diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/user_namespace.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/user_namespace.c | 850 |
1 files changed, 687 insertions, 163 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index d8c30db06c5b..03cb63883d04 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -1,18 +1,15 @@ -/* - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or - * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as - * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the - * License. - */ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/nsproxy.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <linux/proc_ns.h> #include <linux/highuid.h> #include <linux/cred.h> #include <linux/securebits.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/keyctl.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> #include <keys/user-type.h> @@ -22,12 +19,27 @@ #include <linux/ctype.h> #include <linux/projid.h> #include <linux/fs_struct.h> +#include <linux/bsearch.h> +#include <linux/sort.h> +#include <linux/nstree.h> -static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; +static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __ro_after_init; +static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex); static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid, struct uid_gid_map *map); +static void free_user_ns(struct work_struct *work); + +static struct ucounts *inc_user_namespaces(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid) +{ + return inc_ucount(ns, uid, UCOUNT_USER_NAMESPACES); +} + +static void dec_user_namespaces(struct ucounts *ucounts) +{ + return dec_ucount(ucounts, UCOUNT_USER_NAMESPACES); +} static void set_cred_user_ns(struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *user_ns) { @@ -38,6 +50,7 @@ static void set_cred_user_ns(struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *user_ns) cred->cap_inheritable = CAP_EMPTY_SET; cred->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET; cred->cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET; + cred->cap_ambient = CAP_EMPTY_SET; cred->cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET; #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS key_put(cred->request_key_auth); @@ -47,6 +60,18 @@ static void set_cred_user_ns(struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *user_ns) cred->user_ns = user_ns; } +static unsigned long enforced_nproc_rlimit(void) +{ + unsigned long limit = RLIM_INFINITY; + + /* Is RLIMIT_NPROC currently enforced? */ + if (!uid_eq(current_uid(), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) || + (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns)) + limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC); + + return limit; +} + /* * Create a new user namespace, deriving the creator from the user in the * passed credentials, and replacing that user with the new root user for the @@ -60,148 +85,327 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new) struct user_namespace *ns, *parent_ns = new->user_ns; kuid_t owner = new->euid; kgid_t group = new->egid; - int ret; + struct ucounts *ucounts; + int ret, i; + + ret = -ENOSPC; + if (parent_ns->level > 32) + goto fail; + + ucounts = inc_user_namespaces(parent_ns, owner); + if (!ucounts) + goto fail; /* * Verify that we can not violate the policy of which files * may be accessed that is specified by the root directory, - * by verifing that the root directory is at the root of the + * by verifying that the root directory is at the root of the * mount namespace which allows all files to be accessed. */ + ret = -EPERM; if (current_chrooted()) - return -EPERM; + goto fail_dec; /* The creator needs a mapping in the parent user namespace * or else we won't be able to reasonably tell userspace who * created a user_namespace. */ + ret = -EPERM; if (!kuid_has_mapping(parent_ns, owner) || !kgid_has_mapping(parent_ns, group)) - return -EPERM; + goto fail_dec; + + ret = security_create_user_ns(new); + if (ret < 0) + goto fail_dec; + ret = -ENOMEM; ns = kmem_cache_zalloc(user_ns_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); if (!ns) - return -ENOMEM; + goto fail_dec; - ret = proc_alloc_inum(&ns->proc_inum); - if (ret) { - kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns); - return ret; - } + ns->parent_could_setfcap = cap_raised(new->cap_effective, CAP_SETFCAP); + + ret = ns_common_init(ns); + if (ret) + goto fail_free; - atomic_set(&ns->count, 1); /* Leave the new->user_ns reference with the new user namespace. */ ns->parent = parent_ns; + ns->level = parent_ns->level + 1; ns->owner = owner; ns->group = group; + INIT_WORK(&ns->work, free_user_ns); + for (i = 0; i < UCOUNT_COUNTS; i++) { + ns->ucount_max[i] = INT_MAX; + } + set_userns_rlimit_max(ns, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, enforced_nproc_rlimit()); + set_userns_rlimit_max(ns, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE, rlimit(RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE)); + set_userns_rlimit_max(ns, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_SIGPENDING, rlimit(RLIMIT_SIGPENDING)); + set_userns_rlimit_max(ns, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK)); + ns->ucounts = ucounts; - set_cred_user_ns(new, ns); + /* Inherit USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED from our parent */ + mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex); + ns->flags = parent_ns->flags; + mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); - update_mnt_policy(ns); +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->keyring_name_list); + init_rwsem(&ns->keyring_sem); +#endif + ret = -ENOMEM; + if (!setup_userns_sysctls(ns)) + goto fail_keyring; + set_cred_user_ns(new, ns); + ns_tree_add(ns); return 0; +fail_keyring: +#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS + key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register); +#endif + ns_common_free(ns); +fail_free: + kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns); +fail_dec: + dec_user_namespaces(ucounts); +fail: + return ret; } int unshare_userns(unsigned long unshare_flags, struct cred **new_cred) { struct cred *cred; + int err = -ENOMEM; if (!(unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER)) return 0; cred = prepare_creds(); - if (!cred) - return -ENOMEM; + if (cred) { + err = create_user_ns(cred); + if (err) + put_cred(cred); + else + *new_cred = cred; + } - *new_cred = cred; - return create_user_ns(cred); + return err; } -void free_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) +static void free_user_ns(struct work_struct *work) { - struct user_namespace *parent; + struct user_namespace *parent, *ns = + container_of(work, struct user_namespace, work); do { + struct ucounts *ucounts = ns->ucounts; parent = ns->parent; - proc_free_inum(ns->proc_inum); - kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns); + ns_tree_remove(ns); + if (ns->gid_map.nr_extents > UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) { + kfree(ns->gid_map.forward); + kfree(ns->gid_map.reverse); + } + if (ns->uid_map.nr_extents > UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) { + kfree(ns->uid_map.forward); + kfree(ns->uid_map.reverse); + } + if (ns->projid_map.nr_extents > UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) { + kfree(ns->projid_map.forward); + kfree(ns->projid_map.reverse); + } +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC) + kfree(ns->binfmt_misc); +#endif + retire_userns_sysctls(ns); + key_free_user_ns(ns); + ns_common_free(ns); + /* Concurrent nstree traversal depends on a grace period. */ + kfree_rcu(ns, ns.ns_rcu); + dec_user_namespaces(ucounts); ns = parent; - } while (atomic_dec_and_test(&parent->count)); + } while (ns_ref_put(parent)); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_user_ns); -static u32 map_id_range_down(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id, u32 count) +void __put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) +{ + schedule_work(&ns->work); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_ns); + +/* + * struct idmap_key - holds the information necessary to find an idmapping in a + * sorted idmap array. It is passed to cmp_map_id() as first argument. + */ +struct idmap_key { + bool map_up; /* true -> id from kid; false -> kid from id */ + u32 id; /* id to find */ + u32 count; +}; + +/* + * cmp_map_id - Function to be passed to bsearch() to find the requested + * idmapping. Expects struct idmap_key to be passed via @k. + */ +static int cmp_map_id(const void *k, const void *e) { - unsigned idx, extents; + u32 first, last, id2; + const struct idmap_key *key = k; + const struct uid_gid_extent *el = e; + + id2 = key->id + key->count - 1; + + /* handle map_id_{down,up}() */ + if (key->map_up) + first = el->lower_first; + else + first = el->first; + + last = first + el->count - 1; + + if (key->id >= first && key->id <= last && + (id2 >= first && id2 <= last)) + return 0; + + if (key->id < first || id2 < first) + return -1; + + return 1; +} + +/* + * map_id_range_down_max - Find idmap via binary search in ordered idmap array. + * Can only be called if number of mappings exceeds UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS. + */ +static struct uid_gid_extent * +map_id_range_down_max(unsigned extents, struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id, u32 count) +{ + struct idmap_key key; + + key.map_up = false; + key.count = count; + key.id = id; + + return bsearch(&key, map->forward, extents, + sizeof(struct uid_gid_extent), cmp_map_id); +} + +/* + * map_id_range_down_base - Find idmap via binary search in static extent array. + * Can only be called if number of mappings is equal or less than + * UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS. + */ +static struct uid_gid_extent * +map_id_range_down_base(unsigned extents, struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id, u32 count) +{ + unsigned idx; u32 first, last, id2; id2 = id + count - 1; /* Find the matching extent */ - extents = map->nr_extents; - smp_read_barrier_depends(); for (idx = 0; idx < extents; idx++) { first = map->extent[idx].first; last = first + map->extent[idx].count - 1; if (id >= first && id <= last && (id2 >= first && id2 <= last)) - break; + return &map->extent[idx]; } - /* Map the id or note failure */ - if (idx < extents) - id = (id - first) + map->extent[idx].lower_first; - else - id = (u32) -1; - - return id; + return NULL; } -static u32 map_id_down(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id) +static u32 map_id_range_down(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id, u32 count) { - unsigned idx, extents; - u32 first, last; + struct uid_gid_extent *extent; + unsigned extents = map->nr_extents; + smp_rmb(); + + if (extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) + extent = map_id_range_down_base(extents, map, id, count); + else + extent = map_id_range_down_max(extents, map, id, count); - /* Find the matching extent */ - extents = map->nr_extents; - smp_read_barrier_depends(); - for (idx = 0; idx < extents; idx++) { - first = map->extent[idx].first; - last = first + map->extent[idx].count - 1; - if (id >= first && id <= last) - break; - } /* Map the id or note failure */ - if (idx < extents) - id = (id - first) + map->extent[idx].lower_first; + if (extent) + id = (id - extent->first) + extent->lower_first; else id = (u32) -1; return id; } -static u32 map_id_up(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id) +u32 map_id_down(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id) { - unsigned idx, extents; - u32 first, last; + return map_id_range_down(map, id, 1); +} + +/* + * map_id_up_base - Find idmap via binary search in static extent array. + * Can only be called if number of mappings is equal or less than + * UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS. + */ +static struct uid_gid_extent * +map_id_range_up_base(unsigned extents, struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id, u32 count) +{ + unsigned idx; + u32 first, last, id2; + + id2 = id + count - 1; /* Find the matching extent */ - extents = map->nr_extents; - smp_read_barrier_depends(); for (idx = 0; idx < extents; idx++) { first = map->extent[idx].lower_first; last = first + map->extent[idx].count - 1; - if (id >= first && id <= last) - break; + if (id >= first && id <= last && + (id2 >= first && id2 <= last)) + return &map->extent[idx]; } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * map_id_up_max - Find idmap via binary search in ordered idmap array. + * Can only be called if number of mappings exceeds UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS. + */ +static struct uid_gid_extent * +map_id_range_up_max(unsigned extents, struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id, u32 count) +{ + struct idmap_key key; + + key.map_up = true; + key.count = count; + key.id = id; + + return bsearch(&key, map->reverse, extents, + sizeof(struct uid_gid_extent), cmp_map_id); +} + +u32 map_id_range_up(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id, u32 count) +{ + struct uid_gid_extent *extent; + unsigned extents = map->nr_extents; + smp_rmb(); + + if (extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) + extent = map_id_range_up_base(extents, map, id, count); + else + extent = map_id_range_up_max(extents, map, id, count); + /* Map the id or note failure */ - if (idx < extents) - id = (id - first) + map->extent[idx].first; + if (extent) + id = (id - extent->lower_first) + extent->first; else id = (u32) -1; return id; } +u32 map_id_up(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id) +{ + return map_id_range_up(map, id, 1); +} + /** * make_kuid - Map a user-namespace uid pair into a kuid. * @ns: User namespace that the uid is in @@ -212,7 +416,7 @@ static u32 