diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditfilter.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditfilter.c | 650 |
1 files changed, 370 insertions, 280 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index f7aee8be7fb2..6a86c0683b67 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1,24 +1,13 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* auditfilter.c -- filtering of audit events * * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc. * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License - * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software - * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA */ +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/kthread.h> @@ -29,19 +18,21 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <net/net_namespace.h> +#include <net/sock.h> #include "audit.h" /* * Locking model: * * audit_filter_mutex: - * Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist - * data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access - * contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque - * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures - * must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist. - * An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may - * be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held. + * Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist + * data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access + * contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque + * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures + * must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist. + * An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may + * be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held. */ /* Audit filter lists, defined in <linux/audit.h> */ @@ -52,7 +43,9 @@ struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = { LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]), -#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 6 + LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[6]), + LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[7]), +#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 8 #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser #endif }; @@ -63,10 +56,30 @@ static struct list_head audit_rules_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = { LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[3]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[4]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[5]), + LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[6]), + LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[7]), }; DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex); +static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f) +{ + switch (f->type) { + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: + case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: + kfree(f->lsm_str); + security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule); + } +} + static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e) { int i; @@ -76,11 +89,8 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e) if (erule->watch) audit_put_watch(erule->watch); if (erule->fields) - for (i = 0; i < erule->field_count; i++) { - struct audit_field *f = &erule->fields[i]; - kfree(f->lsm_str); - security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule); - } + for (i = 0; i < erule->field_count; i++) + audit_free_lsm_field(&erule->fields[i]); kfree(erule->fields); kfree(erule->filterkey); kfree(e); @@ -102,7 +112,7 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_init_entry(u32 field_count) if (unlikely(!entry)) return NULL; - fields = kzalloc(sizeof(*fields) * field_count, GFP_KERNEL); + fields = kcalloc(field_count, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL); if (unlikely(!fields)) { kfree(entry); return NULL; @@ -139,12 +149,13 @@ char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len) return str; } -/* Translate an inode field to kernel respresentation. */ +/* Translate an inode field to kernel representation. */ static inline int audit_to_inode(struct audit_krule *krule, struct audit_field *f) { - if (krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT || - krule->watch || krule->inode_f || krule->tree || + if ((krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT && + krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT) || + krule->inode_f || krule->watch || krule->tree || (f->op != Audit_equal && f->op != Audit_not_equal)) return -EINVAL; @@ -156,7 +167,7 @@ static __u32 *classes[AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES]; int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list) { - __u32 *p = kzalloc(AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * sizeof(__u32), GFP_KERNEL); + __u32 *p = kcalloc(AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE, sizeof(__u32), GFP_KERNEL); if (!p) return -ENOMEM; while (*list != ~0U) { @@ -210,7 +221,7 @@ static int audit_match_signal(struct audit_entry *entry) entry->rule.mask)); } - switch(audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) { + switch (audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) { case 0: /* native */ return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL, entry->rule.mask)); @@ -224,7 +235,7 @@ static int audit_match_signal(struct audit_entry *entry) #endif /* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */ -static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule) +static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule_data *rule) { unsigned listnr; struct audit_entry *entry; @@ -232,22 +243,24 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule) err = -EINVAL; listnr = rule->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; - switch(listnr) { + switch (listnr) { default: goto exit_err; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY: - if (rule->action == AUDIT_ALWAYS) - goto exit_err; + pr_err("AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY is deprecated\n"); + goto exit_err; case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT: + case AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT: case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK: #endif case AUDIT_FILTER_USER: - case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE: + case AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE: + case AUDIT_FILTER_FS: ; } if (unlikely(rule->action == AUDIT_POSSIBLE)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "AUDIT_POSSIBLE is deprecated\n"); + pr_err("AUDIT_POSSIBLE is deprecated\n"); goto exit_err; } if (rule->action != AUDIT_NEVER && rule->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS) @@ -313,17 +326,43 @@ static u32 audit_to_op(u32 op) /* check if an audit field is valid */ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f) { - switch(f->type) { + switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_MSGTYPE: - if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE && + if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE && entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_USER) return -EINVAL; break; - }; + case AUDIT_FSTYPE: + if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_FS) + return -EINVAL; + break; + case AUDIT_PERM: + if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT) + return -EINVAL; + break; + } - switch(f->type) { - default: - return -EINVAL; + switch (entry->rule.listnr) { + case AUDIT_FILTER_FS: + switch (f->type) { + case AUDIT_FSTYPE: + case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + } + + /* Check for valid field type and op */ + switch (f->type) { + case AUDIT_ARG0: + case AUDIT_ARG1: + case AUDIT_ARG2: + case AUDIT_ARG3: + case AUDIT_PERS: /* <uapi/linux/personality.h> */ + case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: + /* all ops are valid */ + break; case AUDIT_UID: case AUDIT_EUID: case AUDIT_SUID: @@ -336,43 +375,53 @@ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f) case AUDIT_FSGID: case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: case AUDIT_PID: - case AUDIT_PERS: case AUDIT_MSGTYPE: case AUDIT_PPID: case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: - case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: case AUDIT_EXIT: case AUDIT_SUCCESS: + case AUDIT_INODE: + case AUDIT_SESSIONID: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: + case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM: /* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */ if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest) return -EINVAL; break; - case AUDIT_ARG0: - case AUDIT_ARG1: - case AUDIT_ARG2: - case AUDIT_ARG3: case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: - case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: - case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: - case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: case AUDIT_WATCH: case AUDIT_DIR: case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: - break; case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: - if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1)) - return -EINVAL; - /* FALL THROUGH */ case AUDIT_ARCH: + case AUDIT_FSTYPE: + case AUDIT_PERM: + case AUDIT_FILETYPE: + case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: + case AUDIT_EXE: + /* only equal and not equal valid ops */ if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal) return -EINVAL; break; + default: + /* field not recognized */ + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Check for select valid field values */ + switch (f->type) { + case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: + if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1)) + return -EINVAL; + break; case AUDIT_PERM: if (f->val & ~15) return -EINVAL; @@ -385,11 +434,18 @@ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f) if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE) return -EINVAL; break; - }; + case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM: + if (f->val >= AF_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + break; + default: + break; + } + return 0; } -/* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule respresentation. */ +/* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule representation. */ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, size_t datasz) { @@ -399,15 +455,16 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data); int i; char *str; + struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark; - entry = audit_to_entry_common((struct audit_rule *)data); + entry = audit_to_entry_common(data); if (IS_ERR(entry)) goto exit_nofree; bufp = data->buf; - entry->rule.vers_ops = 2; for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i]; + u32 f_val; err = -EINVAL; @@ -416,16 +473,13 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, goto exit_free; f->type = data->fields[i]; - f->val = data->values[i]; - f->uid = INVALID_UID; - f->gid = INVALID_GID; - f->lsm_str = NULL; - f->lsm_rule = NULL; + f_val = data->values[i]; /* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */ - if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == ~0U)) { + if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f_val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) { f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET; - f->val = 0; + f_val = 0; + entry->rule.pflags |= AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY; } err = audit_field_valid(entry, f); @@ -440,7 +494,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, case AUDIT_SUID: case AUDIT_FSUID: case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: - f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f->val); + f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f_val); if (!uid_valid(f->uid)) goto exit_free; break; @@ -449,11 +503,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, case AUDIT_SGID: case AUDIT_FSGID: case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: - f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f->val); + f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f_val); if (!gid_valid(f->gid)) goto exit_free; break; case AUDIT_ARCH: + f->val = f_val; entry->rule.arch_f = f; break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: @@ -466,63 +521,87 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: - str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); - if (IS_ERR(str)) + str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val); + if (IS_ERR(str)) { + err = PTR_ERR(str); goto exit_free; - entry->rule.buflen += f->val; - + } + entry->rule.buflen += f_val; + f->lsm_str = str; err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, - (void **)&f->lsm_rule); + (void **)&f->lsm_rule, + GFP_KERNEL); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (err == -EINVAL) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM " - "\'%s\' is invalid\n", str); + pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n", + str); err = 0; - } - if (err) { - kfree(str); + } else if (err) goto exit_free; - } else - f->lsm_str = str; break; case AUDIT_WATCH: - str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); - if (IS_ERR(str)) + str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val); + if (IS_ERR(str)) { + err = PTR_ERR(str); goto exit_free; - entry->rule.buflen += f->val; - - err = audit_to_watch(&entry->rule, str, f->val, f->op); + } + err = audit_to_watch(&entry->rule, str, f_val, f->op); if (err) { kfree(str); goto exit_free; } + entry->rule.buflen += f_val; break; case AUDIT_DIR: - str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); - if (IS_ERR(str)) + str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val); + if (IS_ERR(str)) { + err = PTR_ERR(str); goto exit_free; - entry->rule.buflen += f->val; - + } err = audit_make_tree(&entry->rule, str, f->op); kfree(str); if (err) goto exit_free; + entry->rule.buflen += f_val; break; case AUDIT_INODE: + f->val = f_val; err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f); if (err) goto exit_free; break; case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: - if (entry->rule.filterkey || f->val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN) + if (entry->rule.filterkey || f_val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN) goto exit_free; - str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); - if (IS_ERR(str)) + str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val); + if (IS_ERR(str)) { + err = PTR_ERR(str); goto exit_free; - entry->rule.buflen += f->val; + } + entry->rule.buflen += f_val; entry->rule.filterkey = str; break; + case AUDIT_EXE: + if (entry->rule.exe || f_val > PATH_MAX) + goto exit_free; + str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val); + if (IS_ERR(str)) { + err = PTR_ERR(str); + goto exit_free; + } + audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(&entry->rule, str, f_val); + if (IS_ERR(audit_mark)) { + kfree(str); + err = PTR_ERR(audit_mark); + goto exit_free; + } + entry->rule.buflen += f_val; + entry->rule.exe = audit_mark; + break; + default: + f->val = f_val; + break; } } @@ -533,10 +612,10 @@ exit_nofree: return entry; exit_free: - if (entry->rule.watch) - audit_put_watch(entry->rule.watch); /* matches initial get */ if (entry->rule.tree) audit_put_tree(entry->rule.tree); /* that's the temporary one */ + if (entry->rule.exe) + audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe); /* that's the template one */ audit_free_rule(entry); return ERR_PTR(err); } @@ -552,17 +631,16 @@ static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, const char *str) return len; } -/* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule_data. */ +/* Translate kernel rule representation to struct audit_rule_data. */ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) { struct audit_rule_data *data; void *bufp; int i; - data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data) + krule->buflen, GFP_KERNEL); + data = kzalloc(struct_size(data, buf, krule->buflen), GFP_KERNEL); if (unlikely(!data)) return NULL; - memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); data->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr; data->action = krule->action; @@ -573,7 +651,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) data->fields[i] = f->type; data->fieldflags[i] = audit_ops[f->op]; - switch(f->type) { + switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: @@ -601,11 +679,23 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) data->buflen += data->values[i] = audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey); break; + case AUDIT_EXE: + data->buflen += data->values[i] = + audit_pack_string(&bufp, audit_mark_path(krule->exe)); + break; + case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: + if (krule->pflags & AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY && !f->val) { + data->fields[i] = AUDIT_LOGINUID; + data->values[i] = AUDIT_UID_UNSET; + break; + } + fallthrough; /* if set */ default: data->values[i] = f->val; } } - for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i]; + for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) + data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i]; return data; } @@ -617,6 +707,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b) int