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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc and other driver subsystem updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the big set of char/misc and other driver subsystem updates
for 6.10-rc1. Nothing major here, just lots of new drivers and updates
for apis and new hardware types. Included in here are:
- big IIO driver updates with more devices and drivers added
- fpga driver updates
- hyper-v driver updates
- uio_pruss driver removal, no one uses it, other drivers control the
same hardware now
- binder minor updates
- mhi driver updates
- excon driver updates
- counter driver updates
- accessability driver updates
- coresight driver updates
- other hwtracing driver updates
- nvmem driver updates
- slimbus driver updates
- spmi driver updates
- other smaller misc and char driver updates
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues"
* tag 'char-misc-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (319 commits)
misc: ntsync: mark driver as "broken" to prevent from building
spmi: pmic-arb: Add multi bus support
spmi: pmic-arb: Register controller for bus instead of arbiter
spmi: pmic-arb: Make core resources acquiring a version operation
spmi: pmic-arb: Make the APID init a version operation
spmi: pmic-arb: Fix some compile warnings about members not being described
dt-bindings: spmi: Deprecate qcom,bus-id
dt-bindings: spmi: Add X1E80100 SPMI PMIC ARB schema
spmi: pmic-arb: Replace three IS_ERR() calls by null pointer checks in spmi_pmic_arb_probe()
spmi: hisi-spmi-controller: Do not override device identifier
dt-bindings: spmi: hisilicon,hisi-spmi-controller: clean up example
dt-bindings: spmi: hisilicon,hisi-spmi-controller: fix binding references
spmi: make spmi_bus_type const
extcon: adc-jack: Document missing struct members
extcon: realtek: Remove unused of_gpio.h
extcon: usbc-cros-ec: Convert to platform remove callback returning void
extcon: usb-gpio: Convert to platform remove callback returning void
extcon: max77843: Convert to platform remove callback returning void
extcon: max3355: Convert to platform remove callback returning void
extcon: intel-mrfld: Convert to platform remove callback returning void
...
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The mm_struct contains a function pointer *get_unmapped_area(), which is
set to either arch_get_unmapped_area() or arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown()
during the initialization of the mm.
Since the function pointer only ever points to two functions that are
named the same across all arch's, a function pointer is not really
required. In addition future changes will want to add versions of the
functions that take additional arguments. So to save a pointers worth of
bytes in mm_struct, and prevent adding additional function pointers to
mm_struct in future changes, remove it and keep the information about
which get_unmapped_area() to use in a flag.
Add the new flag to MMF_INIT_MASK so it doesn't get clobbered on fork by
mmf_init_flags(). Most MM flags get clobbered on fork. In the
pre-existing behavior mm->get_unmapped_area() would get copied to the new
mm in dup_mm(), so not clobbering the flag preserves the existing behavior
around inheriting the topdown-ness.
Introduce a helper, mm_get_unmapped_area(), to easily convert code that
refers to the old function pointer to instead select and call either
arch_get_unmapped_area() or arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown() based on the
flag. Then drop the mm->get_unmapped_area() function pointer. Leave the
get_unmapped_area() pointer in struct file_operations alone. The main
purpose of this change is to reorganize in preparation for future changes,
but it also converts the calls of mm->get_unmapped_area() from indirect
branches into a direct ones.
The stress-ng bigheap benchmark calls realloc a lot, which calls through
get_unmapped_area() in the kernel. On x86, the change yielded a ~1%
improvement there on a retpoline config.
In testing a few x86 configs, removing the pointer unfortunately didn't
result in any actual size reductions in the compiled layout of mm_struct.
But depending on compiler or arch alignment requirements, the change could
shrink the size of mm_struct.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240326021656.202649-3-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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In the future inb() and friends will not be available when compiling
with CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT=n so we must only try to access them here if
CONFIG_DEVPORT is set which depends on HAS_IOPORT.
