1 files changed, 110 insertions, 104 deletions

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 70663229b3cc..3a1ce04a7a53 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -22,11 +22,10 @@
 
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <crypto/aes.h>
-#include <crypto/algapi.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/kpp.h>
+#include <crypto/utils.h>
 
 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
@@ -56,7 +55,9 @@
 /* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
 #define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY)
 
-#define SMP_TIMEOUT	msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
+#define SMP_TIMEOUT	secs_to_jiffies(30)
+
+#define ID_ADDR_TIMEOUT	msecs_to_jiffies(200)
 
 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev)	(hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
 				 0x3f : 0x07)
@@ -607,7 +608,7 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 
 	iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_SOURCE, iv, 2, 1 + len);
 
-	l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
+	l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len, NULL);
 
 	if (!chan->data)
 		return;
@@ -913,7 +914,7 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 	 * Confirms and the responder Enters the passkey.
 	 */
 	if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
-		if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
 			smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
 		else
 			smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
@@ -963,7 +964,7 @@ static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
 
 	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 
-	if (conn->hcon->out)
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
 	else
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
@@ -979,7 +980,8 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	int ret;
 
 	bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
-		   conn->hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
+		   test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags) ? "initiator" :
+		   "responder");
 
 	ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
 		     hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
@@ -993,7 +995,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
 		return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
 	}
 
-	if (hcon->out) {
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 		u8 stk[16];
 		__le64 rand = 0;
 		__le16 ediv = 0;
@@ -1067,7 +1069,12 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 		if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
 			bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
 			hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
-			queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
+			/* Use a short delay to make sure the new address is
+			 * propagated _before_ the channels.
+			 */
+			queue_delayed_work(hdev->workqueue,
+					   &conn->id_addr_timer,
+					   ID_ADDR_TIMEOUT);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -1243,14 +1250,15 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
 
 	/* The responder sends its keys first */
-	if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags) &&
+	    (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
 		smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
 		return;
 	}
 
 	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
 
-	if (hcon->out) {
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 		keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
 		*keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
 	} else {
@@ -1371,7 +1379,7 @@ static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
 
 	bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
 
-	hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
+	hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
 }
 
 static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
@@ -1419,7 +1427,7 @@ static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
 	u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
 
-	if (hcon->out) {
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 		na   = smp->prnd;
 		nb   = smp->rrnd;
 	} else {
@@ -1447,7 +1455,7 @@ static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
 	b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
 
-	if (hcon->out) {
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 		local_addr = a;
 		remote_addr = b;
 		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
@@ -1526,7 +1534,7 @@ static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
 		/* The round is only complete when the initiator
 		 * receives pairing random.
 		 */
-		if (!hcon->out) {
+		if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
 				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
 			if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
@@ -1554,7 +1562,7 @@ static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
 
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
 
-		if (hcon->out) {
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
 				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
 			return 0;
@@ -1565,7 +1573,7 @@ static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
 	case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
 	default:
 		/* Initiating device starts the round */
-		if (!hcon->out)
+		if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
 			return 0;
 
 		bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Starting passkey round %u",
@@ -1610,7 +1618,7 @@ static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 	}
 
 	/* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
-	if (hcon->out) {
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
 	} else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
@@ -1733,7 +1741,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
-	struct smp_chan *smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 	u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -1742,16 +1750,14 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
-	if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
+	if (smp && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
 		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
 
-	if (!chan->data)
+	if (!smp) {
 		smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
-	else
-		smp = chan->data;
-
-	if (!smp)
-		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		if (!smp)
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+	}
 
 	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
 	auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
@@ -1933,7 +1939,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
-	if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
 		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
 
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
@@ -2028,7 +2034,7 @@ static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
 		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
 
-	if (conn->hcon->out) {
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
 			     smp->prnd);
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
@@ -2050,7 +2056,7 @@ static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	u8 auth;
 
 	/* The issue is only observed when we're in responder role */
-	if (hcon->out)
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
 	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
@@ -2086,7 +2092,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
 
 	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
-		   hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
+		   test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags) ? "initiator" :
+		   "responder");
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
@@ -2108,7 +2115,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			return ret;
 	}
 
-	if (conn->hcon->out) {
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
 			     smp->prnd);
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
@@ -2129,7 +2136,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb, confirm_hint;
-	u32 passkey;
+	u32 passkey = 0;
 	int err;
 
 	bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
@@ -2143,7 +2150,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
 		return smp_random(smp);
 
-	if (hcon->out) {
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 		pkax = smp->local_pk;
 		pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
 		na   = smp->prnd;
@@ -2156,7 +2163,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	}
 
 	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
-		if (!hcon->out)
+		if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
 			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
 				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
@@ -2167,7 +2174,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
 		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
 