i; if (a->flags != b->flags || + a->pflags != b->pflags || a->listnr != b->listnr || a->action != b->action || a->field_count != b->field_count) @@ -627,7 +718,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b) a->fields[i].op != b->fields[i].op) return 1; - switch(a->fields[i].type) { + switch (a->fields[i].type) { case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: @@ -656,6 +747,12 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b) if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey)) return 1; break; + case AUDIT_EXE: + /* both paths exist based on above type compare */ + if (strcmp(audit_mark_path(a->exe), + audit_mark_path(b->exe))) + return 1; + break; case AUDIT_UID: case AUDIT_EUID: case AUDIT_SUID: @@ -691,7 +788,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b) static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df, struct audit_field *sf) { - int ret = 0; + int ret; char *lsm_str; /* our own copy of lsm_str */ @@ -702,12 +799,12 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df, /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, - (void **)&df->lsm_rule); + (void **)&df->lsm_rule, GFP_KERNEL); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (ret == -EINVAL) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is " - "invalid\n", df->lsm_str); + pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n", + df->lsm_str); ret = 0; } @@ -733,8 +830,8 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); new = &entry->rule; - new->vers_ops = old->vers_ops; new->flags = old->flags; + new->pflags = old->pflags; new->listnr = old->listnr; new->action = old->action; for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) @@ -777,8 +874,14 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old) err = -ENOMEM; else new->filterkey = fk; + break; + case AUDIT_EXE: + err = audit_dupe_exe(new, old); + break; } if (err) { + if (new->exe) + audit_remove_mark(new->exe); audit_free_rule(entry); return ERR_PTR(err); } @@ -839,14 +942,17 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch; struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree; struct list_head *list; - int err; + int err = 0; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL int dont_count = 0; - /* If either of these, don't count towards total */ - if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_USER || - entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE) + /* If any of these, don't count towards total */ + switch (entry->rule.listnr) { + case AUDIT_FILTER_USER: + case AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE: + case AUDIT_FILTER_FS: dont_count = 1; + } #endif mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); @@ -857,7 +963,7 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) /* normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it on failure */ if (tree) audit_put_tree(tree); - goto error; + return err; } if (watch) { @@ -871,19 +977,20 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) */ if (tree) audit_put_tree(tree); - goto error; + return err; } } if (tree) { err = audit_add_tree_rule(&entry->rule); if (err) { mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); - goto error; + return err; } } entry->rule.prio = ~0ULL; - if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT) { + if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT || + entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT) { if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) entry->rule.prio = ++prio_high; else @@ -909,35 +1016,31 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) #endif mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); - return 0; - -error: - if (watch) - audit_put_watch(watch); /* tmp watch, matches initial get */ return err; } /* Remove an existing rule from filterlist. */ -static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) +int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) { struct audit_entry *e; - struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch; struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree; struct list_head *list; int ret = 0; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL int dont_count = 0; - /* If either of these, don't count towards total */ - if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_USER || - entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE) + /* If any of these, don't count towards total */ + switch (entry->rule.listnr) { + case AUDIT_FILTER_USER: + case AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE: + case AUDIT_FILTER_FS: dont_count = 1; + } #endif mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list); if (!e) { - mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); ret = -ENOENT; goto out; } @@ -948,9 +1051,8 @@ static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) if (e->rule.tree) audit_remove_tree_rule(&e->rule); - list_del_rcu(&e->list); - list_del(&e->rule.list); - call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu); + if (e->rule.exe) + audit_remove_mark_rule(&e->rule); #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL if (!dont_count) @@ -959,11 +1061,14 @@ static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) if (!audit_match_signal(entry)) audit_signals--; #endif - mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); + + list_del_rcu(&e->list); + list_del(&e->rule.list); + call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu); out: - if (watch) - audit_put_watch(watch); /* match initial get */ + mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); + if (tree) audit_put_tree(tree); /* that's the temporary one */ @@ -971,7 +1076,7 @@ out: } /* List rules using struct audit_rule_data. */ -static void audit_list_rules(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q) +static