diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 1511 |
1 files changed, 870 insertions, 641 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c index d0347d148b34..a8ec30759a18 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au> * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu> @@ -48,12 +49,35 @@ #include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h> #include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h> #include <linux/sunrpc/cache.h> +#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h> + +#include <trace/events/rpcgss.h> + #include "gss_rpc_upcall.h" +/* + * Unfortunately there isn't a maximum checksum size exported via the + * GSS API. Manufacture one based on GSS mechanisms supported by this + * implementation. + */ +#define GSS_MAX_CKSUMSIZE (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN) + +/* + * This value may be increased in the future to accommodate other + * usage of the scratch buffer. + */ +#define GSS_SCRATCH_SIZE GSS_MAX_CKSUMSIZE + +struct gss_svc_data { + /* decoded gss client cred: */ + struct rpc_gss_wire_cred clcred; + u32 gsd_databody_offset; + struct rsc *rsci; -#ifdef RPC_DEBUG -# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH -#endif + /* for temporary results */ + __be32 gsd_seq_num; + u8 gsd_scratch[GSS_SCRATCH_SIZE]; +}; /* The rpcsec_init cache is used for mapping RPCSEC_GSS_{,CONT_}INIT requests * into replies. @@ -76,6 +100,7 @@ struct rsi { struct xdr_netobj in_handle, in_token; struct xdr_netobj out_handle, out_token; int major_status, minor_status; + struct rcu_head rcu_head; }; static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *new, struct rsi *old); @@ -89,13 +114,21 @@ static void rsi_free(struct rsi *rsii) kfree(rsii->out_token.data); } -static void rsi_put(struct kref *ref) +static void rsi_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) { - struct rsi *rsii = container_of(ref, struct rsi, h.ref); + struct rsi *rsii = container_of(head, struct rsi, rcu_head); + rsi_free(rsii); kfree(rsii); } +static void rsi_put(struct kref *ref) +{ + struct rsi *rsii = container_of(ref, struct rsi, h.ref); + + call_rcu(&rsii->rcu_head, rsi_free_rcu); +} + static inline int rsi_hash(struct rsi *item) { return hash_mem(item->in_handle.data, item->in_handle.len, RSI_HASHBITS) @@ -171,6 +204,11 @@ static struct cache_head *rsi_alloc(void) return NULL; } +static int rsi_upcall(struct cache_detail *cd, struct cache_head *h) +{ + return sunrpc_cache_pipe_upcall_timeout(cd, h); +} + static void rsi_request(struct cache_detail *cd, struct cache_head *h, char **bpp, int *blen) @@ -180,6 +218,8 @@ static void rsi_request(struct cache_detail *cd, qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_handle.data, rsii->in_handle.len); qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_token.data, rsii->in_token.len); (*bpp)[-1] = '\n'; + WARN_ONCE(*blen < 0, + "RPCSEC/GSS credential too large - please use gssproxy\n"); } static int rsi_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, @@ -190,7 +230,7 @@ static int rsi_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, char *ep; int len; struct rsi rsii, *rsip = NULL; - time_t expiry; + time64_t expiry; int status = -EINVAL; memset(&rsii, 0, sizeof(rsii)); @@ -217,11 +257,11 @@ static int rsi_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, rsii.h.flags = 0; /* expiry */ - expiry = get_expiry(&mesg); - status = -EINVAL; - if (expiry == 0) + status = get_expiry(&mesg, &expiry); + if (status) goto out; + status = -EINVAL; /* major/minor */ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen); if (len <= 0) @@ -264,11 +304,12 @@ out: return status; } -static struct cache_detail rsi_cache_template = { +static const struct cache_detail rsi_cache_template = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .hash_size = RSI_HASHMAX, .name = "auth.rpcsec.init", .cache_put = rsi_put, + .cache_upcall = rsi_upcall, .cache_request = rsi_request, .cache_parse = rsi_parse, .match = rsi_match, @@ -282,7 +323,7 @@ static struct rsi *rsi_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *item) struct cache_head *ch; int hash = rsi_hash(item); - ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup(cd, &item->h, hash); + ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup_rcu(cd, &item->h, hash); if (ch) return container_of(ch, struct rsi, h); else @@ -317,7 +358,7 @@ static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *new, struct r struct gss_svc_seq_data { /* highest seq number seen so far: */ - int sd_max; + u32 sd_max; /* for i such that sd_max-GSS_SEQ_WIN < i <= sd_max, the i-th bit of * sd_win is nonzero iff sequence number i has been seen already: */ unsigned long sd_win[GSS_SEQ_WIN/BITS_PER_LONG]; @@ -330,6 +371,7 @@ struct rsc { struct svc_cred cred; struct gss_svc_seq_data seqdata; struct gss_ctx *mechctx; + struct rcu_head rcu_head; }; static struct rsc *rsc_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *new, struct rsc *old); @@ -343,12 +385,22 @@ static void rsc_free(struct rsc *rsci) free_svc_cred(&rsci->cred); } +static void rsc_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) +{ + struct rsc *rsci = container_of(head, struct rsc, rcu_head); + + kfree(rsci->handle.data); + kfree(rsci); +} + static void rsc_put(struct kref *ref) { struct rsc *rsci = container_of(ref, struct rsc, h.ref); - rsc_free(rsci); - kfree(rsci); + if (rsci->mechctx) + gss_delete_sec_context(&rsci->mechctx); + free_svc_cred(&rsci->cred); + call_rcu(&rsci->rcu_head, rsc_free_rcu); } static inline int @@ -404,6 +456,11 @@ rsc_alloc(void) return NULL; } +static int rsc_upcall(struct cache_detail *cd, struct cache_head *h) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, char *mesg, int mlen) { @@ -412,7 +469,7 @@ static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, int id; int len, rv; struct rsc rsci, *rscp = NULL; - time_t expiry; + time64_t expiry; int status = -EINVAL; struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL; @@ -426,11 +483,11 @@ static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, rsci.h.flags = 0; /* expiry */ - expiry = get_expiry(&mesg); - status = -EINVAL; - if (expiry == 0) + status = get_expiry(&mesg, &expiry); + if (status) goto out; + status = -EINVAL; rscp = rsc_lookup(cd, &rsci); if (!rscp) goto out; @@ -453,16 +510,18 @@ static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, * treatment so are checked for validity here.) */ /* uid */ - rsci.cred.cr_uid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, id); + rsci.cred.cr_uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), id); /* gid */ if (get_int(&mesg, &id)) goto out; - rsci.cred.cr_gid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, id); + rsci.cred.cr_gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), id); /* number of additional gid's */ if (get_int(&mesg, &N)) goto out; + if (N < 0 || N > NGROUPS_MAX) + goto out; status = -ENOMEM; rsci.cred.cr_group_info = groups_alloc(N); if (rsci.cred.cr_group_info == NULL) @@ -474,11 +533,12 @@ static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, kgid_t kgid; if (get_int(&mesg, &id)) goto out; - kgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, id); + kgid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), id); if (!gid_valid(kgid)) goto out; - GROUP_AT(rsci.cred.cr_group_info, i) = kgid; + rsci.cred.cr_group_info->gid[i] = kgid; } + groups_sort(rsci.cred.cr_group_info); /* mech name */ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen); @@ -522,11 +582,12 @@ out: return status; } -static struct cache_detail rsc_cache_template = { +static const struct cache_detail rsc_cache_template = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .hash_size = RSC_HASHMAX, .name = "auth.rpcsec.context", .cache_put = rsc_put, + .cache_upcall = rsc_upcall, .cache_parse = rsc_parse, .match = rsc_match, .init = rsc_init, @@ -539,7 +600,7 @@ static struct rsc *rsc_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *item) struct cache_head *ch; int hash = rsc_hash(item); - ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup(cd, &item->h, hash); + ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup_rcu(cd, &item->h, hash); if (ch) return container_of(ch, struct rsc, h); else @@ -578,16 +639,29 @@ gss_svc_searchbyctx(struct cache_detail *cd, struct xdr_netobj *handle) return found; } -/* Implements sequence number algorithm as specified in RFC 2203. */ -static int -gss_check_seq_num(struct rsc *rsci, int seq_num) +/** + * gss_check_seq_num - GSS sequence number window check + * @rqstp: RPC Call to use when