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-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Kconfig11
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h37
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c38
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c37
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c7
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c133
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c22
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c8
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c198
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c185
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c41
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c49
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c41
13 files changed, 620 insertions, 187 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 475c32615006..976e75f9b9ba 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -321,4 +321,15 @@ config IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE
help
This option disables htable to allow measurement of duplicate records.
+config IMA_KEXEC_EXTRA_MEMORY_KB
+ int "Extra memory for IMA measurements added during kexec soft reboot"
+ range 0 40
+ depends on IMA_KEXEC
+ default 0
+ help
+ IMA_KEXEC_EXTRA_MEMORY_KB determines the extra memory to be
+ allocated (in kb) for IMA measurements added during kexec soft reboot.
+ If set to the default value of 0, an extra half page of memory for those
+ additional measurements will be allocated.
+
endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 11d7c0332207..e3d71d8d56e3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -49,11 +49,19 @@ extern int ima_policy_flag;
/* bitset of digests algorithms allowed in the setxattr hook */
extern atomic_t ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms;
+/* IMA hash algorithm description */
+struct ima_algo_desc {
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ enum hash_algo algo;
+};
+
/* set during initialization */
extern int ima_hash_algo __ro_after_init;
extern int ima_sha1_idx __ro_after_init;
extern int ima_hash_algo_idx __ro_after_init;
extern int ima_extra_slots __ro_after_init;
+extern struct ima_algo_desc *ima_algo_array __ro_after_init;
+
extern int ima_appraise;
extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;
extern const char boot_aggregate_name[];
@@ -141,6 +149,9 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {
#define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000
#define IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED 0x80000000
+/* Exclude non-action flags which are not rule-specific. */
+#define IMA_NONACTION_RULE_FLAGS (IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS & ~IMA_NEW_FILE)
+
#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
#define IMA_DONE_MASK (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \
@@ -170,17 +181,16 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {
#define IMA_UPDATE_XATTR 1
#define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR 2
#define IMA_DIGSIG 3
-#define IMA_MUST_MEASURE 4
+#define IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU 4
+#define IMA_EMITTED_OPENWRITERS 5
/* IMA integrity metadata associated with an inode */
struct ima_iint_cache {
struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */
- u64 version; /* track inode changes */
+ struct integrity_inode_attributes real_inode;
unsigned long flags;
unsigned long measured_pcrs;
unsigned long atomic_flags;
- unsigned long real_ino;
- dev_t real_dev;
enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
@@ -217,7 +227,7 @@ static inline void ima_inode_set_iint(const struct inode *inode,
struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
struct ima_iint_cache *ima_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
-void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
+void ima_inode_free_rcu(void *inode_security);
void __init ima_iintcache_init(void);
extern const int read_idmap[];
@@ -234,6 +244,12 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
unsigned long flags, bool create);
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
+void ima_measure_kexec_event(const char *event_name);
+#else
+static inline void ima_measure_kexec_event(const char *event_name) {}
+#endif
+
/*
* The default binary_runtime_measurements list format is defined as the
* platform native format. The canonical format is defined as little-endian.
@@ -272,6 +288,7 @@ unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(void);
int ima_init_template(void);
void ima_init_template_list(void);
int __init ima_init_digests(void);
+void __init ima_init_reboot_notifier(void);
int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
void *lsm_data);
@@ -363,7 +380,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
/* LIM API function definitions */
int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
@@ -394,8 +411,8 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
/* IMA policy related functions */
int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
- int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop,
+ enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
void ima_init_policy(void);
@@ -540,7 +557,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
#else
static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- void **lsmrule)
+ void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -549,7 +566,7 @@ static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
{
}
-static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
void *lsmrule)
{
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index b37d043d5748..c35ea613c9f8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ err_out:
* @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @prop: properties of the task being validated
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
* MAY_APPEND)
* @func: caller identifier
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ err_out:
*
*/
int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
- return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
+ return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, prop, func, mask,
flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data,
allowed_algos);
}
@@ -245,8 +245,10 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
const char *audit_cause = "failed";
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct inode *real_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file));
