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Diffstat (limited to 'tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c953
1 files changed, 953 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..28b4f7035ceb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,953 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Converted from tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c */
+
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include "../../../include/linux/filter.h"
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+
+#define BPF_SK_LOOKUP(func) \
+ /* struct bpf_sock_tuple tuple = {} */ \
+ "r2 = 0;" \
+ "*(u32*)(r10 - 8) = r2;" \
+ "*(u64*)(r10 - 16) = r2;" \
+ "*(u64*)(r10 - 24) = r2;" \
+ "*(u64*)(r10 - 32) = r2;" \
+ "*(u64*)(r10 - 40) = r2;" \
+ "*(u64*)(r10 - 48) = r2;" \
+ /* sk = func(ctx, &tuple, sizeof tuple, 0, 0) */ \
+ "r2 = r10;" \
+ "r2 += -48;" \
+ "r3 = %[sizeof_bpf_sock_tuple];"\
+ "r4 = 0;" \
+ "r5 = 0;" \
+ "call %[" #func "];"
+
+struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
+ __uint(max_entries, 1);
+ __type(key, long long);
+ __type(value, long long);
+} map_hash_8b SEC(".maps");
+
+void dummy_prog_42_socket(void);
+void dummy_prog_24_socket(void);
+void dummy_prog_loop1_socket(void);
+
+struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY);
+ __uint(max_entries, 4);
+ __uint(key_size, sizeof(int));
+ __array(values, void (void));
+} map_prog1_socket SEC(".maps") = {
+ .values = {
+ [0] = (void *)&dummy_prog_42_socket,
+ [1] = (void *)&dummy_prog_loop1_socket,
+ [2] = (void *)&dummy_prog_24_socket,
+ },
+};
+
+SEC("socket")
+__auxiliary __auxiliary_unpriv
+__naked void dummy_prog_42_socket(void)
+{
+ asm volatile ("r0 = 42; exit;");
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__auxiliary __auxiliary_unpriv
+__naked void dummy_prog_24_socket(void)
+{
+ asm volatile ("r0 = 24; exit;");
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__auxiliary __auxiliary_unpriv
+__naked void dummy_prog_loop1_socket(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r3 = 1; \
+ r2 = %[map_prog1_socket] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_tail_call]; \
+ r0 = 41; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_tail_call),
+ __imm_addr(map_prog1_socket)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: return pointer")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 leaks addr")
+__retval(POINTER_VALUE)
+__naked void unpriv_return_pointer(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r0 = r10; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: add const to pointer")
+__success __success_unpriv __retval(0)
+__naked void unpriv_add_const_to_pointer(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 += 8; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: add pointer to pointer")
+__failure __msg("R1 pointer += pointer")
+__failure_unpriv
+__naked void unpriv_add_pointer_to_pointer(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 += r10; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: neg pointer")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer arithmetic")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void unpriv_neg_pointer(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = -r1; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: cmp pointer with const")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void unpriv_cmp_pointer_with_const(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ if r1 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R10 pointer comparison")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void unpriv_cmp_pointer_with_pointer(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ if r1 == r10 goto l0_%=; \
+l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("tracepoint")
+__description("unpriv: check that printk is disallowed")
+__success
+__naked void check_that_printk_is_disallowed(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
+ r1 = r10; \
+ r1 += -8; \
+ r2 = 8; \
+ r3 = r1; \
+ call %[bpf_trace_printk]; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_trace_printk)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: pass pointer to helper function")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R4 leaks addr")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void pass_pointer_to_helper_function(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ r3 = r2; \
+ r4 = r2; \
+ call %[bpf_map_update_elem]; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_update_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function")
+__success __failure_unpriv
+__msg_unpriv("invalid read from stack R2 off -8+0 size 8")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void on_stack_to_helper_function(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r10; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("attempt to corrupt spilled")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void mangle_pointer_on_stack_1(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r10; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ *(u32*)(r10 - 8) = r0; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("attempt to corrupt spilled")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void mangle_pointer_on_stack_2(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r10; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ *(u8*)(r10 - 1) = r0; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks")
+__failure __msg("invalid size")
+__failure_unpriv
+__naked void from_stack_in_small_chunks(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r10; \
+ r0 = *(u32*)(r10 - 8); \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: write pointer into ctx")
+__failure __msg("invalid bpf_context access")
+__failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 leaks addr")
+__naked void unpriv_write_pointer_into_ctx(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ *(u64*)(r1 + 0) = r1; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: spill/fill of ctx")
+__success __success_unpriv __retval(0)
+__naked void unpriv_spill_fill_of_ctx(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r6 = r10; \
