1 files changed, 142 insertions, 118 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index bf309f2592c4..6a86c0683b67 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1,22 +1,9 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
 /* auditfilter.c -- filtering of audit events
  *
  * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc.
  * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
- * (at your option) any later version.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
- * GNU General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
  */
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
@@ -57,7 +44,8 @@ struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]),
 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[6]),
-#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 7
+	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[7]),
+#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 8
 #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
 #endif
 };
@@ -69,6 +57,7 @@ static struct list_head audit_rules_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[4]),
 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[5]),
 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[6]),
+	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[7]),
 };
 
 DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
@@ -164,7 +153,8 @@ char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
 static inline int audit_to_inode(struct audit_krule *krule,
 				 struct audit_field *f)
 {
-	if (krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT ||
+	if ((krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT &&
+	     krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT) ||
 	    krule->inode_f || krule->watch || krule->tree ||
 	    (f->op != Audit_equal && f->op != Audit_not_equal))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -231,7 +221,7 @@ static int audit_match_signal(struct audit_entry *entry)
 					       entry->rule.mask));
 	}
 
-	switch(audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) {
+	switch (audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) {
 	case 0: /* native */
 		return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL,
 					       entry->rule.mask));
@@ -253,7 +243,7 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule_data *
 
 	err = -EINVAL;
 	listnr = rule->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
-	switch(listnr) {
+	switch (listnr) {
 	default:
 		goto exit_err;
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
@@ -261,6 +251,7 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule_data *
 		pr_err("AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY is deprecated\n");
 		goto exit_err;
 	case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT:
+	case AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT:
 	case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK:
 #endif
 	case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
@@ -335,7 +326,7 @@ static u32 audit_to_op(u32 op)
 /* check if an audit field is valid */
 static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f)
 {
-	switch(f->type) {
+	switch (f->type) {
 	case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
 		if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE &&
 		    entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_USER)
@@ -345,11 +336,15 @@ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f)
 		if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_FS)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		break;
+	case AUDIT_PERM:
+		if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
 	}
 
-	switch(entry->rule.listnr) {
+	switch (entry->rule.listnr) {
 	case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
-		switch(f->type) {
+		switch (f->type) {
 		case AUDIT_FSTYPE:
 		case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
 			break;
@@ -358,9 +353,16 @@ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f)
 		}
 	}
 
-	switch(f->type) {
-	default:
-		return -EINVAL;
+	/* Check for valid field type and op */
+	switch (f->type) {
+	case AUDIT_ARG0:
+	case AUDIT_ARG1:
+	case AUDIT_ARG2:
+	case AUDIT_ARG3:
+	case AUDIT_PERS: /* <uapi/linux/personality.h> */
+	case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
+		/* all ops are valid */
+		break;
 	case AUDIT_UID:
 	case AUDIT_EUID:
 	case AUDIT_SUID:
@@ -373,46 +375,53 @@ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f)
 	case AUDIT_FSGID:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
 	case AUDIT_PID:
-	case AUDIT_PERS:
 	case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
 	case AUDIT_PPID:
 	case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
-	case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
 	case AUDIT_EXIT:
 	case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
 	case AUDIT_INODE:
 	case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+	case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
 		/* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */
 		if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		break;
-	case AUDIT_ARG0:
-	case AUDIT_ARG1:
-	case AUDIT_ARG2:
-	case AUDIT_ARG3:
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
-	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
-	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
-	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
-	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
 	case AUDIT_WATCH:
 	case AUDIT_DIR:
 	case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
-		break;
 	case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
-		if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1))
-			return -EINVAL;
-	/* FALL THROUGH */
 	case AUDIT_ARCH:
 	case AUDIT_FSTYPE:
+	case AUDIT_PERM:
+	case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
+	case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
+	case AUDIT_EXE:
+		/* only equal and not equal valid ops */
 		if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		break;
+	default:
+		/* field not recognized */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Check for select valid field values */
+	switch (f->type) {
+	case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
+		if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
 	case AUDIT_PERM:
 		if (f->val & ~15)
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -425,11 +434,14 @@ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f)
 		if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		break;
-	case AUDIT_EXE:
-		if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
+	case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
+		if (f->val >= AF_MAX)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		break;
+	default:
+		break;
 	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -452,6 +464,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 	bufp = data->buf;
 	for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
 		struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
+		u32 f_val;
 
 		err = -EINVAL;
 