- const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+ struct ima_digest_data *hash_hdr = container_of(&hash.hdr,
+ struct ima_digest_data, hdr);
+ struct name_snapshot filename;
struct kstat stat;
int result = 0;
int length;
@@ -286,9 +288,9 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
result = -ENODATA;
}
} else if (buf) {
- result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
+ result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, hash_hdr);
} else {
- result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
+ result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, hash_hdr);
}
if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL)
@@ -303,11 +305,11 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
- iint->version = i_version;
- if (real_inode != inode) {
- iint->real_ino = real_inode->i_ino;
- iint->real_dev = real_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
- }
+ if (real_inode == inode)
+ iint->real_inode.version = i_version;
+ else
+ integrity_inode_attrs_store(&iint->real_inode, i_version,
+ real_inode);
/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
if (!result)
@@ -317,9 +319,13 @@ out:
if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
+ take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, file->f_path.dentry);
+
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
- filename, "collect_data", audit_cause,
- result, 0);
+ filename.name.name, "collect_data",
+ audit_cause, result, 0);
+
+ release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename);
}
return result;
}
@@ -432,6 +438,7 @@ out:
*/
const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf)
{
+ struct name_snapshot filename;
char *pathname = NULL;
*pathbuf = __getname();
@@ -445,7 +452,10 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf)
}
if (!pathname) {
- strscpy(namebuf, path->dentry->d_name.name, NAME_MAX);
+ take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, path->dentry);
+ strscpy(namebuf, filename.name.name, NAME_MAX);
+ release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename);
+
pathname = namebuf;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 3497741caea9..f435eff4667f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
@@ -73,13 +74,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), secid,
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+ return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), &prop,
func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
@@ -378,7 +379,9 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
}
rc = calc_file_id_hash(IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG, iint->ima_hash->algo,
- iint->ima_hash->digest, &hash.hdr);
+ iint->ima_hash->digest,
+ container_of(&hash.hdr,
+ struct ima_digest_data, hdr));
if (rc) {
*cause = "sigv3-hashing-error";
*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
@@ -467,6 +470,17 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
return rc;
}
+static bool is_bprm_creds_for_exec(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct linux_binprm *bprm;
+
+ if (func == BPRM_CHECK) {
+ bprm = container_of(&file, struct linux_binprm, file);
+ return bprm->is_check;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
* ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
*
@@ -481,6 +495,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig)
{
static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
+ int audit_msgno = AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA;
const char *cause = "unknown";
struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
@@ -492,6 +507,16 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) && !try_modsig)
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ /*
+ * Unlike any of the other LSM hooks where the kernel enforces file
+ * integrity, enforcing file integrity for the bprm_creds_for_exec()
+ * LSM hook with the AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag is left up to the discretion
+ * of the script interpreter(userspace). Differentiate kernel and
+ * userspace enforced integrity audit messages.
+ */
+ if (is_bprm_creds_for_exec(func, file))
+ audit_msgno = AUDIT_INTEGRITY_USERSPACE;
+
/* If reading the xattr failed and there's no modsig, error out. */
if (rc <= 0 && !try_modsig) {
if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
@@ -567,7 +592,7 @@ out:
(iint->flags & IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS))) {
status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
cause = "unverifiable-signature";
- integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
+ integrity_audit_msg(audit_msgno, inode, filename,
op, cause, rc, 0);
} else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
/* Fix mode, but don't replace file signatures. */
@@ -587,7 +612,7 @@ out:
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
}
- integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
+ integrity_audit_msg(audit_msgno, inode, filename,
op, cause, rc, 0);
} else {
ima_cache_flags(iint, func);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index f3738b2c8bcd..6f5696d999d0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -57,11 +57,6 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ahash_bufsize, "Maximum ahash buffer size");
static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm;
static struct crypto_ahash *ima_ahash_tfm;
-struct ima_algo_desc {
- struct crypto_shash *tfm;
- enum hash_algo algo;
-};
-
int ima_sha1_idx __ro_after_init;
int ima_hash_algo_idx __ro_after_init;
/*
@@ -70,7 +65,7 @@ int ima_hash_algo_idx __ro_after_init;
*/
int ima_extra_slots __ro_after_init;
-static struct ima_algo_desc *ima_algo_array;
+struct ima_algo_desc *ima_algo_array __ro_after_init;
static int __init ima_init_ima_crypto(void)
{
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index cd1683dad3bf..e4a79a9b2d58 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -116,9 +116,31 @@ void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen)
seq_putc(m, *(char *)data++);
}
+static struct dentry **ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists __ro_after_init;
+static struct dentry **binary_securityfs_measurement_lists __ro_after_init;
+static int securityfs_measurement_list_count __ro_after_init;
+
+static void lookup_template_data_hash_algo(int *algo_idx, enum hash_algo *algo,
+ struct seq_file *m,
+ struct dentry **lists)
+{
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ int i;
+
