1 files changed, 389 insertions, 129 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 8c6e4514d494..5770cf691912 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -24,8 +24,10 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
-#include <linux/iversion.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/iversion.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -37,11 +39,30 @@ int ima_appraise;
 
 int __ro_after_init ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
 static int hash_setup_done;
+static int ima_disabled __ro_after_init;
 
 static struct notifier_block ima_lsm_policy_notifier = {
 	.notifier_call = ima_lsm_policy_change,
 };
 
+static int __init ima_setup(char *str)
+{
+	if (!is_kdump_kernel()) {
+		pr_info("Warning: ima setup option only permitted in kdump");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
+		ima_disabled = 1;
+	else if (strncmp(str, "on", 2) == 0)
+		ima_disabled = 0;
+	else
+		pr_err("Invalid ima setup option: \"%s\" , please specify ima=on|off.", str);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima=", ima_setup);
+
 static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
@@ -89,7 +110,8 @@ static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file,
 	struct inode *inode;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if ((func == MMAP_CHECK) && mapping_writably_mapped(file->f_mapping)) {
+	if ((func == MMAP_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT) &&
+	    mapping_writably_mapped(file->f_mapping)) {
 		rc = -ETXTBSY;
 		inode = file_inode(file);
 
@@ -113,7 +135,7 @@ static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file,
  *
  */
 static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
-				     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+				     struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 				     int must_measure,
 				     char **pathbuf,
 				     const char **pathname,
@@ -126,17 +148,23 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
 	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
 		if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
 			if (!iint)
-				iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+				iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+
 			/* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */
-			if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE,
-						&iint->atomic_flags))
+			if (iint && test_and_clear_bit(IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU,
+						       &iint->atomic_flags))
 				send_tomtou = true;
 		}
 	} else {
 		if (must_measure)
-			set_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags);
-		if (inode_is_open_for_write(inode) && must_measure)
-			send_writers = true;
+			set_bit(IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU, &iint->atomic_flags);
+
+		/* Limit number of open_writers violations */
+		if (inode_is_open_for_write(inode) && must_measure) {
+			if (!test_and_set_bit(IMA_EMITTED_OPENWRITERS,
+					      &iint->atomic_flags))
+				send_writers = true;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
@@ -152,7 +180,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
 				  "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
 }
 
-static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 				  struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
@@ -163,11 +191,18 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 
 	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
 	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
+		struct kstat stat;
+
+		clear_bit(IMA_EMITTED_OPENWRITERS, &iint->atomic_flags);
+
 		update = test_and_clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR,
 					    &iint->atomic_flags);
-		if (!IS_I_VERSION(inode) ||
-		    !inode_eq_iversion(inode, iint->version) ||
-		    (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
+		if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) ||
+		    vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat,
+				      STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE,
+				      AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT) ||
+		    !(stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE) ||
+		    stat.change_cookie != iint->real_inode.version) {
 			iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
 			iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
 			if (update)
@@ -183,15 +218,15 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  *
  * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
  */
-void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
+static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 
 	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return;
 
-	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
 	if (!iint)
 		return;
 
@@ -199,12 +234,14 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 }
 
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
-			       u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
-			       enum ima_hooks func)
+			       struct lsm_prop *prop, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			       int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+			       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
+	struct inode *real_inode, *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL;
+	struct inode *metadata_inode;
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	char filename[NAME_MAX];
 	const char *pathname = NULL;
@@ -224,11 +261,14 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
 	 * Included is the appraise submask.
 	 */
-	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, secid,
+	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, prop,
 				mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
 				&allowed_algos);
-	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
-			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
+	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK ||
+			    func == MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT) &&
+			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE) &&
+			   ((action & IMA_MEASURE) ||
+			    (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)));
 	if (!action && !violation_check)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -241,7 +281,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	inode_lock(inode);
 
 	if (action) {
-		iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+		iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
 		if (!iint)
 			rc = -ENOMEM;
 	}
@@ -260,10 +300,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
 
 	if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags))
-		/* reset appraisal flags if ima_inode_post_setattr was called */
+		/*
+		 * Reset appraisal flags (action and non-action rule-specific)
+		 * if ima_inode_post_setattr was called.
+		 */
 		iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED |
 				 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
-				 IMA_ACTION_FLAGS);
+				 IMA_NONACTION_RULE_FLAGS);
 
