struct dm_target *ti = v->ti;
+
+ if (strcmp(arg, "-") != 0) {
+ v->salt_size = strlen(arg) / 2;
+ v->salt = kmalloc(v->salt_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!v->salt) {
+ ti->error = "Cannot allocate salt";
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ if (strlen(arg) != v->salt_size * 2 ||
+ hex2bin(v->salt, arg, v->salt_size)) {
+ ti->error = "Invalid salt";
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (v->shash_tfm) {
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, v->shash_tfm);
+ int r;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the pre-salted hash state that can be passed to
+ * crypto_shash_import() for each block later.
+ */
+ v->initial_hashstate = kmalloc(
+ crypto_shash_statesize(v->shash_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!v->initial_hashstate) {
+ ti->error = "Cannot allocate initial hash state";
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ desc->tfm = v->shash_tfm;
+ r = crypto_shash_init(desc) ?:
+ crypto_shash_update(desc, v->salt, v->salt_size) ?:
+ crypto_shash_export(desc, v->initial_hashstate);
+ if (r) {
+ ti->error = "Cannot set up initial hash state";
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Target parameters:
* <version> The current format is version 1.
@@ -1350,38 +1543,9 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
}
v->hash_start = num_ll;
- v->alg_name = kstrdup(argv[7], GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!v->alg_name) {
- ti->error = "Cannot allocate algorithm name";
- r = -ENOMEM;
- goto bad;
- }
-
- v->tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(v->alg_name, 0,
- v->use_bh_wq ? CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC : 0);
- if (IS_ERR(v->tfm)) {
- ti->error = "Cannot initialize hash function";
- r = PTR_ERR(v->tfm);
- v->tfm = NULL;
- goto bad;
- }
-
- /*
- * dm-verity performance can vary greatly depending on which hash
- * algorithm implementation is used. Help people debug performance
- * problems by logging the ->cra_driver_name.
- */
- DMINFO("%s using implementation \"%s\"", v->alg_name,
- crypto_hash_alg_common(v->tfm)->base.cra_driver_name);
-
- v->digest_size = crypto_ahash_digestsize(v->tfm);
- if ((1 << v->hash_dev_block_bits) < v->digest_size * 2) {
- ti->error = "Digest size too big";
- r = -EINVAL;
+ r = verity_setup_hash_alg(v, argv[7]);
+ if (r)
goto bad;
- }
- v->ahash_reqsize = sizeof(struct ahash_request) +
- crypto_ahash_reqsize(v->tfm);
v->root_digest = kmalloc(v->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!v->root_digest) {
@@ -1397,21 +1561,9 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
}
root_hash_digest_to_validate = argv[8];
- if (strcmp(argv[9], "-")) {
- v->salt_size = strlen(argv[9]) / 2;
- v->salt = kmalloc(v->salt_size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!v->salt) {
- ti->error = "Cannot allocate salt";
- r = -ENOMEM;
- goto bad;
- }
- if (strlen(argv[9]) != v->salt_size * 2 ||
- hex2bin(v->salt, argv[9], v->salt_size)) {
- ti->error = "Invalid salt";
- r = -EINVAL;
- goto bad;
- }
- }
+ r = verity_setup_salt_and_hashstate(v, argv[9]);
+ if (r)
+ goto bad;
argv += 10;
argc -= 10;
@@ -1434,6 +1586,13 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
ti->error = "Root hash verification failed";
goto bad;
}
+
+ r = verity_init_sig(v, verify_args.sig, verify_args.sig_size);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ ti->error = "Cannot allocate root digest signature";
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
v->hash_per_block_bits =
__fls((1 << v->hash_dev_block_bits) / v->digest_size);
@@ -1513,8 +1672,7 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
goto bad;
}
- ti->per_io_data_size = sizeof(struct dm_verity_io) +
- v->ahash_reqsize + v->digest_size * 2;
+ ti->per_io_data_size = sizeof(struct dm_verity_io) + v->hash_reqsize;
r = verity_fec_ctr(v);
if (r)
@@ -1539,14 +1697,6 @@ bad:
}
/*
- * Check whether a DM target is a verity target.
- */
-bool dm_is_verity_target(struct dm_target *ti)
-{
- return ti->type->module == THIS_MODULE;
-}
-
-/*
* Get the verity mode (error behavior) of a verity target.
*
* Returns the verity mode of the target, or -EINVAL if 'ti' is not a verity
@@ -1584,21 +1734,104 @@ int dm_verity_get_root_digest(struct dm_target *ti, u8 **root_digest, unsigned i
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG
+
+static int verity_security_set_signature(struct block_device *bdev,
+ struct dm_verity *v)
+{
+ /*
+ * if the dm-verity target is unsigned, v->root_digest_sig will
+ * be NULL, and the hook call is still required to let LSMs mark
+ * the device as unsigned. This information is crucial for LSMs to
+ * block operations such as execution on unsigned files
+ */
+ return security_bdev_setintegrity(bdev,
+ LSM_INT_DMVERITY_SIG_VALID,
+ v->root_digest_sig,
+ v->sig_size);
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline int verity_security_set_signature(struct block_device *bdev,
+ struct dm_verity *v)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG */
+
+/*
+ * Expose verity target's root hash and signature data to LSMs before resume.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, or -ENOMEM if the system is out of memory.
+ */
+static int verity_preresume(struct dm_target *ti)
+{
+ struct block_device *bdev;
+ struct dm_verity_digest root_digest;
+ struct dm_verity *v;
+ int r;
+
+ v = ti->private;
+ bdev = dm_disk(dm_table_get_md(ti->table))->part0;
+ root_digest.digest = v->root_digest;
+ root_digest.digest_len = v->digest_size;
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&ahash_enabled) && !v->shash_tfm)
+ root_digest.alg = crypto_ahash_alg_name(v->ahash_tfm);
+ else
+ root_digest.alg = crypto_shash_alg_name(v->shash_tfm);
+
+ r = security_bdev_setintegrity(bdev, LSM_INT_DMVERITY_ROOTHASH, &root_digest,
+ sizeof(root_digest));
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ r = verity_security_set_signature(bdev, v);
+ if (r)
+ goto bad;
+
+ return 0;
+
+bad:
+
+ security_bdev_setintegrity(bdev, LSM_INT_DMVERITY_ROOTHASH, NULL, 0);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+
static struct target_type verity_target = {
.name = "verity",
+/* Note: the LSMs depend on the singleton and immutable features */
.features = DM_TARGET_SINGLETON | DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE,
- .version = {1, 10, 0},
+ .version = {1, 11, 0},
.module = THIS_MODULE,
.ctr = verity_ctr,
.dtr = verity_dtr,
.map = verity_map,
+ .postsuspend = verity_postsuspend,
.status = verity_status,
.prepare_ioctl = verity_prepare_ioctl,
.iterate_devices = verity_iterate_devices,
.io_hints = verity_io_hints,
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ .preresume = verity_preresume,
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
};
module_dm(verity);
+/*
+ * Check whether a DM target is a verity target.
+ */
+bool dm_is_verity_target(struct dm_target *ti)
+{
+ return ti->type == &verity_target;
+}
+
MODULE_AUTHOR("Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Mandeep Baines <msb@chromium.org>");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>");