+ dentry = file_dentry(m->file);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < securityfs_measurement_list_count; i++) {
+ if (dentry == lists[i]) {
+ *algo_idx = i;
+ *algo = ima_algo_array[i].algo;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/* print format:
* 32bit-le=pcr#
- * char[20]=template digest
+ * char[n]=template digest
* 32bit-le=template name size
* char[n]=template name
* [eventdata length]
@@ -132,7 +154,15 @@ int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
char *template_name;
u32 pcr, namelen, template_data_len; /* temporary fields */
bool is_ima_template = false;
- int i;
+ enum hash_algo algo;
+ int i, algo_idx;
+
+ algo_idx = ima_sha1_idx;
+ algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+
+ if (m->file != NULL)
+ lookup_template_data_hash_algo(&algo_idx, &algo, m,
+ binary_securityfs_measurement_lists);
/* get entry */
e = qe->entry;
@@ -151,7 +181,7 @@ int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(e->pcr));
/* 2nd: template digest */
- ima_putc(m, e->digests[ima_sha1_idx].digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ ima_putc(m, e->digests[algo_idx].digest, hash_digest_size[algo]);
/* 3rd: template name size */
namelen = !ima_canonical_fmt ? strlen(template_name) :
@@ -220,7 +250,15 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
struct ima_template_entry *e;
char *template_name;
- int i;
+ enum hash_algo algo;
+ int i, algo_idx;
+
+ algo_idx = ima_sha1_idx;
+ algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+
+ if (m->file != NULL)
+ lookup_template_data_hash_algo(&algo_idx, &algo, m,
+ ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists);
/* get entry */
e = qe->entry;
@@ -233,8 +271,8 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
/* 1st: PCR used (config option) */
seq_printf(m, "%2d ", e->pcr);
- /* 2nd: SHA1 template hash */
- ima_print_digest(m, e->digests[ima_sha1_idx].digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ /* 2nd: template hash */
+ ima_print_digest(m, e->digests[algo_idx].digest, hash_digest_size[algo]);
/* 3th: template name */
seq_printf(m, " %s", template_name);
@@ -379,6 +417,69 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = {
};
#endif
+static void __init remove_securityfs_measurement_lists(struct dentry **lists)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (lists) {
+ for (i = 0; i < securityfs_measurement_list_count; i++)
+ securityfs_remove(lists[i]);
+
+ kfree(lists);
+ }
+}
+
+static int __init create_securityfs_measurement_lists(void)
+{
+ char file_name[NAME_MAX + 1];
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ u16 algo;
+ int i;
+
+ securityfs_measurement_list_count = NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip);
+
+ if (ima_sha1_idx >= NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip))
+ securityfs_measurement_list_count++;
+
+ ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists =
+ kcalloc(securityfs_measurement_list_count, sizeof(struct dentry *),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ binary_securityfs_measurement_lists =
+ kcalloc(securityfs_measurement_list_count, sizeof(struct dentry *),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!binary_securityfs_measurement_lists)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < securityfs_measurement_list_count; i++) {
+ algo = ima_algo_array[i].algo;
+
+ sprintf(file_name, "ascii_runtime_measurements_%s",
+ hash_algo_name[algo]);
+ dentry = securityfs_create_file(file_name, S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
+ ima_dir, NULL,
+ &ima_ascii_measurements_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+ return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+
+ ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists[i] = dentry;
+
+ sprintf(file_name, "binary_runtime_measurements_%s",
+ hash_algo_name[algo]);
+ dentry = securityfs_create_file(file_name, S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
+ ima_dir, NULL,
+ &ima_measurements_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+ return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+
+ binary_securityfs_measurement_lists[i] = dentry;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
*/
@@ -454,6 +555,9 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
{
int ret;
+ ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists = NULL;
+ binary_securityfs_measurement_lists = NULL;
+
ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", integrity_dir);
if (IS_ERR(ima_dir))
return PTR_ERR(ima_dir);
@@ -465,19 +569,21 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
goto out;
}
+ ret = create_securityfs_measurement_lists();
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+
binary_runtime_measurements =
- securityfs_create_file("binary_runtime_measurements",
- S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
- &ima_measurements_ops);
+ securityfs_create_symlink("binary_runtime_measurements", ima_dir,
+ "binary_runtime_measurements_sha1", NULL);
if (IS_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements);
goto out;
}
ascii_runtime_measurements =
- securityfs_create_file("ascii_runtime_measurements",
- S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
- &ima_ascii_measurements_ops);
+ securityfs_create_symlink("ascii_runtime_measurements", ima_dir,
+ "ascii_runtime_measurements_sha1", NULL);
if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements);
goto out;
@@ -515,6 +621,9 @@ out:
securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
+ remove_securityfs_measurement_lists(ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists);
+ remove_securityfs_measurement_lists(binary_securityfs_measurement_lists);
+ securityfs_measurement_list_count = 0;
securityfs_remove(ima_symlink);
securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
index e7c9c216c1c6..00b249101f98 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static void ima_iint_init_always(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
struct inode *inode)
{
iint->ima_hash = NULL;
- iint->version = 0;
+ iint->real_inode.version = 0;
iint->flags = 0UL;
iint->atomic_flags = 0UL;
iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
@@ -109,22 +109,18 @@ struct ima_iint_cache *ima_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
}
/**
- * ima_inode_free - Called on inode free
- * @inode: Pointer to the inode
+ * ima_inode_free_rcu - Called to free an inode via a RCU callback
+ * @inode_security: The inode->i_security pointer
*
- * Free the iint associated with an inode.
+ * Free the IMA data associated with an inode.