@@ -460,12 +473,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 			goto exit_free;
 
 		f->type = data->fields[i];
-		f->val = data->values[i];
+		f_val = data->values[i];
 
 		/* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */
-		if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) {
+		if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f_val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) {
 			f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
-			f->val = 0;
+			f_val = 0;
 			entry->rule.pflags |= AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY;
 		}
 
@@ -481,7 +494,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 		case AUDIT_SUID:
 		case AUDIT_FSUID:
 		case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
-			f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
+			f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f_val);
 			if (!uid_valid(f->uid))
 				goto exit_free;
 			break;
@@ -490,11 +503,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 		case AUDIT_SGID:
 		case AUDIT_FSGID:
 		case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
-			f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
+			f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f_val);
 			if (!gid_valid(f->gid))
 				goto exit_free;
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_ARCH:
+			f->val = f_val;
 			entry->rule.arch_f = f;
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
@@ -507,81 +521,87 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 		case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
-			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
-			if (IS_ERR(str))
+			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val);
+			if (IS_ERR(str)) {
+				err = PTR_ERR(str);
 				goto exit_free;
-			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
-
+			}
+			entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
+			f->lsm_str = str;
 			err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
-						       (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
+						       (void **)&f->lsm_rule,
+						       GFP_KERNEL);
 			/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
 			 * become valid after a policy reload. */
 			if (err == -EINVAL) {
 				pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n",
 					str);
 				err = 0;
-			}
-			if (err) {
-				kfree(str);
+			} else if (err)
 				goto exit_free;
-			} else
-				f->lsm_str = str;
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_WATCH:
-			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
-			if (IS_ERR(str))
+			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val);
+			if (IS_ERR(str)) {
+				err = PTR_ERR(str);
 				goto exit_free;
-			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
-
-			err = audit_to_watch(&entry->rule, str, f->val, f->op);
+			}
+			err = audit_to_watch(&entry->rule, str, f_val, f->op);
 			if (err) {
 				kfree(str);
 				goto exit_free;
 			}
+			entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_DIR:
-			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
-			if (IS_ERR(str))
+			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val);
+			if (IS_ERR(str)) {
+				err = PTR_ERR(str);
 				goto exit_free;
-			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
-
+			}
 			err = audit_make_tree(&entry->rule, str, f->op);
 			kfree(str);
 			if (err)
 				goto exit_free;
+			entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_INODE:
+			f->val = f_val;
 			err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
 			if (err)
 				goto exit_free;
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
-			if (entry->rule.filterkey || f->val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN)
+			if (entry->rule.filterkey || f_val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN)
 				goto exit_free;
-			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
-			if (IS_ERR(str))
+			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val);
+			if (IS_ERR(str)) {
+				err = PTR_ERR(str);
 				goto exit_free;
-			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
+			}
+			entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
 			entry->rule.filterkey = str;
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_EXE:
-			if (entry->rule.exe || f->val > PATH_MAX)
+			if (entry->rule.exe || f_val > PATH_MAX)
 				goto exit_free;
-			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
+			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val);
 			if (IS_ERR(str)) {
 				err = PTR_ERR(str);
 				goto exit_free;
 			}
-			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
-
-			audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(&entry->rule, str, f->val);
+			audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(&entry->rule, str, f_val);
 			if (IS_ERR(audit_mark)) {
 				kfree(str);
 				err = PTR_ERR(audit_mark);
 				goto exit_free;
 			}
+			entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
 			entry->rule.exe = audit_mark;
 			break;
+		default:
+			f->val = f_val;
+			break;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -618,10 +638,9 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
 	void *bufp;
 	int i;
 
