diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h | 245 |
1 files changed, 67 insertions, 178 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h index 1f42f103c761..f5907b67db29 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h @@ -1,32 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ /* - * zcrypt 2.1.0 - * * Copyright IBM Corp. 2001, 2006 * Author(s): Robert Burroughs * Eric Rossman (edrossma@us.ibm.com) * * Hotplug & misc device support: Jochen Roehrig (roehrig@de.ibm.com) * Major cleanup & driver split: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) - * any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License - * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software - * Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. */ #ifndef _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_ #define _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_ -struct T6_keyBlock_hdr { +struct t6_keyblock_hdr { unsigned short blen; unsigned short ulen; unsigned short flags; @@ -44,30 +29,10 @@ struct cca_token_hdr { unsigned char version; unsigned short token_length; unsigned char reserved[4]; -} __attribute__((packed)); +} __packed; #define CCA_TKN_HDR_ID_EXT 0x1E -/** - * mapping for the cca private ME section - */ -struct cca_private_ext_ME_sec { - unsigned char section_identifier; - unsigned char version; - unsigned short section_length; - unsigned char private_key_hash[20]; - unsigned char reserved1[4]; - unsigned char key_format; - unsigned char reserved2; - unsigned char key_name_hash[20]; - unsigned char key_use_flags[4]; - unsigned char reserved3[6]; - unsigned char reserved4[24]; - unsigned char confounder[24]; - unsigned char exponent[128]; - unsigned char modulus[128]; -} __attribute__((packed)); - #define CCA_PVT_USAGE_ALL 0x80 /** @@ -84,7 +49,7 @@ struct cca_public_sec { unsigned short exponent_len; unsigned short modulus_bit_len; unsigned short modulus_byte_len; /* In a private key, this is 0 */ -} __attribute__((packed)); +} __packed; /** * mapping for the cca private CRT key 'token' @@ -98,7 +63,7 @@ struct cca_public_sec { * complement of the residue modulo 8 of the sum of * (p_len + q_len + dp_len + dq_len + u_len). */ -struct cca_pvt_ext_CRT_sec { +struct cca_pvt_ext_crt_sec { unsigned char section_identifier; unsigned char version; unsigned short section_length; @@ -118,161 +83,80 @@ struct cca_pvt_ext_CRT_sec { unsigned short pad_len; unsigned char reserved4[52]; unsigned char confounder[8]; -} __attribute__((packed)); +} __packed; #define CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_ID_PVT 0x08 #define CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_FMT_CL 0x40 /** * Set up private key fields of a type6 MEX message. - * Note that all numerics in the key token are big-endian, - * while the entries in the key block header are little-endian. * * @mex: pointer to user input data * @p: pointer to memory area for the key * - * Returns the size of the key area or -EFAULT + * Returns the size of the key area or negative errno value. */ -static inline int zcrypt_type6_mex_key_de(struct ica_rsa_modexpo *mex, - void *p, int big_endian) +static inline int zcrypt_type6_mex_key_en(struct ica_rsa_modexpo *mex, void *p) { - static struct cca_token_hdr static_pvt_me_hdr = { + static struct cca_token_hdr static_pub_hdr = { .token_identifier = 0x1E, - .token_length = 0x0183, }; - static struct cca_private_ext_ME_sec static_pvt_me_sec = { - .section_identifier = 0x02, - .section_length = 0x016C, - .key_use_flags = {0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00}, - }; - static struct cca_public_sec static_pub_me_sec = { + static struct cca_public_sec static_pub_sec = { .section_identifier = 0x04, - .section_length = 0x000F, - .exponent_len = 0x0003, }; - static char pk_exponent[3] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 }; struct { - struct T6_keyBlock_hdr t6_hdr; - struct cca_token_hdr pvtMeHdr; - struct cca_private_ext_ME_sec pvtMeSec; - struct cca_public_sec