Co-developed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240404114917.3627747-2-schnelle@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the big set of char/misc and other small driver subsystem
changes for 6.7-rc1. Included in here are:
- IIO subsystem driver updates and additions (largest part of this
pull request)
- FPGA subsystem driver updates
- Counter subsystem driver updates
- ICC subsystem driver updates
- extcon subsystem driver updates
- mei driver updates and additions
- nvmem subsystem driver updates and additions
- comedi subsystem dependency fixes
- parport driver fixups
- cdx subsystem driver and core updates
- splice support for /dev/zero and /dev/full
- other smaller driver cleanups
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues"
* tag 'char-misc-6.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (326 commits)
cdx: add sysfs for subsystem, class and revision
cdx: add sysfs for bus reset
cdx: add support for bus enable and disable
cdx: Register cdx bus as a device on cdx subsystem
cdx: Create symbol namespaces for cdx subsystem
cdx: Introduce lock to protect controller ops
cdx: Remove cdx controller list from cdx bus system
dts: ti: k3-am625-beagleplay: Add beaglecc1352
greybus: Add BeaglePlay Linux Driver
dt-bindings: net: Add ti,cc1352p7
dt-bindings: eeprom: at24: allow NVMEM cells based on old syntax
dt-bindings: nvmem: SID: allow NVMEM cells based on old syntax
Revert "nvmem: add new config option"
MAINTAINERS: coresight: Add missing Coresight files
misc: pci_endpoint_test: Add deviceID for J721S2 PCIe EP device support
firmware: xilinx: Move EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL next to zynqmp_pm_feature definition
uacce: make uacce_class constant
ocxl: make ocxl_class constant
cxl: make cxl_class constant
misc: phantom: make phantom_class constant
...
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This allows splicing zeroed pages into a pipe, and allows discarding
pages from a pipe by splicing them to /dev/zero. Writing to /dev/zero
should have the same effect as writing to /dev/null, and a
"splice_write" implementation exists only for /dev/null.
(The /dev/zero splice_read implementation could be optimized by
pushing references to the global zero page to the pipe, but that's an
optimization for another day.)
Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230919073743.1066313-1-max.kellermann@ionos.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The Itanium architecture is obsolete, and an informal survey [0] reveals
that any residual use of Itanium hardware in production is mostly HP-UX
or OpenVMS based. The use of Linux on Itanium appears to be limited to
enthusiasts that occasionally boot a fresh Linux kernel to see whether
things are still working as intended, and perhaps to churn out some
distro packages that are rarely used in practice.
None of the original companies behind Itanium still produce or support
any hardware or software for the architecture, and it is listed as
'Orphaned' in the MAINTAINERS file, as apparently, none of the engineers
that contributed on behalf of those companies (nor anyone else, for that
matter) have been willing to support or maintain the architecture
upstream or even be responsible for applying the odd fix. The Intel
firmware team removed all IA-64 support from the Tianocore/EDK2
reference implementation of EFI in 2018. (Itanium is the original
architecture for which EFI was developed, and the way Linux supports it
deviates significantly from other architectures.) Some distros, such as
Debian and Gentoo, still maintain [unofficial] ia64 ports, but many have
dropped support years ago.
While the argument is being made [1] that there is a 'for the common
good' angle to being able to build and run existing projects such as the
Grid Community Toolkit [2] on Itanium for interoperability testing, the
fact remains that none of those projects are known to be deployed on
Linux/ia64, and very few people actually have access to such a system in
the first place. Even if there were ways imaginable in which Linux/ia64
could be put to good use today, what matters is whether anyone is
actually doing that, and this does not appear to be the case.
There are no emulators widely available, and so boot testing Itanium is
generally infeasible for ordinary contributors. GCC still supports IA-64
but its compile farm [3] no longer has any IA-64 machines. GLIBC would
like to get rid of IA-64 [4] too because it would permit some overdue
code cleanups. In summary, the benefits to the ecosystem of having IA-64
be part of it are mostly theoretical, whereas the maintenance overhead
of keeping it supported is real.
So let's rip off the band aid, and remove the IA-64 arch code entirely.
This follows the timeline proposed by the Debian/ia64 maintainer [5],
which removes support in a controlled manner, leaving IA-64 in a known
good state in the most recent LTS release. Other projects will follow
once the kernel support is removed.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAMj1kXFCMh_578jniKpUtx_j8ByHnt=s7S+yQ+vGbKt9ud7+kQ@mail.gmail.com/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/0075883c-7c51-00f5-2c2d-5119c1820410@web.de/
[2] https://gridcf.org/gct-docs/latest/index.html
[3] https://cfarm.tetaneutral.net/machines/list/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/all/87bkiilpc4.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de/
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/all/ff58a3e76e5102c94bb5946d99187b358def688a.camel@physik.fu-berlin.de/
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Merge padding, shrinking "struct memdev" from 32 bytes to 24 bytes
on 64-bit.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fe4d62ab-2427-4635-b9f4-467853fb63e3@p183
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull Char/Misc updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the big set of char/misc and other driver subsystem updates
for 6.5-rc1.
Lots of different, tiny, stuff in here, from a range of smaller driver
subsystems, including pulls from some substems directly:
- IIO driver updates and additions
- W1 driver updates and fixes (and a new maintainer!)
