diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc/root.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/root.c | 129 |
1 files changed, 105 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c index 3c2ee3eb1138..d8ca41d823e4 100644 --- a/fs/proc/root.c +++ b/fs/proc/root.c @@ -38,12 +38,14 @@ enum proc_param { Opt_gid, Opt_hidepid, Opt_subset, + Opt_pidns, }; static const struct fs_parameter_spec proc_fs_parameters[] = { - fsparam_u32("gid", Opt_gid), + fsparam_u32("gid", Opt_gid), fsparam_string("hidepid", Opt_hidepid), fsparam_string("subset", Opt_subset), + fsparam_file_or_string("pidns", Opt_pidns), {} }; @@ -109,11 +111,66 @@ static int proc_parse_subset_param(struct fs_context *fc, char *value) return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PID_NS +static int proc_parse_pidns_param(struct fs_context *fc, + struct fs_parameter *param, + struct fs_parse_result *result) +{ + struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private; + struct pid_namespace *target, *active = task_active_pid_ns(current); + struct ns_common *ns; + struct file *ns_filp __free(fput) = NULL; + + switch (param->type) { + case fs_value_is_file: + /* came through fsconfig, steal the file reference */ + ns_filp = no_free_ptr(param->file); + break; + case fs_value_is_string: + ns_filp = filp_open(param->string, O_RDONLY, 0); + break; + default: + WARN_ON_ONCE(true); + break; + } + if (!ns_filp) + ns_filp = ERR_PTR(-EBADF); + if (IS_ERR(ns_filp)) { + errorfc(fc, "could not get file from pidns argument"); + return PTR_ERR(ns_filp); + } + + if (!proc_ns_file(ns_filp)) + return invalfc(fc, "pidns argument is not an nsfs file"); + ns = get_proc_ns(file_inode(ns_filp)); + if (ns->ns_type != CLONE_NEWPID) + return invalfc(fc, "pidns argument is not a pidns file"); + target = container_of(ns, struct pid_namespace, ns); + + /* + * pidns= is shorthand for joining the pidns to get a fsopen fd, so the + * permission model should be the same as pidns_install(). + */ + if (!ns_capable(target->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + errorfc(fc, "insufficient permissions to set pidns"); + return -EPERM; + } + if (!pidns_is_ancestor(target, active)) + return invalfc(fc, "cannot set pidns to non-descendant pidns"); + + put_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns); + ctx->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(target); + put_user_ns(fc->user_ns); + fc->user_ns = get_user_ns(ctx->pid_ns->user_ns); + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_PID_NS */ + static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) { struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private; struct fs_parse_result result; - int opt; + int opt, err; opt = fs_parse(fc, proc_fs_parameters, param, &result); if (opt < 0) @@ -125,14 +182,38 @@ static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) break; case Opt_hidepid: - if (proc_parse_hidepid_param(fc, param)) - return -EINVAL; + err = proc_parse_hidepid_param(fc, param); + if (err) + return err; break; case Opt_subset: - if (proc_parse_subset_param(fc, param->string) < 0) - return -EINVAL; + err = proc_parse_subset_param(fc, param->string); + if (err) + return err; + break; + + case Opt_pidns: +#ifdef CONFIG_PID_NS + /* + * We would have to RCU-protect every proc_pid_ns() or + * proc_sb_info() access if we allowed this to be reconfigured + * for an existing procfs instance. Luckily, procfs instances + * are cheap to create, and mount-beneath would let you + * atomically replace an instance even with overmounts. + */ + if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE) { + errorfc(fc, "cannot reconfigure pidns for existing procfs"); + return -EBUSY; + } + err = proc_parse_pidns_param(fc, param, &result); + if (err) + return err; break; +#else + errorfc(fc, "pidns mount flag not supported on this system"); + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +#endif default: return -EINVAL; @@ -154,6 +235,11 @@ static void proc_apply_options(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, fs_info->hide_pid = ctx->hidepid; if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_subset)) fs_info->pidonly = ctx->pidonly; + if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_pidns) && + !WARN_ON_ONCE(fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE)) { + put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns); + fs_info->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns); + } } static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc) @@ -188,7 +274,7 @@ static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc) s->s_stack_depth = FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH; /* procfs dentries and inodes don't require IO to create */ - s->s_shrink.seeks = 0; + s->s_shrink->seeks = 0; pde_get(&proc_root); root_inode = proc_get_inode(s, &proc_root); @@ -261,17 +347,11 @@ static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb) { struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(sb); - if (!fs_info) { - kill_anon_super(sb); - return; - } - - dput(fs_info->proc_self); - dput(fs_info->proc_thread_self); - kill_anon_super(sb); - put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns); - kfree(fs_info); + if (fs_info) { + put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns); + kfree_rcu(fs_info, rcu); + } } static struct file_system_type proc_fs_type = { @@ -310,11 +390,12 @@ void __init proc_root_init(void) register_filesystem(&proc_fs_type); } -static int proc_root_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, +static int proc_root_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags) { - generic_fillattr(&init_user_ns, d_inode(path->dentry), stat); + generic_fillattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, request_mask, d_inode(path->dentry), + stat); stat->nlink = proc_root.nlink + nr_processes(); return 0; } @@ -362,12 +443,12 @@ static const struct inode_operations proc_root_inode_operations = { * This is the root "inode" in the /proc tree.. */ struct proc_dir_entry proc_root = { - .low_ino = PROC_ROOT_INO, - .namelen = 5, - .mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO, - .nlink = 2, + .low_ino = PROCFS_ROOT_INO, + .namelen = 5, + .mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO, + .nlink = 2, .refcnt = REFCOUNT_INIT(1), - .proc_iops = &proc_root_inode_operations, + .proc_iops = &proc_root_inode_operations, .proc_dir_ops = &proc_root_operations, .parent = &proc_root, .subdir = RB_ROOT, |