1 files changed, 275 insertions, 158 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index f3715cda59c5..267da82afb14 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/errno.h>
-#include <linux/fdtable.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
@@ -29,8 +28,15 @@
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
 
+static const char * const CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR = "conflicting profile attachments";
+static const char * const CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_IX =
+	"conflicting profile attachments - ix fallback";
+static const char * const CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_UX =
+	"conflicting profile attachments - ux fallback";
+
 /**
  * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task
+ * @to_cred: cred of task changing domain
  * @to_label: profile to change to  (NOT NULL)
  * @info: message if there is an error
  *
@@ -39,28 +45,34 @@
  *
  * Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed
  */
-static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct aa_label *to_label,
+static int may_change_ptraced_domain(const struct cred *to_cred,
+				     struct aa_label *to_label,
 				     const char **info)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tracer;
 	struct aa_label *tracerl = NULL;
+	const struct cred *tracer_cred = NULL;
+
 	int error = 0;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
-	if (tracer)
+	if (tracer) {
 		/* released below */
 		tracerl = aa_get_task_label(tracer);
-
+		tracer_cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
+	}
 	/* not ptraced */
 	if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerl))
 		goto out;
 
-	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerl, to_label, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer_cred, tracerl, to_cred, to_label,
+			      PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
 
 out:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	aa_put_label(tracerl);
+	put_cred(tracer_cred);
 
 	if (error)
 		*info = "ptrace prevents transition";
@@ -70,7 +82,7 @@ out:
 /**** TODO: dedup to aa_label_match - needs perm and dfa, merging
  * specifically this is an exact copy of aa_label_match except
  * aa_compute_perms is replaced with aa_compute_fperms
- * and policy.dfa with file.dfa
+ * and policy->dfa with file->dfa
  ****/
 /* match a profile and its associated ns component if needed
  * Assumes visibility test has already been done.
@@ -81,21 +93,20 @@ static inline aa_state_t match_component(struct aa_profile *profile,
 					 struct aa_profile *tp,
 					 bool stack, aa_state_t state)
 {
-	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
-						    typeof(*rules), list);
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
 	const char *ns_name;
 
 	if (stack)
-		state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, "&");
+		state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, "&");
 	if (profile->ns == tp->ns)
-		return aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
+		return aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
 
 	/* try matching with namespace name and then profile */
 	ns_name = aa_ns_name(profile->ns, tp->ns, true);
-	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa, state, ":", 1);
-	state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, ns_name);
-	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa, state, ":", 1);
-	return aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file->dfa, state, ":", 1);
+	state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, ns_name);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file->dfa, state, ":", 1);
+	return aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -119,8 +130,7 @@ static int label_compound_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
 				aa_state_t state, bool subns, u32 request,
 				struct aa_perms *perms)
 {
-	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
-						    typeof(*rules), list);
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
 	struct aa_profile *tp;
 	struct label_it i;
 	struct path_cond cond = { };
@@ -143,12 +153,13 @@ next:
 	label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) {
 		if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns))
 			continue;
-		state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, "//&");
+		state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, "//&");
 		state = match_component(profile, tp, false, state);
 		if (!state)
 			goto fail;
 	}
-	*perms = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond));
+	*perms = *(aa_lookup_condperms(current_fsuid(), rules->file, state,
+				       &cond));
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, perms);
 	if ((perms->allow & request) != request)
 		return -EACCES;
@@ -181,8 +192,7 @@ static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
 				  aa_state_t start, bool subns, u32 request,
 				  struct aa_perms *perms)
 {
-	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
-						    typeof(*rules), list);
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
 	struct aa_profile *tp;
 	struct label_it i;
 	struct aa_perms tmp;
@@ -203,7 +213,8 @@ static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	return 0;
 
 next:
-	tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond));
+	tmp = *(aa_lookup_condperms(current_fsuid(), rules->file, state,
+				    &cond));
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
 	aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp);
 	label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) {
@@ -212,7 +223,8 @@ next:
 		state = match_component(profile, tp, stack, start);
 		if (!state)
 			goto fail;
-		tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond));
+		tmp = *(aa_lookup_condperms(current_fsuid(), rules->file, state,
+					    &cond));
 		aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
 		aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp);
 	}
@@ -265,6 +277,7 @@ static int label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label,
  * @stack: whether this is a stacking request
  * @request: requested perms
  * @start: state to start matching in
+ * @perms: Returns computed perms (NOT NULL)
  *
  *
  * Returns: permission set
@@ -309,34 +322,33 @@ static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	might_sleep();
 
