summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security/apparmor/capability.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor/capability.c')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/capability.c111
1 files changed, 86 insertions, 25 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
index 326a51838ef2..b9ea6bc45c1a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/timekeeping.h>
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/capability.h"
@@ -26,20 +27,22 @@
struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[] = {
AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_SFS_CAPS_MASK),
+ AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("extended", 1),
{ }
};
struct audit_cache {
- struct aa_profile *profile;
- kernel_cap_t caps;
+ const struct cred *ad_subj_cred;
+ /* Capabilities go from 0 to CAP_LAST_CAP */
+ u64 ktime_ns_expiration[CAP_LAST_CAP+1];
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct audit_cache, audit_cache);
/**
* audit_cb - call back for capability components of audit struct
- * @ab - audit buffer (NOT NULL)
- * @va - audit struct to audit data from (NOT NULL)
+ * @ab: audit buffer (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit struct to audit data from (NOT NULL)
*/
static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
@@ -51,7 +54,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
/**
* audit_caps - audit a capability
- * @sa: audit data
+ * @ad: audit data
* @profile: profile being tested for confinement (NOT NULL)
* @cap: capability tested
* @error: error code returned by test
@@ -59,17 +62,18 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
* Do auditing of capability and handle, audit/complain/kill modes switching
* and duplicate message elimination.
*
- * Returns: 0 or sa->error on success, error code on failure
+ * Returns: 0 or ad->error on success, error code on failure
*/
-static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
+static int audit_caps(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, struct aa_profile *profile,
int cap, int error)
{
- struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
- typeof(*rules), list);
+ const u64 AUDIT_CACHE_TIMEOUT_NS = 1000*1000*1000; /* 1 second */
+
+ struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
struct audit_cache *ent;
int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
- aad(sa)->error = error;
+ ad->error = error;
if (likely(!error)) {
/* test if auditing is being forced */
@@ -89,19 +93,20 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
/* Do simple duplicate message elimination */
ent = &get_cpu_var(audit_cache);
- if (profile == ent->profile && cap_raised(ent->caps, cap)) {
+ /* If the capability was never raised the timestamp check would also catch that */
+ if (ad->subj_cred == ent->ad_subj_cred && ktime_get_ns() <= ent->ktime_ns_expiration[cap]) {
put_cpu_var(audit_cache);
if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
return complain_error(error);
return error;
} else {
- aa_put_profile(ent->profile);
- ent->profile = aa_get_profile(profile);
- cap_raise(ent->caps, cap);
+ put_cred(ent->ad_subj_cred);
+ ent->ad_subj_cred = get_cred(ad->subj_cred);
+ ent->ktime_ns_expiration[cap] = ktime_get_ns() + AUDIT_CACHE_TIMEOUT_NS;
}
put_cpu_var(audit_cache);
- return aa_audit(type, profile, sa, audit_cb);
+ return aa_audit(type, profile, ad, audit_cb);
}
/**
@@ -109,17 +114,39 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
* @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined)
* @cap: capability to test if allowed
* @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
- * @sa: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing)
+ * @ad: audit data (NOT NULL)
*
* Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM
*/
static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
- unsigned int opts, struct common_audit_data *sa)
+ unsigned int opts, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
- struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
- typeof(*rules), list);
+ struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+ aa_state_t state;
int error;
+ state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, ad->class);
+ if (state) {
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+ u32 request;
+
+ /* caps broken into 256 x 32 bit permission chunks */
+ state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, state, cap >> 5);
+ request = 1 << (cap & 0x1f);
+ perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+
+ if (opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) {
+ if (perms.complain & request)
+ ad->info = "optional: no audit";
+ else
+ ad = NULL;
+ }
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad,
+ audit_cb);
+ }
+
+ /* fallback to old caps mediation that doesn't support conditionals */
if (cap_raised(rules->caps.allow, cap) &&
!cap_raised(rules->caps.denied, cap))
error = 0;
@@ -132,14 +159,15 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
/* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it
* should be optional.
*/
- aad(sa)->info = "optional: no audit";
+ ad->info = "optional: no audit";
}
- return audit_caps(sa, profile, cap, error);
+ return audit_caps(ad, profile, cap, error);
}
/**
* aa_capable - test permission to use capability
+ * @subj_cred: cred we are testing capability against
* @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL)
* @cap: capability to be tested
* @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
@@ -148,15 +176,48 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
*
* Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code.
*/
-int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts)
+int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+ int cap, unsigned int opts)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
int error = 0;
- DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, AA_CLASS_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, AA_CLASS_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);
- sa.u.cap = cap;
+ ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
+ ad.common.u.cap = cap;
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &sa));
+ profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &ad));
return error;
}
+
+kernel_cap_t aa_profile_capget(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+ aa_state_t state;
+
+ state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_CAP);
+ if (state) {
+ kernel_cap_t caps = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
+ int i;
+
+ /* caps broken into up to 256, 32 bit permission chunks */
+ for (i = 0; i < (CAP_LAST_CAP >> 5); i++) {
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+ aa_state_t tmp;
+
+ tmp = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, state, i);
+ perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, tmp);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+ caps.val |= ((u64)(perms.allow)) << (i * 5);
+ caps.val |= ((u64)(perms.complain)) << (i * 5);
+ }
+ return caps;
+ }
+
+ /* fallback to old caps */
+ if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+ return CAP_FULL_SET;
+
+ return rules->caps.allow;
+}