reporting errors + * @rsci: cached GSS context state (updated on return) + * @seq_num: sequence number to check + * + * Implements sequence number algorithm as specified in + * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.3.1. "Context Management". + * + * Return values: + * %true: @rqstp's GSS sequence number is inside the window + * %false: @rqstp's GSS sequence number is outside the window + */ +static bool gss_check_seq_num(const struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsc *rsci, + u32 seq_num) { struct gss_svc_seq_data *sd = &rsci->seqdata; + bool result = false; spin_lock(&sd->sd_lock); if (seq_num > sd->sd_max) { if (seq_num >= sd->sd_max + GSS_SEQ_WIN) { - memset(sd->sd_win,0,sizeof(sd->sd_win)); + memset(sd->sd_win, 0, sizeof(sd->sd_win)); sd->sd_max = seq_num; } else while (sd->sd_max < seq_num) { sd->sd_max++; @@ -595,151 +669,115 @@ gss_check_seq_num(struct rsc *rsci, int seq_num) } __set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win); goto ok; - } else if (seq_num <= sd->sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN) { - goto drop; + } else if (seq_num + GSS_SEQ_WIN <= sd->sd_max) { + goto toolow; } - /* sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN < seq_num <= sd_max */ if (__test_and_set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win)) - goto drop; + goto alreadyseen; + ok: + result = true; +out: spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock); - return 1; -drop: - spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock); - return 0; -} - -static inline u32 round_up_to_quad(u32 i) -{ - return (i + 3 ) & ~3; -} - -static inline int -svc_safe_getnetobj(struct kvec *argv, struct xdr_netobj *o) -{ - int l; - - if (argv->iov_len < 4) - return -1; - o->len = svc_getnl(argv); - l = round_up_to_quad(o->len); - if (argv->iov_len < l) - return -1; - o->data = argv->iov_base; - argv->iov_base += l; - argv->iov_len -= l; - return 0; -} + return result; -static inline int -svc_safe_putnetobj(struct kvec *resv, struct xdr_netobj *o) -{ - u8 *p; - - if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE) - return -1; - svc_putnl(resv, o->len); - p = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len; - resv->iov_len += round_up_to_quad(o->len); - if (resv->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE) - return -1; - memcpy(p, o->data, o->len); - memset(p + o->len, 0, round_up_to_quad(o->len) - o->len); - return 0; +toolow: + trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_low(rqstp, seq_num, + sd->sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN, + sd->sd_max); + goto out; +alreadyseen: + trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_seen(rqstp, seq_num); + goto out; } /* - * Verify the checksum on the header and return SVC_OK on success. - * Otherwise, return SVC_DROP (in the case of a bad sequence number) - * or return SVC_DENIED and indicate error in authp. + * Decode and verify a Call's verifier field. For RPC_AUTH_GSS Calls, + * the body of this field contains a variable length checksum. + * + * GSS-specific auth_stat values are mandated by RFC 2203 Section + * 5.3.3.3. */ static int -gss_verify_header(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsc *rsci, - __be32 *rpcstart, struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp) +svcauth_gss_verify_header(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsc *rsci, + __be32 *rpcstart, struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc) { + struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream; struct gss_ctx *ctx_id = rsci->mechctx; + u32 flavor, maj_stat; struct xdr_buf rpchdr; struct xdr_netobj checksum; - u32 flavor = 0; - struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0]; struct kvec iov; - /* data to compute the checksum over: */ + /* + * Compute the checksum of the incoming Call from the + * XID field to credential field: + */ iov.iov_base = rpcstart; - iov.iov_len = (u8 *)argv->iov_base - (u8 *)rpcstart; + iov.iov_len = (u8 *)xdr->p - (u8 *)rpcstart; xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &rpchdr); - *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; - if (argv->iov_len < 4) + /* Call's verf field: */ + if (xdr_stream_decode_opaque_auth(xdr, &flavor, + (void **)&checksum.data, + &checksum.len) < 0) { + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badverf; return SVC_DENIED; - flavor = svc_getnl(argv); - if (flavor != RPC_AUTH_GSS) - return SVC_DENIED; - if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &checksum)) + } + if (flavor != RPC_AUTH_GSS || checksum.len < XDR_UNIT) { + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badverf; return SVC_DENIED; + } - if (rqstp->rq_deferred) /* skip verification of revisited request */ + if (rqstp->rq_deferred) return SVC_OK; - if (gss_verify_mic(ctx_id, &rpchdr, &checksum) != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { - *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem; + maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx_id, &rpchdr, &checksum); + if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + trace_rpcgss_svc_mic(rqstp, maj_stat); + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem; return SVC_DENIED; } if (gc->gc_seq > MAXSEQ) { - dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: discarding request with " - "large sequence number %d\n", gc->gc_seq); - *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem; + trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_large(rqstp, gc->gc_seq); + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem; return SVC_DENIED; } - if (!gss_check_seq_num(rsci, gc->gc_seq)) { - dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: discarding request with " - "old sequence number %d\n", gc->gc_seq); + if (!gss_check_seq_num(rqstp, rsci, gc->gc_seq)) return SVC_DROP; - } return SVC_OK; } -static int -gss_write_null_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) -{ - __be32 *p; - - svc_putnl(rqstp->rq_res.head, RPC_AUTH_NULL); - p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len; - /* don't really need to check if head->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE ... */ - *p++ = 0; - if (!xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p)) - return -1; - return 0; -} - -static int -gss_write_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, u32 seq) +/* + * Construct and encode a Reply's verifier field. The verifier's body + * field contains a variable-length checksum of the GSS sequence + * number. + */ +static bool +svcauth_gss_encode_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, u32 seq) { - __be32 xdr_seq; + struct gss_svc_data *gsd = rqstp->rq_auth_data; u32 maj_stat; struct xdr_buf verf_data; - struct xdr_netobj mic; - __be32 *p; + struct xdr_netobj checksum; struct kvec iov; - svc_putnl(rqstp->rq_res.head, RPC_AUTH_GSS); - xdr_seq = htonl(seq); - - iov.iov_base = &xdr_seq; - iov.iov_len = sizeof(xdr_seq); + gsd->gsd_seq_num = cpu_to_be32(seq); + iov.iov_base = &gsd->gsd_seq_num; + iov.iov_len = XDR_UNIT; xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_data); - p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len; - mic.data = (u8 *)(p + 1); - maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx_id, &verf_data, &mic); + + checksum.data = gsd->gsd_scratch; + maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx_id, &verf_data, &checksum); if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) - return -1; - *p++ = htonl(mic.len); - memset((u8 *)p + mic.len, 0, round_up_to_quad(mic.len) - mic.len); - p += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len); - if (!xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p)) - return -1; - return 0; + goto bad_mic; + + return xdr_stream_encode_opaque_auth(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, RPC_AUTH_GSS, + checksum.data, checksum.len) > 0; + +bad_mic: + trace_rpcgss_svc_get_mic(rqstp, maj_stat); + return false; } struct gss_domain { @@ -769,7 +807,7 @@ u32 svcauth_gss_flavor(struct auth_domain *dom) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svcauth_gss_flavor); -int +struct auth_domain * svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor, char * name) { struct gss_domain *new; @@ -786,161 +824,159 @@ svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor, char * name) new->h.flavour = &svcauthops_gss; new->pseudoflavor = pseudoflavor; - stat = 0; test = auth_domain_lookup(name, &new->h); - if (test != &new->h) { /* Duplicate registration */ + if (test != &new->h) { + pr_warn("svc: duplicate registration of gss pseudo flavour %s.