map_id_up(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id) * * When there is no mapping defined for the user-namespace uid * pair INVALID_UID is returned. Callers are expected to test - * for and handle handle INVALID_UID being returned. INVALID_UID + * for and handle INVALID_UID being returned. INVALID_UID * may be tested for using uid_valid(). */ kuid_t make_kuid(struct user_namespace *ns, uid_t uid) @@ -273,7 +477,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kuid_munged); /** * make_kgid - Map a user-namespace gid pair into a kgid. * @ns: User namespace that the gid is in - * @uid: group identifier + * @gid: group identifier * * Maps a user-namespace gid pair into a kernel internal kgid, * and returns that kgid. @@ -347,7 +551,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kgid_munged); * * When there is no mapping defined for the user-namespace projid * pair INVALID_PROJID is returned. Callers are expected to test - * for and handle handle INVALID_PROJID being returned. INVALID_PROJID + * for and handle INVALID_PROJID being returned. INVALID_PROJID * may be tested for using projid_valid(). */ kprojid_t make_kprojid(struct user_namespace *ns, projid_t projid) @@ -469,15 +673,20 @@ static int projid_m_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) return 0; } -static void *m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos, struct uid_gid_map *map) +static void *m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos, + struct uid_gid_map *map) { - struct uid_gid_extent *extent = NULL; loff_t pos = *ppos; + unsigned extents = map->nr_extents; + smp_rmb(); - if (pos < map->nr_extents) - extent = &map->extent[pos]; + if (pos >= extents) + return NULL; - return extent; + if (extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) + return &map->extent[pos]; + + return &map->forward[pos]; } static void *uid_m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos) @@ -512,28 +721,29 @@ static void m_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) return; } -struct seq_operations proc_uid_seq_operations = { +const struct seq_operations proc_uid_seq_operations = { .start = uid_m_start, .stop = m_stop, .next = m_next, .show = uid_m_show, }; -struct seq_operations proc_gid_seq_operations = { +const struct seq_operations proc_gid_seq_operations = { .start = gid_m_start, .stop = m_stop, .next = m_next, .show = gid_m_show, }; -struct seq_operations proc_projid_seq_operations = { +const struct seq_operations proc_projid_seq_operations = { .start = projid_m_start, .stop = m_stop, .next = m_next, .show = projid_m_show, }; -static bool mappings_overlap(struct uid_gid_map *new_map, struct uid_gid_extent *extent) +static bool mappings_overlap(struct uid_gid_map *new_map, + struct uid_gid_extent *extent) { u32 upper_first, lower_first, upper_last, lower_last; unsigned idx; @@ -548,7 +758,10 @@ static bool mappings_overlap(struct uid_gid_map *new_map, struct uid_gid_extent u32 prev_upper_last, prev_lower_last; struct uid_gid_extent *prev; - prev = &new_map->extent[idx]; + if (new_map->nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) + prev = &new_map->extent[idx]; + else + prev = &new_map->forward[idx]; prev_upper_first = prev->first; prev_lower_first = prev->lower_first; @@ -568,8 +781,154 @@ static bool mappings_overlap(struct uid_gid_map *new_map, struct uid_gid_extent return false; } +/* + * insert_extent - Safely insert a new idmap extent into struct uid_gid_map. + * Takes care to allocate a 4K block of memory if the number of mappings exceeds + * UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS. + */ +static int insert_extent(struct uid_gid_map *map, struct uid_gid_extent *extent) +{ + struct uid_gid_extent *dest; + + if (map->nr_extents == UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) { + struct uid_gid_extent *forward; + + /* Allocate memory for 340 mappings. */ + forward = kmalloc_array(UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS, + sizeof(struct uid_gid_extent), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!forward) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Copy over memory. Only set up memory for the forward pointer. + * Defer the memory setup for the reverse pointer. + */ + memcpy(forward, map->extent, + map->nr_extents * sizeof(map->extent[0])); + + map->forward = forward; + map->reverse = NULL; + } + + if (map->nr_extents < UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) + dest = &map->extent[map->nr_extents]; + else + dest = &map->forward[map->nr_extents]; + + *dest = *extent; + map->nr_extents++; + return 0; +} + +/* cmp function to sort() forward mappings */ +static int