- FPGA driver updates and fixes
- Counter driver updates
- Extcon driver updates
- Interconnect driver updates
- Coresight driver updates
- mfd tree tag merge needed for other updates on top of that, lots of
small driver updates as patches, including:
- static const updates for class structures
- nvmem driver updates
- pcmcia driver fix
- lots of other small driver updates and fixes
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
problems"
* tag 'char-misc-6.5-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (243 commits)
bsr: fix build problem with bsr_class static cleanup
comedi: make all 'class' structures const
char: xillybus: make xillybus_class a static const structure
xilinx_hwicap: make icap_class a static const structure
virtio_console: make port class a static const structure
ppdev: make ppdev_class a static const structure
char: misc: make misc_class a static const structure
/dev/mem: make mem_class a static const structure
char: lp: make lp_class a static const structure
dsp56k: make dsp56k_class a static const structure
bsr: make bsr_class a static const structure
oradax: make 'cl' a static const structure
hwtracing: hisi_ptt: Fix potential sleep in atomic context
hwtracing: hisi_ptt: Advertise PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_EXCLUDE for PTT PMU
hwtracing: hisi_ptt: Export available filters through sysfs
hwtracing: hisi_ptt: Add support for dynamically updating the filter list
hwtracing: hisi_ptt: Factor out filter allocation and release operation
samples: pfsm: add CC_CAN_LINK dependency
misc: fastrpc: check return value of devm_kasprintf()
coresight: dummy: Update type of mode parameter in dummy_{sink,source}_enable()
...
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Now that the driver core allows for struct class to be in read-only
memory, move the mem_class structure to be declared at build time
placing it into read-only memory, instead of having to be dynamically
allocated at load time.
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Suggested-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov <ivan.orlov0322@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230620143751.578239-13-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The unxlate_dev_mem_ptr() function has no prototype on the mips
architecture, which does not include asm-generic/io.h, so gcc warns
about the __weak definition:
drivers/char/mem.c:94:29: error: no previous prototype for 'unxlate_dev_mem_ptr' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
Since everyone else already gets the generic definition or has a custom
one, there is not really much point in having a __weak version as well.
Remove this one, and instead add a trivial macro to the mips header.
Once we convert mips to use the asm-generic header, this can go away
again.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
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The module pointer in class_create() never actually did anything, and it
shouldn't have been requred to be set as a parameter even if it did
something. So just remove it and fix up all callers of the function in
the kernel tree at the same time.
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230313181843.1207845-4-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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is_nommu_shared_mapping()
Patch series "mm/nommu: don't use VM_MAYSHARE for MAP_PRIVATE mappings".
Trying to reduce the confusion around VM_SHARED and VM_MAYSHARE first
requires !CONFIG_MMU to stop using VM_MAYSHARE for MAP_PRIVATE mappings.
CONFIG_MMU only sets VM_MAYSHARE for MAP_SHARED mappings.
This paves the way for further VM_MAYSHARE and VM_SHARED cleanups: for
example, renaming VM_MAYSHARED to VM_MAP_SHARED to make it cleaner what is
actually means.
Let's first get the weird case out of the way and not use VM_MAYSHARE in
MAP_PRIVATE mappings, using a new VM_MAYOVERLAY flag instead.
This patch (of 3):
We want to stop using VM_MAYSHARE in private mappings to pave the way for
clarifying the semantics of VM_MAYSHARE vs. VM_SHARED and reduce the
confusion. While CONFIG_MMU uses VM_MAYSHARE to represent MAP_SHARED,
!CONFIG_MMU also sets VM_MAYSHARE for selected R/O private file mappings
that are an effective overlay of a file mapping.
Let's factor out all relevant VM_MAYSHARE checks in !CONFIG_MMU code into
is_nommu_shared_mapping() first.
Note that whenever VM_SHARED is set, VM_MAYSHARE must be set as well
(unless there is a serious BUG). So there is not need to test for
VM_SHARED manually.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230102160856.500584-1-david@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230102160856.500584-2-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@fluxnic.net>
Cc: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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The devnode() in struct class should not be modifying the device that is
passed into it, so mark it as a const * and propagate the function
signature changes out into all relevant subsystems that use this
callback.