 	/* transition from exec match to xattr set */
-	state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch.dfa, state);
+	state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch->dfa, state);
 	d = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < attach->xattr_count; i++) {
 		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, d, attach->xattrs[i],
 					  &value, value_size, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (size >= 0) {
-			u32 index, perm;
+			struct aa_perms *perms;
 
 			/*
 			 * Check the xattr presence before value. This ensure
 			 * that not present xattr can be distinguished from a 0
 			 * length value or rule that matches any value
 			 */
-			state = aa_dfa_null_transition(attach->xmatch.dfa,
+			state = aa_dfa_null_transition(attach->xmatch->dfa,
 						       state);
 			/* Check xattr value */
-			state = aa_dfa_match_len(attach->xmatch.dfa, state,
+			state = aa_dfa_match_len(attach->xmatch->dfa, state,
 						 value, size);
-			index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch.dfa)[state];
-			perm = attach->xmatch.perms[index].allow;
-			if (!(perm & MAY_EXEC)) {
+			perms = aa_lookup_perms(attach->xmatch, state);
+			if (!(perms->allow & MAY_EXEC)) {
 				ret = -EINVAL;
 				goto out;
 			}
 		}
 		/* transition to next element */
-		state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch.dfa, state);
+		state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch->dfa, state);
 		if (size < 0) {
 			/*
 			 * No xattr match, so verify if transition to
@@ -359,11 +371,11 @@ out:
 
 /**
  * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes
- * @bprm - binprm structure of transitioning task
+ * @bprm: binprm structure of transitioning task
  * @ns: the current namespace  (NOT NULL)
- * @head - profile list to walk  (NOT NULL)
- * @name - to match against  (NOT NULL)
- * @info - info message if there was an error (NOT NULL)
+ * @head: profile list to walk  (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: to match against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @info: info message if there was an error (NOT NULL)
  *
  * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list.  There is a matching
  * preference where an exact match is preferred over a name which uses
@@ -405,18 +417,17 @@ restart:
 		 * as another profile, signal a conflict and refuse to
 		 * match.
 		 */
-		if (attach->xmatch.dfa) {
+		if (attach->xmatch->dfa) {
 			unsigned int count;
 			aa_state_t state;
-			u32 index, perm;
+			struct aa_perms *perms;
 
-			state = aa_dfa_leftmatch(attach->xmatch.dfa,
-					attach->xmatch.start[AA_CLASS_XMATCH],
+			state = aa_dfa_leftmatch(attach->xmatch->dfa,
+					attach->xmatch->start[AA_CLASS_XMATCH],
 					name, &count);
-			index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch.dfa)[state];
-			perm = attach->xmatch.perms[index].allow;
+			perms = aa_lookup_perms(attach->xmatch, state);
 			/* any accepting state means a valid match. */
-			if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
+			if (perms->allow & MAY_EXEC) {
 				int ret = 0;
 
 				if (count < candidate_len)
@@ -477,7 +488,7 @@ restart:
 
 	if (!candidate || conflict) {
 		if (conflict)
-			*info = "conflicting profile attachments";
+			*info = CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR;
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		return NULL;
 	}
@@ -501,15 +512,16 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
  * @name: returns: name tested to find label (NOT NULL)
  *
  * Returns: refcounted label, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
+ *          @name will always be set with the last name tried
  */
 struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
 				const char **name)
 {
-	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
-						    typeof(*rules), list);
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
 	struct aa_label *label = NULL;
 	u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
 	int index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
+	const char *next;
 
 	AA_BUG(!name);
 