-	data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data) + krule->buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	data = kzalloc(struct_size(data, buf, krule->buflen), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (unlikely(!data))
 		return NULL;
-	memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
 
 	data->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
 	data->action = krule->action;
@@ -632,7 +651,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
 
 		data->fields[i] = f->type;
 		data->fieldflags[i] = audit_ops[f->op];
-		switch(f->type) {
+		switch (f->type) {
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
@@ -670,12 +689,13 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
 				data->values[i] = AUDIT_UID_UNSET;
 				break;
 			}
-			/* fallthrough if set */
+			fallthrough;	/* if set */
 		default:
 			data->values[i] = f->val;
 		}
 	}
-	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
+	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
+		data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
 
 	return data;
 }
@@ -698,7 +718,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
 		    a->fields[i].op != b->fields[i].op)
 			return 1;
 
-		switch(a->fields[i].type) {
+		switch (a->fields[i].type) {
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
@@ -768,7 +788,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
 static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
 					   struct audit_field *sf)
 {
-	int ret = 0;
+	int ret;
 	char *lsm_str;
 
 	/* our own copy of lsm_str */
@@ -779,7 +799,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
 
 	/* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
 	ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
-				       (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
+				       (void **)&df->lsm_rule, GFP_KERNEL);
 	/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
 	 * become valid after a policy reload. */
 	if (ret == -EINVAL) {
@@ -927,7 +947,7 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
 	int dont_count = 0;
 
 	/* If any of these, don't count towards total */
-	switch(entry->rule.listnr) {
+	switch (entry->rule.listnr) {
 	case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
 	case AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE:
 	case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
@@ -969,7 +989,8 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
 	}
 
 	entry->rule.prio = ~0ULL;
-	if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT) {
+	if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT ||
+	    entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT) {
 		if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND)
 			entry->rule.prio = ++prio_high;
 		else
@@ -1009,7 +1030,7 @@ int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
 	int dont_count = 0;
 
 	/* If any of these, don't count towards total */
-	switch(entry->rule.listnr) {
+	switch (entry->rule.listnr) {
 	case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
 	case AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE:
 	case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
@@ -1063,7 +1084,7 @@ static void audit_list_rules(int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
 
 	/* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu
 	 * iterator to sync with list writers. */
-	for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
 		list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
 			struct audit_rule_data *data;
 
@@ -1072,7 +1093,7 @@ static void audit_list_rules(int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
 				break;
 			skb = audit_make_reply(seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 0, 1,
 					       data,
-					       sizeof(*data) + data->buflen);
+					       struct_size(data, buf, data->buflen));
 			if (skb)
 				skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
 			kfree(data);
@@ -1091,7 +1112,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int re
 	if (!audit_enabled)
 		return;
 
-	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
 	if (!ab)
 		return;
 	audit_log_session_info(ab);
@@ -1114,22 +1135,24 @@ int audit_rule_change(int type, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz)
 	int err = 0;
 	struct audit_entry *entry;
 
-	entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
-	if (IS_ERR(entry))
-		return PTR_ERR(entry);
-
 	switch (type) {
 	case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
+		entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
+		if (IS_ERR(entry))
+			return PTR_ERR(entry);
 		err = audit_add_rule(entry);
 		audit_log_rule_change("add_rule", &entry->rule, !err);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
+		entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
+		if (IS_ERR(entry))
+			return PTR_ERR(entry);
 		err = audit_del_rule(entry);
 		audit_log_rule_change("remove_rule", &entry->rule, !err);
 		break;
 	default:
-		err = -EINVAL;
 		WARN_ON(1);
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE) {
@@ -1148,11 +1171,8 @@ int audit_rule_change(int type, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz)
  */
 int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq)
 {
-	u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid;
-	struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk);
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	struct audit_netlink_list *dest;
-	int err = 0;
 