-	if (hcon->out) {
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 		u8 cfm[16];
 
 		err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
@@ -2181,24 +2188,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
 			     smp->prnd);
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
-
-		/* Only Just-Works pairing requires extra checks */
-		if (smp->method != JUST_WORKS)
-			goto mackey_and_ltk;
-
-		/* If there already exists long term key in local host, leave
-		 * the decision to user space since the remote device could
-		 * be legitimate or malicious.
-		 */
-		if (hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
-				 hcon->role)) {
-			/* Set passkey to 0. The value can be any number since
-			 * it'll be ignored anyway.
-			 */
-			passkey = 0;
-			confirm_hint = 1;
-			goto confirm;
-		}
 	}
 
 mackey_and_ltk:
@@ -2208,7 +2197,7 @@ mackey_and_ltk:
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
 	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
-		if (hcon->out) {
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 			sc_dhkey_check(smp);
 			SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
 		}
@@ -2219,11 +2208,12 @@ mackey_and_ltk:
 	if (err)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
-	confirm_hint = 0;
-
-confirm:
-	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS)
-		confirm_hint = 1;
+	/* Always require user confirmation for Just-Works pairing to prevent
+	 * impersonation attacks, or in case of a legitimate device that is
+	 * repairing use the confirmation as acknowledgment to proceed with the
+	 * creation of new keys.
+	 */
+	confirm_hint = smp->method == JUST_WORKS ? 1 : 0;
 
 	err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
 					hcon->dst_type, passkey, confirm_hint);
@@ -2282,10 +2272,27 @@ bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
 	return false;
 }
 
+static void smp_send_pairing_req(struct smp_chan *smp, __u8 auth)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+
+	if (smp->conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK)
+		build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &cp, NULL);
+	else
+		build_pairing_cmd(smp->conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
+
+	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+
+	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
+}
+
 static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
-	struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
@@ -2334,16 +2341,20 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
-	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
-	build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
+	smp_send_pairing_req(smp, auth);
 
-	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
-	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+	return 0;
+}
 
-	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
-	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
+static void smp_send_security_req(struct smp_chan *smp, __u8 auth)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
 
-	return 0;
+	cp.auth_req = auth;
+	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
+
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
 }
 
 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
@@ -2414,23 +2425,11 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 			authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
 	}
 
-	if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
-		struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
-
-		build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
-		smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
-		memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
-
-		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
-		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
-	} else {
-		struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
-		cp.auth_req = authreq;
-		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
-		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
-	}
+	if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+		smp_send_pairing_req(smp, authreq);
+	else
+		smp_send_security_req(smp, authreq);
 
-	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
 	ret = 0;
 
 unlock:
@@ -2681,8 +2680,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
 {
-	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
-	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
 	u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
 
@@ -2695,7 +2692,7 @@ static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
 	 * first byte which contains the opcode.
 	 */
-	if (hcon->out) {
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 		local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
 		remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
 	} else {
@@ -2764,7 +2761,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	/* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
 	 * the key from the initiating device.
 	 */
-	if (!hcon->out) {
+	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 		err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
@@ -2826,7 +2823,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	}
 
 	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
-		if (hcon->out)
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
 			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
 				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
 
@@ -2835,7 +2832,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (hcon->out)
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
 
 	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
@@ -2850,7 +2847,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	/* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
 	 * send the confirm value.
 	 */
-	if (conn->hcon->out)
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
 		return 0;
 
 	err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
@@ -2884,7 +2881,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
 	b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
 
-	if (hcon->out) {
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 		local_addr = a;
 		remote_addr = b;
 		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
@@ -2909,7 +2906,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (crypto_memneq(check->e, e, 16))
 		return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
 
-	if (!hcon->out) {
+	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
 			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
 			return 0;
@@ -2921,7 +2918,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	sc_add_ltk(smp);
 
-	if (hcon->out) {
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
 		hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size);
 		hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
 	}
@@ -2963,8 +2960,25 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
 		goto drop;
 
-	if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
+	if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)) {
+		/* If there is a context and the command is not allowed consider
+		 * it a failure so the session is cleanup properly.
+		 */
+		switch (code) {
+		case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
+		case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
+		case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
+			/* 3.6.1. Key distribution and generation
+			 *
+			 * A device may reject a distributed key by sending the
+			 * Pairing Failed command with the reason set to
+			 * "Key Rejected".
+			 */
+			smp_failure(conn, SMP_KEY_REJECTED);
+			break;
+		}
 		goto drop;
+	}
 
 	/* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
 	 * pairing request and security request.
@@ -3070,7 +3084,6 @@ static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
-	struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
 
 	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "chan %p", chan);
@@ -3122,14 +3135,7 @@ static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 
 	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "starting SMP over BR/EDR");
 
-	/* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
-	build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
-
-	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
-	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
-
-	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
-	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
+	smp_send_pairing_req(smp, 0x00);
 }
 
 static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
@@ -3166,7 +3172,7 @@ static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 	/* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own
 	 * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the
 	 * first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in
-	 * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function wont
+	 * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function won't
 	 * get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called.
 	 */
 	conn->smp = chan;