*/
-void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
+void ima_inode_free_rcu(void *inode_security)
{
- struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
-
- if (!IS_IMA(inode))
- return;
-
- iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
- ima_inode_set_iint(inode, NULL);
+ struct ima_iint_cache **iint_p = inode_security + ima_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
- ima_iint_free(iint);
+ /* *iint_p should be NULL if !IS_IMA(inode) */
+ if (*iint_p)
+ ima_iint_free(*iint_p);
}
static void ima_iint_init_once(void *foo)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 393f5c7912d5..a2f34f2d8ad7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -48,12 +48,14 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
.filename = boot_aggregate_name };
struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+ struct ima_digest_data *hash_hdr = container_of(&hash.hdr,
+ struct ima_digest_data, hdr);
int result = -ENOMEM;
int violation = 0;
memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
- iint->ima_hash = &hash.hdr;
+ iint->ima_hash = hash_hdr;
iint->ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
iint->ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
@@ -70,7 +72,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
* is not found.
*/
if (ima_tpm_chip) {
- result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr);
+ result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(hash_hdr);
if (result < 0) {
audit_cause = "hashing_error";
goto err_out;
@@ -150,6 +152,8 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
ima_init_key_queue();
+ ima_init_reboot_notifier();
+
ima_measure_critical_data("kernel_info", "kernel_version",
UTS_RELEASE, strlen(UTS_RELEASE), false,
NULL, 0);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
index dadc1d138118..7362f68f2d8b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
@@ -12,64 +12,118 @@
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/of.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/reboot.h>
+#include <asm/page.h>
#include "ima.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
+#define IMA_KEXEC_EVENT_LEN 256
+
+static bool ima_kexec_update_registered;
+static struct seq_file ima_kexec_file;
+static size_t kexec_segment_size;
+static void *ima_kexec_buffer;
+
+static void ima_free_kexec_file_buf(struct seq_file *sf)
+{
+ vfree(sf->buf);
+ sf->buf = NULL;
+ sf->size = 0;
+ sf->read_pos = 0;
+ sf->count = 0;
+}
+
+void ima_measure_kexec_event(const char *event_name)
+{
+ char ima_kexec_event[IMA_KEXEC_EVENT_LEN];
+ size_t buf_size = 0;
+ long len;
+ int n;
+
+ buf_size = ima_get_binary_runtime_size();
+ len = atomic_long_read(&ima_htable.len);
+
+ n = scnprintf(ima_kexec_event, IMA_KEXEC_EVENT_LEN,
+ "kexec_segment_size=%lu;ima_binary_runtime_size=%lu;"
+ "ima_runtime_measurements_count=%ld;",
+ kexec_segment_size, buf_size, len);
+
+ ima_measure_critical_data("ima_kexec", event_name, ima_kexec_event, n, false, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int ima_alloc_kexec_file_buf(size_t segment_size)
+{
+ /*
+ * kexec 'load' may be called multiple times.
+ * Free and realloc the buffer only if the segment_size is
+ * changed from the previous kexec 'load' call.
+ */
+ if (ima_kexec_file.buf && ima_kexec_file.size == segment_size)
+ goto out;
+
+ ima_free_kexec_file_buf(&ima_kexec_file);
+
+ /* segment size can't change between kexec load and execute */
+ ima_kexec_file.buf = vmalloc(segment_size);
+ if (!ima_kexec_file.buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ima_kexec_file.size = segment_size;
+
+out:
+ ima_kexec_file.read_pos = 0;
+ ima_kexec_file.count = sizeof(struct ima_kexec_hdr); /* reserved space */
+ ima_measure_kexec_event("kexec_load");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int ima_dump_measurement_list(unsigned long *buffer_size, void **buffer,
unsigned long segment_size)
{
struct ima_queue_entry *qe;
- struct seq_file file;
struct ima_kexec_hdr khdr;
int ret = 0;
/* segment size can't change between kexec load and execute */
- file.buf = vmalloc(segment_size);
- if (!file.buf) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
+ if (!ima_kexec_file.buf) {
+ pr_err("Kexec file buf not allocated\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
}
- file.size = segment_size;
- file.read_pos = 0;
- file.count = sizeof(khdr); /* reserved space */
-
memset(&khdr, 0, sizeof(khdr));
khdr.version = 1;
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_measurements, later) {
- if (file.count < file.size) {
+ /* This is an append-only list, no need to hold the RCU read lock */
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_measurements, later, true) {
+ if (ima_kexec_file.count < ima_kexec_file.size) {
khdr.count++;
- ima_measurements_show(&file, qe);
+ ima_measurements_show(&ima_kexec_file, qe);
} else {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
-
/*
* fill in reserved space with some buffer details
* (eg. version, buffer size, number of measurements)
*/
- khdr.buffer_size = file.count;
+ khdr.buffer_size = ima_kexec_file.count;
if (ima_canonical_fmt) {
khdr.version = cpu_to_le16(khdr.version);
khdr.count = cpu_to_le64(khdr.count);
khdr.buffer_size = cpu_to_le64(khdr.buffer_size);
}
- memcpy(file.buf, &khdr, sizeof(khdr));
+ memcpy(ima_kexec_file.buf, &khdr, sizeof(khdr));
print_hex_dump_debug("ima dump: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
- file.buf, file.count < 100 ? file.count : 100,
+ ima_kexec_file.buf, ima_kexec_file.count < 100 ?