pubMeSec; - char exponent[3]; - } __attribute__((packed)) *key = p; - unsigned char *temp; + struct t6_keyblock_hdr t6_hdr; + struct cca_token_hdr pubhdr; + struct cca_public_sec pubsec; + char exponent[]; + } __packed *key = p; + unsigned char *ptr; - memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key)); - - if (big_endian) { - key->t6_hdr.blen = cpu_to_be16(0x189); - key->t6_hdr.ulen = cpu_to_be16(0x189 - 2); - } else { - key->t6_hdr.blen = cpu_to_le16(0x189); - key->t6_hdr.ulen = cpu_to_le16(0x189 - 2); - } - key->pvtMeHdr = static_pvt_me_hdr; - key->pvtMeSec = static_pvt_me_sec; - key->pubMeSec = static_pub_me_sec; /* - * In a private key, the modulus doesn't appear in the public - * section. So, an arbitrary public exponent of 0x010001 will be - * used. + * The inputdatalength was a selection criteria in the dispatching + * function zcrypt_rsa_modexpo(). However, do a plausibility check + * here to make sure the following copy_from_user() can't be utilized + * to compromise the system. */ - memcpy(key->exponent, pk_exponent, 3); - - /* key parameter block */ - temp = key->pvtMeSec.exponent + - sizeof(key->pvtMeSec.exponent) - mex->inputdatalength; - if (copy_from_user(temp, mex->b_key, mex->inputdatalength)) - return -EFAULT; - - /* modulus */ - temp = key->pvtMeSec.modulus + - sizeof(key->pvtMeSec.modulus) - mex->inputdatalength; - if (copy_from_user(temp, mex->n_modulus, mex->inputdatalength)) - return -EFAULT; - key->pubMeSec.modulus_bit_len = 8 * mex->inputdatalength; - return sizeof(*key); -} - -/** - * Set up private key fields of a type6 MEX message. The _pad variant - * strips leading zeroes from the b_key. - * Note that all numerics in the key token are big-endian, - * while the entries in the key block header are little-endian. - * - * @mex: pointer to user input data - * @p: pointer to memory area for the key - * - * Returns the size of the key area or -EFAULT - */ -static inline int zcrypt_type6_mex_key_en(struct ica_rsa_modexpo *mex, - void *p, int big_endian) -{ - static struct cca_token_hdr static_pub_hdr = { - .token_identifier = 0x1E, - }; - static struct cca_public_sec static_pub_sec = { - .section_identifier = 0x04, - }; - struct { - struct T6_keyBlock_hdr t6_hdr; - struct cca_token_hdr pubHdr; - struct cca_public_sec pubSec; - char exponent[0]; - } __attribute__((packed)) *key = p; - unsigned char *temp; - int i; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mex->inputdatalength > 512)) + return -EINVAL; memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key)); - key->pubHdr = static_pub_hdr; - key->pubSec = static_pub_sec; + key->pubhdr = static_pub_hdr; + key->pubsec = static_pub_sec; /* key parameter block */ - temp = key->exponent; - if (copy_from_user(temp, mex->b_key, mex->inputdatalength)) + ptr = key->exponent; + if (copy_from_user(ptr, mex->b_key, mex->inputdatalength)) return -EFAULT; - /* Strip leading zeroes from b_key. */ - for (i = 0; i < mex->inputdatalength; i++) - if (temp[i]) - break; - if (i >= mex->inputdatalength) - return -EINVAL; - memmove(temp, temp + i, mex->inputdatalength - i); - temp += mex->inputdatalength - i; + ptr += mex->inputdatalength; /* modulus */ - if (copy_from_user(temp, mex->n_modulus, mex->inputdatalength)) + if (copy_from_user(ptr, mex->n_modulus, mex->inputdatalength)) return -EFAULT; - key->pubSec.modulus_bit_len = 8 * mex->inputdatalength; - key->pubSec.modulus_byte_len = mex->inputdatalength; - key->pubSec.exponent_len = mex->inputdatalength - i; - key->pubSec.section_length = sizeof(key->pubSec) + - 2*mex->inputdatalength - i; - key->pubHdr.token_length = - key->pubSec.section_length + sizeof(key->pubHdr); - if (big_endian) { - key->t6_hdr.ulen = cpu_to_be16(key->pubHdr.token_length + 4); - key->t6_hdr.blen = cpu_to_be16(key->pubHdr.token_length + 6); - } else { - key->t6_hdr.ulen = cpu_to_le16(key->pubHdr.token_length + 4); - key->t6_hdr.blen = cpu_to_le16(key->pubHdr.token_length + 6); - } - return sizeof(*key) + 2*mex->inputdatalength - i; + key->pubsec.modulus_bit_len = 8 * mex->inputdatalength; + key->pubsec.modulus_byte_len = mex->inputdatalength; + key->pubsec.exponent_len = mex->inputdatalength; + key->pubsec.section_length = sizeof(key->pubsec) + + 2 * mex->inputdatalength; + key->pubhdr.token_length = + key->pubsec.section_length + sizeof(key->pubhdr); + key->t6_hdr.ulen = key->pubhdr.token_length + 4; + key->t6_hdr.blen = key->pubhdr.token_length + 6; + + return sizeof(*key) + 2 * mex->inputdatalength; } /** * Set up private key fields of a type6 CRT message. - * Note that all numerics in the key token are big-endian, - * while the entries in the key block header are little-endian. * * @mex: pointer to user input data * @p: pointer to memory area for the key * * Returns the size of the key area or -EFAULT */ -static inline int zcrypt_type6_crt_key(struct ica_rsa_modexpo_crt *crt, - void *p, int big_endian) +static inline int zcrypt_type6_crt_key(struct ica_rsa_modexpo_crt *crt, void *p) { static struct cca_public_sec static_cca_pub_sec = { .section_identifier = 4, @@ -281,30 +165,34 @@ static inline int zcrypt_type6_crt_key(struct ica_rsa_modexpo_crt *crt, }; static char pk_exponent[3] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 }; struct { - struct T6_keyBlock_hdr t6_hdr; + struct t6_keyblock_hdr t6_hdr; struct cca_token_hdr token; - struct cca_pvt_ext_CRT_sec pvt; - char key_parts[0]; - } __attribute__((packed)) *key = p; + struct cca_pvt_ext_crt_sec pvt; + char key_parts[]; + } __packed *key = p; struct cca_public_sec *pub; int short_len, long_len, pad_len, key_len, size; + /* + * The inputdatalength was a selection criteria in the dispatching + * function zcrypt_rsa_crt(). However, do a plausibility check + * here to make sure the following copy_from_user() can't be utilized + * to compromise the system. + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crt->inputdatalength > 512)) + return -EINVAL; + memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key)); - short_len = crt->inputdatalength / 2; + short_len = (crt->inputdatalength + 1) / 2; long_len = short_len + 8; - pad_len = -(3*long_len + 2*short_len) & 7; - key_len = 3*long_len + 2*short_len + pad_len + crt->inputdatalength; + pad_len = -(3 * long_len + 2 * short_len) & 7; + key_len = 3 * long_len + 2 * short_len + pad_len + crt->inputdatalength; size = sizeof(*key) + key_len + sizeof(*pub) + 3; /* parameter block.key block */ - if (big_endian) { - key->t6_hdr.blen = cpu_to_be16(size); - key->t6_hdr.ulen = cpu_to_be16(size - 2); - } else { - key->t6_hdr.blen = cpu_to_le16(size); - key->t6_hdr.ulen = cpu_to_le16(size - 2); - } + key->t6_hdr.blen = size; + key->t6_hdr.ulen = size - 2; /* key token header */ key->token.token_identifier = CCA_TKN_HDR_ID_EXT; @@ -323,15 +211,15 @@ static inline int zcrypt_type6_crt_key(struct ica_rsa_modexpo_crt *crt, /* key parts */ if (copy_from_user(key->key_parts, crt->np_prime, long_len) || copy_from_user(key->key_parts + long_len, - crt->nq_prime, short_len) || + crt->nq_prime, short_len) || copy_from_user(key->key_parts + long_len + short_len, - crt->bp_key, long_len) || - copy_from_user(key->key_parts + 2*long_len + short_len, - crt->bq_key, short_len) || - copy_from_user(key->key_parts + 2*long_len + 2*short_len, - crt->u_mult_inv, long_len)) + crt->bp_key, long_len) || + copy_from_user(key->key_parts + 2 * long_len + short_len, + crt->bq_key, short_len) || + copy_from_user(key->key_parts + 2 * long_len + 2 * short_len, + crt->u_mult_inv, long_len)) return -EFAULT; - memset(key->key_parts + 3*long_len + 2*short_len + pad_len, + memset(key->key_parts + 3 * long_len + 2 * short_len + pad_len, 0xff, crt->inputdatalength); pub = (struct cca_public_sec *)(key->key_parts + key_len); *pub = static_cca_pub_sec; @@ -341,7 +229,8 @@ static inline int zcrypt_type6_crt_key(struct ica_rsa_modexpo_crt *crt, * section. So, an arbitrary public exponent of 0x010001 will be * used. */ - memcpy((char *) (pub + 1), pk_exponent, 3); + memcpy((char *)(pub + 1), pk_exponent, 3); + return size; } |