 	/* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
 	 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
@@ -1160,25 +1180,26 @@ int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq)
 	 * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
 	 * trying to _send_ the stuff */
 
-	dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+	dest = kmalloc(sizeof(*dest), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!dest)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	dest->net = get_net(net);
-	dest->portid = portid;
+	dest->net = get_net(sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk));
+	dest->portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid;
 	skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q);
 
 	mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
 	audit_list_rules(seq, &dest->q);
 	mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
 
-	tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list, dest, "audit_send_list");
+	tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list_thread, dest, "audit_send_list");
 	if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
 		skb_queue_purge(&dest->q);
+		put_net(dest->net);
 		kfree(dest);
-		err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
+		return PTR_ERR(tsk);
 	}
 
-	return err;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 int audit_comparator(u32 left, u32 op, u32 right)
@@ -1201,7 +1222,6 @@ int audit_comparator(u32 left, u32 op, u32 right)
 	case Audit_bittest:
 		return ((left & right) == right);
 	default:
-		BUG();
 		return 0;
 	}
 }
@@ -1224,7 +1244,6 @@ int audit_uid_comparator(kuid_t left, u32 op, kuid_t right)
 	case Audit_bitmask:
 	case Audit_bittest:
 	default:
-		BUG();
 		return 0;
 	}
 }
@@ -1247,7 +1266,6 @@ int audit_gid_comparator(kgid_t left, u32 op, kgid_t right)
 	case Audit_bitmask:
 	case Audit_bittest:
 	default:
-		BUG();
 		return 0;
 	}
 }
@@ -1290,23 +1308,30 @@ int parent_len(const char *path)
  * @parentlen:	length of the parent if known. Passing in AUDIT_NAME_FULL
  * 		here indicates that we must compute this value.
  */
-int audit_compare_dname_path(const char *dname, const char *path, int parentlen)
+int audit_compare_dname_path(const struct qstr *dname, const char *path, int parentlen)
 {
 	int dlen, pathlen;
 	const char *p;
 
-	dlen = strlen(dname);
+	dlen = dname->len;
 	pathlen = strlen(path);
 	if (pathlen < dlen)
 		return 1;
 
-	parentlen = parentlen == AUDIT_NAME_FULL ? parent_len(path) : parentlen;
-	if (pathlen - parentlen != dlen)
-		return 1;
+	if (parentlen == AUDIT_NAME_FULL)
+		parentlen = parent_len(path);
 
 	p = path + parentlen;
 
-	return strncmp(p, dname, dlen);
+	/* handle trailing slashes */
+	pathlen -= parentlen;
+	while (pathlen > 0 && p[pathlen - 1] == '/')
+		pathlen--;
+
+	if (pathlen != dlen)
+		return 1;
+
+	return memcmp(p, dname->name, dlen);
 }
 
 int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
@@ -1315,19 +1340,17 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 	int ret = 1; /* Audit by default */
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[listtype]))
-		goto unlock_and_return;
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[listtype], list) {
 		int i, result = 0;
 
 		for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
 			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+			struct lsm_prop prop = { };
 			pid_t pid;
-			u32 sid;
 
 			switch (f->type) {
 			case AUDIT_PID:
-				pid = task_pid_nr(current);
+				pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
 				result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
 				break;
 			case AUDIT_UID:
@@ -1353,9 +1376,10 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 				if (f->lsm_rule) {
-					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
-					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
-							f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, NULL);
+					security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+					result = security_audit_rule_match(
+						   &prop, f->type, f->op,
+						   f->lsm_rule);
 				}
 				break;
 			case AUDIT_EXE:
@@ -1415,7 +1439,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
 }
 
 /* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
- * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
+ * It will traverse the filter lists searching for rules that contain LSM
  * specific filter fields.  When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
  * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
  * updated rule. */