\n", + name); + stat = -EADDRINUSE; auth_domain_put(test); - kfree(new->h.name); - goto out_free_dom; + goto out_free_name; } - return 0; + return test; +out_free_name: + kfree(new->h.name); out_free_dom: kfree(new); out: - return stat; + return ERR_PTR(stat); } - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor); -static inline int -read_u32_from_xdr_buf(struct xdr_buf *buf, int base, u32 *obj) -{ - __be32 raw; - int status; - - status = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, base, &raw, sizeof(*obj)); - if (status) - return status; - *obj = ntohl(raw); - return 0; -} - -/* It would be nice if this bit of code could be shared with the client. - * Obstacles: - * The client shouldn't malloc(), would have to pass in own memory. - * The server uses base of head iovec as read pointer, while the - * client uses separate pointer. */ -static int -unwrap_integ_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx) +/* + * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.2 + * + * struct rpc_gss_integ_data { + * opaque databody_integ<>; + * opaque checksum<>; + * }; + * + * struct rpc_gss_data_t { + * unsigned int seq_num; + * proc_req_arg_t arg; + * }; + */ +static noinline_for_stack int +svcauth_gss_unwrap_integ(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx) { - int stat = -EINVAL; - u32 integ_len, maj_stat; - struct xdr_netobj mic; - struct xdr_buf integ_buf; + struct gss_svc_data *gsd = rqstp->rq_auth_data; + struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream; + u32 len, offset, seq_num, maj_stat; + struct xdr_buf *buf = xdr->buf; + struct xdr_buf databody_integ; + struct xdr_netobj checksum; /* Did we already verify the signature on the original pass through? */ if (rqstp->rq_deferred) return 0; - integ_len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]); - if (integ_len & 3) - return stat; - if (integ_len > buf->len) - return stat; - if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &integ_buf, 0, integ_len)) - BUG(); - /* copy out mic... */ - if (read_u32_from_xdr_buf(buf, integ_len, &mic.len)) - BUG(); - if (mic.len > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE) - return stat; - mic.data = kmalloc(mic.len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!mic.data) - return stat; - if (read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, integ_len + 4, mic.data, mic.len)) - goto out; - maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx, &integ_buf, &mic); + if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &len) < 0) + goto unwrap_failed; + if (len & 3) + goto unwrap_failed; + offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr); + if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &databody_integ, offset, len)) + goto unwrap_failed; + + /* + * The xdr_stream now points to the @seq_num field. The next + * XDR data item is the @arg field, which contains the clear + * text RPC program payload. The checksum, which follows the + * @arg field, is located and decoded without updating the + * xdr_stream. + */ + + offset += len; + if (xdr_decode_word(buf, offset, &checksum.len)) + goto unwrap_failed; + if (checksum.len > sizeof(gsd->gsd_scratch)) + goto unwrap_failed; + checksum.data = gsd->gsd_scratch; + if (read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, offset + XDR_UNIT, checksum.data, + checksum.len)) + goto unwrap_failed; + + maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx, &databody_integ, &checksum); if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) - goto out; - if (svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]) != seq) - goto out; - /* trim off the mic at the end before returning */ - xdr_buf_trim(buf, mic.len + 4); - stat = 0; -out: - kfree(mic.data); - return stat; -} + goto bad_mic; -static inline int -total_buf_len(struct xdr_buf *buf) -{ - return buf->head[0].iov_len + buf->page_len + buf->tail[0].iov_len; -} + /* The received seqno is protected by the checksum. */ + if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &seq_num) < 0) + goto unwrap_failed; + if (seq_num != seq) + goto bad_seqno; -static void -fix_priv_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, int pad) -{ - if (buf->page_len == 0) { - /* We need to adjust head and buf->len in tandem in this - * case to make svc_defer() work--it finds the original - * buffer start using buf->len - buf->head[0].iov_len. */ - buf->head[0].iov_len -= pad; - } + xdr_truncate_decode(xdr, XDR_UNIT + checksum.len); + return 0; + +unwrap_failed: + trace_rpcgss_svc_unwrap_failed(rqstp); + return -EINVAL; +bad_seqno: + trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_bad(rqstp, seq, seq_num); + return -EINVAL; +bad_mic: + trace_rpcgss_svc_mic(rqstp, maj_stat); + return -EINVAL; } -static int -unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx) +/* + * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.3 + * + * struct rpc_gss_priv_data { + * opaque databody_priv<> + * }; + * + * struct rpc_gss_data_t { + * unsigned int seq_num; + * proc_req_arg_t arg; + * }; + */ +static noinline_for_stack int +svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx) { - u32 priv_len, maj_stat; - int pad, saved_len, remaining_len, offset; - - rqstp->rq_splice_ok = 0; + struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream; + u32 len, maj_stat, seq_num, offset; + struct xdr_buf *buf = xdr->buf; + unsigned int saved_len; - priv_len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]); + if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &len) < 0) + goto unwrap_failed; if (rqstp->rq_deferred) { /* Already decrypted last time through! The sequence number * check at out_seq is unnecessary but harmless: */ goto out_seq; } - /* buf->len is the number of bytes from the original start of the - * request to the end, where head[0].iov_len is just the bytes - * not yet read from the head, so these two values are different: */ - remaining_len = total_buf_len(buf); - if (priv_len > remaining_len) - return -EINVAL; - pad = remaining_len - priv_len; - buf->len -= pad; - fix_priv_head(buf, pad); + if (len > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr)) + goto unwrap_failed; + offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr); - /* Maybe it would be better to give gss_unwrap a length parameter: */ saved_len = buf->len; - buf->len = priv_len; - maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, 0, buf); - pad = priv_len - buf->len; - buf->len = saved_len; - buf->len -= pad; - /* The upper layers assume the buffer is aligned on 4-byte boundaries. - * In the krb5p case, at least, the data ends up offset, so we need to - * move it around. */ - /* XXX: This is very inefficient. It would be better to either do - * this while we encrypt, or maybe in the receive code, if we can peak - * ahead and work out the service and mechanism there. */ - offset = buf->head[0].iov_len % 4; - if (offset) { - buf->buflen = RPCSVC_MAXPAYLOAD; - xdr_shift_buf(buf, offset); - fix_priv_head(buf, pad); - } + maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, offset, offset + len, buf); if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) - return -EINVAL; + goto bad_unwrap; + xdr->nwords -= XDR_QUADLEN(saved_len - buf->len); + out_seq: - if (svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]) != seq) - return -EINVAL; + /* gss_unwrap() decrypted the sequence number. */ + if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &seq_num) < 0) + goto unwrap_failed; + if (seq_num != seq) + goto bad_seqno; return 0; -} -struct gss_svc_data { - /* decoded gss client cred: */ - struct rpc_gss_wire_cred clcred; - /* save a pointer to the beginning of the encoded verifier, - * for use in encryption/checksumming in svcauth_gss_release: */ - __be32 *verf_start; - struct rsc *rsci; -}; +unwrap_failed: + trace_rpcgss_svc_unwrap_failed(rqstp); + return -EINVAL; +bad_seqno: + trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_bad(rqstp, seq, seq_num); + return -EINVAL; +bad_unwrap: + trace_rpcgss_svc_unwrap(rqstp, maj_stat); + return -EINVAL; +} -static int +static enum svc_auth_status svcauth_gss_set_client(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) { struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data; @@ -948,6 +984,8 @@ svcauth_gss_set_client(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &svcdata->clcred; int stat; + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badcred; + /* * A gss export can be specified either by: * export *(sec=krb5,rw) @@ -963,129 +1001,146 @@ svcauth_gss_set_client(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) stat = svcauth_unix_set_client(rqstp); if (stat == SVC_DROP || stat == SVC_CLOSE) return stat; + + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_auth_ok; return SVC_OK; } -static inline int -gss_write_init_verf(struct cache_detail *cd, struct svc_rqst *rqstp, - struct xdr_netobj *out_handle, int *major_status) +static bool +svcauth_gss_proc_init_verf(struct cache_detail *cd, struct svc_rqst *rqstp, + struct xdr_netobj *out_handle, int *major_status, + u32 seq_num) { + struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_res_stream; struct rsc *rsci; - int rc; + bool rc; if (*major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) - return gss_write_null_verf(rqstp); + goto null_verifier; rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(cd, out_handle); if (rsci == NULL) { *major_status = GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT; - return gss_write_null_verf(rqstp); + goto null_verifier; } - rc = gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, GSS_SEQ_WIN); + + rc = svcauth_gss_encode_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, seq_num); cache_put(&rsci->h, cd); return rc; -} - -static inline int -gss_read_common_verf(struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, - struct kvec *argv, __be32 *authp, - struct xdr_netobj *in_handle) -{ - /* Read the verifier; should be NULL: */ - *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; - if (argv->iov_len < 2 * 4) - return SVC_DENIED; - if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_AUTH_NULL) - return SVC_DENIED; - if (svc_getnl(argv) != 0) - return SVC_DENIED; - /* Martial context handle and token for upcall: */ - *authp = rpc_autherr_badcred; - if (gc->gc_proc == RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT && gc->gc_ctx.len != 0) - return SVC_DENIED; - if (dup_netobj(in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx)) - return SVC_CLOSE; - *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; - return 0; +null_verifier: + return xdr_stream_encode_opaque_auth(xdr, RPC_AUTH_NULL, NULL, 0) > 0; } -static inline int -gss_read_verf(struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, - struct kvec *argv, __be32 *authp, - struct xdr_netobj *in_handle, - struct xdr_netobj *in_token) +static void gss_free_in_token_pages(struct gssp_in_token *in_token) { - struct xdr_netobj tmpobj; - int res; + int i; - res = gss_read_common_verf(gc, argv, authp, in_handle); - if (res) - return res; - - if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &tmpobj)) { - kfree(in_handle->data); - return SVC_DENIED; - } - if (dup_netobj(in_token, &tmpobj)) { - kfree(in_handle->data); - return SVC_CLOSE; - } - - return 0; + i = 0; + while (in_token->pages[i]) + put_page(in_token->pages[i++]); + kfree(in_token->pages); + in_token->pages = NULL; } -/* Ok this is really heavily depending on a set of semantics in - * how rqstp is set up by svc_recv and pages laid down by the - * server when reading a request. We are basically guaranteed that - * the token lays all down linearly across a set of pages, starting - * at iov_base in rq_arg.head[0] which happens to be the first of a - * set of pages stored in rq_pages[]. - * rq_arg.head[0].iov_base will provide us the page_base to pass - * to the upcall. - */ -static inline int -gss_read_proxy_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, - struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp, - struct xdr_netobj *in_handle, - struct gssp_in_token *in_token) +static int gss_read_proxy_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, + struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, + struct xdr_netobj *in_handle, + struct gssp_in_token *in_token) { - struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0]; + struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream; + unsigned int length, pgto_offs, pgfrom_offs; + int pages, i, pgto, pgfrom; + size_t to_offs, from_offs; u32 inlen; - int res; - res = gss_read_common_verf(gc, argv, authp, in_handle); - if (res) - return res; - - inlen = svc_getnl(argv); - if (inlen > (argv->iov_len + rqstp->rq_arg.page_len)) - return SVC_DENIED; + if (dup_netobj(in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx)) + return SVC_CLOSE; - in_token->pages = rqstp->rq_pages; - in_token->page_base = (ulong)argv->iov_base & ~PAGE_MASK; + /* + * RFC 2203 Section 5.2.2 + * + * struct rpc_gss_init_arg { + * opaque gss_token<>; + * }; + */ + if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &inlen) < 0) + goto out_denied_free; + if (inlen > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr)) + goto out_denied_free; + + pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, PAGE_SIZE); + in_token->pages = kcalloc(pages + 1, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!in_token->pages) + goto out_denied_free; + in_token->page_base = 0; in_token->page_len = inlen; + for (i = 0; i < pages; i++) { + in_token->pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!in_token->pages[i]) { + gss_free_in_token_pages(in_token); + goto out_denied_free; + } + } + length = min_t(unsigned int, inlen, (char *)xdr->end - (char *)xdr->p); + memcpy(page_address(in_token->pages[0]), xdr->p, length); + inlen -= length; + + to_offs = length; + from_offs = rqstp->rq_arg.page_base; + while (inlen) { + pgto = to_offs >> PAGE_SHIFT; + pgfrom = from_offs >> PAGE_SHIFT; + pgto_offs = to_offs & ~PAGE_MASK; + pgfrom_offs = from_offs & ~PAGE_MASK; + + length = min_t(unsigned int, inlen, + min_t(unsigned int, PAGE_SIZE - pgto_offs, + PAGE_SIZE - pgfrom_offs)); + memcpy(page_address(in_token->pages[pgto]) + pgto_offs, + page_address(rqstp->rq_arg.pages[pgfrom]) + pgfrom_offs, + length); + + to_offs += length; + from_offs += length; + inlen -= length; + } return 0; + +out_denied_free: + kfree(in_handle->data); + return SVC_DENIED; } -static inline int -gss_write_resv(struct kvec *resv, size_t size_limit, - struct xdr_netobj *out_handle, struct xdr_netobj *out_token, - int major_status, int minor_status) -{ - if (resv->iov_len + 4 > size_limit) - return -1; - svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS); - if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, out_handle)) - return -1; - if (resv->iov_len + 3 * 4 > size_limit) - return -1; - svc_putnl(resv, major_status); - svc_putnl(resv, minor_status); - svc_putnl(resv, GSS_SEQ_WIN); - if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, out_token)) - return -1; - return 0; +/* + * RFC 2203, Section 5.2.3.1. + * + * struct rpc_gss_init_res { + * opaque handle<>; + * unsigned int gss_major; + * unsigned int gss_minor; + * unsigned int seq_window; + * opaque gss_token<>; + * }; + */ +static bool +svcxdr_encode_gss_init_res(struct xdr_stream *xdr, + struct xdr_netobj *handle, + struct xdr_netobj *gss_token, + unsigned int major_status, + unsigned int minor_status, u32 seq_num) +{ + if (xdr_stream_encode_opaque(xdr, handle->data, handle->len) < 0) + return false; + if (xdr_stream_encode_u32(xdr, major_status) < 0) + return false; + if (xdr_stream_encode_u32(xdr, minor_status) < 0) + return false; + if (xdr_stream_encode_u32(xdr, seq_num) < 0) + return false; + if (xdr_stream_encode_opaque(xdr, gss_token->data, gss_token->len) < 0) + return false; + return true; } /* @@ -1095,20 +1150,44 @@ gss_write_resv(struct kvec *resv, size_t size_limit, * the upcall results are available, write the verifier and result. * Otherwise, drop the request pending an answer to the upcall. */ -static int svcauth_gss_legacy_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, - struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp) +static int +svcauth_gss_legacy_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, + struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc) { - struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0]; - struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0]; + struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream; struct rsi *rsip, rsikey; + __be32 *p; + u32 len; int ret; - struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_net, sunrpc_net_id); + struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), sunrpc_net_id); memset(&rsikey, 0, sizeof(rsikey)); - ret = gss_read_verf(gc, argv, authp, - &rsikey.in_handle, &rsikey.in_token); - if (ret) - return ret; + if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx)) + return SVC_CLOSE; + + /* + * RFC 2203 Section 5.2.2 + * + * struct rpc_gss_init_arg { + * opaque gss_token<>; + * }; + */ + if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &len) < 0) { + kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data); + return SVC_DENIED; + } + p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, len); + if (!p) { + kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data); + return SVC_DENIED; + } + rsikey.in_token.data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(rsikey.in_token.data)) { + kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data); + return SVC_CLOSE; + } + memcpy(rsikey.in_token.data, p, len); + rsikey.in_token.len = len; /* Perform upcall, or find upcall result: */ rsip = rsi_lookup(sn->rsi_cache, &rsikey); @@ -1120,13 +1199,14 @@ static int svcauth_gss_legacy_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, return SVC_CLOSE; ret = SVC_CLOSE; - /* Got an answer to the upcall; use it: */ - if (gss_write_init_verf(sn->rsc_cache, rqstp, - &rsip->out_handle, &rsip->major_status)) + if (!svcauth_gss_proc_init_verf(sn->rsc_cache, rqstp, &rsip->out_handle, + &rsip->major_status, GSS_SEQ_WIN)) + goto out; + if (!svcxdr_set_accept_stat(rqstp)) goto out; - if (gss_write_resv(resv, PAGE_SIZE, - &rsip->out_handle, &rsip->out_token, - rsip->major_status, rsip->minor_status)) + if (!svcxdr_encode_gss_init_res(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, &rsip->out_handle, + &rsip->out_token, rsip->major_status, + rsip->minor_status, GSS_SEQ_WIN)) goto out; ret = SVC_COMPLETE; @@ -1143,8 +1223,8 @@ static int gss_proxy_save_rsc(struct cache_detail *cd, static atomic64_t ctxhctr; long long ctxh; struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL; - time_t expiry; - int status = -EINVAL; + time64_t expiry; + int status; memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci)); /* context handle */ @@ -1167,9 +1247,9 @@ static int gss_proxy_save_rsc(struct cache_detail *cd, if (!ud->found_creds) { /* userspace seem buggy, we should always get at least a * mapping to nobody */ - dprintk("RPC: No creds found, marking Negative!\n"); - set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &rsci.h.flags); + goto out; } else { + struct timespec64 boot; /* steal creds */ rsci.cred = ud->creds; @@ -1180,6 +1260,7 @@ static int gss_proxy_save_rsc(struct cache_detail *cd, gm = gss_mech_get_by_OID(&ud->mech_oid); if (!gm) goto out; + rsci.cred.cr_gss_mech = gm; status = -EINVAL; /* mech-specific data: */ @@ -1189,13 +1270,15 @@ static int gss_proxy_save_rsc(struct cache_detail *cd, &expiry, GFP_KERNEL); if (status) goto out; + + getboottime64(&boot); + expiry -= boot.tv_sec; } rsci.h.expiry_time = expiry; rscp = rsc_update(cd, &rsci, rscp); status = 0; out: - gss_mech_put(gm); rsc_free(&rsci); if (rscp) cache_put(&rscp->h, cd); @@ -1205,20 +1288,18 @@ out: } static int svcauth_gss_proxy_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, - struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp) + struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc) { - struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0]; struct xdr_netobj cli_handle; struct gssp_upcall_data ud; uint64_t handle; int status; int ret; - struct net *net = rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_net; + struct net *net = SVC_NET(rqstp); struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id); memset(&ud, 0, sizeof(ud)); - ret = gss_read_proxy_verf(rqstp, gc, authp, - &ud.in_handle, &ud.in_token); + ret = gss_read_proxy_verf(rqstp, gc, &ud.in_handle, &ud.in_token); if (ret) return ret; @@ -1229,8 +1310,7 @@ static int svcauth_gss_proxy_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, if (status) goto out; - dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: gss major status = %d\n", - ud.major_status); + trace_rpcgss_svc_accept_upcall(rqstp, ud.major_status, ud.minor_status); switch (ud.major_status) { case GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED: @@ -1244,89 +1324,84 @@ static int svcauth_gss_proxy_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, cli_handle.len = sizeof(handle); break; default: - ret = SVC_CLOSE; goto out; } - /* Got an answer to the upcall; use it: */ - if (gss_write_init_verf(sn->rsc_cache, rqstp, - &cli_handle, &ud.major_status)) + if (!svcauth_gss_proc_init_verf(sn->rsc_cache, rqstp, &cli_handle, + &ud.major_status, GSS_SEQ_WIN)) + goto out; + if (!svcxdr_set_accept_stat(rqstp)) goto out; - if (gss_write_resv(resv, PAGE_SIZE, - &cli_handle, &ud.out_token, - ud.major_status, ud.minor_status)) + if (!svcxdr_encode_gss_init_res(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, &cli_handle, + &ud.out_token, ud.major_status, + ud.minor_status, GSS_SEQ_WIN)) goto out; ret = SVC_COMPLETE; out: + gss_free_in_token_pages(&ud.in_token); gssp_free_upcall_data(&ud); return ret; } -DEFINE_SPINLOCK(use_gssp_lock); - -static bool use_gss_proxy(struct net *net) +/* + * Try to set the sn->use_gss_proxy variable to a new value. We only allow + * it to be changed if it's currently undefined (-1). If it's any other value + * then return -EBUSY unless the type wouldn't have changed anyway. + */ +static int set_gss_proxy(struct net *net, int type) { struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id); + int ret; - if (sn->use_gss_proxy != -1) - return sn->use_gss_proxy; - spin_lock(&use_gssp_lock); - /* - * If you wanted gss-proxy, you should have said so before - * starting to accept requests: - */ - sn->use_gss_proxy = 0; - spin_unlock(&use_gssp_lock); + WARN_ON_ONCE(type != 0 && type != 1); + ret = cmpxchg(&sn->use_gss_proxy, -1, type); + if (ret != -1 && ret != type) + return -EBUSY; return 0; } -#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS - -static int set_gss_proxy(struct net *net, int type) +static bool use_gss_proxy(struct net *net) { struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id); - int ret = 0; - WARN_ON_ONCE(type != 0 && type != 1); - spin_lock(&use_gssp_lock); - if (sn->use_gss_proxy == -1 || sn->use_gss_proxy == type) - sn->use_gss_proxy = type; - else - ret = -EBUSY; - spin_unlock(&use_gssp_lock); - wake_up(&sn->gssp_wq); - return ret; + /* If use_gss_proxy is still undefined, then try to disable it */ + if (sn->use_gss_proxy == -1) + set_gss_proxy(net, 0); + return sn->use_gss_proxy; } -static inline bool gssp_ready(struct sunrpc_net *sn) +static noinline_for_stack int +svcauth_gss_proc_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc) { - switch (sn->use_gss_proxy) { - case -1: - return false; - case 0: - return true; - case 1: - return sn->gssp_clnt; + struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream; + u32 flavor, len; + void *body; + + /* Call's verf field: */ + if (xdr_stream_decode_opaque_auth(xdr, &flavor, &body, &len) < 0) + return SVC_GARBAGE; + if (flavor != RPC_AUTH_NULL || len != 0) { + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badverf; + return SVC_DENIED; } - WARN_ON_ONCE(1); - return false; -} -static int wait_for_gss_proxy(struct net *net, struct file *file) -{ - struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id); + if (gc->gc_proc == RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT && gc->gc_ctx.len != 0) { + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badcred; + return SVC_DENIED; + } - if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK && !gssp_ready(sn)) - return -EAGAIN; - return wait_event_interruptible(sn->gssp_wq, gssp_ready(sn)); + if (!use_gss_proxy(SVC_NET(rqstp))) + return svcauth_gss_legacy_init(rqstp, gc); + return svcauth_gss_proxy_init(rqstp, gc); } +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS static ssize_t write_gssp(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct net *net = PDE_DATA(file_inode(file)); + struct net *net = pde_data(file_inode(file)); char tbuf[20]; unsigned long i; int res; @@ -1342,10 +1417,10 @@ static ssize_t write_gssp(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, return res; if (i != 1) return -EINVAL; - res = set_gss_proxy(net, 1); + res = set_gssp_clnt(net); if (res) return res; - res = set_gssp_clnt(net); + res = set_gss_proxy(net, 1); if (res) return res; return count; @@ -1354,17 +1429,13 @@ static ssize_t write_gssp(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, static ssize_t read_gssp(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct net *net = PDE_DATA(file_inode(file)); + struct net *net = pde_data(file_inode(file)); + struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id); unsigned long p = *ppos; char tbuf[10]; size_t len; - int ret; - - ret = wait_for_gss_proxy(net, file); - if (ret) - return ret; - snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d\n", use_gss_proxy(net)); + snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d\n", sn->use_gss_proxy); len = strlen(tbuf); if (p >= len) return 0; @@ -1377,10 +1448,10 @@ static ssize_t read_gssp(struct file *file, char __user *buf, return len; } -static const struct file_operations use_gss_proxy_ops = { - .open = nonseekable_open, - .write = write_gssp, - .read = read_gssp, +static const struct proc_ops use_gss_proxy_proc_ops = { + .proc_open = nonseekable_open, + .proc_write = write_gssp, + .proc_read = read_gssp, }; static int create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net) @@ -1389,9 +1460,9 @@ static int create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net) struct proc_dir_entry **p = &sn->use_gssp_proc; sn->use_gss_proxy = -1; - *p = proc_create_data("use-gss-proxy", S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR, + *p = proc_create_data("use-gss-proxy", S_IFREG | 0600, sn->proc_net_rpc, - &use_gss_proxy_ops, net); + &use_gss_proxy_proc_ops, net); if (!