@@ -517,25 +529,27 @@ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
 	/* TODO: move lookup parsing to unpack time so this is a straight
 	 *       index into the resultant label
 	 */
-	for (*name = rules->file.trans.table[index]; !label && *name;
-	     *name = next_name(xtype, *name)) {
+	for (next = rules->file->trans.table[index]; next;
+	     next = next_name(xtype, next)) {
+		const char *lookup = (*next == '&') ? next + 1 : next;
+		*name = next;
 		if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) {
-			struct aa_profile *new_profile;
-			/* release by caller */
-			new_profile = aa_find_child(profile, *name);
-			if (new_profile)
-				label = &new_profile->label;
+			/* TODO: switich to parse to get stack of child */
+			struct aa_profile *new = aa_find_child(profile, lookup);
+
+			if (new)
+				/* release by caller */
+				return &new->label;
 			continue;
 		}
-		label = aa_label_parse(&profile->label, *name, GFP_KERNEL,
+		label = aa_label_parse(&profile->label, lookup, GFP_KERNEL,
 				       true, false);
-		if (IS_ERR(label))
-			label = NULL;
+		if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(label))
+			/* release by caller */
+			return label;
 	}
 
-	/* released by caller */
-
-	return label;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -545,6 +559,7 @@ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
  * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL)
  * @xindex: index into x transition table
  * @lookupname: returns: name used in lookup if one was specified (NOT NULL)
+ * @info: info message if there was an error (NOT NULL)
  *
  * find label for a transition index
  *
@@ -556,12 +571,12 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
 				   const char **lookupname,
 				   const char **info)
 {
-	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
-						    typeof(*rules), list);
 	struct aa_label *new = NULL;
+	struct aa_label *stack = NULL;
 	struct aa_ns *ns = profile->ns;
 	u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
-	const char *stack = NULL;
+	/* Used for info checks during fallback handling */
+	const char *old_info = NULL;
 
 	switch (xtype) {
 	case AA_X_NONE:
@@ -570,13 +585,14 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
 		break;
 	case AA_X_TABLE:
 		/* TODO: fix when perm mapping done at unload */
-		stack = rules->file.trans.table[xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK];
-		if (*stack != '&') {
-			/* released by caller */
-			new = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex, lookupname);
-			stack = NULL;
+		/* released by caller
+		 * if null for both stack and direct want to try fallback
+		 */
+		new = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex, lookupname);
+		if (!new || **lookupname != '&')
 			break;
-		}
+		stack = new;
+		new = NULL;
 		fallthrough;	/* to X_NAME */
 	case AA_X_NAME:
 		if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
@@ -591,17 +607,38 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
 		break;
 	}
 
+	/* fallback transition check */
 	if (!new) {
 		if (xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) {
 			/* (p|c|n)ix - don't change profile but do
 			 * use the newest version
 			 */
-			*info = "ix fallback";
+			if (*info == CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR) {
+				*info = CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_IX;
+			} else {
+				old_info = *info;
+				*info = "ix fallback";
+			}
 			/* no profile && no error */
 			new = aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
 		} else if (xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) {
 			new = aa_get_newest_label(ns_unconfined(profile->ns));
-			*info = "ux fallback";
+			if (*info == CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR) {
+				*info = CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_UX;
+			} else {
+				old_info = *info;
+				*info = "ux fallback";
+			}
+		}
+		/* We set old_info on the code paths above where overwriting
+		 * could have happened, so now check if info was set by
+		 * find_attach as well (i.e. whether we actually overwrote)
+		 * and warn accordingly.
+		 */
+		if (old_info && old_info != CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR) {
+			pr_warn_ratelimited(
+				"AppArmor: find_attach (from profile %s) audit info \"%s\" dropped",
+				profile->base.hname, old_info);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -609,26 +646,27 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
 		/* base the stack on post domain transition */
 		struct aa_label *base = new;
 
-		new = aa_label_parse(base, stack, GFP_KERNEL, true, false);
-		if (IS_ERR(new))
-			new = NULL;
+		new = aa_label_merge(base, stack, GFP_KERNEL);
+		/* null on error */
 		aa_put_label(base);
 	}
 