cmp_extents_forward(const void *a, const void *b) +{ + const struct uid_gid_extent *e1 = a; + const struct uid_gid_extent *e2 = b; + + if (e1->first < e2->first) + return -1; + + if (e1->first > e2->first) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +/* cmp function to sort() reverse mappings */ +static int cmp_extents_reverse(const void *a, const void *b) +{ + const struct uid_gid_extent *e1 = a; + const struct uid_gid_extent *e2 = b; + + if (e1->lower_first < e2->lower_first) + return -1; + + if (e1->lower_first > e2->lower_first) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * sort_idmaps - Sorts an array of idmap entries. + * Can only be called if number of mappings exceeds UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS. + */ +static int sort_idmaps(struct uid_gid_map *map) +{ + if (map->nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) + return 0; + + /* Sort forward array. */ + sort(map->forward, map->nr_extents, sizeof(struct uid_gid_extent), + cmp_extents_forward, NULL); + + /* Only copy the memory from forward we actually need. */ + map->reverse = kmemdup_array(map->forward, map->nr_extents, + sizeof(struct uid_gid_extent), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!map->reverse) + return -ENOMEM; -static DEFINE_MUTEX(id_map_mutex); + /* Sort reverse array. */ + sort(map->reverse, map->nr_extents, sizeof(struct uid_gid_extent), + cmp_extents_reverse, NULL); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * verify_root_map() - check the uid 0 mapping + * @file: idmapping file + * @map_ns: user namespace of the target process + * @new_map: requested idmap + * + * If a process requests mapping parent uid 0 into the new ns, verify that the + * process writing the map had the CAP_SETFCAP capability as the target process + * will be able to write fscaps that are valid in ancestor user namespaces. + * + * Return: true if the mapping is allowed, false if not. + */ +static bool verify_root_map(const struct file *file, + struct user_namespace *map_ns, + struct uid_gid_map *new_map) +{ + int idx; + const struct user_namespace *file_ns = file->f_cred->user_ns; + struct uid_gid_extent *extent0 = NULL; + + for (idx = 0; idx < new_map->nr_extents; idx++) { + if (new_map->nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) + extent0 = &new_map->extent[idx]; + else + extent0 = &new_map->forward[idx]; + if (extent0->lower_first == 0) + break; + + extent0 = NULL; + } + + if (!extent0) + return true; + + if (map_ns == file_ns) { + /* The process unshared its ns and is writing to its own + * /proc/self/uid_map. User already has full capabilites in + * the new namespace. Verify that the parent had CAP_SETFCAP + * when it unshared. + * */ + if (!file_ns->parent_could_setfcap) + return false; + } else { + /* Process p1 is writing to uid_map of p2, who is in a child + * user namespace to p1's. Verify that the opener of the map + * file has CAP_SETFCAP against the parent of the new map + * namespace */ + if (!file_ns_capable(file, map_ns->parent, CAP_SETFCAP)) + return false; + } + + return true; +} static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos, @@ -578,16 +937,24 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, struct uid_gid_map *parent_map) { struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; - struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; + struct user_namespace *map_ns = seq->private; struct uid_gid_map new_map; unsigned idx; - struct uid_gid_extent *extent = NULL; - unsigned long page = 0; + struct uid_gid_extent extent; char *kbuf, *pos, *next_line; - ssize_t ret = -EINVAL; + ssize_t ret; + + /* Only allow < page size writes at the beginning of the file */ + if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= PAGE_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Slurp in the user data */ + kbuf = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(kbuf)) + return PTR_ERR(kbuf); /* - * The id_map_mutex serializes all writes to any given map. + * The userns_state_mutex serializes all writes to any given map. * * Any map is only ever written once. * @@ -602,11 +969,12 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, * were written before the count of the extents. * * To achieve this smp_wmb() is used on guarantee the write - * order and smp_read_barrier_depends() is guaranteed that we - * don't have crazy architectures returning stale data. - * + * order and smp_rmb() is guaranteed that we don't have crazy + * architectures returning stale data. */ - mutex_lock(&id_map_mutex); + mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex); + + memset(&new_map, 