diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/panic.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/panic.c | 183 |
1 files changed, 137 insertions, 46 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c index 747c3f3d289a..b0b9a8bf4560 100644 --- a/kernel/panic.c +++ b/kernel/panic.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <linux/sysfs.h> #include <linux/context_tracking.h> +#include <linux/seq_buf.h> #include <trace/events/error_report.h> #include <asm/sections.h> @@ -63,6 +64,8 @@ unsigned long panic_on_taint; bool panic_on_taint_nousertaint = false; static unsigned int warn_limit __read_mostly; +bool panic_triggering_all_cpu_backtrace; + int panic_timeout = CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(panic_timeout); @@ -81,7 +84,7 @@ ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(panic_notifier_list); EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list); #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL -static struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = { +static const struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_SMP { .procname = "oops_all_cpu_backtrace", @@ -94,13 +97,42 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = { }, #endif { + .procname = "panic", + .data = &panic_timeout, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + }, + { + .procname = "panic_on_oops", + .data = &panic_on_oops, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + }, + { + .procname = "panic_print", + .data = &panic_print, + .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax, + }, + { + .procname = "panic_on_warn", + .data = &panic_on_warn, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }, + { .procname = "warn_limit", .data = &warn_limit, .maxlen = sizeof(warn_limit), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_douintvec, }, - { } }; static __init int kernel_panic_sysctls_init(void) @@ -253,8 +285,12 @@ void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin) */ static void panic_other_cpus_shutdown(bool crash_kexec) { - if (panic_print & PANIC_PRINT_ALL_CPU_BT) + if (panic_print & PANIC_PRINT_ALL_CPU_BT) { + /* Temporary allow non-panic CPUs to write their backtraces. */ + panic_triggering_all_cpu_backtrace = true; trigger_all_cpu_backtrace(); + panic_triggering_all_cpu_backtrace = false; + } /* * Note that smp_send_stop() is the usual SMP shutdown function, @@ -271,12 +307,10 @@ static void panic_other_cpus_shutdown(bool crash_kexec) } /** - * panic - halt the system - * @fmt: The text string to print + * panic - halt the system + * @fmt: The text string to print * - * Display a message, then perform cleanups. - * - * This function never returns. + * Display a message, then perform cleanups. This function never returns. */ void panic(const char *fmt, ...) { @@ -368,6 +402,8 @@ void panic(const char *fmt, ...) panic_other_cpus_shutdown(_crash_kexec_post_notifiers); + printk_legacy_allow_panic_sync(); + /* * Run any panic handlers, including those that might need to * add information to the kmsg dump output. @@ -376,7 +412,7 @@ void panic(const char *fmt, ...) panic_print_sys_info(false); - kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_PANIC); + kmsg_dump_desc(KMSG_DUMP_PANIC, buf); /* * If you doubt kdump always works fine in any situation, @@ -457,6 +493,7 @@ void panic(const char *fmt, ...) * Explicitly flush the kernel log buffer one last time. */ console_flush_on_panic(CONSOLE_FLUSH_PENDING); + nbcon_atomic_flush_unsafe(); local_irq_enable(); for (i = 0; ; i += PANIC_TIMER_STEP) { @@ -471,32 +508,84 @@ void panic(const char *fmt, ...) EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic); +#define TAINT_FLAG(taint, _c_true, _c_false, _module) \ + [ TAINT_##taint ] = { \ + .c_true = _c_true, .c_false = _c_false, \ + .module = _module, \ + .desc = #taint, \ + } + /* * TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD could be a per-module flag but the module * is being removed anyway. */ const struct taint_flag taint_flags[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT] = { - [ TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE ] = { 'P', 'G', true }, - [ TAINT_FORCED_MODULE ] = { 'F', ' ', true }, - [ TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC ] = { 'S', ' ', false }, - [ TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD ] = { 'R', ' ', false }, - [ TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ] = { 'M', ' ', false }, - [ TAINT_BAD_PAGE ] = { 'B', ' ', false }, - [ TAINT_USER ] = { 'U', ' ', false }, - [ TAINT_DIE ] = { 'D', ' ', false }, - [ TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE ] = { 'A', ' ', false }, - [ TAINT_WARN ] = { 'W', ' ', false }, - [ TAINT_CRAP ] = { 'C', ' ', true }, - [ TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND ] = { 'I', ' ', false }, - [ TAINT_OOT_MODULE ] = { 'O', ' ', true }, - [ TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE ] = { 'E', ' ', true }, - [ TAINT_SOFTLOCKUP ] = { 'L', ' ', false }, - [ TAINT_LIVEPATCH ] = { 'K', ' ', true }, - [ TAINT_AUX ] = { 'X', ' ', true }, - [ TAINT_RANDSTRUCT ] = { 'T', ' ', true }, - [ TAINT_TEST ] = { 'N', ' ', true }, + TAINT_FLAG(PROPRIETARY_MODULE, 'P', 'G', true), + TAINT_FLAG(FORCED_MODULE, 'F', ' ', true), + TAINT_FLAG(CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, 'S', ' ', false), + TAINT_FLAG(FORCED_RMMOD, 'R', ' ', false), + TAINT_FLAG(MACHINE_CHECK, 'M', ' ', false), + TAINT_FLAG(BAD_PAGE, 'B', ' ', false), + TAINT_FLAG(USER, 'U', ' ', false), + TAINT_FLAG(DIE, 'D', ' ', false), + TAINT_FLAG(OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, 'A', ' ', false), + TAINT_FLAG(WARN, 'W', ' ', false), + TAINT_FLAG(CRAP, 'C', ' ', true), + TAINT_FLAG(FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, 'I', ' ', false), + TAINT_FLAG(OOT_MODULE, 'O', ' ', true), + TAINT_FLAG(UNSIGNED_MODULE, 'E', ' ', true), + TAINT_FLAG(SOFTLOCKUP, 'L', ' ', false), + TAINT_FLAG(LIVEPATCH, 'K', ' ', true), + TAINT_FLAG(AUX, 'X', ' ', true), + TAINT_FLAG(RANDSTRUCT, 'T', ' ', true), + TAINT_FLAG(TEST, 'N', ' ', true), + TAINT_FLAG(FWCTL, 'J', ' ', true), }; +#undef TAINT_FLAG + +static void print_tainted_seq(struct seq_buf *s, bool verbose) +{ + const char *sep = ""; + int i; + + if (!tainted_mask) { + seq_buf_puts(s, "Not tainted"); + return; + } + + seq_buf_printf(s, "Tainted: "); + for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++) { + const struct taint_flag *t = &taint_flags[i]; + bool is_set = test_bit(i, &tainted_mask); + char c = is_set ? t->c_true : t->c_false; + + if (verbose) { + if (is_set) { + seq_buf_printf(s, "%s[%c]=%s", sep, c, t->desc); + sep = ", "; + } + } else { + seq_buf_putc(s, c); + } + } +} + +static const char *_print_tainted(bool verbose) +{ + /* FIXME: what should the size be? */ + static char buf[sizeof(taint_flags)]; + struct seq_buf s; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(taint_flags) != TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT); + + seq_buf_init(&s, buf, sizeof(buf)); + + print_tainted_seq(&s, verbose); + + return seq_buf_str(&s); +} + /** * print_tainted - return a string to represent the kernel taint state. * @@ -507,25 +596,15 @@ const struct taint_flag taint_flags[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT] = { */ const char *print_tainted(void) { - static char buf[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT + sizeof("Tainted: ")]; - - BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(taint_flags) != TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT); - - if (tainted_mask) { - char *s; - int i; - - s = buf + sprintf(buf, "Tainted: "); - for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++) { - const struct taint_flag *t = &taint_flags[i]; - *s++ = test_bit(i, &tainted_mask) ? - t->c_true : t->c_false; - } - *s = 0; - } else - snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Not tainted"); + return _print_tainted(false); +} - return buf; +/** + * print_tainted_verbose - A more verbose version of print_tainted() + */ +const char *print_tainted_verbose(void) +{ + return _print_tainted(true); } int test_taint(unsigned flag) @@ -635,6 +714,7 @@ bool oops_may_print(void) */ void oops_enter(void) { + nbcon_cpu_emergency_enter(); tracing_off(); /* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore: */ debug_locks_off(); @@ -657,6 +737,7 @@ void oops_exit(void) { do_oops_enter_exit(); print_oops_end_marker(); + nbcon_cpu_emergency_exit(); kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_OOPS); } @@ -668,6 +749,8 @@ struct warn_args { void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned taint, struct pt_regs *regs, struct warn_args *args) { + nbcon_cpu_emergency_enter(); + disable_trace_on_warning(); if (file) @@ -703,6 +786,8 @@ void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned taint, /* Just a warning, don't kill lockdep. */ add_taint(taint, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); + + nbcon_cpu_emergency_exit(); } #ifdef CONFIG_BUG @@ -776,9 +861,15 @@ device_initcall(register_warn_debugfs); */ __visible noinstr void __stack_chk_fail(void) { + unsigned long flags; + instrumentation_begin(); + flags = user_access_save(); + panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: %pB", __builtin_return_address(0)); + + user_access_restore(flags); instrumentation_end(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail); |