+	aa_put_label(stack);
 	/* released by caller */
 	return new;
 }
 
-static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static struct aa_label *profile_transition(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+					   struct aa_profile *profile,
 					   const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 					   char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
 					   bool *secure_exec)
 {
-	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
-						    typeof(*rules), list);
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
 	struct aa_label *new = NULL;
+	struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
 	const char *info = NULL, *name = NULL, *target = NULL;
-	aa_state_t state = rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE];
+	aa_state_t state = rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE];
 	struct aa_perms perms = {};
 	bool nonewprivs = false;
 	int error = 0;
@@ -642,7 +680,7 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	if (error) {
 		if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
 		    (profile->label.flags & FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR)) {
-			AA_DEBUG("name lookup ix on error");
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, "name lookup ix on error");
 			error = 0;
 			new = aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
 		}
@@ -653,33 +691,64 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	if (profile_unconfined(profile)) {
 		new = find_attach(bprm, profile->ns,
 				  &profile->ns->base.profiles, name, &info);
+		/* info set -> something unusual that we should report
+		 * Currently this is only conflicting attachments, but other
+		 * infos added in the future should also be logged by default
+		 * and only excluded on a case-by-case basis
+		 */
+		if (info) {
+			/* Because perms is never used again after this audit
+			 * we don't need to care about clobbering it
+			 */
+			perms.audit |= MAY_EXEC;
+			perms.allow |= MAY_EXEC;
+			/* Don't cause error if auditing fails */
+			(void) aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms,
+				OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name, target, new, cond->uid,
+				info, error);
+		}
 		if (new) {
-			AA_DEBUG("unconfined attached to new label");
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, "unconfined attached to new label");
 			return new;
 		}
-		AA_DEBUG("unconfined exec no attachment");
+		AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, "unconfined exec no attachment");
 		return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
 	}
 
 	/* find exec permissions for name */
-	state = aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), state, name, cond, &perms);
+	state = aa_str_perms(rules->file, state, name, cond, &perms);
 	if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) {
 		/* exec permission determine how to transition */
 		new = x_to_label(profile, bprm, name, perms.xindex, &target,
 				 &info);
 		if (new && new->proxy == profile->label.proxy && info) {
+			/* Force audit on conflicting attachment fallback
+			 * Because perms is never used again after this audit
+			 * we don't need to care about clobbering it
+			 */
+			if (info == CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_IX
+			    || info == CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_UX)
+				perms.audit |= MAY_EXEC;
 			/* hack ix fallback - improve how this is detected */
 			goto audit;
 		} else if (!new) {
-			error = -EACCES;
+			if (info) {
+				pr_warn_ratelimited(
+					"AppArmor: %s (from profile %s) audit info \"%s\" dropped on missing transition",
+					__func__, profile->base.hname, info);
+			}
 			info = "profile transition not found";
-			/* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */
+			/* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure or complaint */
 			perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
+			if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
+				/* create null profile instead of failing */
+				goto create_learning_profile;
+			}
+			error = -EACCES;
 		}
 	} else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
+create_learning_profile:
 		/* no exec permission - learning mode */
-		struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
-
 		new_profile = aa_new_learning_profile(profile, false, name,
 						      GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!new_profile) {
@@ -700,8 +769,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 
 	if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
 		if (DEBUG_ON) {
-			dbg_printk("apparmor: scrubbing environment variables"
-				   " for %s profile=", name);
+			dbg_printk("apparmor: setting AT_SECURE for %s profile=",
+				   name);
 			aa_label_printk(new, GFP_KERNEL);
 			dbg_printk("\n");
 		}
@@ -709,7 +778,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	}
 
 audit:
-	aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name, target, new,
+	aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name,
+		      target, new,
 		      cond->uid, info, error);
 	if (!new || nonewprivs) {
 		aa_put_label(new);
@@ -719,14 +789,14 @@ audit:
 	return new;
 }
 
-static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
+static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			  struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
 			  bool stack, const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 			  char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
 			  bool *secure_exec)
 {
-	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
-						    typeof(*rules), list);
-	aa_state_t state = rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE];
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	aa_state_t state = rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE];
 	struct aa_perms perms = {};
 	const char *xname = NULL, *info = "change_profile onexec";
 	int error = -EACCES;
@@ -740,7 +810,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
 		/* change_profile on exec already granted */
 		/*
 		 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed
-		 * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results
+		 * even when no_new_privs is set because this always results
 		 * in a further reduction of permissions.
 		 */
 		return 0;
@@ -751,7 +821,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
 	if (error) {
 		if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
 		    (profile->label.flags & FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR)) {
-			AA_DEBUG("name lookup ix on error");
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, "name lookup ix on error");
 			error = 0;
 		}
 		xname = bprm->filename;
@@ -759,7 +829,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
 	}
 