+ r6 += -8; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1; \
+ r1 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("tc")
+__description("unpriv: spill/fill of ctx 2")
+__success __retval(0)
+__naked void spill_fill_of_ctx_2(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r6 = r10; \
+ r6 += -8; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1; \
+ r1 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
+ call %[bpf_get_hash_recalc]; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_hash_recalc)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("tc")
+__description("unpriv: spill/fill of ctx 3")
+__failure __msg("R1 type=fp expected=ctx")
+__naked void spill_fill_of_ctx_3(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r6 = r10; \
+ r6 += -8; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r10; \
+ r1 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
+ call %[bpf_get_hash_recalc]; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_hash_recalc)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("tc")
+__description("unpriv: spill/fill of ctx 4")
+__failure __msg("R1 type=scalar expected=ctx")
+__naked void spill_fill_of_ctx_4(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r6 = r10; \
+ r6 += -8; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1; \
+ r0 = 1; \
+ lock *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) += r0; \
+ r1 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
+ call %[bpf_get_hash_recalc]; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_hash_recalc)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("tc")
+__description("unpriv: spill/fill of different pointers stx")
+__failure __msg("same insn cannot be used with different pointers")
+__naked void fill_of_different_pointers_stx(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r3 = 42; \
+ r6 = r10; \
+ r6 += -8; \
+ if r1 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -16; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r2; \
+l0_%=: if r1 != 0 goto l1_%=; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1; \
+l1_%=: r1 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
+ *(u32*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_mark]) = r3; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm_const(__sk_buff_mark, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark))
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Same as above, but use BPF_ST_MEM to save 42
+ * instead of BPF_STX_MEM.
+ */
+SEC("tc")
+__description("unpriv: spill/fill of different pointers st")
+__failure __msg("same insn cannot be used with different pointers")
+__naked void fill_of_different_pointers_st(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r6 = r10; \
+ r6 += -8; \
+ if r1 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -16; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r2; \
+l0_%=: if r1 != 0 goto l1_%=; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1; \
+l1_%=: r1 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
+ .8byte %[st_mem]; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm_const(__sk_buff_mark, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
+ __imm_insn(st_mem,
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark), 42))
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("tc")
+__description("unpriv: spill/fill of different pointers stx - ctx and sock")
+__failure __msg("type=ctx expected=sock")
+__naked void pointers_stx_ctx_and_sock(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r8 = r1; \
+ /* struct bpf_sock *sock = bpf_sock_lookup(...); */\
+" BPF_SK_LOOKUP(bpf_sk_lookup_tcp)
+" r2 = r0; \
+ /* u64 foo; */ \
+ /* void *target = &foo; */ \
+ r6 = r10; \
+ r6 += -8; \
+ r1 = r8; \
+ /* if (skb == NULL) *target = sock; */ \
+ if r1 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r2; \
+l0_%=: /* else *target = skb; */ \
+ if r1 != 0 goto l1_%=; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1; \
+l1_%=: /* struct __sk_buff *skb = *target; */ \
+ r1 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
+ /* skb->mark = 42; */ \
+ r3 = 42; \
+ *(u32*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_mark]) = r3; \
+ /* if (sk) bpf_sk_release(sk) */ \
+ if r1 == 0 goto l2_%=; \
+ call %[bpf_sk_release]; \
+l2_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_sk_lookup_tcp),
+ __imm(bpf_sk_release),
+ __imm_const(__sk_buff_mark, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
+ __imm_const(sizeof_bpf_sock_tuple, sizeof(struct bpf_sock_tuple))
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("tc")
+__description("unpriv: spill/fill of different pointers stx - leak sock")
+__failure
+//.errstr = "same insn cannot be used with different pointers",
+__msg("Unreleased reference")
+__naked void different_pointers_stx_leak_sock(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r8 = r1; \
+ /* struct bpf_sock *sock = bpf_sock_lookup(...); */\
+" BPF_SK_LOOKUP(bpf_sk_lookup_tcp)
+" r2 = r0; \
+ /* u64 foo; */ \
+ /* void *target = &foo; */ \
+ r6 = r10; \
+ r6 += -8; \
+ r1 = r8; \
+ /* if (skb == NULL) *target = sock; */ \
+ if r1 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r2; \
+l0_%=: /* else *target = skb; */ \
+ if r1 != 0 goto l1_%=; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1; \
+l1_%=: /* struct __sk_buff *skb = *target; */ \
+ r1 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
+ /* skb->mark = 42; */ \
+ r3 = 42; \
+ *(u32*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_mark]) = r3; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_sk_lookup_tcp),
+ __imm_const(__sk_buff_mark, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
+ __imm_const(sizeof_bpf_sock_tuple, sizeof(struct bpf_sock_tuple))
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("tc")
+__description("unpriv: spill/fill of different pointers stx - sock and ctx (read)")
+__failure __msg("same insn cannot be used with different pointers")
+__naked void stx_sock_and_ctx_read(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r8 = r1; \
+ /* struct bpf_sock *sock = bpf_sock_lookup(...); */\
+" BPF_SK_LOOKUP(bpf_sk_lookup_tcp)
+" r2 = r0; \
+ /* u64 foo; */ \
+ /* void *target = &foo; */ \
+ r6 = r10; \
+ r6 += -8; \
+ r1 = r8; \