void audit_list_rules(int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q) { struct sk_buff *skb; struct audit_krule *r; @@ -979,21 +1084,22 @@ static void audit_list_rules(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q) /* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu * iterator to sync with list writers. */ - for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) { list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) { struct audit_rule_data *data; data = audit_krule_to_data(r); if (unlikely(!data)) break; - skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 0, 1, - data, sizeof(*data) + data->buflen); + skb = audit_make_reply(seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 0, 1, + data, + struct_size(data, buf, data->buflen)); if (skb) skb_queue_tail(q, skb); kfree(data); } } - skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 1, 1, NULL, 0); + skb = audit_make_reply(seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 1, 1, NULL, 0); if (skb) skb_queue_tail(q, skb); } @@ -1002,90 +1108,100 @@ static void audit_list_rules(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q) static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int res) { struct audit_buffer *ab; - uid_t loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)); - u32 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); if (!audit_enabled) return; - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); if (!ab) return; - audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u" ,loginuid, sessionid); + audit_log_session_info(ab); audit_log_task_context(ab); - audit_log_format(ab, " op="); - audit_log_string(ab, action); + audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s", action); audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey); audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=%d", rule->listnr, res); audit_log_end(ab); } /** - * audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type + * audit_rule_change - apply all rules to the specified message type * @type: audit message type - * @pid: target pid for netlink audit messages * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number * @data: payload data * @datasz: size of payload data */ -int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz) +int audit_rule_change(int type, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz) { - struct task_struct *tsk; - struct audit_netlink_list *dest; int err = 0; struct audit_entry *entry; switch (type) { - case AUDIT_LIST_RULES: - /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill - * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for - * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to - * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl - * trying to _send_ the stuff */ - - dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!dest) - return -ENOMEM; - dest->pid = pid; - skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q); - - mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); - audit_list_rules(pid, seq, &dest->q); - mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); - - tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list, dest, "audit_send_list"); - if (IS_ERR(tsk)) { - skb_queue_purge(&dest->q); - kfree(dest); - err = PTR_ERR(tsk); - } - break; case AUDIT_ADD_RULE: entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz); if (IS_ERR(entry)) return PTR_ERR(entry); - err = audit_add_rule(entry); - audit_log_rule_change("add rule", &entry->rule, !err); - if (err) - audit_free_rule(entry); + audit_log_rule_change("add_rule", &entry->rule, !err); break; case AUDIT_DEL_RULE: entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz); if (IS_ERR(entry)) return PTR_ERR(entry); - err = audit_del_rule(entry); - audit_log_rule_change("remove rule", &entry->rule, !err); - audit_free_rule(entry); + audit_log_rule_change("remove_rule", &entry->rule, !err); break; default: + WARN_ON(1); return -EINVAL; } + if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE) { + if (entry->rule.exe) + audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe); + audit_free_rule(entry); + } + return err; } +/** + * audit_list_rules_send - list the audit rules + * @request_skb: skb of request we are replying to (used to target the reply) + * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number + */ +int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq) +{ + struct task_struct *tsk; + struct audit_netlink_list *dest; + + /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill + * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for + * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to + * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl + * trying to _send_ the stuff */ + + dest = kmalloc(sizeof(*dest), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!dest) + return -ENOMEM; + dest->net = get_net(sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk)); + dest->portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid; + skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q); + + mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); + audit_list_rules(seq, &dest->q); + mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); + + tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list_thread, dest, "audit_send_list"); + if (IS_ERR(tsk)) { + skb_queue_purge(&dest->q); + put_net(dest->net); + kfree(dest); + return PTR_ERR(tsk); + } + + return 0; +} + int audit_comparator(u32 left, u32 op, u32 right) { switch (op) { @@ -1106,7 +1222,6 @@ int audit_comparator(u32 left, u32 op, u32 right) case Audit_bittest: return ((left & right) == right); default: - BUG(); return 0; } } @@ -1129,7 +1244,6 @@ int audit_uid_comparator(kuid_t left, u32 op, kuid_t right) case Audit_bitmask: case