 	/* find exec permissions for name */
-	state = aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), state, xname, cond, &perms);
+	state = aa_str_perms(rules->file, state, xname, cond, &perms);
 	if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) {
 		info = "no change_onexec valid for executable";
 		goto audit;
@@ -768,7 +838,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
 	 * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing
 	 * exec\0change_profile
 	 */
-	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->file.dfa, state);
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->file->dfa, state);
 	error = change_profile_perms(profile, onexec, stack, AA_MAY_ONEXEC,
 				     state, &perms);
 	if (error) {
@@ -778,8 +848,8 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
 
 	if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
 		if (DEBUG_ON) {
-			dbg_printk("apparmor: scrubbing environment "
-				   "variables for %s label=", xname);
+			dbg_printk("apparmor: setting AT_SECURE for %s label=",
+				   xname);
 			aa_label_printk(onexec, GFP_KERNEL);
 			dbg_printk("\n");
 		}
@@ -787,13 +857,15 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
 	}
 
 audit:
-	return aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, AA_MAY_ONEXEC, xname,
+	return aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_EXEC,
+			     AA_MAY_ONEXEC, xname,
 			     NULL, onexec, cond->uid, info, error);
 }
 
 /* ensure none ns domain transitions are correctly applied with onexec */
 
-static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label,
+static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+				      struct aa_label *label,
 				      struct aa_label *onexec, bool stack,
 				      const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 				      char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
@@ -808,37 +880,26 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label,
 	AA_BUG(!bprm);
 	AA_BUG(!buffer);
 
-	if (!stack) {
-		error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
-				profile_onexec(profile, onexec, stack,
-					       bprm, buffer, cond, unsafe));
-		if (error)
-			return ERR_PTR(error);
-		new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
-				aa_get_newest_label(onexec),
-				profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer,
-						   cond, unsafe));
-
-	} else {
-		/* TODO: determine how much we want to loosen this */
-		error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
-				profile_onexec(profile, onexec, stack, bprm,
-					       buffer, cond, unsafe));
-		if (error)
-			return ERR_PTR(error);
-		new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
-				aa_label_merge(&profile->label, onexec,
-					       GFP_KERNEL),
-				profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer,
-						   cond, unsafe));
-	}
+	/* TODO: determine how much we want to loosen this */
+	error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
+			profile_onexec(subj_cred, profile, onexec, stack,
+				       bprm, buffer, cond, unsafe));
+	if (error)
+		return ERR_PTR(error);
 
+	new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
+			stack ? aa_label_merge(&profile->label, onexec,
+					       GFP_KERNEL)
+			      : aa_get_newest_label(onexec),
+			profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm,
+					   buffer, cond, unsafe));
 	if (new)
 		return new;
 
 	/* TODO: get rid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID */
 	error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
-			aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC,
+			aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms,
+				      OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC,
 				      AA_MAY_ONEXEC, bprm->filename, NULL,
 				      onexec, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
 				      "failed to build target label", -ENOMEM));
@@ -857,6 +918,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
 	struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL;
+	const struct cred *subj_cred;
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	char *buffer = NULL;
 	const char *info = NULL;
@@ -869,6 +931,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
 	};
 
+	subj_cred = current_cred();
 	ctx = task_ctx(current);
 	AA_BUG(!cred_label(bprm->cred));
 	AA_BUG(!ctx);
@@ -895,11 +958,12 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 	/* Test for onexec first as onexec override other x transitions. */
 	if (ctx->onexec)
-		new = handle_onexec(label, ctx->onexec, ctx->token,
+		new = handle_onexec(subj_cred, label, ctx->onexec, ctx->token,
 				    bprm, buffer, &cond, &unsafe);
 	else
 		new = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
-				profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer,
+				profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm,
+						   buffer,
 						   &cond, &unsafe));
 