+ ima_kexec_file.count : 100,
true);
- *buffer_size = file.count;
- *buffer = file.buf;
-out:
- if (ret == -EINVAL)
- vfree(file.buf);
+ *buffer_size = ima_kexec_file.count;
+ *buffer = ima_kexec_file.buf;
+
return ret;
}
@@ -85,32 +139,39 @@ void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
.buf_min = 0, .buf_max = ULONG_MAX,
.top_down = true };
unsigned long binary_runtime_size;
+ unsigned long extra_memory;
/* use more understandable variable names than defined in kbuf */
+ size_t kexec_buffer_size = 0;
void *kexec_buffer = NULL;
- size_t kexec_buffer_size;
- size_t kexec_segment_size;
int ret;
+ if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH)
+ return;
+
/*
- * Reserve an extra half page of memory for additional measurements
- * added during the kexec load.
+ * Reserve extra memory for measurements added during kexec.
*/
- binary_runtime_size = ima_get_binary_runtime_size();
+ if (CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC_EXTRA_MEMORY_KB <= 0)
+ extra_memory = PAGE_SIZE / 2;
+ else
+ extra_memory = CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC_EXTRA_MEMORY_KB * 1024;
+
+ binary_runtime_size = ima_get_binary_runtime_size() + extra_memory;
+
if (binary_runtime_size >= ULONG_MAX - PAGE_SIZE)
kexec_segment_size = ULONG_MAX;
else
- kexec_segment_size = ALIGN(ima_get_binary_runtime_size() +
- PAGE_SIZE / 2, PAGE_SIZE);
+ kexec_segment_size = ALIGN(binary_runtime_size, PAGE_SIZE);
+
if ((kexec_segment_size == ULONG_MAX) ||
((kexec_segment_size >> PAGE_SHIFT) > totalram_pages() / 2)) {
pr_err("Binary measurement list too large.\n");
return;
}
- ima_dump_measurement_list(&kexec_buffer_size, &kexec_buffer,
- kexec_segment_size);
- if (!kexec_buffer) {
+ ret = ima_alloc_kexec_file_buf(kexec_segment_size);
+ if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("Not enough memory for the kexec measurement buffer.\n");
return;
}
@@ -118,6 +179,7 @@ void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
kbuf.buffer = kexec_buffer;
kbuf.bufsz = kexec_buffer_size;
kbuf.memsz = kexec_segment_size;
+ image->is_ima_segment_index_set = false;
ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Error passing over kexec measurement buffer.\n");
@@ -128,10 +190,80 @@ void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
image->ima_buffer_addr = kbuf.mem;
image->ima_buffer_size = kexec_segment_size;
image->ima_buffer = kexec_buffer;
+ image->ima_segment_index = image->nr_segments - 1;
+ image->is_ima_segment_index_set = true;
kexec_dprintk("kexec measurement buffer for the loaded kernel at 0x%lx.\n",
kbuf.mem);
}
+
+/*
+ * Called during kexec execute so that IMA can update the measurement list.
+ */
+static int ima_update_kexec_buffer(struct notifier_block *self,
+ unsigned long action, void *data)
+{
+ size_t buf_size = 0;
+ int ret = NOTIFY_OK;
+ void *buf = NULL;
+
+ if (!kexec_in_progress) {
+ pr_info("No kexec in progress.\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!ima_kexec_buffer) {
+ pr_err("Kexec buffer not set.\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = ima_dump_measurement_list(&buf_size, &buf, kexec_segment_size);
+
+ if (ret)
+ pr_err("Dump measurements failed. Error:%d\n", ret);
+
+ if (buf_size != 0)
+ memcpy(ima_kexec_buffer, buf, buf_size);
+
+ kimage_unmap_segment(ima_kexec_buffer);
+ ima_kexec_buffer = NULL;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block update_buffer_nb = {
+ .notifier_call = ima_update_kexec_buffer,
+ .priority = INT_MIN
+};
+
+/*
+ * Create a mapping for the source pages that contain the IMA buffer
+ * so we can update it later.