Audit_bittest: default: - BUG(); return 0; } } @@ -1152,7 +1266,6 @@ int audit_gid_comparator(kgid_t left, u32 op, kgid_t right) case Audit_bitmask: case Audit_bittest: default: - BUG(); return 0; } } @@ -1195,127 +1308,102 @@ int parent_len(const char *path) * @parentlen: length of the parent if known. Passing in AUDIT_NAME_FULL * here indicates that we must compute this value. */ -int audit_compare_dname_path(const char *dname, const char *path, int parentlen) +int audit_compare_dname_path(const struct qstr *dname, const char *path, int parentlen) { int dlen, pathlen; const char *p; - dlen = strlen(dname); + dlen = dname->len; pathlen = strlen(path); if (pathlen < dlen) return 1; - parentlen = parentlen == AUDIT_NAME_FULL ? parent_len(path) : parentlen; - if (pathlen - parentlen != dlen) - return 1; + if (parentlen == AUDIT_NAME_FULL) + parentlen = parent_len(path); p = path + parentlen; - return strncmp(p, dname, dlen); -} - -static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct audit_krule *rule, int type, - enum audit_state *state) -{ - int i; + /* handle trailing slashes */ + pathlen -= parentlen; + while (pathlen > 0 && p[pathlen - 1] == '/') + pathlen--; - for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { - struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; - int result = 0; - u32 sid; - - switch (f->type) { - case AUDIT_PID: - result = audit_comparator(task_pid_vnr(current), f->op, f->val); - break; - case AUDIT_UID: - result = audit_uid_comparator(current_uid(), f->op, f->uid); - break; - case AUDIT_GID: - result = audit_gid_comparator(current_gid(), f->op, f->gid); - break; - case AUDIT_LOGINUID: - result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(current), - f->op, f->uid); - break; - case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: - result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(current), - f->op, f->val); - break; - case AUDIT_MSGTYPE: - result = audit_comparator(type, f->op, f->val); - break; - case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: - case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: - case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: - if (f->lsm_rule) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, - f->type, - f->op, - f->lsm_rule, - NULL); - } - break; - } - - if (!result) - return 0; - } - switch (rule->action) { - case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; - case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; - } - return 1; -} - -int audit_filter_user(int type) -{ - enum audit_state state = AUDIT_DISABLED; - struct audit_entry *e; - int ret = 1; - - rcu_read_lock(); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) { - if (audit_filter_user_rules(&e->rule, type, &state)) { - if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) - ret = 0; - break; - } - } - rcu_read_unlock(); + if (pathlen != dlen) + return 1; - return ret; /* Audit by default */ + return memcmp(p, dname->name, dlen); } -int audit_filter_type(int type) +int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) { struct audit_entry *e; - int result = 0; + int ret = 1; /* Audit by default */ rcu_read_lock(); - if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE])) - goto unlock_and_return; + list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[listtype], list) { + int i, result = 0; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE], - list) { - int i; for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; - if (f->type == AUDIT_MSGTYPE) { - result = audit_comparator(type, f->op, f->val); - if (!result) - break; + struct lsm_prop prop = { }; + pid_t pid; + + switch (f->type) { + case AUDIT_PID: + pid = task_tgid_nr(current); + result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val); + break; + case AUDIT_UID: + result = audit_uid_comparator(current_uid(), f->op, f->uid); + break; + case AUDIT_GID: + result = audit_gid_comparator(current_gid(), f->op, f->gid); + break; + case AUDIT_LOGINUID: + result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(current), + f->op, f->uid); + break; + case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: + result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(current), + f->op, f->val); + break; + case AUDIT_MSGTYPE: + result = audit_comparator(msgtype, f->op, f->val); + break; + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: + if (f->lsm_rule) { + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + result = security_audit_rule_match( + &prop, f->type, f->op, + f->lsm_rule); + } + break; + case AUDIT_EXE: + result = audit_exe_compare(current, e->rule.exe); + if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) + result = !result; + break; + default: + goto unlock_and_return; } + if (result < 0) /* error */ + goto unlock_and_return; + if (!result) + break; + } + if (result > 0) { + if (e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER || listtype == AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE) + ret = 0; + break; } - if (result) - goto unlock_and_return; } unlock_and_return: rcu_read_unlock(); - return result; + return ret; } static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r) @@ -1328,6 +1416,8 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r) return 0; nentry = audit_dupe_rule(r); + if (entry->rule.exe) + audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe); if (IS_ERR(nentry)) { /* save the first error encountered for the * return value */ @@ -1349,7 +1439,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r) } /* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules. - * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM + * It will traverse the filter lists searching for rules that contain LSM * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the * updated rule. */ |