diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc/base.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/base.c | 1210 |
1 files changed, 787 insertions, 423 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 633a63462573..4eec684baca9 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/file.h> -#include <linux/fdtable.h> +#include <linux/generic-radix-tree.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/namei.h> @@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> -#include <linux/tracehook.h> #include <linux/printk.h> #include <linux/cache.h> #include <linux/cgroup.h> @@ -85,6 +84,7 @@ #include <linux/elf.h> #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/fs_parser.h> #include <linux/fs_struct.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/sched/autogroup.h> @@ -92,8 +92,12 @@ #include <linux/sched/coredump.h> #include <linux/sched/debug.h> #include <linux/sched/stat.h> -#include <linux/flex_array.h> #include <linux/posix-timers.h> +#include <linux/time_namespace.h> +#include <linux/resctrl.h> +#include <linux/cn_proc.h> +#include <linux/ksm.h> +#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> #include <trace/events/oom.h> #include "internal.h" #include "fd.h" @@ -113,6 +117,40 @@ static u8 nlink_tid __ro_after_init; static u8 nlink_tgid __ro_after_init; +enum proc_mem_force { + PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, + PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE, + PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER +}; + +static enum proc_mem_force proc_mem_force_override __ro_after_init = + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER : + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE : + PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS; + +static const struct constant_table proc_mem_force_table[] __initconst = { + { "always", PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS }, + { "ptrace", PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE }, + { "never", PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER }, + { } +}; + +static int __init early_proc_mem_force_override(char *buf) +{ + if (!buf) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * lookup_constant() defaults to proc_mem_force_override to preseve + * the initial Kconfig choice in case an invalid param gets passed. + */ + proc_mem_force_override = lookup_constant(proc_mem_force_table, + buf, proc_mem_force_override); + + return 0; +} +early_param("proc_mem.force_override", early_proc_mem_force_override); + struct pid_entry { const char *name; unsigned int len; @@ -140,9 +178,13 @@ struct pid_entry { #define REG(NAME, MODE, fops) \ NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), NULL, &fops, {}) #define ONE(NAME, MODE, show) \ - NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \ + NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \ NULL, &proc_single_file_operations, \ { .proc_show = show } ) +#define ATTR(LSMID, NAME, MODE) \ + NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \ + NULL, &proc_pid_attr_operations, \ + { .lsmid = LSMID }) /* * Count the number of hardlinks for the pid_entry table, excluding the . @@ -205,12 +247,53 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) return result; } +/* + * If the user used setproctitle(), we just get the string from + * user space at arg_start, and limit it to a maximum of one page. + */ +static ssize_t get_mm_proctitle(struct mm_struct *mm, char __user *buf, + size_t count, unsigned long pos, + unsigned long arg_start) +{ + char *page; + int ret, got; + + if (pos >= PAGE_SIZE) + return 0; + + page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!page) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = 0; + got = access_remote_vm(mm, arg_start, page, PAGE_SIZE, FOLL_ANON); + if (got > 0) { + int len = strnlen(page, got); + + /* Include the NUL character if it was found */ + if (len < got) + len++; + + if (len > pos) { + len -= pos; + if (len > count) + len = count; + len -= copy_to_user(buf, page+pos, len); + if (!len) + len = -EFAULT; + ret = len; + } + } + free_page((unsigned long)page); + return ret; +} + static ssize_t get_mm_cmdline(struct mm_struct *mm, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { unsigned long arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end; unsigned long pos, len; - char *page; + char *page, c; /* Check if process spawned far enough to have cmdline. */ if (!mm->env_end) @@ -227,28 +310,42 @@ static ssize_t get_mm_cmdline(struct mm_struct *mm, char __user *buf, return 0; /* - * We have traditionally allowed the user to re-write - * the argument strings and overflow the end result - * into the environment section. But only do that if - * the environment area is contiguous to the arguments. + * We allow setproctitle() to overwrite the argument + * strings, and overflow past the original end. But + * only when it overflows into the environment area. */ - if (env_start != arg_end || env_start >= env_end) + if (env_start != arg_end || env_end < env_start) env_start = env_end = arg_end; - - /* .. and limit it to a maximum of one page of slop */ - if (env_end >= arg_end + PAGE_SIZE) - env_end = arg_end + PAGE_SIZE - 1; + len = env_end - arg_start; /* We're not going to care if "*ppos" has high bits set */ - pos = arg_start + *ppos; - - /* .. but we do check the result is in the proper range */ - if (pos < arg_start || pos >= env_end) + pos = *ppos; + if (pos >= len) + return 0; + if (count > len - pos) + count = len - pos; + if (!count) return 0; - /* .. and we never go past env_end */ - if (env_end - pos < count) - count = env_end - pos; + /* + * Magical special case: if the argv[] end byte is not + * zero, the user has overwritten it with setproctitle(3). + * + * Possible future enhancement: do this only once when + * pos is 0, and set a flag in the 'struct file'. + */ + if (access_remote_vm(mm, arg_end-1, &c, 1, FOLL_ANON) == 1 && c) + return get_mm_proctitle(mm, buf, count, pos, arg_start); + + /* + * For the non-setproctitle() case we limit things strictly + * to the [arg_start, arg_end[ range. + */ + pos += arg_start; + if (pos < arg_start || pos >= arg_end) + return 0; + if (count > arg_end - pos) + count = arg_end - pos; page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!page) @@ -258,48 +355,11 @@ static ssize_t get_mm_cmdline(struct mm_struct *mm, char __user *buf, while (count) { int got; size_t size = min_t(size_t, PAGE_SIZE, count); - long offset; - /* - * Are we already starting past the official end? - * We always include the last byte that is *supposed* - * to be NUL - */ - offset = (pos >= arg_end) ? pos - arg_end + 1 : 0; - - got = access_remote_vm(mm, pos - offset, page, size + offset, FOLL_ANON); - if (got <= offset) + got = access_remote_vm(mm, pos, page, size, FOLL_ANON); + if (got <= 0) break; - got -= offset; - - /* Don't walk past a NUL character once you hit arg_end */ - if (pos + got >= arg_end) { - int n = 0; - - /* - * If we started before 'arg_end' but ended up - * at or after it, we start the NUL character - * check at arg_end-1 (where we expect the normal - * EOF to be). - * - * NOTE! This is smaller than 'got', because - * pos + got >= arg_end - */ - if (pos < arg_end) - n = arg_end - pos - 1; - - /* Cut off at first NUL after 'n' */ - got = n + strnlen(page+n, offset+got-n); - if (got < offset) - break; - got -= offset; - - /* Include the NUL if it existed */ - if (got < size) - got++; - } - - got -= copy_to_user(buf, page+offset, got); + got -= copy_to_user(buf, page, got); if (unlikely(!got)) { if (!len) len = -EFAULT; @@ -356,7 +416,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_cmdline_ops = { #ifdef CONFIG_KALLSYMS /* * Provides a wchan file via kallsyms in a proper one-value-per-file format. - * Returns the resolved symbol. If that fails, simply return the address. + * Returns the resolved symbol to user space. */ static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) @@ -381,11 +441,11 @@ print0: static int lock_trace(struct task_struct *task) { - int err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + int err = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); if (err) return err; if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)) { - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); return -EPERM; } return 0; @@ -393,7 +453,7 @@ static int lock_trace(struct task_struct *task) static void unlock_trace(struct task_struct *task) { - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); } #ifdef CONFIG_STACKTRACE @@ -403,7 +463,6 @@ static void unlock_trace(struct task_struct *task) static int proc_pid_stack(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) { - struct stack_trace trace; unsigned long *entries; int err; @@ -426,20 +485,17 @@ static int proc_pid_stack(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, if (!entries) return -ENOMEM; - trace.nr_entries = 0; - trace.max_entries = MAX_STACK_TRACE_DEPTH; - trace.entries = entries; - trace.skip = 0; - err = lock_trace(task); if (!err) { - unsigned int i; + unsigned int i, nr_entries; - save_stack_trace_tsk(task, &trace); + nr_entries = stack_trace_save_tsk(task, entries, + MAX_STACK_TRACE_DEPTH, 0); - for (i = 0; i < trace.nr_entries; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < nr_entries; i++) { seq_printf(m, "[<0>] %pB\n", (void *)entries[i]); } + unlock_trace(task); } kfree(entries); @@ -456,7 +512,7 @@ static int proc_pid_schedstat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) { if (unlikely(!sched_info_on())) - seq_printf(m, "0 0 0\n"); + seq_puts(m, "0 0 0\n"); else seq_printf(m, "%llu %llu %lu\n", (unsigned long long)task->se.sum_exec_runtime, @@ -485,10 +541,9 @@ static int lstats_show_proc(struct seq_file *m, void *v) lr->count, lr->time, lr->max); for (q = 0; q < LT_BACKTRACEDEPTH; q++) { unsigned long bt = lr->backtrace[q]; + if (!bt) break; - if (bt == ULONG_MAX) - break; seq_printf(m, " %ps", (void *)bt); } seq_putc(m, '\n'); @@ -511,7 +566,7 @@ static ssize_t lstats_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (!task) return -ESRCH; - clear_all_latency_tracing(task); + clear_tsk_latency_tracing(task); put_task_struct(task); return count; @@ -532,9 +587,17 @@ static int proc_oom_score(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, { unsigned long totalpages = totalram_pages() + total_swap_pages; unsigned long points = 0; + long badness; + + badness = oom_badness(task, totalpages); + /* + * Special case OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN for all others scale the + * badness value into [0, 2000] range which we have been + * exporting for a long time so userspace might depend on it. + */ + if (badness != LONG_MIN) + points = (1000 + badness * 1000 / (long)totalpages) * 2 / 3; - points = oom_badness(task, NULL, NULL, totalpages) * - 1000 / totalpages; seq_printf(m, "%lu\n", points); return 0; @@ -612,24 +675,25 @@ static int proc_pid_limits(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, static int proc_pid_syscall(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) { - long nr; - unsigned long args[6], sp, pc; + struct syscall_info info; + u64 *args = &info.data.args[0]; int res; res = lock_trace(task); if (res) return res; - if (task_current_syscall(task, &nr, args, 6, &sp, &pc)) + if (task_current_syscall(task, &info)) seq_puts(m, "running\n"); - else if (nr < 0) - seq_printf(m, "%ld 0x%lx 0x%lx\n", nr, sp, pc); + else if (info.data.nr < 0) + seq_printf(m, "%d 0x%llx 0x%llx\n", + info.data.nr, info.sp, info.data.instruction_pointer); else seq_printf(m, - "%ld 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx\n", - nr, + "%d 0x%llx 0x%llx 0x%llx 0x%llx 0x%llx 0x%llx 0x%llx 0x%llx\n", + info.data.nr, args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], args[4], args[5], - sp, pc); + info.sp, info.data.instruction_pointer); unlock_trace(task); return 0; @@ -641,10 +705,10 @@ static int proc_pid_syscall(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, /************************************************************************/ /* permission checks */ -static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) +static bool proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) { struct task_struct *task; - int allowed = 0; + bool allowed = false; /* Allow access to a task's file descriptors if it is us or we * may use ptrace attach to the process and find out that * information. @@ -657,7 +721,8 @@ static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) return allowed; } -int proc_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +int proc_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + struct iattr *attr) { int error; struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); @@ -665,12 +730,11 @@ int proc_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) return -EPERM; - error = setattr_prepare(dentry, attr); + error = setattr_prepare(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, attr); if (error) return error; - setattr_copy(inode, attr); - mark_inode_dirty(inode); + setattr_copy(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, attr); return 0; } @@ -678,32 +742,41 @@ int proc_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) * May current process learn task's sched/cmdline info (for hide_pid_min=1) * or euid/egid (for hide_pid_min=2)? */ -static bool has_pid_permissions(struct pid_namespace *pid, +static bool has_pid_permissions(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, struct task_struct *task, - int hide_pid_min) + enum proc_hidepid hide_pid_min) { - if (pid->hide_pid < hide_pid_min) + /* + * If 'hidpid' mount option is set force a ptrace check, + * we indicate that we are using a filesystem syscall + * by passing PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS + */ + if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE) + return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); + + if (fs_info->hide_pid < hide_pid_min) return true; - if (in_group_p(pid->pid_gid)) + if (in_group_p(fs_info->pid_gid)) return true; return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); } -static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) +static int proc_pid_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct inode *inode, int mask) { - struct pid_namespace *pid = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb); struct task_struct *task; bool has_perms; task = get_proc_task(inode); if (!task) return -ESRCH; - has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS); + has_perms = has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS); put_task_struct(task); if (!has_perms) { - if (pid->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) { + if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) { /* * Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open() * consistent with each other. If a process @@ -715,7 +788,7 @@ static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) return -EPERM; } - return generic_permission(inode, mask); + return generic_permission(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, mask); } @@ -727,7 +800,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations proc_def_inode_operations = { static int proc_single_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct inode *inode = m->private; - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); struct pid *pid = proc_pid(inode); struct task_struct *task; int ret; @@ -754,23 +827,31 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_single_file_operations = { .release = single_release, }; - +/* + * proc_mem_open() can return errno, NULL or mm_struct*. + * + * - Returns NULL if the task has no mm (PF_KTHREAD or PF_EXITING) + * - Returns mm_struct* on success + * - Returns error code on failure + */ struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode) { struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode); - struct mm_struct *mm = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); + struct mm_struct *mm; - if (task) { - mm = mm_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS); - put_task_struct(task); + if (!task) + return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); - if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) { - /* ensure this mm_struct can't be freed */ - mmgrab(mm); - /* but do not pin its memory */ - mmput(mm); - } - } + mm = mm_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS); + put_task_struct(task); + + if (IS_ERR(mm)) + return mm == ERR_PTR(-ESRCH) ? NULL : mm; + + /* ensure this mm_struct can't be freed */ + mmgrab(mm); + /* but do not pin its memory */ + mmput(mm); return mm; } @@ -779,8 +860,8 @@ static int __mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int mode) { struct mm_struct *mm = proc_mem_open(inode, mode); - if (IS_ERR(mm)) - return PTR_ERR(mm); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) + return mm ? PTR_ERR(mm) : -ESRCH; file->private_data = mm; return 0; @@ -788,12 +869,31 @@ static int __mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int mode) static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { - int ret = __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); - - /* OK to pass negative loff_t, we can catch out-of-range */ - file->f_mode |= FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(file->f_op->fop_flags & FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET))) + return -EINVAL; + return __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); +} - return ret; +static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + bool ptrace_active = false; + + switch (proc_mem_force_override) { + case PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER: + return false; + case PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE: + task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file)); + if (task) { + ptrace_active = READ_ONCE(task->ptrace) && + READ_ONCE(task->mm) == mm && + READ_ONCE(task->parent) == current; + put_task_struct(task); + } + return ptrace_active; + default: + return true; + } } static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf, @@ -816,10 +916,12 @@ static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf, if (!mmget_not_zero(mm)) goto free; - flags = FOLL_FORCE | (write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0); + flags = write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0; + if (proc_mem_foll_force(file, mm)) + flags |= FOLL_FORCE; while (count > 0) { - int this_len = min_t(int, count, PAGE_SIZE); + size_t this_len = min_t(size_t, count, PAGE_SIZE); if (write && copy_from_user(page, buf, this_len)) { copied = -EFAULT; @@ -893,6 +995,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_mem_operations = { .write = mem_write, .open = mem_open, .release = mem_release, + .fop_flags = FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET, }; static int environ_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) @@ -1013,13 +1116,14 @@ static ssize_t oom_adj_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, oom_adj = (task->signal->oom_score_adj * -OOM_DISABLE) / OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MAX; put_task_struct(task); + if (oom_adj > OOM_ADJUST_MAX) + oom_adj = OOM_ADJUST_MAX; len = snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%d\n", oom_adj); return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, buffer, len); } static int __set_oom_adj(struct file *file, int oom_adj, bool legacy) { - static DEFINE_MUTEX(oom_adj_mutex); struct mm_struct *mm = NULL; struct task_struct *task; int err = 0; @@ -1059,7 +1163,7 @@ static int __set_oom_adj(struct file *file, int oom_adj, bool legacy) struct task_struct *p = find_lock_task_mm(task); if (p) { - if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) > 1) { + if (mm_flags_test(MMF_MULTIPROCESS, p->mm)) { mm = p->mm; mmgrab(mm); } @@ -1086,10 +1190,6 @@ static int __set_oom_adj(struct file *file, int oom_adj, bool legacy) task_lock(p); if (!p->vfork_done && process_shares_mm(p, mm)) { - pr_info("updating oom_score_adj for %d (%s) from %d to %d because it shares mm with %d (%s). Report if this is unexpected.\n", - task_pid_nr(p), p->comm, - p->signal->oom_score_adj, oom_adj, - task_pid_nr(task), task->comm); p->signal->oom_score_adj = oom_adj; if (!legacy && has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) p->signal->oom_score_adj_min = (short)oom_adj; @@ -1118,11 +1218,10 @@ err_unlock: static ssize_t oom_adj_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF]; + char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF] = {}; int oom_adj; int err; - memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer)); if (count > sizeof(buffer) - 1) count = sizeof(buffer) - 1; if (copy_from_user(buffer, buf, count)) { @@ -1178,11 +1277,10 @@ static ssize_t oom_score_adj_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, static ssize_t oom_score_adj_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF]; + char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF] = {}; int oom_score_adj; int err; - memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer)); if (count > sizeof(buffer) - 1) count = sizeof(buffer) - 1; if (copy_from_user(buffer, buf, count)) { @@ -1210,7 +1308,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_oom_score_adj_operations = { .llseek = default_llseek, }; -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT #define TMPBUFLEN 11 static ssize_t proc_loginuid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) @@ -1237,6 +1335,10 @@ static ssize_t proc_loginuid_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, kuid_t kloginuid; int rv; + /* Don't let kthreads write their own loginuid */ + if (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD) + return -EPERM; + rcu_read_lock(); if (current != pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID)) { rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -1319,13 +1421,13 @@ static ssize_t proc_fault_inject_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { struct task_struct *task; - char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF]; + char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF] = {}; int make_it_fail; int rv; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) return -EPERM; - memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer)); + if (count > sizeof(buffer) - 1) count = sizeof(buffer) - 1; if (copy_from_user(buffer, buf, count)) @@ -1393,14 +1495,13 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_fail_nth_operations = { #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG /* * Print out various scheduling related per-task fields: */ static int sched_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct inode *inode = m->private; - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); struct task_struct *p; p = get_proc_task(inode); @@ -1443,8 +1544,6 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_sched_operations = { .release = single_release, }; -#endif - #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_AUTOGROUP /* * Print out autogroup related information: @@ -1470,11 +1569,10 @@ sched_autogroup_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct task_struct *p; - char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF]; + char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF] = {}; int nice; int err; - memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer)); if (count > sizeof(buffer) - 1) count = sizeof(buffer) - 1; if (copy_from_user(buffer, buf, count)) @@ -1520,15 +1618,116 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_sched_autogroup_operations = { #endif /* CONFIG_SCHED_AUTOGROUP */ +#ifdef CONFIG_TIME_NS +static int timens_offsets_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) +{ + struct task_struct *p; + + p = get_proc_task(file_inode(m->file)); + if (!p) + return -ESRCH; + proc_timens_show_offsets(p, m); + + put_task_struct(p); + + return 0; +} + +static ssize_t timens_offsets_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + struct proc_timens_offset offsets[2]; + char *kbuf = NULL, *pos, *next_line; + struct task_struct *p; + int ret, noffsets; + + /* Only allow < page size writes at the beginning of the file */ + if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= PAGE_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Slurp in the user data */ + kbuf = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(kbuf)) + return PTR_ERR(kbuf); + + /* Parse the user data */ + ret = -EINVAL; + noffsets = 0; + for (pos = kbuf; pos; pos = next_line) { + struct proc_timens_offset *off = &offsets[noffsets]; + char clock[10]; + int err; + + /* Find the end of line and ensure we don't look past it */ + next_line = strchr(pos, '\n'); + if (next_line) { + *next_line = '\0'; + next_line++; + if (*next_line == '\0') + next_line = NULL; + } + + err = sscanf(pos, "%9s %lld %lu", clock, + &off->val.tv_sec, &off->val.tv_nsec); + if (err != 3 || off->val.tv_nsec >= NSEC_PER_SEC) + goto out; + + clock[sizeof(clock) - 1] = 0; + if (strcmp(clock, "monotonic") == 0 || + strcmp(clock, __stringify(CLOCK_MONOTONIC)) == 0) + off->clockid = CLOCK_MONOTONIC; + else if (strcmp(clock, "boottime") == 0 || + strcmp(clock, __stringify(CLOCK_BOOTTIME)) == 0) + off->clockid = CLOCK_BOOTTIME; + else + goto out; + + noffsets++; + if (noffsets == ARRAY_SIZE(offsets)) { + if (next_line) + count = next_line - kbuf; + break; + } + } + + ret = -ESRCH; + p = get_proc_task(inode); + if (!p) + goto out; + ret = proc_timens_set_offset(file, p, offsets, noffsets); + put_task_struct(p); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = count; +out: + kfree(kbuf); + return ret; +} + +static int timens_offsets_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +{ + return single_open(filp, timens_offsets_show, inode); +} + +static const struct file_operations proc_timens_offsets_operations = { + .open = timens_offsets_open, + .read = seq_read, + .write = timens_offsets_write, + .llseek = seq_lseek, + .release = single_release, +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_TIME_NS */ + static ssize_t comm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *offset) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct task_struct *p; - char buffer[TASK_COMM_LEN]; + char buffer[TASK_COMM_LEN] = {}; const size_t maxlen = sizeof(buffer) - 1; - memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer)); if (copy_from_user(buffer, buf, count > maxlen ? maxlen : count)) return -EFAULT; @@ -1536,8 +1735,10 @@ static ssize_t comm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (!p) return -ESRCH; - if (same_thread_group(current, p)) + if (same_thread_group(current, p)) { set_task_comm(p, buffer); + proc_comm_connector(p); + } else count = -EINVAL; @@ -1613,33 +1814,32 @@ static const char *proc_pid_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, if (error) goto out; - nd_jump_link(&path); - return NULL; + error = nd_jump_link(&path); out: return ERR_PTR(error); } -static int do_proc_readlink(struct path *path, char __user *buffer, int buflen) +static int do_proc_readlink(const struct path *path, char __user *buffer, int buflen) { - char *tmp = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + char *tmp = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); char *pathname; int len; if (!tmp) return -ENOMEM; - pathname = d_path(path, tmp, PAGE_SIZE); + pathname = d_path(path, tmp, PATH_MAX); len = PTR_ERR(pathname); if (IS_ERR(pathname)) goto out; - len = tmp + PAGE_SIZE - 1 - pathname; + len = tmp + PATH_MAX - 1 - pathname; if (len > buflen) len = buflen; if (copy_to_user(buffer, pathname, len)) len = -EFAULT; out: - free_page((unsigned long)tmp); + kfree(tmp); return len; } @@ -1730,11 +1930,23 @@ void task_dump_owner(struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode, *rgid = gid; } -struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb, +void proc_pid_evict_inode(struct proc_inode *ei) +{ + struct pid *pid = ei->pid; + + if (S_ISDIR(ei->vfs_inode.i_mode)) { + spin_lock(&pid->lock); + hlist_del_init_rcu(&ei->sibling_inodes); + spin_unlock(&pid->lock); + } +} + +struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode) { struct inode * inode; struct proc_inode *ei; + struct pid *pid; /* We need a new inode */ @@ -1746,16 +1958,19 @@ struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb, ei = PROC_I(inode); inode->i_mode = mode; inode->i_ino = get_next_ino(); - inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode); + simple_inode_init_ts(inode); inode->i_op = &proc_def_inode_operations; /* * grab the reference to task. */ - ei->pid = get_task_pid(task, PIDTYPE_PID); - if (!ei->pid) + pid = get_task_pid(task, PIDTYPE_PID); + if (!pid) goto out_unlock; + /* Let the pid remember us for quick removal */ + ei->pid = pid; + task_dump_owner(task, 0, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); security_task_to_inode(task, inode); @@ -1767,21 +1982,54 @@ out_unlock: return NULL; } -int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, - u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags) +/* + * Generating an inode and adding it into @pid->inodes, so that task will + * invalidate inode's dentry before being released. + * + * This helper is used for creating dir-type entries under '/proc' and + * '/proc/<tgid>/task'. Other entries(eg. fd, stat) under '/proc/<tgid>' + * can be released by invalidating '/proc/<tgid>' dentry. + * In theory, dentries under '/proc/<tgid>/task' can also be released by + * invalidating '/proc/<tgid>' dentry, we reserve it to handle single + * thread exiting situation: Any one of threads should invalidate its + * '/proc/<tgid>/task/<pid>' dentry before released. + */ +static struct inode *proc_pid_make_base_inode(struct super_block *sb, + struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode) +{ + struct inode *inode; + struct proc_inode *ei; + struct pid *pid; + + inode = proc_pid_make_inode(sb, task, mode); + if (!inode) + return NULL; + + /* Let proc_flush_pid find this directory inode */ + ei = PROC_I(inode); + pid = ei->pid; + spin_lock(&pid->lock); + hlist_add_head_rcu(&ei->sibling_inodes, &pid->inodes); + spin_unlock(&pid->lock); + + return inode; +} + +int pid_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path, + struct kstat *stat, u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags) { struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry); - struct pid_namespace *pid = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb); struct task_struct *task; - generic_fillattr(inode, stat); + generic_fillattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, request_mask, inode, stat); stat->uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; stat->gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; rcu_read_lock(); task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID); if (task) { - if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) { + if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) { rcu_read_unlock(); /* * This doesn't prevent learning whether PID exists, @@ -1813,23 +2061,26 @@ void pid_update_inode(struct task_struct *task, struct inode *inode) * performed a setuid(), etc. * */ -static int pid_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) +static int pid_revalidate(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name, + struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { struct inode *inode; struct task_struct *task; + int ret = 0; - if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) - return -ECHILD; - - inode = d_inode(dentry); - task = get_proc_task(inode); + rcu_read_lock(); + inode = d_inode_rcu(dentry); + if (!inode) + goto out; + task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID); if (task) { pid_update_inode(task, inode); - put_task_struct(task); - return 1; + ret = 1; } - return 0; +out: + rcu_read_unlock(); + return ret; } static inline bool proc_inode_is_dead(struct inode *inode) @@ -1861,7 +2112,7 @@ const struct dentry_operations pid_dentry_operations = * file type from dcache entry. * * Since all of the proc inode numbers are dynamically generated, the inode - * numbers do not exist until the inode is cache. This means creating the + * numbers do not exist until the inode is cache. This means creating * the dcache entry in readdir is necessary to keep the inode numbers * reported by readdir in sync with the inode numbers reported * by stat. @@ -1876,7 +2127,7 @@ bool proc_fill_cache(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx, unsigned type = DT_UNKNOWN; ino_t ino = 1; - child = d_hash_and_lookup(dir, &qname); + child = try_lookup_noperm(&qname, dir); if (!child) { DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD_ONSTACK(wq); child = d_alloc_parallel(dir, &qname, &wq); @@ -1944,7 +2195,8 @@ static int dname_to_vma_addr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } -static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) +static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name, + struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { unsigned long vm_start, vm_end; bool exact_vma_exists = false; @@ -1962,13 +2214,16 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) goto out_notask; mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) + if (IS_ERR(mm)) goto out; if (!dname_to_vma_addr(dentry, &vm_start, &vm_end)) { - down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); - exact_vma_exists = !!find_exact_vma(mm, vm_start, vm_end); - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + status = mmap_read_lock_killable(mm); + if (!status) { + exact_vma_exists = !!find_exact_vma(mm, vm_start, + vm_end); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); + } } mmput(mm); @@ -2014,15 +2269,18 @@ static int map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) if (rc) goto out_mmput; + rc = mmap_read_lock_killable(mm); + if (rc) + goto out_mmput; + rc = -ENOENT; - down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); vma = find_exact_vma(mm, vm_start, vm_end); if (vma && vma->vm_file) { - *path = vma->vm_file->f_path; + *path = *file_user_path(vma->vm_file); path_get(path); rc = 0; } - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); out_mmput: mmput(mm); @@ -2037,16 +2295,16 @@ struct map_files_info { }; /* - * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to follow the links, due to concerns about how the - * symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the - * path to the file in question. + * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to follow the links, due + * to concerns about how the symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on + * ancestor directories in the path to the file in question. */ static const char * proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, struct delayed_call *done) { - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(&init_user_ns)) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); return proc_pid_get_link(dentry, inode, done); @@ -2081,8 +2339,8 @@ proc_map_files_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, inode->i_op = &proc_map_files_link_inode_operations; inode->i_size = 64; - d_set_d_op(dentry, &tid_map_files_dentry_operations); - return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry); + return proc_splice_unmountable(inode, dentry, + &tid_map_files_dentry_operations); } static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir, @@ -2111,7 +2369,11 @@ static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir, if (!mm) goto out_put_task; - down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + result = ERR_PTR(-EINTR); + if (mmap_read_lock_killable(mm)) + goto out_put_mm; + + result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); vma = find_exact_vma(mm, vm_start, vm_end); if (!vma) goto out_no_vma; @@ -2121,7 +2383,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir, (void *)(unsigned long)vma->vm_file->f_mode); out_no_vma: - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); +out_put_mm: mmput(mm); out_put_task: put_task_struct(task); @@ -2142,10 +2405,12 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) struct task_struct *task; struct mm_struct *mm; unsigned long nr_files, pos, i; - struct flex_array *fa = NULL; - struct map_files_info info; + GENRADIX(struct map_files_info) fa; struct map_files_info *p; int ret; + struct vma_iterator vmi; + + genradix_init(&fa); ret = -ENOENT; task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file)); @@ -2163,59 +2428,53 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) mm = get_task_mm(task); if (!mm) goto out_put_task; - down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + + ret = mmap_read_lock_killable(mm); + if (ret) { + mmput(mm); + goto out_put_task; + } nr_files = 0; /* * We need two passes here: * - * 1) Collect vmas of mapped files with mmap_sem taken - * 2) Release mmap_sem and instantiate entries + * 1) Collect vmas of mapped files with mmap_lock taken + * 2) Release mmap_lock and instantiate entries * * otherwise we get lockdep complained, since filldir() - * routine might require mmap_sem taken in might_fault(). + * routine might require mmap_lock taken in might_fault(). */ - for (vma = mm->mmap, pos = 2; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { - if (vma->vm_file && ++pos > ctx->pos) - nr_files++; - } + pos = 2; + vma_iter_init(&vmi, mm, 0); + for_each_vma(vmi, vma) { + if (!vma->vm_file) + continue; + if (++pos <= ctx->pos) + continue; - if (nr_files) { - fa = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(info), nr_files, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!fa || flex_array_prealloc(fa, 0, nr_files, - GFP_KERNEL)) { + p = genradix_ptr_alloc(&fa, nr_files++, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!p) { ret = -ENOMEM; - if (fa) - flex_array_free(fa); - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); mmput(mm); goto out_put_task; } - for (i = 0, vma = mm->mmap, pos = 2; vma; - vma = vma->vm_next) { - if (!vma->vm_file) - continue; - if (++pos <= ctx->pos) - continue; - info.start = vma->vm_start; - info.end = vma->vm_end; - info.mode = vma->vm_file->f_mode; - if (flex_array_put(fa, i++, &info, GFP_KERNEL)) - BUG(); - } + p->start = vma->vm_start; + p->end = vma->vm_end; + p->mode = vma->vm_file->f_mode; } - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); mmput(mm); for (i = 0; i < nr_files; i++) { char buf[4 * sizeof(long) + 2]; /* max: %lx-%lx\0 */ unsigned int len; - p = flex_array_get(fa, i); + p = genradix_ptr(&fa, i); len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%lx-%lx", p->start, p->end); if (!proc_fill_cache(file, ctx, buf, len, @@ -2225,12 +2484,11 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) break; ctx->pos++; } - if (fa) - flex_array_free(fa); out_put_task: put_task_struct(task); out: + genradix_free(&fa); return ret; } @@ -2242,11 +2500,9 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_map_files_operations = { #if defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) && defined(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS) struct timers_private { - struct pid *pid; - struct task_struct *task; - struct sighand_struct *sighand; - struct pid_namespace *ns; - unsigned long flags; + struct pid *pid; + struct task_struct *task; + struct pid_namespace *ns; }; static void *timers_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) @@ -2257,54 +2513,48 @@ static void *timers_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) if (!tp->task) return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); - tp->sighand = lock_task_sighand(tp->task, &tp->flags); - if (!tp->sighand) - return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); - - return seq_list_start(&tp->task->signal->posix_timers, *pos); + rcu_read_lock(); + return seq_hlist_start_rcu(&tp->task->signal->posix_timers, *pos); } static void *timers_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) { struct timers_private *tp = m->private; - return seq_list_next(v, &tp->task->signal->posix_timers, pos); + + return seq_hlist_next_rcu(v, &tp->task->signal->posix_timers, pos); } static void timers_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct timers_private *tp = m->private; - if (tp->sighand) { - unlock_task_sighand(tp->task, &tp->flags); - tp->sighand = NULL; - } - if (tp->task) { put_task_struct(tp->task); tp->task = NULL; + rcu_read_unlock(); } } static int show_timer(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { - struct k_itimer *timer; - struct timers_private *tp = m->private; - int notify; static const char * const nstr[] = { - [SIGEV_SIGNAL] = "signal", - [SIGEV_NONE] = "none", - [SIGEV_THREAD] = "thread", + [SIGEV_SIGNAL] = "signal", + [SIGEV_NONE] = "none", + [SIGEV_THREAD] = "thread", }; - timer = list_entry((struct list_head *)v, struct k_itimer, list); - notify = timer->it_sigev_notify; + struct k_itimer *timer = hlist_entry((struct hlist_node *)v, struct k_itimer, list); + struct timers_private *tp = m->private; + int notify = timer->it_sigev_notify; + + guard(spinlock_irq)(&timer->it_lock); + if (!posixtimer_valid(timer)) + return 0; seq_printf(m, "ID: %d\n", timer->it_id); - seq_printf(m, "signal: %d/%px\n", - timer->sigq->info.si_signo, - timer->sigq->info.si_value.sival_ptr); - seq_printf(m, "notify: %s/%s.%d\n", - nstr[notify & ~SIGEV_THREAD_ID], + seq_printf(m, "signal: %d/%px\n", timer->sigq.info.si_signo, + timer->sigq.info.si_value.sival_ptr); + seq_printf(m, "notify: %s/%s.%d\n", nstr[notify & ~SIGEV_THREAD_ID], (notify & SIGEV_THREAD_ID) ? "tid" : "pid", pid_nr_ns(timer->it_pid, tp->ns)); seq_printf(m, "ClockID: %d\n", timer->it_clock); @@ -2329,7 +2579,7 @@ static int proc_timers_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) return -ENOMEM; tp->pid = proc_pid(inode); - tp->ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + tp->ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); return 0; } @@ -2374,10 +2624,11 @@ static ssize_t timerslack_ns_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } task_lock(p); - if (slack_ns == 0) - p->timer_slack_ns = p->default_timer_slack_ns; - else - p->timer_slack_ns = slack_ns; + if (rt_or_dl_task_policy(p)) + slack_ns = 0; + else if (slack_ns == 0) + slack_ns = p->default_timer_slack_ns; + p->timer_slack_ns = slack_ns; task_unlock(p); out: @@ -2453,17 +2704,15 @@ static struct dentry *proc_pident_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, inode->i_fop = p->fop; ei->op = p->op; pid_update_inode(task, inode); - d_set_d_op(dentry, &pid_dentry_operations); - return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry); + return d_splice_alias_ops(inode, dentry, &pid_dentry_operations); } static struct dentry *proc_pident_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, - const struct pid_entry *ents, - unsigned int nents) + const struct pid_entry *p, + const struct pid_entry *end) { struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(dir); - const struct pid_entry *p, *last; struct dentry *res = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); if (!task) @@ -2473,8 +2722,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_pident_lookup(struct inode *dir, * Yes, it does not scale. And it should not. Don't add * new entries into /proc/<tgid>/ without very good reasons. */ - last = &ents[nents]; - for (p = ents; p < last; p++) { + for (; p < end; p++) { if (p->len != dentry->d_name.len) continue; if (!memcmp(dentry->d_name.name, p->name, p->len)) { @@ -2514,6 +2762,13 @@ out: } #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +static int proc_pid_attr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + file->private_data = NULL; + __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); + return 0; +} + static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -2525,8 +2780,8 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, if (!task) return -ESRCH; - length = security_getprocattr(task, - (char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, + length = security_getprocattr(task, PROC_I(inode)->op.lsmid, + file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, &p); put_task_struct(task); if (length > 0) @@ -2543,6 +2798,10 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, void *page; int rv; + /* A task may only write when it was the opener. */ + if (file->private_data != current->mm) + return -EPERM; + rcu_read_lock(); task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID); if (!task) { @@ -2554,6 +2813,11 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, rcu_read_unlock(); return -EACCES; } + /* Prevent changes to overridden credentials. */ + if (current_cred() != current_real_cred()) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return -EBUSY; + } rcu_read_unlock(); if (count > PAGE_SIZE) @@ -2574,7 +2838,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, if (rv < 0) goto out_free; - rv = security_setprocattr(file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page, count); + rv = security_setprocattr(PROC_I(inode)->op.lsmid, + file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page, + count); mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); out_free: kfree(page); @@ -2583,18 +2849,73 @@ out: } static const struct file_operations proc_pid_attr_operations = { + .open = proc_pid_attr_open, .read = proc_pid_attr_read, .write = proc_pid_attr_write, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, + .release = mem_release, +}; + +#define LSM_DIR_OPS(LSM) \ +static int proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_iterate(struct file *filp, \ + struct dir_context *ctx) \ +{ \ + return proc_pident_readdir(filp, ctx, \ + LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \ + ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \ +} \ +\ +static const struct file_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_ops = { \ + .read = generic_read_dir, \ + .iterate_shared = proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_iterate, \ + .llseek = default_llseek, \ +}; \ +\ +static struct dentry *proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup(struct inode *dir, \ + struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) \ +{ \ + return proc_pident_lookup(dir, dentry, \ + LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \ + LSM##_attr_dir_stuff + ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \ +} \ +\ +static const struct inode_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_inode_ops = { \ + .lookup = proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup, \ + .getattr = pid_getattr, \ + .setattr = proc_setattr, \ +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK +static const struct pid_entry smack_attr_dir_stuff[] = { + ATTR(LSM_ID_SMACK, "current", 0666), +}; +LSM_DIR_OPS(smack); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR +static const struct pid_entry apparmor_attr_dir_stuff[] = { + ATTR(LSM_ID_APPARMOR, "current", 0666), + ATTR(LSM_ID_APPARMOR, "prev", 0444), + ATTR(LSM_ID_APPARMOR, "exec", 0666), }; +LSM_DIR_OPS(apparmor); +#endif static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { - REG("current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), - REG("prev", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), - REG("exec", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), - REG("fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), - REG("keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), - REG("sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), + ATTR(LSM_ID_UNDEF, "current", 0666), + ATTR(LSM_ID_UNDEF, "prev", 0444), + ATTR(LSM_ID_UNDEF, "exec", 0666), + ATTR(LSM_ID_UNDEF, "fscreate", 0666), + ATTR(LSM_ID_UNDEF, "keycreate", 0666), + ATTR(LSM_ID_UNDEF, "sockcreate", 0666), +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK + DIR("smack", 0555, + proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops), +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR + DIR("apparmor", 0555, + proc_apparmor_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_apparmor_attr_dir_ops), +#endif }; static int proc_attr_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) @@ -2613,7 +2934,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_attr_dir_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { return proc_pident_lookup(dir, dentry, - attr_dir_stuff, ARRAY_SIZE(attr_dir_stuff)); + attr_dir_stuff, + attr_dir_stuff + ARRAY_SIZE(attr_dir_stuff)); } static const struct inode_operations proc_attr_dir_inode_operations = { @@ -2640,8 +2962,10 @@ static ssize_t proc_coredump_filter_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, ret = 0; mm = get_task_mm(task); if (mm) { + unsigned long flags = __mm_flags_get_dumpable(mm); + len = snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%08lx\n", - ((mm->flags & MMF_DUMP_FILTER_MASK) >> + ((flags & MMF_DUMP_FILTER_MASK) >> MMF_DUMP_FILTER_SHIFT)); mmput(mm); ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, buffer, len); @@ -2680,9 +3004,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_coredump_filter_write(struct file *file, for (i = 0, mask = 1; i < MMF_DUMP_FILTER_BITS; i++, mask <<= 1) { if (val & mask) - set_bit(i + MMF_DUMP_FILTER_SHIFT, &mm->flags); + mm_flags_set(i + MMF_DUMP_FILTER_SHIFT, mm); else - clear_bit(i + MMF_DUMP_FILTER_SHIFT, &mm->flags); + mm_flags_clear(i + MMF_DUMP_FILTER_SHIFT, mm); } mmput(mm); @@ -2704,11 +3028,10 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_coredump_filter_operations = { #ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int whole) { - struct task_io_accounting acct = task->ioac; - unsigned long flags; + struct task_io_accounting acct; int result; - result = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + result = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); if (result) return result; @@ -2717,15 +3040,21 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int wh goto out_unlock; } - if (whole && lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) { - struct task_struct *t = task; + if (whole) { + struct signal_struct *sig = task->signal; + struct task_struct *t; - task_io_accounting_add(&acct, &task->signal->ioac); - while_each_thread(task, t) - task_io_accounting_add(&acct, &t->ioac); + guard(rcu)(); + scoped_seqlock_read (&sig->stats_lock, ss_lock_irqsave) { + acct = sig->ioac; + __for_each_thread(sig, t) + task_io_accounting_add(&acct, &t->ioac); - unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags); + } + } else { + acct = task->ioac; } + seq_printf(m, "rchar: %llu\n" "wchar: %llu\n" @@ -2744,7 +3073,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int wh result = 0; out_unlock: - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); return result; } @@ -2913,7 +3242,50 @@ static int proc_pid_patch_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, } #endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */ -#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS +#ifdef CONFIG_KSM +static int proc_pid_ksm_merging_pages(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, + struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct mm_struct *mm; + + mm = get_task_mm(task); + if (mm) { + seq_printf(m, "%lu\n", mm->ksm_merging_pages); + mmput(mm); + } + + return 0; +} +static int proc_pid_ksm_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, + struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct mm_struct *mm; + int ret = 0; + + mm = get_task_mm(task); + if (mm) { + seq_printf(m, "ksm_rmap_items %lu\n", mm->ksm_rmap_items); + seq_printf(m, "ksm_zero_pages %ld\n", mm_ksm_zero_pages(mm)); + seq_printf(m, "ksm_merging_pages %lu\n", mm->ksm_merging_pages); + seq_printf(m, "ksm_process_profit %ld\n", ksm_process_profit(mm)); + seq_printf(m, "ksm_merge_any: %s\n", + mm_flags_test(MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY, mm) ? "yes" : "no"); + ret = mmap_read_lock_killable(mm); + if (ret) { + mmput(mm); + return ret; + } + seq_printf(m, "ksm_mergeable: %s\n", + ksm_process_mergeable(mm) ? "yes" : "no"); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); + mmput(mm); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KSM */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS static int proc_stack_depth(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) { @@ -2926,7 +3298,7 @@ static int proc_stack_depth(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, prev_depth, depth); return 0; } -#endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS */ +#endif /* CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS */ /* * Thread groups @@ -2938,7 +3310,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = { DIR("task", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, proc_task_inode_operations, proc_task_operations), DIR("fd", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_fd_inode_operations, proc_fd_operations), DIR("map_files", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_map_files_inode_operations, proc_map_files_operations), - DIR("fdinfo", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_fdinfo_inode_operations, proc_fdinfo_operations), + DIR("fdinfo", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, proc_fdinfo_inode_operations, proc_fdinfo_operations), DIR("ns", S_IRUSR|S_IXUGO, proc_ns_dir_inode_operations, proc_ns_dir_operations), #ifdef CONFIG_NET DIR("net", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, proc_net_inode_operations, proc_net_operations), @@ -2948,12 +3320,13 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = { ONE("status", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_status), ONE("personality", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_personality), ONE("limits", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_limits), -#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG REG("sched", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_sched_operations), -#endif #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_AUTOGROUP REG("autogroup", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_sched_autogroup_operations), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TIME_NS + REG("timens_offsets", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_timens_offsets_operations), +#endif REG("comm", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_set_comm_operations), #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK ONE("syscall", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_syscall), @@ -2999,10 +3372,13 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS ONE("cgroup", S_IRUGO, proc_cgroup_show), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_CPU_RESCTRL + ONE("cpu_resctrl_groups", S_IRUGO, proc_resctrl_show), +#endif ONE("oom_score", S_IRUGO, proc_oom_score), REG("oom_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_adj_operations), REG("oom_score_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_score_adj_operations), -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations), REG("sessionid", S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations), #endif @@ -3029,9 +3405,19 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH ONE("patch_state", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_patch_state), #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS +#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS ONE("stack_depth", S_IRUGO, proc_stack_depth), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS + ONE("arch_status", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_arch_status), +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG + ONE("seccomp_cache", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_seccomp_cache), +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KSM + ONE("ksm_merging_pages", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_ksm_merging_pages), + ONE("ksm_stat", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_ksm_stat), +#endif }; static int proc_tgid_base_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) @@ -3046,10 +3432,19 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_tgid_base_operations = { .