diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditsc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditsc.c | 1311 |
1 files changed, 902 insertions, 409 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 6593a5207fb0..dd0563a8e0be 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. * @@ -6,20 +7,6 @@ * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation * All Rights Reserved. * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License - * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software - * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA - * * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> * * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, @@ -75,6 +62,9 @@ #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h> #include <uapi/linux/limits.h> +#include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h> +#include <uapi/linux/openat2.h> // struct open_how +#include <uapi/linux/fanotify.h> #include "audit.h" @@ -101,8 +91,6 @@ struct audit_aux_data { int type; }; -#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 - /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */ #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16 @@ -112,7 +100,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids { kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; - u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; + struct lsm_prop target_ref[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; int pid_count; }; @@ -130,15 +118,46 @@ struct audit_tree_refs { struct audit_chunk *c[31]; }; +struct audit_nfcfgop_tab { + enum audit_nfcfgop op; + const char *s; +}; + +static const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs[] = { + { AUDIT_XT_OP_REGISTER, "xt_register" }, + { AUDIT_XT_OP_REPLACE, "xt_replace" }, + { AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER, "xt_unregister" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_table" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_table" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_REGISTER, "nft_register_chain" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_chain" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_REGISTER, "nft_register_rule" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_rule" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_REGISTER, "nft_register_set" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_set" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_REGISTER, "nft_register_setelem" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_setelem" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_GEN_REGISTER, "nft_register_gen" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_REGISTER, "nft_register_obj" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_obj" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_RESET, "nft_reset_obj" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_flowtable" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_flowtable" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_RESET, "nft_reset_setelem" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_RESET, "nft_reset_rule" }, + { AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID, "nft_invalid" }, +}; + static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) { unsigned n; + if (unlikely(!ctx)) return 0; n = ctx->major; switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) { - case 0: /* native */ + case AUDITSC_NATIVE: if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n)) return 1; @@ -149,7 +168,7 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n)) return 1; return 0; - case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ + case AUDITSC_COMPAT: /* 32bit on biarch */ if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n)) return 1; @@ -160,14 +179,16 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n)) return 1; return 0; - case 2: /* open */ + case AUDITSC_OPEN: return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]); - case 3: /* openat */ + case AUDITSC_OPENAT: return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]); - case 4: /* socketcall */ + case AUDITSC_SOCKETCALL: return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND); - case 5: /* execve */ + case AUDITSC_EXECVE: return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC; + case AUDITSC_OPENAT2: + return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)ctx->openat2.flags); default: return 0; } @@ -204,7 +225,7 @@ static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) { if (!ctx->prio) { ctx->prio = 1; - ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; + ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD; } } @@ -212,6 +233,7 @@ static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) { struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; int left = ctx->tree_count; + if (likely(left)) { p->c[--left] = chunk; ctx->tree_count = left; @@ -232,6 +254,7 @@ static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) { struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; + ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctx->trees) { ctx->trees = p; @@ -250,6 +273,7 @@ static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, { struct audit_tree_refs *q; int n; + if (!p) { /* we started with empty chain */ p = ctx->first_trees; @@ -276,6 +300,7 @@ static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) { struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q; + for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) { q = p->next; kfree(p); @@ -286,6 +311,7 @@ static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) { struct audit_tree_refs *p; int n; + if (!tree) return 0; /* full ones */ @@ -310,13 +336,13 @@ static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid, { struct audit_names *n; int rc; - + if (name) { rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid); if (rc) return rc; } - + if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid); @@ -334,13 +360,13 @@ static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid, { struct audit_names *n; int rc; - + if (name) { rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid); if (rc) return rc; } - + if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid); @@ -444,9 +470,12 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, { const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; - u32 sid; + struct lsm_prop prop = { }; unsigned int sessionid; + if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio) + return 0; + cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { @@ -523,11 +552,11 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, break; case AUDIT_EXIT: - if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) + if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_SUCCESS: - if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { + if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) { if (f->val) result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); else @@ -601,12 +630,20 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, } break; case AUDIT_WATCH: - if (name) - result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev); + if (name) { + result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, + name->ino, + name->dev); + if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) + result = !result; + } break; case AUDIT_DIR: - if (ctx) + if (ctx) { result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree); + if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) + result = !result; + } break; case AUDIT_LOGINUID: result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), @@ -615,6 +652,11 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val); break; + case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM: + if (ctx && ctx->sockaddr) + result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family, + f->op, f->val); + break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: @@ -627,13 +669,23 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, logged upon error */ if (f->lsm_rule) { if (need_sid) { - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); + /* @tsk should always be equal to + * @current with the exception of + * fork()/copy_process() in which case + * the new @tsk creds are still a dup + * of @current's creds so we can still + * use + * security_current_getlsmprop_subj() + * here even though it always refs + * @current's creds + */ + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); need_sid = 0; } - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, - f->op, - f->lsm_rule, - ctx); + result = security_audit_rule_match(&prop, + f->type, + f->op, + f->lsm_rule); } break; case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: @@ -647,13 +699,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, /* Find files that match */ if (name) { result = security_audit_rule_match( - name->osid, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule, ctx); + &name->oprop, + f->type, + f->op, + f->lsm_rule); } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { - if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type, - f->op, f->lsm_rule, - ctx)) { + if (security_audit_rule_match( + &n->oprop, + f->type, + f->op, + f->lsm_rule)) { ++result; break; } @@ -662,9 +718,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, /* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) break; - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, + if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.oprop, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule, ctx)) + f->lsm_rule)) ++result; } break; @@ -681,9 +737,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, break; case AUDIT_PERM: result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val); + if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) + result = !result; break; case AUDIT_FILETYPE: result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val); + if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) + result = !result; break; case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name); @@ -694,8 +754,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, } if (ctx) { - if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio) - return 0; if (rule->filterkey) { kfree(ctx->filterkey); ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); @@ -704,10 +762,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, } switch (rule->action) { case AUDIT_NEVER: - *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; + *state = AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED; break; case AUDIT_ALWAYS: - *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; + *state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD; break; } return 1; @@ -726,14 +784,14 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state, true)) { - if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) + if (state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); rcu_read_unlock(); return state; } } rcu_read_unlock(); - return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; + return AUDIT_STATE_BUILD; } static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val) @@ -752,35 +810,72 @@ static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val) return rule->mask[word] & bit; } -/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the - * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is - * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit - * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). +/** + * __audit_filter_op - common filter helper for operations (syscall/uring/etc) + * @tsk: associated task + * @ctx: audit context + * @list: audit filter list + * @name: audit_name (can be NULL) + * @op: current syscall/uring_op + * + * Run the udit filters specified in @list against @tsk using @ctx, + * @name, and @op, as necessary; the caller is responsible for ensuring + * that the call is made while the RCU read lock is held. The @name + * parameter can be NULL, but all others must be specified. + * Returns 1/true if the filter finds a match, 0/false if none are found. */ -static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, - struct audit_context *ctx, - struct list_head *list) +static int __audit_filter_op(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct audit_context *ctx, + struct list_head *list, + struct audit_names *name, + unsigned long op) { struct audit_entry *e; enum audit_state state; + list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { + if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, op) && + audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, name, + &state, false)) { + ctx->current_state = state; + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * audit_filter_uring - apply filters to an io_uring operation + * @tsk: associated task + * @ctx: audit context + */ +static void audit_filter_uring(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct audit_context *ctx) +{ if (auditd_test_task(tsk)) - return AUDIT_DISABLED; + return; rcu_read_lock(); - if (!list_empty(list)) { - list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { - if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) && - audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, - &state, false)) { - rcu_read_unlock(); - ctx->current_state = state; - return state; - } - } - } + __audit_filter_op(tsk, ctx, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT], + NULL, ctx->uring_op); + rcu_read_unlock(); +} + +/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if the audit_state is + * not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is also not + * high enough that we already know we have to write an audit record + * (i.e., the state is AUDIT_STATE_BUILD). + */ +static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct audit_context *ctx) +{ + if (auditd_test_task(tsk)) + return; + + rcu_read_lock(); + __audit_filter_op(tsk, ctx, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT], + NULL, ctx->major); rcu_read_unlock(); - return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; } /* @@ -789,24 +884,12 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, */ static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_names *n, - struct audit_context *ctx) { + struct audit_context *ctx) +{ int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; - struct audit_entry *e; - enum audit_state state; - - if (list_empty(list)) - return 0; - - list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { - if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) && - audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) { - ctx->current_state = state; - return 1; - } - } - return 0; + return __audit_filter_op(tsk, ctx, list, n, ctx->major); } /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been @@ -837,6 +920,13 @@ static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context) context->proctitle.len = 0; } +static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context) +{ + if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) { + kfree(context->module.name); + context->module.name = NULL; + } +} static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) { struct audit_names *n, *next; @@ -862,10 +952,80 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) context->aux = aux->next; kfree(aux); } + context->aux = NULL; while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) { context->aux_pids = aux->next; kfree(aux); } + context->aux_pids = NULL; +} + +/** + * audit_reset_context - reset a audit_context structure + * @ctx: the audit_context to reset + * + * All fields in the audit_context will be reset to an initial state, all + * references held by fields will be dropped, and private memory will be + * released. When this function returns the audit_context will be suitable + * for reuse, so long as the passed context is not NULL or a dummy context. + */ +static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx) +{ + if (!ctx) + return; + + /* if ctx is non-null, reset the "ctx->context" regardless */ + ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED; + if (ctx->dummy) + return; + + /* + * NOTE: It shouldn't matter in what order we release the fields, so + * release them in the order in which they appear in the struct; + * this gives us some hope of quickly making sure we are + * resetting the audit_context properly. + * + * Other things worth mentioning: + * - we don't reset "dummy" + * - we don't reset "state", we do reset "current_state" + * - we preserve "filterkey" if "state" is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD + * - much of this is likely overkill, but play it safe for now + * - we really need to work on improving the audit_context struct + */ + + ctx->current_state = ctx->state; + ctx->stamp.serial = 0; + ctx->stamp.ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 }; + ctx->major = 0; + ctx->uring_op = 0; + memset(ctx->argv, 0, sizeof(ctx->argv)); + ctx->return_code = 0; + ctx->prio = (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0); + ctx->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID; + audit_free_names(ctx); + if (ctx->state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) { + kfree(ctx->filterkey); + ctx->filterkey = NULL; + } + audit_free_aux(ctx); + kfree(ctx->sockaddr); + ctx->sockaddr = NULL; + ctx->sockaddr_len = 0; + ctx->ppid = 0; + ctx->uid = ctx->euid = ctx->suid = ctx->fsuid = KUIDT_INIT(0); + ctx->gid = ctx->egid = ctx->sgid = ctx->fsgid = KGIDT_INIT(0); + ctx->personality = 0; + ctx->arch = 0; + ctx->target_pid = 0; + ctx->target_auid = ctx->target_uid = KUIDT_INIT(0); + ctx->target_sessionid = 0; + lsmprop_init(&ctx->target_ref); + ctx->target_comm[0] = '\0'; + unroll_tree_refs(ctx, NULL, 0); + WARN_ON(!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees)); + audit_free_module(ctx); + ctx->fds[0] = -1; + ctx->type = 0; /* reset last for audit_free_*() */ } static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) @@ -875,10 +1035,13 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL); if (!context) return NULL; + context->context = AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED; context->state = state; - context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; + context->prio = state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list); + context->fds[0] = -1; + context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID; return context; } @@ -898,15 +1061,16 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) char *key = NULL; if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled)) - return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ + return 0; state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key); - if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) { - clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); + if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) { + clear_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT); return 0; } - if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { + context = audit_alloc_context(state); + if (!context) { kfree(key); audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); return -ENOMEM; @@ -914,29 +1078,26 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) context->filterkey = key; audit_set_context(tsk, context); - set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); + set_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT); return 0; } static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) { - audit_free_names(context); - unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); + /* resetting is extra work, but it is likely just noise */ + audit_reset_context(context); + audit_proctitle_free(context); free_tree_refs(context); - audit_free_aux(context); kfree(context->filterkey); - kfree(context->sockaddr); - audit_proctitle_free(context); kfree(context); } static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, - kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid, - u32 sid, char *comm) + kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, + unsigned int sessionid, struct lsm_prop *prop, + char *comm) { struct audit_buffer *ab; - char *ctx = NULL; - u32 len; int rc = 0; ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); @@ -946,15 +1107,9 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); - if (sid) { - if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) { - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); - rc = 1; - } else { - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); - security_release_secctx(ctx, len); - } - } + if (lsmprop_is_set(prop) && audit_log_obj_ctx(ab, prop)) + rc = 1; + audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); audit_log_end(ab); @@ -1136,6 +1291,76 @@ out: kfree(buf_head); } +static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, + kernel_cap_t *cap) +{ + if (cap_isclear(*cap)) { + audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix); + return; + } + audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%016llx", prefix, cap->val); +} + +static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) +{ + if (name->fcap_ver == -1) { + audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?"); + return; + } + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted); + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable); + audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d", + name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver, + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid)); +} + +static void audit_log_time(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_buffer **ab) +{ + const struct audit_ntp_data *ntp = &context->time.ntp_data; + const struct timespec64 *tk = &context->time.tk_injoffset; + static const char * const ntp_name[] = { + "offset", + "freq", + "status", + "tai", + "tick", + "adjust", + }; + int type; + + if (context->type == AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL) { + for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++) { + if (ntp->vals[type].newval != ntp->vals[type].oldval) { + if (!*ab) { + *ab = audit_log_start(context, + GFP_KERNEL, + AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL); + if (!*ab) + return; + } + audit_log_format(*ab, "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", + ntp_name[type], + ntp->vals[type].oldval, + ntp->vals[type].newval); + audit_log_end(*ab); + *ab = NULL; + } + } + } + if (tk->tv_sec != 0 || tk->tv_nsec != 0) { + if (!*ab) { + *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, + AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET); + if (!*ab) + return; + } + audit_log_format(*ab, "sec=%lli nsec=%li", + (long long)tk->tv_sec, tk->tv_nsec); + audit_log_end(*ab); + *ab = NULL; + } +} + static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) { struct audit_buffer *ab; @@ -1148,28 +1373,20 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) switch (context->type) { case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs; + audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs); for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, context->socketcall.args[i]); break; } - case AUDIT_IPC: { - u32 osid = context->ipc.osid; - + case AUDIT_IPC: audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid), from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), context->ipc.mode); - if (osid) { - char *ctx = NULL; - u32 len; - if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) { - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid); + if (lsmprop_is_set(&context->ipc.oprop)) { + if (audit_log_obj_ctx(ab, &context->ipc.oprop)) *call_panic = 1; - } else { - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); - security_release_secctx(ctx, len); - } } if (context->ipc.has_perm) { audit_log_end(ab); @@ -1184,7 +1401,7 