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Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/xfrm.c')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c27
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index c576832febc6..61d56b0c2be1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
- * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ * Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
*
* This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations.
*
@@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
gfp_t gfp)
{
int rc;
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
u32 str_len;
@@ -95,16 +94,15 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
- ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
+ ctx->ctx_len = str_len + 1;
memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len);
ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0';
- rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, ctx->ctx_str, str_len,
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len,
&ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
if (rc)
goto err;
- rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), ctx->ctx_sid,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
if (rc)
goto err;
@@ -135,13 +133,10 @@ static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
*/
static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
-
if (!ctx)
return 0;
- return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), ctx->ctx_sid,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT,
NULL);
}
@@ -163,8 +158,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid)
if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
return -EINVAL;
- rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL);
return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc);
}
@@ -205,7 +199,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
/* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
* is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
* check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
- return (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, flic_sid, state_sid,
+ return (avc_has_perm(flic_sid, state_sid,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
NULL) ? 0 : 1);
}
@@ -355,7 +349,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
if (secid == 0)
return -EINVAL;
- rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, &ctx_str,
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(secid, &ctx_str,
&str_len);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -424,8 +418,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
* according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
* non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
- return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- sk_sid, peer_sid,
+ return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
}
@@ -468,6 +461,6 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
* according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
* non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
- return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+ return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
}