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: FUJITA Tomonori <fujita.tomonori@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Justin Sanders <justin@coraid.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: Benjamin Gaignard <benjamin.gaignard@collabora.com>
Cc: Liam Mark <lmark@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Brian Starkey <Brian.Starkey@arm.com>
Cc: John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>
Cc: "Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@cornelisnetworks.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
Cc: Frank Haverkamp <haver@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Cc: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com>
Cc: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Cc: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Cc: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com>
Cc: Gautam Dawar <gautam.dawar@xilinx.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Cc: Eli Cohen <elic@nvidia.com>
Cc: Parav Pandit <parav@nvidia.com>
Cc: Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>
Cc: alsa-devel@alsa-project.org
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linaro-mm-sig@lists.linaro.org
Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-usb@vger.kernel.org
Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221123122523.1332370-2-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Prior to 5.6, when /dev/random was opened with O_NONBLOCK, it would
return -EAGAIN if there was no entropy. When the pools were unified in
5.6, this was lost. The post 5.6 behavior of blocking until the pool is
initialized, and ignoring O_NONBLOCK in the process, went unnoticed,
with no reports about the regression received for two and a half years.
However, eventually this indeed did break somebody's userspace.
So we restore the old behavior, by returning -EAGAIN if the pool is not
initialized. Unlike the old /dev/random, this can only occur during
early boot, after which it never blocks again.
In order to make this O_NONBLOCK behavior consistent with other
expectations, also respect users reading with preadv2(RWF_NOWAIT) and
similar.
Fixes: 30c08efec888 ("random: make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom")
Reported-by: Guozihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Zhongguohua <zhongguohua1@huawei.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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This patch adds support for the io_uring command pass through, aka
IORING_OP_URING_CMD, to the /dev/null driver. As with all of the
/dev/null functionality, the implementation is just a simple sink
where commands go to die, but it should be useful for developers who
need a simple IORING_OP_URING_CMD test device that doesn't require
any special hardware.
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In 8619e5bdeee8 ("/dev/mem: Bail out upon SIGKILL."), /dev/mem became
killable, and that commit noted:
Theoretically, reading/writing /dev/mem and /dev/kmem can become
"interruptible". But this patch chose "killable". Future patch will
make them "interruptible" so that we can revert to "killable" if
some program regressed.
So now we take the next step in making it "interruptible", by changing
fatal_signal_pending() into signal_pending().
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220407122638.490660-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This reverts commit 6f98a4bfee72c22f50aedb39fb761567969865fe.
It turns out we still can't do this. Way too many platforms that don't
have any real source of randomness at boot and no jitter entropy because
they don't even have a cycle counter.
As reported by Guenter Roeck:
"This causes a large number of qemu boot test failures for various
architectures (arm, m68k, microblaze, sparc32, xtensa are the ones I
observed).
Common denominator is that boot hangs at 'Saving random seed:'"
This isn't hugely unexpected - we tried it, it failed, so now we'll
revert it.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220322155820.GA1745955@roeck-us.net/
Reported-and-bisected-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Jason Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This topic has come up countless times, and usually doesn't go anywhere.
This time I thought I'd bring it up with a slightly narrower focus,
updated for some developments over the last three years: we finally can
make /dev/urandom always secure, in light of the fact that our RNG is
now always seeded.
Ever since Linus' 50ee7529ec45 ("random: try to actively add entropy
rather than passively wait for it"), the RNG does a haveged-style jitter
dance around the scheduler, in order to produce entropy (and credit it)
for the case when we're stuck in wait_for_random_bytes(). How ever you
feel about the Linus Jitter Dance is beside the point: it's been there
for three years and usually gets the RNG initialized in a second or so.
As a matter of fact, this is what happens currently when people use
getrandom(). It's already there and working, and most people have been
using it for years without realizing.
So, given that the kernel has grown this mechanism for seeding itself
from nothing, and that this procedure happens pretty fast, maybe there's
no point any longer in having /dev/urandom give insecure bytes. In the
past we didn't want the boot process to deadlock, which was
understandable. But now, in the worst case, a second goes by, and the
problem is resolved. It seems like maybe we're finally at a point when
we can get rid of the infamous "urandom read hole".
The one slight drawback is that the Linus Jitter Dance relies on random_
get_entropy() being implemented. The first lines of try_to_generate_
entropy() are:
stack.now = random_get_entropy();
if (stack.now == random_get_entropy())
return;
On most platforms, random_get_entropy() is simply aliased to get_cycles().
The number of machines without a cycle counter or some other
implementation of random_get_entropy() in 2022, which can also run a
mainline kernel, and at the same time have a both broken and out of date
userspace that relies on /dev/urandom never blocking at boot is thought
to be exceedingly low. And to be clear: those museum pieces without
cycle counters will continue to run Linux just fine, and even
/dev/urandom will be operable just like before; the RNG just needs to be
seeded first through the usual means, which should already be the case
now.