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) context->ipc.perm_gid, context->ipc.perm_mode); } - break; } + break; case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: audit_log_format(ab, "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld " @@ -1212,6 +1429,7 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) break; case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: { struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat; + audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld " "mq_curmsgs=%ld ", @@ -1230,6 +1448,12 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd, context->mmap.flags); break; + case AUDIT_OPENAT2: + audit_log_format(ab, "oflag=0%llo mode=0%llo resolve=0x%llx", + context->openat2.flags, + context->openat2.mode, + context->openat2.resolve); + break; case AUDIT_EXECVE: audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab); break; @@ -1237,11 +1461,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) audit_log_format(ab, "name="); if (context->module.name) { audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name); - kfree(context->module.name); } else audit_log_format(ab, "(null)"); break; + case AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL: + case AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET: + /* this call deviates from the rest, eating the buffer */ + audit_log_time(context, &ab); + break; } audit_log_end(ab); } @@ -1249,6 +1477,7 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len) { char *end = proctitle + len - 1; + while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end)) end--; @@ -1258,6 +1487,89 @@ static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len) return len; } +/* + * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names + * @context: audit_context for the task + * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details + * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name + * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names + * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails + */ +static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n, + const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH); + if (!ab) + return; + + audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num); + + if (path) + audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path); + else if (n->name) { + switch (n->name_len) { + case AUDIT_NAME_FULL: + /* log the full path */ + audit_log_format(ab, " name="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name); + break; + case 0: + /* name was specified as a relative path and the + * directory component is the cwd + */ + if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) + audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd); + else + audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); + break; + default: + /* log the name's directory component */ + audit_log_format(ab, " name="); + audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name, + n->name_len); + } + } else + audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); + + if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) + audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", + n->ino, + MAJOR(n->dev), + MINOR(n->dev), + n->mode, + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid), + from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid), + MAJOR(n->rdev), + MINOR(n->rdev)); + if (lsmprop_is_set(&n->oprop) && + audit_log_obj_ctx(ab, &n->oprop)) + *call_panic = 2; + + /* log the audit_names record type */ + switch (n->type) { + case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL: + audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL"); + break; + case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT: + audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT"); + break; + case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE: + audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE"); + break; + case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE: + audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE"); + break; + default: + audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN"); + break; + } + + audit_log_fcaps(ab, n); + audit_log_end(ab); +} + static void audit_log_proctitle(void) { int res; @@ -1267,9 +1579,6 @@ static void audit_log_proctitle(void) struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); struct audit_buffer *ab; - if (!context || context->dummy) - return; - ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE); if (!ab) return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */ @@ -1302,6 +1611,44 @@ out: audit_log_end(ab); } +/** + * audit_log_uring - generate a AUDIT_URINGOP record + * @ctx: the audit context + */ +static void audit_log_uring(struct audit_context *ctx) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + const struct cred *cred; + + ab = audit_log_start(ctx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_URINGOP); + if (!ab) + return; + cred = current_cred(); + audit_log_format(ab, "uring_op=%d", ctx->uring_op); + if (ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) + audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", + str_yes_no(ctx->return_valid == + AUDITSC_SUCCESS), + ctx->return_code); + audit_log_format(ab, + " items=%d" + " ppid=%d pid=%d uid=%u gid=%u euid=%u suid=%u" + " fsuid=%u egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u", + ctx->name_count, + task_ppid_nr(current), task_tgid_nr(current), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid), + from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->euid), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->suid), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid), + from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid), + from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid), + from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid)); + audit_log_task_context(ab); + audit_log_key(ab, ctx->filterkey); + audit_log_end(ab); +} + static void audit_log_exit(void) { int i, call_panic = 0; @@ -1312,29 +1659,38 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) context->personality = current->personality; - ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); - if (!ab) - return; /* audit_panic has been called */ - audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", - context->arch, context->major); - if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) - audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); - if (context->return_valid) - audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", - (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", - context->return_code); - - audit_log_format(ab, - " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d", - context->argv[0], - context->argv[1], - context->argv[2], - context->argv[3], - context->name_count); - - audit_log_task_info(ab); - audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey); - audit_log_end(ab); + switch (context->context) { + case AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL: + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); + if (!ab) + return; + audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", + context->arch, context->major); + if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) + audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); + if (context->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) + audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", + str_yes_no(context->return_valid == + AUDITSC_SUCCESS), + context->return_code); + audit_log_format(ab, + " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d", + context->argv[0], + context->argv[1], + context->argv[2], + context->argv[3], + context->name_count); + audit_log_task_info(ab); + audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey); + audit_log_end(ab); + break; + case AUDIT_CTX_URING: + audit_log_uring(context); + break; + default: + BUG(); + break; + } for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { @@ -1346,6 +1702,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: { struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux; + audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver); audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted); audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); @@ -1358,6 +1715,9 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective); audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient); + audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d", + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, + axs->fcap.rootid)); break; } } @@ -1394,7 +1754,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) axs->target_auid[i], axs->target_uid[i], axs->target_sessionid[i], - axs->target_sid[i], + &axs->target_ref[i], axs->target_comm[i])) call_panic = 1; } @@ -1403,8 +1763,9 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, context->target_auid, context->target_uid, context->target_sessionid, - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) - call_panic = 1; + &context->target_ref, + context->target_comm)) + call_panic = 1; if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); @@ -1421,21 +1782,22 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic); } - audit_log_proctitle(); + if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) + audit_log_proctitle(); /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); if (ab) audit_log_end(ab); if (call_panic) - audit_panic("error converting sid to string"); + audit_panic("error in audit_log_exit()"); } /** * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free * - * Called from copy_process and do_exit + * Called from copy_process, do_exit, and the io_uring code */ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) { @@ -1444,30 +1806,168 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) if (!context) return; + /* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */ + if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) + audit_kill_trees(context); + /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code; * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a - * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we + * random task_struct that doesn't have any meaningful data we * need to log via audit_log_exit(). */ - if (tsk == current && !context->dummy && context->in_syscall) { - context->return_valid = 0; + if (tsk == current && !context->dummy) { + context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID; context->return_code = 0; - - audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, - &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); - audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); - if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) - audit_log_exit(); + if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) { + audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context); + audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); + if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) + audit_log_exit(); + } else if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_URING) { + /* TODO: verify this case is real and valid */ + audit_filter_uring(tsk, context); + audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); + if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) + audit_log_uring(context); + } } - if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) - audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); - audit_set_context(tsk, NULL); audit_free_context(context); } /** + * audit_return_fixup - fixup the return codes in the audit_context + * @ctx: the audit_context + * @success: true/false value to indicate if the operation succeeded or not + * @code: operation return code + * + * We need to fixup the return code in the audit logs if the actual return + * codes are later going to be fixed by the arch specific signal handlers. + */ +static void audit_return_fixup(struct audit_context *ctx, + int success, long code) +{ + /* + * This is actually a test for: + * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) || + * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) + * + * but is faster than a bunch of || + */ + if (unlikely(code <= -ERESTARTSYS) && + (code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) && + (code != -ENOIOCTLCMD)) + ctx->return_code = -EINTR; + else + ctx->return_code = code; + ctx->return_valid = (success ? AUDITSC_SUCCESS : AUDITSC_FAILURE); +} + +/** + * __audit_uring_entry - prepare the kernel task's audit context for io_uring + * @op: the io_uring opcode + * + * This is similar to audit_syscall_entry() but is intended for use by io_uring + * operations. This function should only ever be called from + * audit_uring_entry() as we rely on the audit context checking present in that + * function. + */ +void __audit_uring_entry(u8 op) +{ + struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); + + if (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) + return; + + /* + * NOTE: It's possible that we can be called from the process' context + * before it returns to userspace, and before audit_syscall_exit() + * is called. In this case there is not much to do, just record + * the io_uring details and return. + */ + ctx->uring_op = op; + if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) + return; + + ctx->dummy = !audit_n_rules; + if (!ctx->dummy && ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD) + ctx->prio = 0; + + ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_URING; + ctx->current_state = ctx->state; + ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->stamp.ctime); +} + +/** + * __audit_uring_exit - wrap up the kernel task's audit context after io_uring + * @success: true/false value to indicate if the operation succeeded or not + * @code: operation return code + * + * This is similar to audit_syscall_exit() but is intended for use by io_uring + * operations. This function should only ever be called from + * audit_uring_exit() as we rely on the audit context checking present in that + * function. + */ +void __audit_uring_exit(int success, long code) +{ + struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); + + if (ctx->dummy) { + if (ctx->context != AUDIT_CTX_URING) + return; + goto out; + } + + audit_return_fixup(ctx, success, code); + if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) { + /* + * NOTE: See the note in __audit_uring_entry() about the case + * where we may be called from process context before we + * return to userspace via audit_syscall_exit(). In this + * case we simply emit a URINGOP record and bail, the + * normal syscall exit handling will take care of + * everything else. + * It is also worth mentioning that when we are called, + * the current process creds may differ from the creds + * used during the normal syscall processing; keep that + * in mind if/when we move the record generation code. + */ + + /* + * We need to filter on the syscall info here to decide if we + * should emit a URINGOP record. I know it seems odd but this + * solves the problem where users have a filter to block *all* + * syscall records in the "exit" filter; we want to preserve + * the behavior here. + */ + audit_filter_syscall(current, ctx); + if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) + audit_filter_uring(current, ctx); + audit_filter_inodes(current, ctx); + if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) + return; + + audit_log_uring(ctx); + return; + } + + /* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */ + if (!