 	AA_BUG(!new);
@@ -917,7 +981,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 *
 	 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stacked
 	 * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
-	 * aways results in a further reduction of permissions.
+	 * always results in a further reduction of permissions.
 	 */
 	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
 	    !unconfined(label) &&
@@ -934,15 +998,15 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 	if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)) {
 		/* TODO: test needs to be profile of label to new */
-		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new, &info);
+		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(bprm->cred, new, &info);
 		if (error)
 			goto audit;
 	}
 
 	if (unsafe) {
 		if (DEBUG_ON) {
-			dbg_printk("scrubbing environment variables for %s "
-				   "label=", bprm->filename);
+			dbg_printk("setting AT_SECURE for %s label=",
+				   bprm->filename);
 			aa_label_printk(new, GFP_KERNEL);
 			dbg_printk("\n");
 		}
@@ -952,8 +1016,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (label->proxy != new->proxy) {
 		/* when transitioning clear unsafe personality bits */
 		if (DEBUG_ON) {
-			dbg_printk("apparmor: clearing unsafe personality "
-				   "bits. %s label=", bprm->filename);
+			dbg_printk("apparmor: clearing unsafe personality bits. %s label=",
+				   bprm->filename);
 			aa_label_printk(new, GFP_KERNEL);
 			dbg_printk("\n");
 		}
@@ -971,7 +1035,8 @@ done:
 
 audit:
 	error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
-			aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
+			aa_audit_file(current_cred(), profile, &nullperms,
+				      OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
 				      bprm->filename, NULL, new,
 				      vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid), info, error));
 	aa_put_label(new);
@@ -987,7 +1052,8 @@ audit:
  *
  * Returns: label for hat transition OR ERR_PTR.  Does NOT return NULL
  */
-static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+					 struct aa_profile *profile,
 					 const char *name, bool sibling)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *root, *hat = NULL;
@@ -1019,7 +1085,8 @@ static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	aa_put_profile(root);
 
 audit:
-	aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT,
+	aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
+		      AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT,
 		      name, hat ? hat->base.hname : NULL,
 		      hat ? &hat->label : NULL, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info,
 		      error);
@@ -1035,7 +1102,8 @@ audit:
  *
  * Returns: label for hat transition or ERR_PTR. Does not return NULL
  */
-static struct aa_label *change_hat(struct aa_label *label, const char *hats[],
+static struct aa_label *change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+				   struct aa_label *label, const char *hats[],
 				   int count, int flags)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile, *root, *hat = NULL;
@@ -1111,7 +1179,8 @@ fail:
 		 */
 		/* TODO: get rid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID */
 		if (count > 1 || COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
-			aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
+			aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms,
+				      OP_CHANGE_HAT,
 				      AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, name, NULL, NULL,
 				      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
 		}
@@ -1120,7 +1189,8 @@ fail:
 
 build:
 	new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
-				   build_change_hat(profile, name, sibling),
+				   build_change_hat(subj_cred, profile, name,
+						    sibling),
 				   aa_get_label(&profile->label));
 	if (!new) {
 		info = "label build failed";
@@ -1150,7 +1220,7 @@ build:
  */
 int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred;
+	const struct cred *subj_cred;
 	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
 	struct aa_label *label, *previous, *new = NULL, *target = NULL;
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
@@ -1159,8 +1229,8 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 	int error = 0;
 
 	/* released below */
-	cred = get_current_cred();
-	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
+	subj_cred = get_current_cred();
+	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(subj_cred);
 	previous = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
 
 	/*
@@ -1173,14 +1243,28 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 	if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && !ctx->nnp)
 		ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label);
 
+	/* return -EPERM when unconfined doesn't have children to avoid
+	 * changing the traditional error code for unconfined.
+	 */
 	if (unconfined(label)) {
-		info = "unconfined can not change_hat";
-		error = -EPERM;
-		goto fail;
+		struct label_it i;
+		bool empty = true;
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		label_for_each_in_ns(i, labels_ns(label), label, profile) {
+			empty &= list_empty(&profile->base.profiles);
+		}
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		if (empty) {
+			info = "unconfined can not change_hat";
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto fail;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (count) {
-		new = change_hat(label, hats, count, flags);
+		new = change_hat(subj_cred, label, hats, count, flags);
 		AA_BUG(!new);
 		if (IS_ERR(new)) {
 			error = PTR_ERR(new);
@@ -1189,7 +1273,8 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new, &info);
+		/* target cred is the same as current except new label */
+		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(subj_cred, new, &info);
 		if (error)
 			goto fail;
 