 	/*
 	 * Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the
@@ -278,6 +321,30 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 		iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * On stacked filesystems, detect and re-evaluate file data and
+	 * metadata changes.
+	 */
+	real_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file));
+	if (real_inode != inode &&
+	    (action & IMA_DO_MASK) && (iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK)) {
+		if (!IS_I_VERSION(real_inode) ||
+		    integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->real_inode,
+						  real_inode)) {
+			iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
+			iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Reset the EVM status when metadata changed.
+		 */
+		metadata_inode = d_inode(d_real(file_dentry(file),
+					 D_REAL_METADATA));
+		if (evm_metadata_changed(inode, metadata_inode))
+			iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISED |
+					 IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK);
+	}
+
 	/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
 	 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
 	 *  IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
@@ -293,7 +360,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	/* HASH sets the digital signature and update flags, nothing else */
 	if ((action & IMA_HASH) &&
 	    !(test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags))) {
-		xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value);
+		xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file),
+					   &xattr_value, xattr_len);
 		if ((xattr_value && xattr_len > 2) &&
 		    (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
 			set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
@@ -316,7 +384,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
 	    strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
 		/* read 'security.ima' */
-		xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value);
+		xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file),
+					   &xattr_value, xattr_len);
 
 		/*
 		 * Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy, and allow
@@ -338,6 +407,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
 		goto out_locked;
 
+	/* Defer measuring/appraising kernel modules to READING_MODULE */
+	if (read_id == READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED) {
+		must_appraise = 0;
+		goto out_locked;
+	}
+
 	if (!pathbuf)	/* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
 		pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
 
@@ -395,7 +470,9 @@ out:
 /**
  * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
  * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
- * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @reqprot: protection requested by the application
+ * @prot: protection that will be applied by the kernel
+ * @flags: operational flags
  *
  * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
  * policy decision.
@@ -403,22 +480,36 @@ out:
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
+static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!file)
+		return 0;
+
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 
-	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
-		security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
-					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+	if (reqprot & PROT_EXEC) {
+		ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
+					  0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT, 0);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
 	}
 
+	if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
+					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
  * ima_file_mprotect - based on policy, limit mprotect change
- * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @vma: vm_area_struct protection is set to
+ * @reqprot: protection requested by the application
+ * @prot: protection that will be applied by the kernel
  *
  * Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent
  * IMA's mmap appraisal policy rules.  Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore
@@ -428,17 +519,18 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
  *
  * On mprotect change success, return 0.  On failure, return -EACESS.
  */
-int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
+static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+			     unsigned long prot)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
-	struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
+	struct file *file;
 	char filename[NAME_MAX];
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	const char *pathname = NULL;
 	struct inode *inode;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 	int result = 0;
 	int action;
-	u32 secid;
 	int pcr;
 
 	/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
@@ -446,11 +538,15 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
 	    !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
 		return 0;
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 	inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
-	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
-				current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
+	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode,
+				current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
 				&pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
+	action |= ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode,
+				 current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC,
+				 MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT, &pcr, &template, NULL,
+				 NULL);
 
