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-rw-r--r--security/keys/Kconfig2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c1
-rw-r--r--security/keys/gc.c4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c7
-rw-r--r--security/keys/sysctl.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c1
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c58
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c27
10 files changed, 76 insertions, 30 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index abb03a1b2a5c..d4f5fc1e7263 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ config BIG_KEYS
bool "Large payload keys"
depends on KEYS
depends on TMPFS
- depends on CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305 = y
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
help
This option provides support for holding large keys within the kernel
(for example Kerberos ticket caches). The data may be stored out to
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 8af2136069d2..831cb84fd75a 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -1040,4 +1040,5 @@ static void __exit cleanup_encrypted(void)
late_initcall(init_encrypted);
module_exit(cleanup_encrypted);
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Encrypted key type");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index 7d687b0962b1..f27223ea4578 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -218,8 +218,10 @@ continue_scanning:
key = rb_entry(cursor, struct key, serial_node);
cursor = rb_next(cursor);
- if (refcount_read(&key->usage) == 0)
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_FINAL_PUT, &key->flags)) {
+ smp_mb(); /* Clobber key->user after FINAL_PUT seen. */
goto found_unreferenced_key;
+ }
if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1)) {
if (key->type == key_gc_dead_keytype) {
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 3d7d185019d3..7198cd2ac3a3 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -658,6 +658,8 @@ void key_put(struct key *key)
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->user->lock, flags);
}
+ smp_mb(); /* key->user before FINAL_PUT set. */
+ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_FINAL_PUT, &key->flags);
schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
}
}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 4bc3e9398ee3..ab927a142f51 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
goto unlock;
/* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */
- oldwork = task_work_cancel(parent, key_change_session_keyring);
+ oldwork = task_work_cancel_func(parent, key_change_session_keyring);
/* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
* restarting */
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 4448758f643a..f331725d5a37 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -772,8 +772,11 @@ ascend_to_node:
for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
ptr = READ_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
- if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr) && node->back_pointer)
- goto descend_to_node;
+ if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
+ if (node->back_pointer ||
+ assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr))
+ goto descend_to_node;
+ }
if (!keyring_ptr_is_keyring(ptr))
continue;
diff --git a/security/keys/sysctl.c b/security/keys/sysctl.c
index 91f000eef3ad..cde08c478f32 100644
--- a/security/keys/sysctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/sysctl.c
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include "internal.h"
-static struct ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
+static const struct ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
{
.procname = "maxkeys",
.data = &key_quota_maxkeys,
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
index 5113aeae5628..e2d9644efde1 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
@@ -395,4 +395,5 @@ static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
late_initcall(init_trusted);
module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Trusted Key type");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
index b5f81a05be36..7b6eb655df0c 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ static int do_aead_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, u8 *key, u8 *nonce,
struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
struct crypto_aead *aead;
int ret;
+ DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
aead = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(aead)) {
@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ static int do_aead_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, u8 *key, u8 *nonce,
}
aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, len, nonce);
- aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL,
- NULL);
+ aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0);
if (crypto_aead_setkey(aead, key, AES_KEYSIZE_128)) {
@@ -174,9 +175,9 @@ static int do_aead_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, u8 *key, u8 *nonce,
}
if (do_encrypt)
- ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
+ ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req), &wait);
else
- ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
+ ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req), &wait);
free_req:
aead_request_free(aead_req);
@@ -186,51 +187,63 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-static int decrypt_blob_key(u8 *key)
+static int decrypt_blob_key(u8 *encrypted_key, u8 *plain_key)
{
- return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, false);
+ return do_dcp_crypto(encrypted_key, plain_key, false);
}
-static int encrypt_blob_key(u8 *key)
+static int encrypt_blob_key(u8 *plain_key, u8 *encrypted_key)
{
- return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, true);
+ return do_dcp_crypto(plain_key, encrypted_key, true);
}
static int trusted_dcp_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
int blen, ret;
+ u8 *plain_blob_key;
blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len);
if (blen > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
return -E2BIG;
+ plain_blob_key = kmalloc(AES_KEYSIZE_128, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!plain_blob_key)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
b->fmt_version = DCP_BLOB_VERSION;
get_random_bytes(b->nonce, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
- get_random_bytes(b->blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
+ get_random_bytes(plain_blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
- ret = do_aead_crypto(p->key, b->payload, p->key_len, b->blob_key,
+ ret = do_aead_crypto(p->key, b->payload, p->key_len, plain_blob_key,
b->nonce, true);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob payload: %i\n", ret);
- return ret;
+ goto out;
}
- ret = encrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key);
+ ret = encrypt_blob_key(plain_blob_key, b->blob_key);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob key: %i\n", ret);
- return ret;
+ goto out;
}
- b->payload_len = get_unaligned_le32(&p->key_len);
+ put_unaligned_le32(p->key_len, &b->payload_len);
p->blob_len = blen;
- return 0;
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ memzero_explicit(plain_blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
+ kfree(plain_blob_key);
+
+ return ret;
}
static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
int blen, ret;
+ u8 *plain_blob_key = NULL;
if (b->fmt_version != DCP_BLOB_VERSION) {
pr_err("DCP blob has bad version: %i, expected %i\n",
@@ -248,14 +261,20 @@ static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
goto out;
}
- ret = decrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key);
+ plain_blob_key = kmalloc(AES_KEYSIZE_128, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!plain_blob_key) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = decrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key, plain_blob_key);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Unable to decrypt blob key: %i\n", ret);
goto out;
}
ret = do_aead_crypto(b->payload, p->key, p->key_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN,
- b->blob_key, b->nonce, false);
+ plain_blob_key, b->nonce, false);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Unwrap of DCP payload failed: %i\n", ret);
goto out;
@@ -263,6 +282,11 @@ static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
ret = 0;
out:
+ if (plain_blob_key) {
+ memzero_explicit(plain_blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
+ kfree(plain_blob_key);
+ }
+
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index dfeec06301ce..024be262702f 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
-#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
#include "tpm2key.asn1.h"
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
u8 *end_work = scratch + SCRATCH_SIZE;
u8 *priv, *pub;
u16 priv_len, pub_len;
+ int ret;
priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2;
priv = src;
@@ -57,8 +58,10 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
/* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
- if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode"))
- return PTR_ERR(w);
+ if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode")) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(w);
+ goto err;
+ }
work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool);
}
@@ -69,8 +72,10 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
* trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on
*/
if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE,
- "BUG: scratch buffer is too small"))
- return -EINVAL;
+ "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
@@ -79,10 +84,18 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
work1 = payload->blob;
work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob),
scratch, work - scratch);
- if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed"))
- return PTR_ERR(work1);
+ if (IS_ERR(work1)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(work1);
+ pr_err("BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed with %d\n", ret);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ kfree(scratch);
return work1 - payload->blob;
+
+err:
+ kfree(scratch);
+ return ret;
}
struct tpm2_key_context {
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2025-07-08 13:19:26 +0000