@@ -1200,7 +1285,8 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 		if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) &&
 		    !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) {
 			/* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
-			AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN,
+				 "no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
 			error = -EPERM;
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -1221,7 +1307,8 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 		if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) &&
 		    !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(previous, ctx->nnp)) {
 			/* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
-			AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN,
+				 "no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
 			error = -EPERM;
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -1242,7 +1329,7 @@ out:
 	aa_put_label(new);
 	aa_put_label(previous);
 	aa_put_label(label);
-	put_cred(cred);
+	put_cred(subj_cred);
 
 	return error;
 
@@ -1252,7 +1339,7 @@ kill:
 
 fail:
 	fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
-		aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
+		aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
 			      AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL, NULL, target,
 			      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error));
 
@@ -1261,27 +1348,30 @@ fail:
 
 
 static int change_profile_perms_wrapper(const char *op, const char *name,
+					const struct cred *subj_cred,
 					struct aa_profile *profile,
 					struct aa_label *target, bool stack,
 					u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms)
 {
-	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
-						    typeof(*rules), list);
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
 	const char *info = NULL;
 	int error = 0;
 
 	if (!error)
 		error = change_profile_perms(profile, target, stack, request,
-					     rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
+					     rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
 					     perms);
 	if (error)
-		error = aa_audit_file(profile, perms, op, request, name,
+		error = aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, perms, op, request,
+				      name,
 				      NULL, target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info,
 				      error);
 
 	return error;
 }
 
+static const char *stack_msg = "change_profile unprivileged unconfined converted to stacking";
+
 /**
  * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition
  * @fqname: name of profile may include namespace (NOT NULL)
@@ -1304,6 +1394,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
 	const char *auditname = fqname;		/* retain leading & if stack */
 	bool stack = flags & AA_CHANGE_STACK;
 	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+	const struct cred *subj_cred = get_current_cred();
 	int error = 0;
 	char *op;
 	u32 request;
@@ -1322,7 +1413,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
 
 	if (!fqname || !*fqname) {
 		aa_put_label(label);
-		AA_DEBUG("no profile name");
+		AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, "no profile name");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -1340,6 +1431,28 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
 			op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE;
 	}
 
+	/* This should move to a per profile test. Requires pushing build
+	 * into callback
+	 */
+	if (!stack && unconfined(label) &&
+	    label == &labels_ns(label)->unconfined->label &&
+	    aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted &&
+	    /* TODO: refactor so this check is a fn */
+	    cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE,
+			CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
+		/* regardless of the request in this case apparmor
+		 * stacks against unconfined so admin set policy can't be
+		 * by-passed
+		 */
+		stack = true;
+		perms.audit = request;
+		(void) fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
+				aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, op,
+					      request, auditname, NULL, target,
+					      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, stack_msg, 0));
+		perms.audit = 0;
+	}
+
 	if (*fqname == '&') {
 		stack = true;
 		/* don't have label_parse() do stacking */
@@ -1381,6 +1494,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
 	 */
 	error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
 			change_profile_perms_wrapper(op, auditname,
+						     subj_cred,
 						     profile, target, stack,
 						     request, &perms));
 	if (error)
@@ -1391,7 +1505,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
 
 check:
 	/* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */
-	error = may_change_ptraced_domain(target, &info);
+	error = may_change_ptraced_domain(subj_cred, target, &info);
 	if (error && !fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
 					COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)))
 		goto audit;
@@ -1418,7 +1532,8 @@ check:
 		if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) &&
 		    !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) {
 			/* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
-			AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
+			AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN,
+				 "no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
 			error = -EPERM;
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -1446,12 +1561,13 @@ check:
 		}
 
 		/* full transition will be built in exec path */
-		error = aa_set_current_onexec(target, stack);
+		aa_set_current_onexec(target, stack);
 	}
 
 audit:
 	error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
-			aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, op, request, auditname,
+			aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+				      profile, &perms, op, request, auditname,
 				      NULL, new ? new : target,
 				      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error));
 
@@ -1459,6 +1575,7 @@ out:
 	aa_put_label(new);
 	aa_put_label(target);
 	aa_put_label(label);
+	put_cred(subj_cred);
 
 	return error;
 }