+ /* if (skb) *target = skb */ \
+ if r1 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1; \
+l0_%=: /* else *target = sock */ \
+ if r1 != 0 goto l1_%=; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r2; \
+l1_%=: /* struct bpf_sock *sk = *target; */ \
+ r1 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
+ /* if (sk) u32 foo = sk->mark; bpf_sk_release(sk); */\
+ if r1 == 0 goto l2_%=; \
+ r3 = *(u32*)(r1 + %[bpf_sock_mark]); \
+ call %[bpf_sk_release]; \
+l2_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_sk_lookup_tcp),
+ __imm(bpf_sk_release),
+ __imm_const(bpf_sock_mark, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, mark)),
+ __imm_const(sizeof_bpf_sock_tuple, sizeof(struct bpf_sock_tuple))
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("tc")
+__description("unpriv: spill/fill of different pointers stx - sock and ctx (write)")
+__failure
+//.errstr = "same insn cannot be used with different pointers",
+__msg("cannot write into sock")
+__naked void stx_sock_and_ctx_write(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r8 = r1; \
+ /* struct bpf_sock *sock = bpf_sock_lookup(...); */\
+" BPF_SK_LOOKUP(bpf_sk_lookup_tcp)
+" r2 = r0; \
+ /* u64 foo; */ \
+ /* void *target = &foo; */ \
+ r6 = r10; \
+ r6 += -8; \
+ r1 = r8; \
+ /* if (skb) *target = skb */ \
+ if r1 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1; \
+l0_%=: /* else *target = sock */ \
+ if r1 != 0 goto l1_%=; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r2; \
+l1_%=: /* struct bpf_sock *sk = *target; */ \
+ r1 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
+ /* if (sk) sk->mark = 42; bpf_sk_release(sk); */\
+ if r1 == 0 goto l2_%=; \
+ r3 = 42; \
+ *(u32*)(r1 + %[bpf_sock_mark]) = r3; \
+ call %[bpf_sk_release]; \
+l2_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_sk_lookup_tcp),
+ __imm(bpf_sk_release),
+ __imm_const(bpf_sock_mark, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, mark)),
+ __imm_const(sizeof_bpf_sock_tuple, sizeof(struct bpf_sock_tuple))
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: write pointer into map elem value")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 leaks addr")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void pointer_into_map_elem_value(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ *(u64*)(r0 + 0) = r0; \
+l0_%=: exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("alu32: mov u32 const")
+__success __success_unpriv
+__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R7 invalid mem access 'scalar'` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("exit")
+#endif
+__naked void alu32_mov_u32_const(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ w7 = 0; \
+ w7 &= 1; \
+ w0 = w7; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r0 = *(u64*)(r7 + 0); \
+l0_%=: exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: partial copy of pointer")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R10 partial copy")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void unpriv_partial_copy_of_pointer(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ w1 = w10; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R3 leaks addr into helper")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void pass_pointer_to_tail_call(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r3 = r1; \
+ r2 = %[map_prog1_socket] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_tail_call]; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_tail_call),
+ __imm_addr(map_prog1_socket)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero")
+__success __success_unpriv
+__retval(0)
+__naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_zero(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ if r1 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with const")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison prohibited")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_const(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ if r1 == 0x0000beef goto l0_%=; \
+l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: write into frame pointer")
+__failure __msg("frame pointer is read only")
+__failure_unpriv
+__naked void unpriv_write_into_frame_pointer(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r10 = r1; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: spill/fill frame pointer")
+__failure __msg("frame pointer is read only")
+__failure_unpriv
+__naked void unpriv_spill_fill_frame_pointer(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r6 = r10; \
+ r6 += -8; \
+ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r10; \
+ r10 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: cmp of frame pointer")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R10 pointer comparison")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void unpriv_cmp_of_frame_pointer(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ if r10 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: adding of fp, reg")
+__success __failure_unpriv
+__msg_unpriv("R1 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void unpriv_adding_of_fp_reg(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ r1 += r10; \
+ *(u64*)(r1 - 8) = r0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: adding of fp, imm")
+__success __failure_unpriv
+__msg_unpriv("R1 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void unpriv_adding_of_fp_imm(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ r1 = r10; \
+ r1 += 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r1 - 8) = r0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: cmp of stack pointer")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R2 pointer comparison")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void unpriv_cmp_of_stack_pointer(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ if r2 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: Spectre v1 path-based type confusion of scalar as stack-ptr")
+__success __success_unpriv __retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if r0 != 0x1 goto pc+2")
+/* This nospec prevents the exploit because it forces the mispredicted (not
+ * taken) `if r0 != 0x0 goto l0_%=` to resolve before using r6 as a pointer.