+ */
+void ima_kexec_post_load(struct kimage *image)
+{
+ if (ima_kexec_buffer) {
+ kimage_unmap_segment(ima_kexec_buffer);
+ ima_kexec_buffer = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!image->ima_buffer_addr)
+ return;
+
+ ima_kexec_buffer = kimage_map_segment(image,
+ image->ima_buffer_addr,
+ image->ima_buffer_size);
+ if (!ima_kexec_buffer) {
+ pr_err("Could not map measurements buffer.\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!ima_kexec_update_registered) {
+ register_reboot_notifier(&update_buffer_nb);
+ ima_kexec_update_registered = true;
+ }
+}
+
#endif /* IMA_KEXEC */
/*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index c84e8c55333d..f99ab1a3b0f0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/iversion.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -128,16 +129,22 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
if (!iint)
iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+
/* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */
- if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE,
- &iint->atomic_flags))
+ if (iint && test_and_clear_bit(IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU,
+ &iint->atomic_flags))
send_tomtou = true;
}
} else {
if (must_measure)
- set_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags);
- if (inode_is_open_for_write(inode) && must_measure)
- send_writers = true;
+ set_bit(IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU, &iint->atomic_flags);
+
+ /* Limit number of open_writers violations */
+ if (inode_is_open_for_write(inode) && must_measure) {
+ if (!test_and_set_bit(IMA_EMITTED_OPENWRITERS,
+ &iint->atomic_flags))
+ send_writers = true;
+ }
}
if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
@@ -166,6 +173,8 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
struct kstat stat;
+ clear_bit(IMA_EMITTED_OPENWRITERS, &iint->atomic_flags);
+
update = test_and_clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR,
&iint->atomic_flags);
if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) ||
@@ -173,7 +182,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE,
AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT) ||
!(stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE) ||
- stat.change_cookie != iint->version) {
+ stat.change_cookie != iint->real_inode.version) {
iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
if (update)
@@ -205,12 +214,13 @@ static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
}
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
- u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
- enum ima_hooks func)
+ struct lsm_prop *prop, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
- struct inode *backing_inode, *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct inode *real_inode, *inode = file_inode(file);
struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL;
+ struct inode *metadata_inode;
char *pathbuf = NULL;
char filename[NAME_MAX];
const char *pathname = NULL;
@@ -230,12 +240,14 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
- action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, secid,
+ action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, prop,
mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
&allowed_algos);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK ||
func == MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT) &&
- (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
+ (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE) &&
+ ((action & IMA_MEASURE) ||
+ (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)));
if (!action && !violation_check)
return 0;
@@ -267,10 +279,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags))
- /* reset appraisal flags if ima_inode_post_setattr was called */
+ /*
+ * Reset appraisal flags (action and non-action rule-specific)
+ * if ima_inode_post_setattr was called.
+ */
iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED |
IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
- IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS);
+ IMA_NONACTION_RULE_FLAGS);
/*
* Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the
@@ -285,17 +300,28 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
}
- /* Detect and re-evaluate changes made to the backing file. */
- backing_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file));
- if (backing_inode != inode &&
+ /*
+ * On stacked filesystems, detect and re-evaluate file data and
+ * metadata changes.
+ */
+ real_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file));
+ if (real_inode != inode &&
(action & IMA_DO_MASK) && (iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK)) {
- if (!IS_I_VERSION(backing_inode) ||
- backing_inode->i_sb->s_dev != iint->real_dev ||
- backing_inode->i_ino != iint->real_ino ||
- !inode_eq_iversion(backing_inode, iint->version)) {
+ if (!IS_I_VERSION(real_inode) ||
+ integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->real_inode,
+ real_inode)) {
iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
}
+
+ /*
+ * Reset the EVM status when metadata changed.
+ */
+ metadata_inode = d_inode(d_real(file_dentry(file),
+ D_REAL_METADATA));
+ if (evm_metadata_changed(inode, metadata_inode))
+ iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISED |
+ IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK);
}
/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
@@ -430,23 +456,23 @@ out:
static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;
int ret;
if (!file)
return 0;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
if (reqprot & PROT_EXEC) {
- ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
return 0;
@@ -475,9 +501,9 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
char *pathbuf = NULL;
const char *pathname = NULL;
struct inode *inode;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;
int result = 0;
int action;
- u32 secid;
int pcr;
/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
@@ -485,13 +511,13 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
!(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
return 0;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode,
- current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
+ current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
&pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
action |= ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode,
- current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC,
+ current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC,
MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT, &pcr, &template, NULL,
NULL);
@@ -528,20 +554,48 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(),
+ &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
- security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
+ security_cred_getlsmprop(bprm->cred, &prop);
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &prop, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
/**
+ * ima_bprm_creds_for_exec - collect/store/appraise measurement.
+ * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
+ *
+ * Based on the IMA policy and the execveat(2) AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag, measure
+ * and appraise the integrity of a file to be executed by script interpreters.
+ * Unlike any of the other LSM hooks where the kernel enforces file integrity,
+ * enforcing file integrity is left up to the discretion of the script
+ * interpreter (userspace).
+ *
+ * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+static int ima_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ /*
+ * As security_bprm_check() is called multiple times, both
+ * the script and the shebang interpreter are measured, appraised,
+ * and audited. Limit usage of this LSM hook to just measuring,
+ * appraising, and auditing the indirect script execution
+ * (e.g. ./sh example.sh).