0, sizeof(struct uid_gid_map)); ret = -EPERM; /* Only allow one successful write to the map */ @@ -616,33 +984,13 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, /* * Adjusting namespace settings requires capabilities on the target. */ - if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - goto out; - - /* Get a buffer */ - ret = -ENOMEM; - page = __get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY); - kbuf = (char *) page; - if (!page) - goto out; - - /* Only allow <= page size writes at the beginning of the file */ - ret = -EINVAL; - if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= PAGE_SIZE)) - goto out; - - /* Slurp in the user data */ - ret = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, count)) + if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, map_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) goto out; - kbuf[count] = '\0'; /* Parse the user data */ ret = -EINVAL; pos = kbuf; - new_map.nr_extents = 0; - for (;pos; pos = next_line) { - extent = &new_map.extent[new_map.nr_extents]; + for (; pos; pos = next_line) { /* Find the end of line and ensure I don't look past it */ next_line = strchr(pos, '\n'); @@ -654,17 +1002,17 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } pos = skip_spaces(pos); - extent->first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10); + extent.first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10); if (!isspace(*pos)) goto out; pos = skip_spaces(pos); - extent->lower_first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10); + extent.lower_first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10); if (!isspace(*pos)) goto out; pos = skip_spaces(pos); - extent->count = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10); + extent.count = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10); if (*pos && !isspace(*pos)) goto out; @@ -674,46 +1022,57 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, goto out; /* Verify we have been given valid starting values */ - if ((extent->first == (u32) -1) || - (extent->lower_first == (u32) -1 )) + if ((extent.first == (u32) -1) || + (extent.lower_first == (u32) -1)) goto out; - /* Verify count is not zero and does not cause the extent to wrap */ - if ((extent->first + extent->count) <= extent->first) + /* Verify count is not zero and does not cause the + * extent to wrap + */ + if ((extent.first + extent.count) <= extent.first) goto out; - if ((extent->lower_first + extent->count) <= extent->lower_first) + if ((extent.lower_first + extent.count) <= + extent.lower_first) goto out; /* Do the ranges in extent overlap any previous extents? */ - if (mappings_overlap(&new_map, extent)) + if (mappings_overlap(&new_map, &extent)) goto out; - new_map.nr_extents++; - - /* Fail if the file contains too many extents */ - if ((new_map.nr_extents == UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS) && + if ((new_map.nr_extents + 1) == UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS && (next_line != NULL)) goto out; + + ret = insert_extent(&new_map, &extent); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = -EINVAL; } - /* Be very certaint the new map actually exists */ + /* Be very certain the new map actually exists */ if (new_map.nr_extents == 0) goto out; ret = -EPERM; /* Validate the user is allowed to use user id's mapped to. */ - if (!new_idmap_permitted(file, ns, cap_setid, &new_map)) + if (!new_idmap_permitted(file, map_ns, cap_setid, &new_map)) goto out; + ret = -EPERM; /* Map the lower ids from the parent user namespace to the * kernel global id space. */ for (idx = 0; idx < new_map.nr_extents; idx++) { + struct uid_gid_extent *e; u32 lower_first; - extent = &new_map.extent[idx]; + + if (new_map.nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) + e = &new_map.extent[idx]; + else + e = &new_map.forward[idx]; lower_first = map_id_range_down(parent_map, - extent->lower_first, - extent->count); + e->lower_first, + e->count); /* Fail if we can not map the specified extent to * the kernel global id space. @@ -721,25 +1080,46 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (lower_first == (u32) -1) goto out; - extent->lower_first = lower_first; + e->lower_first = lower_first; } + /* + * If we want to use binary search for lookup, this clones the extent + * array and sorts both copies. + */ + ret = sort_idmaps(&new_map); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + /* Install the map */ - memcpy(map->extent, new_map.extent, - new_map.nr_extents*sizeof(new_map.extent[0])); + if (new_map.nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) { + memcpy(map->extent, new_map.extent, + new_map.nr_extents * sizeof(new_map.extent[0])); + } else { + map->forward = new_map.forward; + map->reverse = new_map.reverse; + } smp_wmb(); map->nr_extents = new_map.nr_extents; *ppos = count; ret = count; out: - mutex_unlock(&id_map_mutex); - if (page) - free_page(page); + if (ret < 0 && new_map.nr_extents > UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) { + kfree(new_map.forward); + kfree(new_map.reverse); + map->forward = NULL; + map->reverse = NULL; + map->nr_extents = 0; + } + + mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); + kfree(kbuf); return ret; } -ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *ppos) +ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t size, loff_t *ppos) { struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; @@ -755,7 +1135,8 @@ ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t siz &ns->uid_map, &ns->parent->uid_map); } -ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *ppos) +ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t size, loff_t *ppos) { struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; @@ -771,7 +1152,8 @@ ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t siz &ns->gid_map, &ns->parent->gid_map); } -ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *ppos) +ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t size, loff_t *ppos) { struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; @@ -788,21 +1170,29 @@ ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t &ns->projid_map, &ns->parent->projid_map); } -static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, +static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid, struct uid_gid_map *new_map) { - /* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */ - if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) { + const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred; + + if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID && !verify_root_map(file, ns, new_map)) + return false; + + /* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't + * be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings. + */ + if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1) && + uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) { u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first; if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) { kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id); - if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid)) + if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid)) return true; - } - else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) { + } else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) { kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id); - if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid)) + if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) && + gid_eq(gid, cred->egid)) return true; } } @@ -813,7 +1203,7 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, /* Allow the specified ids if we have the appropriate capability * (CAP_SETUID or CAP_SETGID) over the parent user namespace. - * And the opener of the id file also had the approprpiate capability. + * And the opener of the id file also has the appropriate capability. */ if (ns_capable(ns->parent, cap_setid) && file_ns_capable(file, ns->parent, cap_setid)) @@ -822,7 +1212,120 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, return false; } -static void *userns_get(struct task_struct *task) +int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ + struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; + unsigned long userns_flags = READ_ONCE(ns->flags); + + seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", + (userns_flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) ? + "allow" : "deny"); + return 0; +} + +ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; + struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; + char kbuf[8], *pos; + bool setgroups_allowed; + ssize_t ret; + + /* Only allow a very narrow range of strings to be written */ + ret = -EINVAL; + if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= sizeof(kbuf))) + goto out; + + /* What was written? */ + ret = -EFAULT; + if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, count)) + goto out; + kbuf[count] = '\0'; + pos = kbuf; + + /* What is being requested? */ + ret = -EINVAL; + if (strncmp(pos, "allow", 5) == 0) { + pos += 5; + setgroups_allowed = true; + } + else if (strncmp(pos, "deny", 4) == 0) { + pos += 4; + setgroups_allowed = false; + } + else + goto out; + + /* Verify there is