+ * This causes the CPU to realize that `r6 = r9` should have never executed. It
+ * ensures that r6 always contains a readable stack slot ptr when the insn after
+ * the nospec executes.
+ */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+__xlated_unpriv("r9 = *(u8 *)(r6 +0)")
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_spec_v1_type_confusion(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l2_%=; \
+ /* r0: pointer to a map array entry */ \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ /* r1, r2: prepared call args */ \
+ r6 = r10; \
+ r6 += -8; \
+ /* r6: pointer to readable stack slot */ \
+ r9 = 0xffffc900; \
+ r9 <<= 32; \
+ /* r9: scalar controlled by attacker */ \
+ r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0); /* cache miss */ \
+ if r0 != 0x0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r6 = r9; \
+l0_%=: if r0 != 0x1 goto l1_%=; \
+ r9 = *(u8 *)(r6 + 0); \
+l1_%=: /* leak r9 */ \
+ r9 &= 1; \
+ r9 <<= 9; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r9; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l2_%=; \
+ /* leak secret into is_cached(map[0|512]): */ \
+ r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0); \
+l2_%=: \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: ldimm64 before Spectre v4 barrier")
+__success __success_unpriv
+__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V4
+__xlated_unpriv("r1 = 0x2020200005642020") /* should not matter */
+__xlated_unpriv("*(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_ldimm64_spectre_v4(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = 0x2020200005642020 ll; \
+ *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: Spectre v1 and v4 barrier")
+__success __success_unpriv
+__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+#ifdef SPEC_V4
+/* starts with r0 == r8 == r9 == 0 */
+__xlated_unpriv("if r8 != 0x0 goto pc+1")
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("if r9 == 0x0 goto pc+4")
+__xlated_unpriv("r2 = r0")
+/* Following nospec required to prevent following dangerous `*(u64 *)(NOT_FP -64)
+ * = r1` iff `if r9 == 0 goto pc+4` was mispredicted because of Spectre v1. The
+ * test therefore ensures the Spectre-v4--induced nospec does not prevent the
+ * Spectre-v1--induced speculative path from being fully analyzed.
+ */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* Spectre v1 */
+__xlated_unpriv("*(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1") /* could be used to leak r2 */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* Spectre v4 */
+#endif
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_spectre_v1_and_v4(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ r8 = r0; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ r9 = r0; \
+ r0 = r10; \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ if r8 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ if r9 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+l0_%=: if r8 != 0 goto l1_%=; \
+ goto l2_%=; \
+l1_%=: if r9 == 0 goto l3_%=; \
+ r2 = r0; \
+l2_%=: *(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1; \
+l3_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: Spectre v1 and v4 barrier (simple)")
+__success __success_unpriv
+__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+#ifdef SPEC_V4
+__xlated_unpriv("if r8 != 0x0 goto pc+1")
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* if r9 == 0 goto l3_%= */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* r2 = r0 */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+__xlated_unpriv("*(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+#endif
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_spectre_v1_and_v4_simple(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r8 = 0; \
+ r9 = 0; \
+ r0 = r10; \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ if r8 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ if r9 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+l0_%=: if r8 != 0 goto l1_%=; \
+ goto l2_%=; \
+l1_%=: if r9 == 0 goto l3_%=; \
+ r2 = r0; \
+l2_%=: *(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1; \
+l3_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: ldimm64 before Spectre v1 and v4 barrier (simple)")
+__success __success_unpriv
+__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+#ifdef SPEC_V4
+__xlated_unpriv("if r8 != 0x0 goto pc+1")
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc+4")
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* if r9 == 0 goto l3_%= */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* r2 = r0 */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* r1 = 0x2020200005642020 ll */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* second part of ldimm64 */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+__xlated_unpriv("*(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+#endif
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_ldimm64_spectre_v1_and_v4_simple(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r8 = 0; \
+ r9 = 0; \
+ r0 = r10; \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ if r8 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ if r9 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+l0_%=: if r8 != 0 goto l1_%=; \
+ goto l2_%=; \
+l1_%=: if r9 == 0 goto l3_%=; \
+ r2 = r0; \
+ r1 = 0x2020200005642020 ll; \
+l2_%=: *(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1; \
+l3_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2025-12-25 07:08:46 +0000