+ */
+ if (!bprm->is_check)
+ return 0;
+
+ return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
+}
+
+/**
* ima_file_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
* @file: pointer to the file to be measured
* @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC or MAY_APPEND
@@ -553,10 +607,10 @@ static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -755,7 +809,7 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
bool contents)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;
/*
* Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
@@ -775,9 +829,9 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
- 0, MAY_READ, func);
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
+ MAY_READ, func);
}
const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
@@ -805,7 +859,7 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;
/* permit signed certs */
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
@@ -818,8 +872,8 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
}
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, buf, size,
MAY_READ, func);
}
@@ -902,6 +956,13 @@ static int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
return 0;
}
+ /*
+ * Measure the init_module syscall buffer containing the ELF image.
+ */
+ if (load_id == LOADING_MODULE)
+ ima_measure_critical_data("modules", "init_module",
+ buf, size, true, NULL, 0);
+
return 0;
}
@@ -941,11 +1002,13 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
.buf_len = size};
struct ima_template_desc *template;
struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+ struct ima_digest_data *hash_hdr = container_of(&hash.hdr,
+ struct ima_digest_data, hdr);
char digest_hash[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
int violation = 0;
int action = 0;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;
if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -961,16 +1024,16 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
}
/*
- * Both LSM hooks and auxilary based buffer measurements are
- * based on policy. To avoid code duplication, differentiate
- * between the LSM hooks and auxilary buffer measurements,
+ * Both LSM hooks and auxiliary based buffer measurements are
+ * based on policy. To avoid code duplication, differentiate
+ * between the LSM hooks and auxiliary buffer measurements,
* retrieving the policy rule information only for the LSM hook
* buffer measurements.
*/
if (func) {
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
action = ima_get_action(idmap, inode, current_cred(),
- secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
+ &prop, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
func_data, NULL);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
return -ENOENT;
@@ -979,7 +1042,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
if (!pcr)
pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
- iint.ima_hash = &hash.hdr;
+ iint.ima_hash = hash_hdr;
iint.ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
@@ -990,7 +1053,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
}
if (buf_hash) {
- memcpy(digest_hash, hash.hdr.digest, digest_hash_len);
+ memcpy(digest_hash, hash_hdr->digest, digest_hash_len);
ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(digest_hash, digest_hash_len,
iint.ima_hash);
@@ -1040,19 +1103,16 @@ out:
*/
void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
{
- struct fd f;
-
if (!buf || !size)
return;
- f = fdget(kernel_fd);
- if (!f.file)
+ CLASS(fd, f)(kernel_fd);
+ if (fd_empty(f))
return;
- process_buffer_measurement(file_mnt_idmap(f.file), file_inode(f.file),
+ process_buffer_measurement(file_mnt_idmap(fd_file(f)), file_inode(fd_file(f)),
buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0,
NULL, false, NULL, 0);
- fdput(f);
}
/**
@@ -1092,7 +1152,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
/**
- * ima_kernel_module_request - Prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
+ * ima_kernel_module_request - Prevent crypto-pkcs1(rsa,*) requests
* @kmod_name: kernel module name
*
* Avoid a verification loop where verifying the signature of the modprobe
@@ -1106,7 +1166,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
* algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use alg_name
* in order to load a kernel module with same name.
*
- * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
+ * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
* we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(), and
* avoid the verification loop.
*
@@ -1114,7 +1174,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
*/
static int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
- if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
+ if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1(rsa,", 17) == 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
@@ -1155,6 +1215,7 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, ima_bprm_creds_for_exec),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_post_open, ima_file_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_create_tmpfile, ima_post_create_tmpfile),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, ima_file_free),
@@ -1171,7 +1232,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, ima_kernel_module_request),
#endif
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, ima_inode_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security_rcu, ima_inode_free_rcu),
};
static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index c0556907c2e6..128fab897930 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -148,7 +148,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .func = FILE_CHECK,
+ .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_FUNC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
@@ -401,7 +402,8 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
kfree(entry);
}
-static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
+ gfp_t gfp)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
int i;
@@ -410,7 +412,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
* Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only
* lsm rules can change
*/
- nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), gfp);
if (!nentry)
return NULL;
@@ -425,7 +427,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
- &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+ &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
+ gfp);
if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
@@ -438,7 +441,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
int i;
struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
- nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry);
+ nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!nentry)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -555,7 +558,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
* @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: a pointer to an inode
* @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
- * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
+ * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated
* @func: LIM hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
@@ -565,7 +568,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
- u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ struct lsm_prop *prop, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
const char *func_data)
{
int i;
@@ -633,7 +636,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsm_prop inode_prop = { };
if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule) {
if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].args_p)
@@ -647,15 +650,16 @@ retry:
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
+ security_inode_getlsmprop(inode, &inode_prop);
+ rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&inode_prop,
+ lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
+ rc = ima_filter_rule_match(prop, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
break;
@@ -664,7 +668,7 @@ retry:
}
if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) {
- lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule);
+ lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (lsm_rule) {
rule_reinitialized = true;
goto retry;
@@ -718,7 +722,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
* @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
* being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated
* @func: IMA hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @flags: IMA actions to consider (e.g. IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE)
@@ -735,8 +739,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
*/
int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
- int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop,
+ enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
{
@@ -754,7 +758,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
continue;
- if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, secid,
+ if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, prop,
func, mask, func_data))
continue;
@@ -1140,7 +1144,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
- &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
+ &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
@@ -1427,7 +1432,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
int token;
unsigned long lnum;
- if (result < 0)
+ if (result < 0 || *p == '#') /* ignore suffixed comment */
break;
if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
continue;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index 532da87ce519..590637e81ad1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -44,6 +45,12 @@ struct ima_h_table ima_htable = {
*/
static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_extend_list_mutex);
+/*
+ * Used internally by the kernel to suspend measurements.