*p) return -ENOMEM; init_gssp_clnt(sn); @@ -1403,10 +1474,60 @@ static void destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net) struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id); if (sn->use_gssp_proc) { - remove_proc_entry("use-gss-proxy", sn->proc_net_rpc); + remove_proc_entry("use-gss-proxy", sn->proc_net_rpc); clear_gssp_clnt(sn); } } + +static ssize_t read_gss_krb5_enctypes(struct file *file, char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct rpcsec_gss_oid oid = { + .len = 9, + .data = "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02", + }; + struct gss_api_mech *mech; + ssize_t ret; + + mech = gss_mech_get_by_OID(&oid); + if (!mech) + return 0; + if (!mech->gm_upcall_enctypes) { + gss_mech_put(mech); + return 0; + } + + ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, + mech->gm_upcall_enctypes, + strlen(mech->gm_upcall_enctypes)); + gss_mech_put(mech); + return ret; +} + +static const struct proc_ops gss_krb5_enctypes_proc_ops = { + .proc_open = nonseekable_open, + .proc_read = read_gss_krb5_enctypes, +}; + +static int create_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(struct net *net) +{ + struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id); + + sn->gss_krb5_enctypes = + proc_create_data("gss_krb5_enctypes", S_IFREG | 0444, + sn->proc_net_rpc, &gss_krb5_enctypes_proc_ops, + net); + return sn->gss_krb5_enctypes ? 0 : -ENOMEM; +} + +static void destroy_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(struct net *net) +{ + struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id); + + if (sn->gss_krb5_enctypes) + remove_proc_entry("gss_krb5_enctypes", sn->proc_net_rpc); +} + #else /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ static int create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net) @@ -1416,86 +1537,129 @@ static int create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net) static void destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net) {} +static int create_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(struct net *net) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void destroy_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(struct net *net) {} + #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ /* - * Accept an rpcsec packet. - * If context establishment, punt to user space - * If data exchange, verify/decrypt - * If context destruction, handle here - * In the context establishment and destruction case we encode - * response here and return SVC_COMPLETE. + * The Call's credential body should contain a struct rpc_gss_cred_t. + * + * RFC 2203 Section 5 + * + * struct rpc_gss_cred_t { + * union switch (unsigned int version) { + * case RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1: + * struct { + * rpc_gss_proc_t gss_proc; + * unsigned int seq_num; + * rpc_gss_service_t service; + * opaque handle<>; + * } rpc_gss_cred_vers_1_t; + * } + * }; */ -static int -svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp) +static bool +svcauth_gss_decode_credbody(struct xdr_stream *xdr, + struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, + __be32 **rpcstart) +{ + ssize_t handle_len; + u32 body_len; + __be32 *p; + + p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, XDR_UNIT); + if (!p) + return false; + /* + * start of rpc packet is 7 u32's back from here: + * xid direction rpcversion prog vers proc flavour + */ + *rpcstart = p - 7; + body_len = be32_to_cpup(p); + if (body_len > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE) + return false; + + /* struct rpc_gss_cred_t */ + if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &gc->gc_v) < 0) + return false; + if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &gc->gc_proc) < 0) + return false; + if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &gc->gc_seq) < 0) + return false; + if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &gc->gc_svc) < 0) + return false; + handle_len = xdr_stream_decode_opaque_inline(xdr, + (void **)&gc->gc_ctx.data, + body_len); + if (handle_len < 0) + return false; + if (body_len != XDR_UNIT * 5 + xdr_align_size(handle_len)) + return false; + + gc->gc_ctx.len = handle_len; + return true; +} + +/** + * svcauth_gss_accept - Decode and validate incoming RPC_AUTH_GSS credential + * @rqstp: RPC transaction + * + * Return values: + * %SVC_OK: Success + * %SVC_COMPLETE: GSS context lifetime event + * %SVC_DENIED: Credential or verifier is not valid + * %SVC_GARBAGE: Failed to decode credential or verifier + * %SVC_CLOSE: Temporary failure + * + * The rqstp->rq_auth_stat field is also set (see RFCs 2203 and 5531). + */ +static enum svc_auth_status +svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) { - struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0]; - struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0]; - u32 crlen; struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data; + __be32 *rpcstart; struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc; struct rsc *rsci = NULL; - __be32 *rpcstart; - __be32 *reject_stat = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len; int ret; - struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_net, sunrpc_net_id); - - dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: argv->iov_len = %zd\n", - argv->iov_len); + struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), sunrpc_net_id); - *authp = rpc_autherr_badcred; + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_failed; if (!svcdata) svcdata = kmalloc(sizeof(*svcdata), GFP_KERNEL); if (!svcdata) goto auth_err; rqstp->rq_auth_data = svcdata; - svcdata->verf_start = NULL; + svcdata->gsd_databody_offset = 0; svcdata->rsci = NULL; gc = &svcdata->clcred; - /* start of rpc packet is 7 u32's back from here: - * xid direction rpcversion prog vers proc flavour - */ - rpcstart = argv->iov_base; - rpcstart -= 7; - - /* credential is: - * version(==1), proc(0,1,2,3), seq, service (1,2,3), handle - * at least 5 u32s, and is preceded by length, so that makes 6. - */ - - if (argv->iov_len < 5 * 4) - goto auth_err; - crlen = svc_getnl(argv); - if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_GSS_VERSION) + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badcred; + if (!svcauth_gss_decode_credbody(&rqstp->rq_arg_stream, gc, &rpcstart)) goto auth_err; - gc->gc_proc = svc_getnl(argv); - gc->gc_seq = svc_getnl(argv); - gc->gc_svc = svc_getnl(argv); - if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &gc->gc_ctx)) - goto auth_err; - if (crlen != round_up_to_quad(gc->gc_ctx.len) + 5 * 4) - goto auth_err; - - if ((gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA) && (rqstp->rq_proc != 0)) + if (gc->gc_v != RPC_GSS_VERSION) goto auth_err; - *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; switch (gc->gc_proc) { case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT: case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT: - if (use_gss_proxy(SVC_NET(rqstp))) - return svcauth_gss_proxy_init(rqstp, gc, authp); - else - return svcauth_gss_legacy_init(rqstp, gc, authp); - case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA: + if (rqstp->rq_proc != 0) + goto auth_err; + return svcauth_gss_proc_init(rqstp, gc); case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY: - /* Look up the context, and check the verifier: */ - *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem; + if (rqstp->rq_proc != 0) + goto auth_err; + fallthrough; + case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA: + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem; rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(sn->rsc_cache, &gc->gc_ctx); if (!rsci) goto auth_err; - switch (gss_verify_header(rqstp, rsci, rpcstart, gc, authp)) { + switch (svcauth_gss_verify_header(rqstp, rsci, rpcstart, gc)) { case SVC_OK: break; case SVC_DENIED: @@ -1505,47 +1669,50 @@ svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp) } break; default: - *authp = rpc_autherr_rejectedcred; + if (rqstp->rq_proc != 0) + goto auth_err; + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_rejectedcred; goto auth_err; } /* now act upon the command: */ switch (gc->gc_proc) { case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY: - if (gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq)) + if (!svcauth_gss_encode_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq)) goto auth_err; - rsci->h.expiry_time = get_seconds(); - set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &rsci->h.flags); - if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE) - goto drop; - svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS); + if (!svcxdr_set_accept_stat(rqstp)) + goto auth_err; + /* Delete the entry from the cache_list and call cache_put */ + sunrpc_cache_unhash(sn->rsc_cache, &rsci->h); goto complete; case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA: - *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem; - svcdata->verf_start = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len; - if (gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq)) + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem; + if (!svcauth_gss_encode_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq)) + goto auth_err; + if (!svcxdr_set_accept_stat(rqstp)) goto auth_err; + svcdata->gsd_databody_offset = xdr_stream_pos(&rqstp->rq_res_stream); rqstp->rq_cred = rsci->cred; get_group_info(rsci->cred.cr_group_info); - *authp = rpc_autherr_badcred; + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badcred; switch (gc->gc_svc) { case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE: break; case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY: - /* placeholders for length and seq. number: */ - svc_putnl(resv, 0); - svc_putnl(resv, 0); - if (unwrap_integ_data(rqstp, &rqstp->rq_arg, - gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx)) + /* placeholders for body length and seq. number: */ + xdr_reserve_space(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, XDR_UNIT * 2); + if (svcauth_gss_unwrap_integ(rqstp, gc->gc_seq, + rsci->mechctx)) goto garbage_args; + svcxdr_set_auth_slack(rqstp, RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE); break; case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY: - /* placeholders for length and seq. number: */ - svc_putnl(resv, 0); - svc_putnl(resv, 0); - if (unwrap_priv_data(rqstp, &rqstp->rq_arg, - gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx)) + /* placeholders for body length and seq. number: */ + xdr_reserve_space(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, XDR_UNIT * 2); + if (svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(rqstp, gc->gc_seq, + rsci->mechctx)) goto garbage_args; + svcxdr_set_auth_slack(rqstp, RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE * 2); break; default: goto auth_err; @@ -1557,124 +1724,146 @@ svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp) GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, gc->gc_svc); ret = SVC_OK; + trace_rpcgss_svc_authenticate(rqstp, gc); goto out; } garbage_args: ret = SVC_GARBAGE; goto out; auth_err: - /* Restore write pointer to its original value: */ - xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, reject_stat); + xdr_truncate_encode(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, XDR_UNIT * 2); ret = SVC_DENIED; goto out; complete: ret = SVC_COMPLETE; goto out; drop: - ret = SVC_DROP; + ret = SVC_CLOSE; out: if (rsci) cache_put(&rsci->h, sn->rsc_cache); return ret; } -static __be32 * -svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(struct xdr_buf *resbuf, struct gss_svc_data *gsd) +static u32 +svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_svc_data *gsd) { - __be32 *p; - u32 verf_len; + u32 offset; - p = gsd->verf_start; - gsd->verf_start = NULL; + /* Release can be called twice, but we only wrap once. */ + offset = gsd->gsd_databody_offset; + gsd->gsd_databody_offset = 0; - /* If the reply stat is nonzero, don't wrap: */ - if (*(p-1) != rpc_success) - return NULL; - /* Skip the verifier: */ - p += 1; - verf_len = ntohl(*p++); - p += XDR_QUADLEN(verf_len); - /* move accept_stat to right place: */ - memcpy(p, p + 2, 4); - /* Also don't wrap if the accept stat is nonzero: */ - if (*p != rpc_success) { - resbuf->head[0].iov_len -= 2 * 4; - return NULL; - } - p++; - return p; + /* AUTH_ERROR replies are not wrapped. */ + if (rqstp->rq_auth_stat != rpc_auth_ok) + return 0; + + /* Also don't wrap if the accept_stat is nonzero: */ + if (*rqstp->rq_accept_statp != rpc_success) + return 0; + + return offset; } -static inline int -svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_integ(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) +/* + * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.2 + * + * struct rpc_gss_integ_data { + * opaque databody_integ<>; + * opaque checksum<>; + * }; + * + * struct rpc_gss_data_t { + * unsigned int seq_num; + * proc_req_arg_t arg; + * }; + * + * The RPC Reply message has already been XDR-encoded. rq_res_stream + * is now positioned so that the checksum can be written just past + * the RPC Reply message. + */ +static int svcauth_gss_wrap_integ(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) { - struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data; + struct gss_svc_data *gsd = rqstp->rq_auth_data; + struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_res_stream; struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred; - struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res; - struct xdr_buf integ_buf; - struct xdr_netobj mic; - struct kvec *resv; - __be32 *p; - int integ_offset, integ_len; - int stat = -EINVAL; + struct xdr_buf *buf = xdr->buf; + struct xdr_buf databody_integ; + struct xdr_netobj checksum; + u32 offset, maj_stat; - p = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(resbuf, gsd); - if (p == NULL) + offset = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(rqstp, gsd); + if (!offset) goto out; - integ_offset = (u8 *)(p + 1) - (u8 *)resbuf->head[0].iov_base; - integ_len = resbuf->len - integ_offset; - BUG_ON(integ_len % 4); - *p++ = htonl(integ_len); - *p++ = htonl(gc->gc_seq); - if (xdr_buf_subsegment(resbuf, &integ_buf, integ_offset, - integ_len)) - BUG(); - if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base == NULL) { - if (resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE) - goto out_err; - resbuf->tail[0].iov_base = resbuf->head[0].iov_base - + resbuf->head[0].iov_len; - resbuf->tail[0].iov_len = 0; - resv = &resbuf->tail[0]; - } else { - resv = &resbuf->tail[0]; - } - mic.data = (u8 *)resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len + 4; - if (gss_get_mic(gsd->rsci->mechctx, &integ_buf, &mic)) - goto out_err; - svc_putnl(resv, mic.len); - memset(mic.data + mic.len, 0, - round_up_to_quad(mic.len) - mic.len); - resv->iov_len += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len) << 2; - /* not strictly required: */ - resbuf->len += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len) << 2; - BUG_ON(resv->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE); + + if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &databody_integ, offset + XDR_UNIT, + buf->len - offset - XDR_UNIT)) + goto wrap_failed; + /* Buffer space for these has already been reserved in + * svcauth_gss_accept(). */ + if (xdr_encode_word(buf, offset, databody_integ.len)) + goto wrap_failed; + if (xdr_encode_word(buf, offset + XDR_UNIT, gc->gc_seq)) + goto wrap_failed; + + checksum.data = gsd->gsd_scratch; + maj_stat = gss_get_mic(gsd->rsci->mechctx, &databody_integ, &checksum); + if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + goto bad_mic; + + if (xdr_stream_encode_opaque(xdr, checksum.data, checksum.len) < 0) + goto wrap_failed; + xdr_commit_encode(xdr); + out: - stat = 0; -out_err: - return stat; + return 0; + +bad_mic: + trace_rpcgss_svc_get_mic(rqstp, maj_stat); + return -EINVAL; +wrap_failed: + trace_rpcgss_svc_wrap_failed(rqstp); + return -EINVAL; } -static inline int -svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) +/* + * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.3 + * + * struct rpc_gss_priv_data { + * opaque