 	/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
 	if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
@@ -482,20 +578,71 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	int ret;
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
-				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(),
+				   &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_creds_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
+ * @file: contains the file descriptor of the binary being executed
+ *
+ * The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write,
+ * from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file,
+ * already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access().
+ * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
+ * what is being executed.
+ *
+ * The difference from ima_bprm_check() is that ima_creds_check() is invoked
+ * only after determining the final binary to be executed without interpreter,
+ * and not when searching for intermediate binaries. The reason is that since
+ * commit 56305aa9b6fab ("exec: Compute file based creds only once"), the
+ * credentials to be applied to the process are calculated only at that stage
+ * (bprm_creds_from_file security hook instead of bprm_check_security).
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+static int ima_creds_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
+{
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
+
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement((struct file *)file, bprm->cred, &prop, NULL,
+				   0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_bprm_creds_for_exec - collect/store/appraise measurement.
+ * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
+ *
+ * Based on the IMA policy and the execveat(2) AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag, measure
+ * and appraise the integrity of a file to be executed by script interpreters.
+ * Unlike any of the other LSM hooks where the kernel enforces file integrity,
+ * enforcing file integrity is left up to the discretion of the script
+ * interpreter (userspace).
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+static int ima_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	/*
+	 * As security_bprm_check() is called multiple times, both
+	 * the script and the shebang interpreter are measured, appraised,
+	 * and audited. Limit usage of this LSM hook to just measuring,
+	 * appraising, and auditing the indirect script execution
+	 * (e.g. ./sh example.sh).
+	 */
+	if (!bprm->is_check)
+		return 0;
 
-	security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
-	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
-				   MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+	return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -508,36 +655,57 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
-					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
+					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, 0);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
 
-static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
+static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
+			    size_t buf_size)
 {
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
-	int hash_algo;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL, tmp_iint;
+	int rc, hash_algo;
 
-	if (!ima_policy_flag)
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if (ima_policy_flag) {
+		iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+		if (iint)
+			mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+	}
+
+	if ((!iint || !(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) && file) {
+		if (iint)
+			mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+
+		memset(&tmp_iint, 0, sizeof(tmp_iint));
+		mutex_init(&tmp_iint.mutex);
+
+		rc = ima_collect_measurement(&tmp_iint, file, NULL, 0,
+					     ima_hash_algo, NULL);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			/* ima_hash could be allocated in case of failure. */
+			if (rc != -ENOMEM)
+				kfree(tmp_iint.ima_hash);
+
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		}
+
+		iint = &tmp_iint;
+		mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+	}
 
-	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
 	if (!iint)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-
 	/*
 	 * ima_file_hash can be called when ima_collect_measurement has still
 	 * not been called, we might not always have a hash.
 	 */
-	if (!iint->ima_hash) {
+	if (!iint->ima_hash || !(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
 		mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
@@ -551,12 +719,14 @@ static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
 	hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
 	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
 
+	if (iint == &tmp_iint)
+		kfree(iint->ima_hash);
+
 	return hash_algo;
 }
 
 /**
- * ima_file_hash - return the stored measurement if a file has been hashed and
- * is in the iint cache.
+ * ima_file_hash - return a measurement of the file
  * @file: pointer to the file
  * @buf: buffer in which to store the hash
  * @buf_size: length of the buffer
@@ -569,7 +739,7 @@ static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
  * The file hash returned is based on the entire file, including the appended
  * signature.
  *
- * If IMA is disabled or if no measurement is available, return -EOPNOTSUPP.
+ * If the measurement cannot be performed, return -EOPNOTSUPP.
  * If the parameters are incorrect, return -EINVAL.
  */
 int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
@@ -577,7 +747,7 @@ int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
 	if (!file)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return __ima_inode_hash(file_inode(file), buf, buf_size);
+	return __ima_inode_hash(file_inode(file), file, buf, buf_size);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_hash);
 
@@ -604,35 +774,36 @@ int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
 	if (!inode)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return __ima_inode_hash(inode, buf, buf_size);
+	return __ima_inode_hash(inode, NULL, buf, buf_size);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash);
 
 /**
  * ima_post_create_tmpfile - mark newly created tmpfile as new
- * @mnt_userns:	user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
- * @file : newly created tmpfile
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @inode: inode of the newly created tmpfile
  *
  * No measuring, appraising or auditing of newly created tmpfiles is needed.
  * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created
  * tmpfiles are in policy.
  */
-void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
-			     struct inode *inode)
+static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				    struct inode *inode)
+
 {
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 	int must_appraise;
 
 	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return;
 