+ * Protected by ima_extend_list_mutex.
+ */
+static bool ima_measurements_suspended;
+
/* lookup up the digest value in the hash table, and return the entry */
static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value,
int pcr)
@@ -168,6 +175,18 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
int result = 0, tpmresult = 0;
mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+
+ /*
+ * Avoid appending to the measurement log when the TPM subsystem has
+ * been shut down while preparing for system reboot.
+ */
+ if (ima_measurements_suspended) {
+ audit_cause = "measurements_suspended";
+ audit_info = 0;
+ result = -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if (!violation && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE)) {
if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest, entry->pcr)) {
audit_cause = "hash_exists";
@@ -211,6 +230,36 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
return result;
}
+static void ima_measurements_suspend(void)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+ ima_measurements_suspended = true;
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+}
+
+static int ima_reboot_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb,
+ unsigned long action,
+ void *data)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
+ if (action == SYS_RESTART && data && !strcmp(data, "kexec reboot"))
+ ima_measure_kexec_event("kexec_execute");
+#endif
+
+ ima_measurements_suspend();
+
+ return NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block ima_reboot_nb = {
+ .notifier_call = ima_reboot_notifier,
+};
+
+void __init ima_init_reboot_notifier(void)
+{
+ register_reboot_notifier(&ima_reboot_nb);
+}
+
int __init ima_init_digests(void)
{
u16 digest_size;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 6cd0add524cd..0e627eac9c33 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -318,15 +318,21 @@ static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(const u8 *digest, u32 digestsize,
hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
}
- if (digest)
+ if (digest) {
memcpy(buffer + offset, digest, digestsize);
- else
+ } else {
/*
* If digest is NULL, the event being recorded is a violation.
* Make room for the digest by increasing the offset by the
- * hash algorithm digest size.
+ * hash algorithm digest size. If the hash algorithm is not
+ * specified increase the offset by IMA_DIGEST_SIZE which
+ * fits SHA1 or MD5
*/
- offset += hash_digest_size[hash_algo];
+ if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+ offset += hash_digest_size[hash_algo];
+ else
+ offset += IMA_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ }
return ima_write_template_field_data(buffer, offset + digestsize,
fmt, field_data);
@@ -339,6 +345,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+ struct ima_digest_data *hash_hdr = container_of(&hash.hdr,
+ struct ima_digest_data, hdr);
u8 *cur_digest = NULL;
u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
struct inode *inode;
@@ -358,7 +366,7 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
if ((const char *)event_data->filename == boot_aggregate_name) {
if (ima_tpm_chip) {
hash.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
- result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr);
+ result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(hash_hdr);
/* algo can change depending on available PCR banks */
if (!result && hash.hdr.algo != HASH_ALGO_SHA1)
@@ -368,7 +376,7 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
}
- cur_digest = hash.hdr.digest;
+ cur_digest = hash_hdr->digest;
cur_digestsize = hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO_SHA1];
goto out;
}
@@ -379,14 +387,14 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
inode = file_inode(event_data->file);
hash.hdr.algo = ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(ima_hash_algo) ?
ima_hash_algo : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
- result = ima_calc_file_hash(event_data->file, &hash.hdr);
+ result = ima_calc_file_hash(event_data->file, hash_hdr);
if (result) {
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
event_data->filename, "collect_data",
"failed", result, 0);
return result;
}
- cur_digest = hash.hdr.digest;
+ cur_digest = hash_hdr->digest;
cur_digestsize = hash.hdr.length;
out:
return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
@@ -483,7 +491,10 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
bool size_limit)
{
const char *cur_filename = NULL;
+ struct name_snapshot filename;
u32 cur_filename_len = 0;
+ bool snapshot = false;
+ int ret;
BUG_ON(event_data->filename == NULL && event_data->file == NULL);
@@ -496,7 +507,10 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
}
if (event_data->file) {
- cur_filename = event_data->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
+ take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename,
+ event_data->file->f_path.dentry);
+ snapshot = true;
+ cur_filename = filename.name.name;
cur_filename_len = strlen(cur_filename);
} else
/*
@@ -505,8 +519,13 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
*/
cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX;
out:
- return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len,
- DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
+ ret = ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len,
+ DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
+
+ if (snapshot)
+ release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename);
+
+ return ret;
}
/*
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2025-07-23 06:47:54 +0000