not trailing junk on the line */ + pos = skip_spaces(pos); + if (*pos != '\0') + goto out; + + ret = -EPERM; + mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex); + if (setgroups_allowed) { + /* Enabling setgroups after setgroups has been disabled + * is not allowed. + */ + if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED)) + goto out_unlock; + } else { + /* Permanently disabling setgroups after setgroups has + * been enabled by writing the gid_map is not allowed. + */ + if (ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0) + goto out_unlock; + ns->flags &= ~USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED; + } + mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); + + /* Report a successful write */ + *ppos = count; + ret = count; +out: + return ret; +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); + goto out; +} + +bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns) +{ + bool allowed; + + mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex); + /* It is not safe to use setgroups until a gid mapping in + * the user namespace has been established. + */ + allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0; + /* Is setgroups allowed? */ + allowed = allowed && (ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED); + mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); + + return allowed; +} + +/* + * Returns true if @child is the same namespace or a descendant of + * @ancestor. + */ +bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ancestor, + const struct user_namespace *child) +{ + const struct user_namespace *ns; + for (ns = child; ns->level > ancestor->level; ns = ns->parent) + ; + return (ns == ancestor); +} + +bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns) +{ + return in_userns(target_ns, current_user_ns()); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(current_in_userns); + +static struct ns_common *userns_get(struct task_struct *task) { struct user_namespace *user_ns; @@ -830,17 +1333,17 @@ static void *userns_get(struct task_struct *task) user_ns = get_user_ns(__task_cred(task)->user_ns); rcu_read_unlock(); - return user_ns; + return user_ns ? &user_ns->ns : NULL; } -static void userns_put(void *ns) +static void userns_put(struct ns_common *ns) { - put_user_ns(ns); + put_user_ns(to_user_ns(ns)); } -static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns) +static int userns_install(struct nsset *nsset, struct ns_common *ns) { - struct user_namespace *user_ns = ns; + struct user_namespace *user_ns = to_user_ns(ns); struct cred *cred; /* Don't allow gaining capabilities by reentering @@ -849,8 +1352,8 @@ static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns) if (user_ns == current_user_ns()) return -EINVAL; - /* Threaded processes may not enter a different user namespace */ - if (atomic_read(¤t->mm->mm_users) > 1) + /* Tasks that share a thread group must share a user namespace */ + if (!thread_group_empty(current)) return -EINVAL; if (current->fs->users != 1) @@ -859,34 +1362,55 @@ static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns) if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - cred = prepare_creds(); + cred = nsset_cred(nsset); if (!cred) - return -ENOMEM; + return -EINVAL; put_user_ns(cred->user_ns); set_cred_user_ns(cred, get_user_ns(user_ns)); - return commit_creds(cred); + if (set_cred_ucounts(cred) < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns) +{ + struct user_namespace *my_user_ns = current_user_ns(); + struct user_namespace *owner, *p; + + /* See if the owner is in the current user namespace */ + owner = p = ns->ops->owner(ns); + for (;;) { + if (!p) + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + if (p == my_user_ns) + break; + p = p->parent; + } + + return &get_user_ns(owner)->ns; } -static unsigned int userns_inum(void *ns) +static struct user_namespace *userns_owner(struct ns_common *ns) { - struct user_namespace *user_ns = ns; - return user_ns->proc_inum; + return to_user_ns(ns)->parent; } const struct proc_ns_operations userns_operations = { .name = "user", - .type = CLONE_NEWUSER, .get = userns_get, .put = userns_put, .install = userns_install, - .inum = userns_inum, + .owner = userns_owner, + .get_parent = ns_get_owner, }; static __init int user_namespaces_init(void) { - user_ns_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(user_namespace, SLAB_PANIC); + user_ns_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(user_namespace, SLAB_PANIC | SLAB_ACCOUNT); + ns_tree_add(&init_user_ns); return 0; } -module_init(user_namespaces_init); +subsys_initcall(user_namespaces_init); |