-	must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS,
+	must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(idmap, inode, MAY_ACCESS,
 					  FILE_CHECK);
 	if (!must_appraise)
 		return;
 
 	/* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
-	iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+	iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
 	if (!iint)
 		return;
 
@@ -643,29 +814,28 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 
 /**
  * ima_post_path_mknod - mark as a new inode
- * @mnt_userns:	user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
  * @dentry: newly created dentry
  *
  * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the
  * file data can be written later.
  */
-void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
-			 struct dentry *dentry)
+static void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	int must_appraise;
 
 	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return;
 
-	must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS,
+	must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(idmap, inode, MAY_ACCESS,
 					  FILE_CHECK);
 	if (!must_appraise)
 		return;
 
 	/* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
-	iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+	iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
 	if (!iint)
 		return;
 
@@ -685,11 +855,11 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
  *
  * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
-		  bool contents)
+static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+			 bool contents)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	/*
 	 * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
@@ -709,14 +879,15 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
 
 	/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
-				   0, MAY_READ, func);
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
+				   MAY_READ, func, 0);
 }
 
 const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
 	[READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
 	[READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
+	[READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED] = MODULE_CHECK,
 	[READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
 	[READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
 	[READING_POLICY] = POLICY_CHECK
@@ -735,11 +906,11 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
-		       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	/* permit signed certs */
 	if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
@@ -752,9 +923,9 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 	}
 
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
-				   MAY_READ, func);
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, buf, size,
+				   MAY_READ, func, read_id);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -764,12 +935,12 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
  *	      call to ima_post_load_data().
  *
  * Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the
- * data provided by userspace.  Enforce policy rules requring a file
+ * data provided by userspace.  Enforce policy rules requiring a file
  * signature (eg. kexec'ed kernel image).
  *
  * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
 	bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
 
@@ -814,8 +985,8 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
  * ima_post_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
  * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents
  * @size: size of in memory file contents
- * @id: kernel load data caller identifier
- * @description: @id-specific description of contents
+ * @load_id: kernel load data caller identifier
+ * @description: @load_id-specific description of contents
  *
  * Measure/appraise/audit in memory buffer based on policy.  Policy rules
  * are written in terms of a policy identifier.
@@ -823,9 +994,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
-		       enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
-		       char *description)
+static int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
+			      char *description)
 {
 	if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
 		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -836,12 +1007,19 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Measure the init_module syscall buffer containing the ELF image.
+	 */
+	if (load_id == LOADING_MODULE)
+		ima_measure_critical_data("modules", "init_module",
+					  buf, size, true, NULL, 0);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
  * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash
- * @mnt_userns:	user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
  * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
  * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.
  * @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
@@ -859,7 +1037,7 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
  * has been written to the passed location but not added to a measurement entry,
  * a negative value otherwise.
  */
-int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			       struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
 			       const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
 			       int pcr, const char *func_data,
@@ -868,21 +1046,20 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	int ret = 0;
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
-	struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {};
+	struct ima_iint_cache iint = {};
 	struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
 					    .filename = eventname,
 					    .buf = buf,
 					    .buf_len = size};
 	struct ima_template_desc *template;
-	struct {
-		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
-		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
-	} hash = {};
+	struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+	struct ima_digest_data *hash_hdr = container_of(&hash.hdr,
+						struct ima_digest_data, hdr);
 	char digest_hash[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
 	int violation = 0;
 	int action = 0;
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -898,16 +1075,16 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Both LSM hooks and auxilary based buffer measurements are
-	 * based on policy.  To avoid code duplication, differentiate
-	 * between the LSM hooks and auxilary buffer measurements,
+	 * Both LSM hooks and auxiliary based buffer measurements are
+	 * based on policy. To avoid code duplication, differentiate
+	 * between the LSM hooks and auxiliary buffer measurements,
 	 * retrieving the policy rule information only for the LSM hook
 	 * buffer measurements.
 	 */
 	if (func) {
-		security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-		action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
-					secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
+		security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+		action = ima_get_action(idmap, inode, current_cred(),
+					&prop, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
 					func_data, NULL);
 		if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
 			return -ENOENT;
@@ -916,7 +1093,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	if (!pcr)
 		pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
 