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees)) + audit_kill_trees(ctx); + + /* run through both filters to ensure we set the filterkey properly */ + audit_filter_uring(current, ctx); + audit_filter_inodes(current, ctx); + if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) + goto out; + audit_log_exit(); + +out: + audit_reset_context(ctx); +} + +/** * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry * @major: major syscall type (function) * @a1: additional syscall register 1 @@ -1478,7 +1978,7 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the - * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, + * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD, * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it * be written). @@ -1492,30 +1992,33 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, if (!audit_enabled || !context) return; - BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); + WARN_ON(context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED); + WARN_ON(context->name_count); + if (context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED || context->name_count) { + audit_panic("unrecoverable error in audit_syscall_entry()"); + return; + } state = context->state; - if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) + if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) return; context->dummy = !audit_n_rules; - if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) { + if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD) { context->prio = 0; if (auditd_test_task(current)) return; } - context->arch = syscall_get_arch(); + context->arch = syscall_get_arch(current); context->major = major; context->argv[0] = a1; context->argv[1] = a2; context->argv[2] = a3; context->argv[3] = a4; - context->serial = 0; - context->in_syscall = 1; + context->context = AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL; context->current_state = state; - context->ppid = 0; - ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime); + ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->stamp.ctime); } /** @@ -1524,70 +2027,34 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, * @return_code: return value of the syscall * * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as - * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from + * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_STATE_RECORD state from * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, * free the names stored from getname(). */ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) { - struct audit_context *context; - - context = audit_context(); - if (!context) - return; - - if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) { - if (success) - context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS; - else - context->return_valid = AUDITSC_FAILURE; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); - /* - * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the - * actual return codes are later going to be fixed up by the - * arch specific signal handlers - * - * This is actually a test for: - * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) || - * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) - * - * but is faster than a bunch of || - */ - if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) && - (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) && - (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD)) - context->return_code = -EINTR; - else - context->return_code = return_code; + if (!context || context->dummy || + context->context != AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) + goto out; - audit_filter_syscall(current, context, - &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); - audit_filter_inodes(current, context); - if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) - audit_log_exit(); - } + /* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */ + if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) + audit_kill_trees(context); - context->in_syscall = 0; - context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; + audit_return_fixup(context, success, return_code); + /* run through both filters to ensure we set the filterkey properly */ + audit_filter_syscall(current, context); + audit_filter_inodes(current, context); + if (context->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) + goto out; - if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) - audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); + audit_log_exit(); - audit_free_names(context); - unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); - audit_free_aux(context); - context->aux = NULL; - context->aux_pids = NULL; - context->target_pid = 0; - context->target_sid = 0; - context->sockaddr_len = 0; - context->type = 0; - context->fds[0] = -1; - if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) { - kfree(context->filterkey); - context->filterkey = NULL; - } +out: + audit_reset_context(context); } static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) @@ -1596,6 +2063,7 @@ static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) struct audit_tree_refs *p; struct audit_chunk *chunk; int count; + if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) return; context = audit_context(); @@ -1635,10 +2103,12 @@ retry: d = dentry; rcu_read_lock(); seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); - for(;;) { + for (;;) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d); + if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) { struct audit_chunk *chunk; + chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); if (chunk) { if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) { @@ -1694,6 +2164,8 @@ static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context, list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list); context->name_count++; + if (!context->pwd.dentry) + get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd); return aname; } @@ -1714,10 +2186,8 @@ __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr) list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { if (!n->name) continue; - if (n->name->uptr == uptr) { - n->name->refcnt++; - return n->name; - } + if (n->name->uptr == uptr) + return refname(n->name); } return NULL; } @@ -1734,7 +2204,7 @@ void __audit_getname(struct filename *name) struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); struct audit_names *n; - if (!context->in_syscall) + if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED) return; n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN); @@ -1744,10 +2214,49 @@ void __audit_getname(struct filename *name) n->name = name; n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; name->aname = n; - name->refcnt++; + refname(name); +} - if (!context->pwd.dentry) - get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd); +static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, + const struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps; + int rc; + + if (!dentry) + return 0; + + rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, &caps); + if (rc) + return rc; + + name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted; + name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; + name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); + name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid; + name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> + VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; + + return 0; +} + +/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */ +static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, + const struct dentry *dentry, + struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags) +{ + name->ino = inode->i_ino; + name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; + name->mode = inode->i_mode; + name->uid = inode->i_uid; + name->gid = inode->i_gid; + name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; + security_inode_getlsmprop(inode, &name->oprop); + if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) { + name->fcap_ver = -1; + return; + } + audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry); } /** @@ -1763,10 +2272,29 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct audit_names *n; bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT; + struct audit_entry *e; + struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS]; + int i; - if (!context->in_syscall) + if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED) return; + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { + for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { + struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; + + if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE + && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic, + f->op, f->val) + && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return; + } + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (!name) goto out_alloc; @@ -1818,7 +2346,7 @@ out_alloc: return; if (name) { n->name = name; - name->refcnt++; + refname(name); } out: @@ -1832,7 +2360,7 @@ out: n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL; } handle_path(dentry); - audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode); + audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL); } void __audit_file(const struct file *file) @@ -1860,30 +2388,26 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); - const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name; + const struct qstr *dname = &dentry->d_name; struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; struct audit_entry *e; struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS]; int i; - if (!context->in_syscall) + if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED) return; rcu_read_lock(); - if (!list_empty(list)) { - list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { - for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { - struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; - - if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE) { - if (audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic, - f->op, f->val)) { - if (e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) { - rcu_read_unlock(); - return; - } - } - } + list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { + for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { + struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; + + if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE + && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic, + f->op, f->val) + && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return; } } } @@ -1892,39 +2416,36 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, if (inode) handle_one(inode); - /* look for a parent entry first */ list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { - if (!n->name || - (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT && - n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)) + /* can only match entries that have a name */ + if (!n->name) continue; - if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev && - !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, - n->name->name, n->name_len)) { - if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) - n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT; + /* look for a parent entry first */ + if (!found_parent && + (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) && + (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev && + !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, n->name_len))) { + n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT; found_parent = n; - break; - } - } - - /* is there a matching child entry? */ - list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { - /* can only match entries that have a name */ - if (!n->name || - (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)) + if (found_child) + break; continue; + } - if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) || - !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, + /* is there a matching child entry? */ + if (!found_child && + (n->type == type || n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) && + (!strcmp(dname->name, n->name->name) || + !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, found_parent ? found_parent->name_len : - AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) { + AUDIT_NAME_FULL))) { if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) n->type = type; found_child = n; - break; + if (found_parent) + break; } } @@ -1933,7 +2454,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT); if (!n) return; - audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent); + audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0); } if (!found_child) { @@ -1947,12 +2468,12 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, if (found_parent) { found_child->name = found_parent->name; found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; - found_child->name->refcnt++; + refname(found_child->name); } } if (inode) - audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode); + audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0); else found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET; } @@ -1961,112 +2482,24 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child); /** * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values * @ctx: audit_context for the task - * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context - * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context + * @stamp: timestamp to record * * Also sets the context as auditable. */ -int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, - struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial) +int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_stamp *stamp) { - if (!ctx->in_syscall) + if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED) return 0; - if (!ctx->serial) - ctx->serial = audit_serial(); - t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; - t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; - *serial = ctx->serial; + if (!ctx->stamp.serial) + ctx->stamp.serial = audit_serial(); + *stamp = ctx->stamp; if (!ctx->prio) { ctx->prio = 1; - ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; + ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD; } return 1; } -/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */ -static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0); - -static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid) -{ - /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */ - if (!audit_loginuid_set(current)) - return 0; - /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/ - if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE)) - return -EPERM; - /* it is set, you need permission */ - if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) - return -EPERM; - /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */ - if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid)) - return -EPERM; - return 0; -} - -static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid, - unsigned int oldsessionid, unsigned int sessionid, - int rc) -{ - struct audit_buffer *ab; - uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid; - struct tty_struct *tty; - - if (!audit_enabled) - return; - - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); - if (!ab) - return; - - uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current)); - oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid); - loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid), - tty = audit_get_tty(); - - audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current), uid); - audit_log_task_context(ab); - audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d", - oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)", - oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc); - audit_put_tty(tty); - audit_log_end(ab); -} - -/** - * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid - * @loginuid: loginuid value - * - * Returns 0. - * - * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). - */ -int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) -{ - unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET; - kuid_t oldloginuid; - int rc; - - oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); - oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); - - rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid); - if (rc) - goto out; - - /* are we setting or clearing? */ - if (uid_valid(loginuid)) { - sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id); - if (unlikely(sessionid == AUDIT_SID_UNSET)) - sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id); - } - - current->sessionid = sessionid; - current->loginuid = loginuid; -out: - audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc); - return rc; -} - /** * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open * @oflag: open flag @@ -2144,6 +2577,7 @@ void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification) void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes; context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat; context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR; @@ -2157,11 +2591,12 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; context->ipc.has_perm = 0; - security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); + security_ipc_getlsmprop(ipcp, &context->ipc.oprop); context->type = AUDIT_IPC; } @@ -2221,6 +2656,7 @@ int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + context->fds[0] = fd1; context->fds[1] = fd2; } @@ -2238,6 +2674,7 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) if (!context->sockaddr) { void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!p) return -ENOMEM; context->sockaddr = p; @@ -2256,35 +2693,22 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); context->target_uid = task_uid(t); context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); - memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); + strscpy(context->target_comm, t->comm); + security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &context->target_ref); } /** - * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem - * @sig: signal value + * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls * @t: task being signaled * * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) * and uid that is doing that. */ -int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) +int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) { struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); - kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t); - - if (auditd_test_task(t) && - (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || - sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2)) { - audit_sig_pid = task_tgid_nr(current); - auid = audit_get_loginuid(current); - if (uid_valid(auid)) - audit_sig_uid = auid; - else - audit_sig_uid = uid; - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid); - } + kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t); if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) return 0; @@ -2296,8 +2720,8 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); - memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); + strscpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm); + security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &ctx->target_ref); return 0; } @@ -2317,8 +2741,8 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); - memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); + security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &axp->target_ref[axp->pid_count]); + strscpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm); axp->pid_count++; return 0; @@ -2350,11 +2774,13 @@ int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, ax->d.next = context->aux; context->aux = (void *)ax; - get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps); + get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&nop_mnt_idmap, + bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps); ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted; ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); + ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid; ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted; @@ -2380,6 +2806,7 @@ int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current); context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective; context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; @@ -2391,12 +2818,23 @@ void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + context->mmap.fd = fd; context->mmap.flags = flags; context->type = AUDIT_MMAP; } -void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name) +void __audit_openat2_how(struct open_how *how) +{ + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + + context->openat2.flags = how->flags; + context->openat2.mode = how->mode; + context->openat2.resolve = how->resolve; + context->type = AUDIT_OPENAT2; +} + +void __audit_log_kern_module(const char *name) { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); @@ -2406,11 +2844,66 @@ void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name) context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE; } -void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response) +void __audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar) +{ + /* {subj,obj}_trust values are {0,1,2}: no,yes,unknown */ + switch (friar->hdr.type) { + case FAN_RESPONSE_INFO_NONE: + audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FANOTIFY, + "resp=%u fan_type=%u fan_info=0 subj_trust=2 obj_trust=2", + response, FAN_RESPONSE_INFO_NONE); + break; + case FAN_RESPONSE_INFO_AUDIT_RULE: + audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FANOTIFY, + "resp=%u fan_type=%u fan_info=%X subj_trust=%u obj_trust=%u", + response, friar->hdr.type, friar->rule_number, + friar->subj_trust, friar->obj_trust); + } +} + +void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset) +{ + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + + /* only set type if not already set by NTP */ + if (!context->type) + context->type = AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET; + memcpy(&context->time.tk_injoffset, &offset, sizeof(offset)); +} + +void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad) +{ + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + int type; + + for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++) + if (ad->vals[type].newval != ad->vals[type].oldval) { + /* unconditionally set type, overwriting TK */ + context->type = AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL; + memcpy(&context->time.ntp_data, ad, sizeof(*ad)); + break; + } +} + +void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries, + enum audit_nfcfgop op, gfp_t gfp) { - audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, - AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response); + struct audit_buffer *ab; + char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; + + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), gfp, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG); + if (!ab) + return; + audit_log_format(ab, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u op=%s", + name, af, nentries, audit_nfcfgs[op].s); + + audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current)); + audit_log_task_context(ab); /* subj= */ + audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current)); + audit_log_end(ab); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg); static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab) { @@ -2480,7 +2973,7 @@ void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) return; audit_log_task(ab); audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x", - signr, syscall_get_arch(), syscall, + signr, syscall_get_arch(current), syscall, in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code); audit_log_end(ab); } @@ -2507,7 +3000,7 @@ void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names, struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) { struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); - if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall)) + if (likely(!ctx || ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)) return NULL; return &ctx->killed_trees; } |