diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/stackleak.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/stackleak.c | 134 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 134 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/stackleak.c b/kernel/stackleak.c deleted file mode 100644 index b193a59fc05b..000000000000 --- a/kernel/stackleak.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,134 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -/* - * This code fills the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value - * before returning to userspace. It's part of the STACKLEAK feature - * ported from grsecurity/PaX. - * - * Author: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> - * - * STACKLEAK reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can - * reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks. - */ - -#include <linux/stackleak.h> -#include <linux/kprobes.h> - -#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE -#include <linux/jump_label.h> -#include <linux/sysctl.h> - -static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(stack_erasing_bypass); - -int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write, - void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) -{ - int ret = 0; - int state = !static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass); - int prev_state = state; - - table->data = &state; - table->maxlen = sizeof(int); - ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); - state = !!state; - if (ret || !write || state == prev_state) - return ret; - - if (state) - static_branch_disable(&stack_erasing_bypass); - else - static_branch_enable(&stack_erasing_bypass); - - pr_warn("stackleak: kernel stack erasing is %s\n", - state ? "enabled" : "disabled"); - return ret; -} - -#define skip_erasing() static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass) -#else -#define skip_erasing() false -#endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */ - -asmlinkage void notrace stackleak_erase(void) -{ - /* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */ - unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack; - unsigned long boundary = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current); - unsigned int poison_count = 0; - const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long); - - if (skip_erasing()) - return; - - /* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */ - if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE)) - kstack_ptr = boundary; - - /* Search for the poison value in the kernel stack */ - while (kstack_ptr > boundary && poison_count <= depth) { - if (*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr == STACKLEAK_POISON) - poison_count++; - else - poison_count = 0; - - kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long); - } - - /* - * One 'long int' at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and - * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y). - */ - if (kstack_ptr == boundary) - kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long); - -#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS - current->prev_lowest_stack = kstack_ptr; -#endif - - /* - * Now write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from - * 'kstack_ptr' and move up till the new 'boundary'. We assume that - * the stack pointer doesn't change when we write poison. - */ - if (on_thread_stack()) - boundary = current_stack_pointer; - else - boundary = current_top_of_stack(); - - while (kstack_ptr < boundary) { - *(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr = STACKLEAK_POISON; - kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long); - } - - /* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */ - current->lowest_stack = current_top_of_stack() - THREAD_SIZE/64; -} -NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(stackleak_erase); - -void __used notrace stackleak_track_stack(void) -{ - /* - * N.B. stackleak_erase() fills the kernel stack with the poison value, - * which has the register width. That code assumes that the value - * of 'lowest_stack' is aligned on the register width boundary. - * - * That is true for x86 and x86_64 because of the kernel stack - * alignment on these platforms (for details, see 'cc_stack_align' in - * arch/x86/Makefile). Take care of that when you port STACKLEAK to - * new platforms. - */ - unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp; - - /* - * Having CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than - * STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in - * stackleak_erase() unreliable. Let's prevent that. - */ - BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH); - - if (sp < current->lowest_stack && - sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) + - sizeof(unsigned long)) { - current->lowest_stack = sp; - } -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_track_stack); |