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +struct pid *tgid_pidfd_to_pid(const struct file *file) +{ + if (file->f_op != &proc_tgid_base_operations) + return ERR_PTR(-EBADF); + + return proc_pid(file_inode(file)); +} + static struct dentry *proc_tgid_base_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { return proc_pident_lookup(dir, dentry, - tgid_base_stuff, ARRAY_SIZE(tgid_base_stuff)); + tgid_base_stuff, + tgid_base_stuff + ARRAY_SIZE(tgid_base_stuff)); } static const struct inode_operations proc_tgid_base_inode_operations = { @@ -3059,90 +3454,28 @@ static const struct inode_operations proc_tgid_base_inode_operations = { .permission = proc_pid_permission, }; -static void proc_flush_task_mnt(struct vfsmount *mnt, pid_t pid, pid_t tgid) -{ - struct dentry *dentry, *leader, *dir; - char buf[10 + 1]; - struct qstr name; - - name.name = buf; - name.len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", pid); - /* no ->d_hash() rejects on procfs */ - dentry = d_hash_and_lookup(mnt->mnt_root, &name); - if (dentry) { - d_invalidate(dentry); - dput(dentry); - } - - if (pid == tgid) - return; - - name.name = buf; - name.len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", tgid); - leader = d_hash_and_lookup(mnt->mnt_root, &name); - if (!leader) - goto out; - - name.name = "task"; - name.len = strlen(name.name); - dir = d_hash_and_lookup(leader, &name); - if (!dir) - goto out_put_leader; - - name.name = buf; - name.len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", pid); - dentry = d_hash_and_lookup(dir, &name); - if (dentry) { - d_invalidate(dentry); - dput(dentry); - } - - dput(dir); -out_put_leader: - dput(leader); -out: - return; -} - /** - * proc_flush_task - Remove dcache entries for @task from the /proc dcache. - * @task: task that should be flushed. - * - * When flushing dentries from proc, one needs to flush them from global - * proc (proc_mnt) and from all the namespaces' procs this task was seen - * in. This call is supposed to do all of this job. + * proc_flush_pid - Remove dcache entries for @pid from the /proc dcache. + * @pid: pid that should be flushed. * - * Looks in the dcache for - * /proc/@pid - * /proc/@tgid/task/@pid - * if either directory is present flushes it and all of it'ts children - * from the dcache. + * This function walks a list of inodes (that belong to any proc + * filesystem) that are attached to the pid and flushes them from + * the dentry cache. * * It is safe and reasonable to cache /proc entries for a task until * that task exits. After that they just clog up the dcache with * useless entries, possibly causing useful dcache entries to be - * flushed instead. This routine is proved to flush those useless - * dcache entries at process exit time. + * flushed instead. This routine is provided to flush those useless + * dcache entries when a process is reaped. * * NOTE: This routine is just an optimization so it does not guarantee - * that no dcache entries will exist at process exit time it - * just makes it very unlikely that any will persist. + * that no dcache entries will exist after a process is reaped + * it just makes it very unlikely that any will persist. */ -void proc_flush_task(struct task_struct *task) +void proc_flush_pid(struct pid *pid) { - int i; - struct pid *pid, *tgid; - struct upid *upid; - - pid = task_pid(task); - tgid = task_tgid(task); - - for (i = 0; i <= pid->level; i++) { - upid = &pid->numbers[i]; - proc_flush_task_mnt(upid->ns->proc_mnt, upid->nr, - tgid->numbers[i].nr); - } + proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache(&pid->inodes, &pid->lock); } static struct dentry *proc_pid_instantiate(struct dentry * dentry, @@ -3150,7 +3483,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_pid_instantiate(struct dentry * dentry, { struct inode *inode; - inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dentry->d_sb, task, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO); + inode = proc_pid_make_base_inode(dentry->d_sb, task, + S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO); if (!inode) return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); @@ -3161,14 +3495,14 @@ static struct dentry *proc_pid_instantiate(struct dentry * dentry, set_nlink(inode, nlink_tgid); pid_update_inode(task, inode); - d_set_d_op(dentry, &pid_dentry_operations); - return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry); + return d_splice_alias_ops(inode, dentry, &pid_dentry_operations); } -struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry * dentry, unsigned int flags) +struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { struct task_struct *task; unsigned tgid; + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info; struct pid_namespace *ns; struct dentry *result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); @@ -3176,7 +3510,8 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry * dentry, unsign if (tgid == ~0U) goto out; - ns = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info; + fs_info = proc_sb_info(dentry->d_sb); + ns = fs_info->pid_ns; rcu_read_lock(); task = find_task_by_pid_ns(tgid, ns); if (task) @@ -3185,7 +3520,14 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry * dentry, unsign if (!task) goto out; + /* Limit procfs to only ptraceable tasks */ + if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE) { + if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS)) + goto out_put_task; + } + result = proc_pid_instantiate(dentry, task, NULL); +out_put_task: put_task_struct(task); out: return result; @@ -3211,20 +3553,8 @@ retry: pid = find_ge_pid(iter.tgid, ns); if (pid) { iter.tgid = pid_nr_ns(pid, ns); - iter.task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID); - /* What we to know is if the pid we have find is the - * pid of a thread_group_leader. Testing for task - * being a thread_group_leader is the obvious thing - * todo but there is a window when it fails, due to - * the pid transfer logic in de_thread. - * - * So we perform the straight forward test of seeing - * if the pid we have found is the pid of a thread - * group leader, and don't worry if the task we have - * found doesn't happen to be a thread group leader. - * As we don't care in the case of readdir. - */ - if (!iter.task || !has_group_leader_pid(iter.task)) { + iter.task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_TGID); + if (!iter.task) { iter.tgid += 1; goto retry; } @@ -3240,21 +3570,20 @@ retry: int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) { struct tgid_iter iter; - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(file)); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(file_inode(file)->i_sb); + struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(file)->i_sb); loff_t pos = ctx->pos; if (pos >= PID_MAX_LIMIT + TGID_OFFSET) return 0; if (pos == TGID_OFFSET - 2) { - struct inode *inode = d_inode(ns->proc_self); - if (!dir_emit(ctx, "self", 4, inode->i_ino, DT_LNK)) + if (!dir_emit(ctx, "self", 4, self_inum, DT_LNK)) return 0; ctx->pos = pos = pos + 1; } if (pos == TGID_OFFSET - 1) { - struct inode *inode = d_inode(ns->proc_thread_self); - if (!dir_emit(ctx, "thread-self", 11, inode->i_ino, DT_LNK)) + if (!dir_emit(ctx, "thread-self", 11, thread_self_inum, DT_LNK)) return 0; ctx->pos = pos = pos + 1; } @@ -3267,7 +3596,7 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) unsigned int len; cond_resched(); - if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) + if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) continue; len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%u", iter.tgid); @@ -3294,7 +3623,8 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) * This function makes sure that the node is always accessible for members of * same thread group. */ -static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) +static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct inode *inode, int mask) { bool is_same_tgroup; struct task_struct *task; @@ -3313,11 +3643,12 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) return 0; } - return generic_permission(inode, mask); + return generic_permission(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, mask); } static const struct inode_operations proc_tid_comm_inode_operations = { - .permission = proc_tid_comm_permission, + .setattr = proc_setattr, + .permission = proc_tid_comm_permission, }; /* @@ -3325,7 +3656,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations proc_tid_comm_inode_operations = { */ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = { DIR("fd", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_fd_inode_operations, proc_fd_operations), - DIR("fdinfo", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_fdinfo_inode_operations, proc_fdinfo_operations), + DIR("fdinfo", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, proc_fdinfo_inode_operations, proc_fdinfo_operations), DIR("ns", S_IRUSR|S_IXUGO, proc_ns_dir_inode_operations, proc_ns_dir_operations), #ifdef CONFIG_NET DIR("net", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, proc_net_inode_operations, proc_net_operations), @@ -3335,9 +3666,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = { ONE("status", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_status), ONE("personality", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_personality), ONE("limits", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_limits), -#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG REG("sched", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_sched_operations), -#endif NOD("comm", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, &proc_tid_comm_inode_operations, &proc_pid_set_comm_operations, {}), @@ -3387,10 +3716,13 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS ONE("cgroup", S_IRUGO, proc_cgroup_show), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_CPU_RESCTRL + ONE("cpu_resctrl_groups", S_IRUGO, proc_resctrl_show), +#endif ONE("oom_score", S_IRUGO, proc_oom_score), REG("oom_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_adj_operations), REG("oom_score_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_score_adj_operations), -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations), REG("sessionid", S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations), #endif @@ -3410,6 +3742,16 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH ONE("patch_state", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_patch_state), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS + ONE("arch_status", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_arch_status), +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG + ONE("seccomp_cache", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_seccomp_cache), +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KSM + ONE("ksm_merging_pages", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_ksm_merging_pages), + ONE("ksm_stat", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_ksm_stat), +#endif }; static int proc_tid_base_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) @@ -3421,7 +3763,8 @@ static int proc_tid_base_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) static struct dentry *proc_tid_base_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { return proc_pident_lookup(dir, dentry, - tid_base_stuff, ARRAY_SIZE(tid_base_stuff)); + tid_base_stuff, + tid_base_stuff + ARRAY_SIZE(tid_base_stuff)); } static const struct file_operations proc_tid_base_operations = { @@ -3440,7 +3783,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_task_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct task_struct *task, const void *ptr) { struct inode *inode; - inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dentry->d_sb, task, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO); + inode = proc_pid_make_base_inode(dentry->d_sb, task, + S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO); if (!inode) return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); @@ -3451,8 +3795,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_task_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, set_nlink(inode, nlink_tid); pid_update_inode(task, inode); - d_set_d_op(dentry, &pid_dentry_operations); - return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry); + return d_splice_alias_ops(inode, dentry, &pid_dentry_operations); } static struct dentry *proc_task_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry * dentry, unsigned int flags) @@ -3460,6 +3803,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_task_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry * dentry struct task_struct *task; struct task_struct *leader = get_proc_task(dir); unsigned tid; + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info; struct pid_namespace *ns; struct dentry *result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); @@ -3470,7 +3814,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_task_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry * dentry if (tid == ~0U) goto out; - ns = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info; + fs_info = proc_sb_info(dentry->d_sb); + ns = fs_info->pid_ns; rcu_read_lock(); task = find_task_by_pid_ns(tid, ns); if (task) @@ -3530,11 +3875,10 @@ static struct task_struct *first_tid(struct pid *pid, int tid, loff_t f_pos, /* If we haven't found our starting place yet start * with the leader and walk nr threads forward. */ - pos = task = task->group_leader; - do { + for_each_thread(task, pos) { if (!nr--) goto found; - } while_each_thread(task, pos); + } fail: pos = NULL; goto out; @@ -3556,10 +3900,8 @@ static struct task_struct *next_tid(struct task_struct *start) struct task_struct *pos = NULL; rcu_read_lock(); if (pid_alive(start)) { - pos = next_thread(start); - if (thread_group_leader(pos)) - pos = NULL; - else + pos = __next_thread(start); + if (pos) get_task_struct(pos); } rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -3581,24 +3923,27 @@ static int proc_task_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) if (!dir_emit_dots(file, ctx)) return 0; - /* f_version caches the tgid value that the last readdir call couldn't - * return. lseek aka telldir automagically resets f_version to 0. + /* We cache the tgid value that the last readdir call couldn't + * return and lseek resets it to 0. */ - ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); - tid = (int)file->f_version; - file->f_version = 0; + ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); + tid = (int)(intptr_t)file->private_data; + file->private_data = NULL; for (task = first_tid(proc_pid(inode), tid, ctx->pos - 2, ns); task; task = next_tid(task), ctx->pos++) { char name[10 + 1]; unsigned int len; + tid = task_pid_nr_ns(task, ns); - len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%u", tid); + if (!tid) + continue; /* The task has just exited. */ + len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%d", tid); if (!proc_fill_cache(file, ctx, name, len, proc_task_instantiate, task, NULL)) { /* returning this tgid failed, save it as the first * pid for the next readir call */ - file->f_version = (u64)tid; + file->private_data = (void *)(intptr_t)tid; put_task_struct(task); break; } @@ -3607,12 +3952,13 @@ static int proc_task_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) return 0; } -static int proc_task_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, +static int proc_task_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags) { struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry); struct task_struct *p = get_proc_task(inode); - generic_fillattr(inode, stat); + generic_fillattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, request_mask, inode, stat); if (p) { stat->nlink += get_nr_threads(p); @@ -3622,6 +3968,24 @@ static int proc_task_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, return 0; } +/* + * proc_task_readdir() set @file->private_data to a positive integer + * value, so casting that to u64 is safe. generic_llseek_cookie() will + * set @cookie to 0, so casting to an int is safe. The WARN_ON_ONCE() is + * here to catch any unexpected change in behavior either in + * proc_task_readdir() or generic_llseek_cookie(). + */ +static loff_t proc_dir_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence) +{ + u64 cookie = (u64)(intptr_t)file->private_data; + loff_t off; + + off = generic_llseek_cookie(file, offset, whence, &cookie); + WARN_ON_ONCE(cookie > INT_MAX); + file->private_data = (void *)(intptr_t)cookie; /* serialized by f_pos_lock */ + return off; +} + static const struct inode_operations proc_task_inode_operations = { .lookup = proc_task_lookup, .getattr = proc_task_getattr, @@ -3632,7 +3996,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations proc_task_inode_operations = { static const struct file_operations proc_task_operations = { .read = generic_read_dir, .iterate_shared = proc_task_readdir, - .llseek = generic_file_llseek, + .llseek = proc_dir_llseek, }; void __init set_proc_pid_nlink(void) |