databody_priv<> + * }; + * + * struct rpc_gss_data_t { + * unsigned int seq_num; + * proc_req_arg_t arg; + * }; + * + * gss_wrap() expands the size of the RPC message payload in the + * response buffer. The main purpose of svcauth_gss_wrap_priv() + * is to ensure there is adequate space in the response buffer to + * avoid overflow during the wrap. + */ +static int svcauth_gss_wrap_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) { - struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data; + struct gss_svc_data *gsd = rqstp->rq_auth_data; struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred; - struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res; - struct page **inpages = NULL; - __be32 *p, *len; - int offset; - int pad; - - p = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(resbuf, gsd); - if (p == NULL) + struct xdr_buf *buf = &rqstp->rq_res; + struct kvec *head = buf->head; + struct kvec *tail = buf->tail; + u32 offset, pad, maj_stat; + __be32 *p; + + offset = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(rqstp, gsd); + if (!offset) return 0; - len = p++; - offset = (u8 *)p - (u8 *)resbuf->head[0].iov_base; - *p++ = htonl(gc->gc_seq); - inpages = resbuf->pages; - /* XXX: Would be better to write some xdr helper functions for - * nfs{2,3,4}xdr.c that place the data right, instead of copying: */ + + /* + * Buffer space for this field has already been reserved + * in svcauth_gss_accept(). Note that the GSS sequence + * number is encrypted along with the RPC reply payload. + */ + if (xdr_encode_word(buf, offset + XDR_UNIT, gc->gc_seq)) + goto wrap_failed; /* * If there is currently tail data, make sure there is @@ -1683,17 +1872,17 @@ svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) * there is RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE slack space available in * both the head and tail. */ - if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base) { - BUG_ON(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base >= resbuf->head[0].iov_base - + PAGE_SIZE); - BUG_ON(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base < resbuf->head[0].iov_base); - if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_len + resbuf->head[0].iov_len + if (tail->iov_base) { + if (tail->iov_base >= head->iov_base + PAGE_SIZE) + goto wrap_failed; + if (tail->iov_base < head->iov_base) + goto wrap_failed; + if (tail->iov_len + head->iov_len + 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE) - return -ENOMEM; - memmove(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE, - resbuf->tail[0].iov_base, - resbuf->tail[0].iov_len); - resbuf->tail[0].iov_base += RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE; + goto wrap_failed; + memmove(tail->iov_base + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE, tail->iov_base, + tail->iov_len); + tail->iov_base += RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE; } /* * If there is no current tail data, make sure there is @@ -1702,52 +1891,70 @@ svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) * is RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE slack space available in both the * head and tail. */ - if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base == NULL) { - if (resbuf->head[0].iov_len + 2*RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE) - return -ENOMEM; - resbuf->tail[0].iov_base = resbuf->head[0].iov_base - + resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE; - resbuf->tail[0].iov_len = 0; + if (!tail->iov_base) { + if (head->iov_len + 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE) + goto wrap_failed; + tail->iov_base = head->iov_base + + head->iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE; + tail->iov_len = 0; } - if (gss_wrap(gsd->rsci->mechctx, offset, resbuf, inpages)) - return -ENOMEM; - *len = htonl(resbuf->len - offset); - pad = 3 - ((resbuf->len - offset - 1)&3); - p = (__be32 *)(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base + resbuf->tail[0].iov_len); + + maj_stat = gss_wrap(gsd->rsci->mechctx, offset + XDR_UNIT, buf, + buf->pages); + if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + goto bad_wrap; + + /* Wrapping can change the size of databody_priv. */ + if (xdr_encode_word(buf, offset, buf->len - offset - XDR_UNIT)) + goto wrap_failed; + pad = xdr_pad_size(buf->len - offset - XDR_UNIT); + p = (__be32 *)(tail->iov_base + tail->iov_len); memset(p, 0, pad); - resbuf->tail[0].iov_len += pad; - resbuf->len += pad; + tail->iov_len += pad; + buf->len += pad; + return 0; +wrap_failed: + trace_rpcgss_svc_wrap_failed(rqstp); + return -EINVAL; +bad_wrap: + trace_rpcgss_svc_wrap(rqstp, maj_stat); + return -ENOMEM; } +/** + * svcauth_gss_release - Wrap payload and release resources + * @rqstp: RPC transaction context + * + * Return values: + * %0: the Reply is ready to be sent + * %-ENOMEM: failed to allocate memory + * %-EINVAL: encoding error + */ static int svcauth_gss_release(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) { - struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data; - struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred; - struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res; - int stat = -EINVAL; - struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_net, sunrpc_net_id); + struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), sunrpc_net_id); + struct gss_svc_data *gsd = rqstp->rq_auth_data; + struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc; + int stat; - if (gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA) + if (!gsd) goto out; - /* Release can be called twice, but we only wrap once. */ - if (gsd->verf_start == NULL) + gc = &gsd->clcred; + if (gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA) goto out; - /* normally not set till svc_send, but we need it here: */ - /* XXX: what for? Do we mess it up the moment we call svc_putu32 - * or whatever? */ - resbuf->len = total_buf_len(resbuf); + switch (gc->gc_svc) { case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE: break; case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY: - stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_integ(rqstp); + stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_integ(rqstp); if (stat) goto out_err; break; case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY: - stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(rqstp); + stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_priv(rqstp); if (stat) goto out_err; break; @@ -1769,22 +1976,34 @@ out_err: if (rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info) put_group_info(rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info); rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info = NULL; - if (gsd->rsci) + if (gsd && gsd->rsci) { cache_put(&gsd->rsci->h, sn->rsc_cache); - gsd->rsci = NULL; - + gsd->rsci = NULL; + } return stat; } static void -svcauth_gss_domain_release(struct auth_domain *dom) +svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) { + struct auth_domain *dom = container_of(head, struct auth_domain, rcu_head); struct gss_domain *gd = container_of(dom, struct gss_domain, h); kfree(dom->name); kfree(gd); } +static void +svcauth_gss_domain_release(struct auth_domain *dom) +{ + call_rcu(&dom->rcu_head, svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu); +} + +static rpc_authflavor_t svcauth_gss_pseudoflavor(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) +{ + return svcauth_gss_flavor(rqstp->rq_gssclient); +} + static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss = { .name = "rpcsec_gss", .owner = THIS_MODULE, @@ -1793,6 +2012,7 @@ static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss = { .release = svcauth_gss_release, .domain_release = svcauth_gss_domain_release, .set_client = svcauth_gss_set_client, + .pseudoflavor = svcauth_gss_pseudoflavor, }; static int rsi_cache_create_net(struct net *net) @@ -1867,9 +2087,17 @@ gss_svc_init_net(struct net *net) rv = create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net); if (rv) goto out2; + + rv = create_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(net); + if (rv) + goto out3; + return 0; -out2: + +out3: destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net); +out2: + rsi_cache_destroy_net(net); out1: rsc_cache_destroy_net(net); return rv; @@ -1878,6 +2106,7 @@ out1: void gss_svc_shutdown_net(struct net *net) { + destroy_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(net); destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net); rsi_cache_destroy_net(net); rsc_cache_destroy_net(net); |