-	iint.ima_hash = &hash.hdr;
+	iint.ima_hash = hash_hdr;
 	iint.ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
 	iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
 
@@ -927,7 +1104,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	}
 
 	if (buf_hash) {
-		memcpy(digest_hash, hash.hdr.digest, digest_hash_len);
+		memcpy(digest_hash, hash_hdr->digest, digest_hash_len);
 
 		ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(digest_hash, digest_hash_len,
 					   iint.ima_hash);
@@ -977,19 +1154,16 @@ out:
  */
 void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
 {
-	struct fd f;
-
 	if (!buf || !size)
 		return;
 
-	f = fdget(kernel_fd);
-	if (!f.file)
+	CLASS(fd, f)(kernel_fd);
+	if (fd_empty(f))
 		return;
 
-	process_buffer_measurement(file_mnt_user_ns(f.file), file_inode(f.file),
+	process_buffer_measurement(file_mnt_idmap(fd_file(f)), file_inode(fd_file(f)),
 				   buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0,
 				   NULL, false, NULL, 0);
-	fdput(f);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1019,17 +1193,56 @@ int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
 	if (!event_name || !event_label || !buf || !buf_len)
 		return -ENOPARAM;
 
-	return process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len,
+	return process_buffer_measurement(&nop_mnt_idmap, NULL, buf, buf_len,
 					  event_name, CRITICAL_DATA, 0,
 					  event_label, hash, digest,
 					  digest_len);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+
+/**
+ * ima_kernel_module_request - Prevent crypto-pkcs1(rsa,*) requests
+ * @kmod_name: kernel module name
+ *
+ * Avoid a verification loop where verifying the signature of the modprobe
+ * binary requires executing modprobe itself. Since the modprobe iint->mutex
+ * is already held when the signature verification is performed, a deadlock
+ * occurs as soon as modprobe is executed within the critical region, since
+ * the same lock cannot be taken again.
+ *
+ * This happens when public_key_verify_signature(), in case of RSA algorithm,
+ * use alg_name to store internal information in order to construct an
+ * algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use alg_name
+ * in order to load a kernel module with same name.
+ *
+ * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
+ * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(), and
+ * avoid the verification loop.
+ *
+ * Return: Zero if it is safe to load the kernel module, -EINVAL otherwise.
+ */
+static int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+	if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1(rsa,", 17) == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
+
 static int __init init_ima(void)
 {
 	int error;
 
+	/*Note that turning IMA off is intentionally limited to kdump kernel.*/
+	if (ima_disabled && is_kdump_kernel()) {
+		pr_info("IMA functionality is disabled");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	ima_appraise_parse_cmdline();
 	ima_init_template_list();
 	hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
@@ -1057,4 +1270,51 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
 	return error;
 }
 
-late_initcall(init_ima);	/* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
+static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, ima_bprm_creds_for_exec),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_from_file, ima_creds_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_post_open, ima_file_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_create_tmpfile, ima_post_create_tmpfile),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, ima_file_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ima_file_mmap),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ima_file_mprotect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ima_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_load_data, ima_post_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ima_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_read_file, ima_post_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, ima_post_path_mknod),
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_post_create_or_update, ima_post_key_create_or_update),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, ima_kernel_module_request),
+#endif
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security_rcu, ima_inode_free_rcu),
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = {
+	.name = "ima",
+	.id = LSM_ID_IMA,
+};
+
+static int __init init_ima_lsm(void)
+{
+	ima_iintcache_init();
+	security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid);
+	init_ima_appraise_lsm(&ima_lsmid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes ima_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache *),
+};
+
+DEFINE_LSM(ima) = {
+	.id = &ima_lsmid,
+	.init = init_ima_lsm,
+	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
+	.blobs = &ima_blob_sizes,
+	/* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
+	.initcall_late = init_ima,
+};