On systems that really do want unseeded randomness, we already offer
getrandom(GRND_INSECURE), which is in use by, e.g., systemd for seeding
their hash tables at boot. Nothing in this commit would affect
GRND_INSECURE, and it remains the means of getting those types of random
numbers.
This patch goes a long way toward eliminating a long overdue userspace
crypto footgun. After several decades of endless user confusion, we will
finally be able to say, "use any single one of our random interfaces and
you'll be fine. They're all the same. It doesn't matter." And that, I
think, is really something. Finally all of those blog posts and
disagreeing forums and contradictory articles will all become correct
about whatever they happened to recommend, and along with it, a whole
class of vulnerabilities eliminated.
With very minimal downside, we're finally in a position where we can
make this change.
Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
Cc: Konstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
|
|
Make read_iter_zero() to honor IOCB_NOWAIT, so /dev/zero can be
advertised as FMODE_NOWAIT. It's useful for io_uring, which needs it to
apply certain optimisations when doing I/O against the device.
Set FMODE_NOWAIT for /dev/null as well, it never waits and therefore
trivially meets the criteria.
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f11090f97ddc2b2ce49ea1211258658ddfbc5563.1631127867.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
The raw driver used to provide direct unbuffered access to block devices
before O_DIRECT was invented. It has been obsolete for more than a
decade.
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Pine.LNX.4.64.0703180754060.6605@CPE00045a9c397f-CM001225dbafb6/
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210531072526.97052-1-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Patch series "drivers/char: remove /dev/kmem for good".
Exploring /dev/kmem and /dev/mem in the context of memory hot(un)plug and
memory ballooning, I started questioning the existence of /dev/kmem.
Comparing it with the /proc/kcore implementation, it does not seem to be
able to deal with things like
a) Pages unmapped from the direct mapping (e.g., to be used by secretmem)
-> kern_addr_valid(). virt_addr_valid() is not sufficient.
b) Special cases like gart aperture memory that is not to be touched
-> mem_pfn_is_ram()
Unless I am missing something, it's at least broken in some cases and might
fault/crash the machine.
Looks like its existence has been questioned before in 2005 and 2010 [1],
after ~11 additional years, it might make sense to revive the discussion.
CONFIG_DEVKMEM is only enabled in a single defconfig (on purpose or by
mistake?). All distributions disable it: in Ubuntu it has been disabled
for more than 10 years, in Debian since 2.6.31, in Fedora at least
starting with FC3, in RHEL starting with RHEL4, in SUSE starting from
15sp2, and OpenSUSE has it disabled as well.
1) /dev/kmem was popular for rootkits [2] before it got disabled
basically everywhere. Ubuntu documents [3] "There is no modern user of
/dev/kmem any more beyond attackers using it to load kernel rootkits.".
RHEL documents in a BZ [5] "it served no practical purpose other than to
serve as a potential security problem or to enable binary module drivers
to access structures/functions they shouldn't be touching"
2) /proc/kcore is a decent interface to have a controlled way to read
kernel memory for debugging puposes. (will need some extensions to
deal with memory offlining/unplug, memory ballooning, and poisoned
pages, though)
3) It might be useful for corner case debugging [1]. KDB/KGDB might be a
better fit, especially, to write random memory; harder to shoot
yourself into the foot.
4) "Kernel Memory Editor" [4] hasn't seen any updates since 2000 and seems
to be incompatible with 64bit [1]. For educational purposes,
/proc/kcore might be used to monitor value updates -- or older
kernels can be used.
5) It's broken on arm64, and therefore, completely disabled there.
Looks like it's essentially unused and has been replaced by better
suited interfaces for individual tasks (/proc/kcore, KDB/KGDB). Let's
just remove it.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/147901/
[2] https://www.linuxjournal.com/article/10505
[3] https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Security/Features#A.2Fdev.2Fkmem_disabled
[4] https://sourceforge.net/projects/kme/
[5] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=154796
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210324102351.6932-1-david@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210324102351.6932-2-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "Alexander A. Klimov" <grandmaster@al2klimov.de>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Cc: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Cc: Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.zhizhikin@leica-geosystems.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Cc: Gregory Clement <gregory.clement@bootlin.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Cc: huang ying <huang.ying.caritas@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: James Troup <james.troup@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Cc: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
Cc: Liviu Dudau <liviu.dudau@arm.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Cc: Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Oleksiy Avramchenko <oleksiy.avramchenko@sonymobile.com>
Cc: openrisc@lists.librecores.org
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: "Pavel Machek (CIP)" <pavel@denx.de>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Sebastian Hesselbarth <sebastian.hesselbarth@gmail.com>
Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Cc: Theodore Dubois <tblodt@icloud.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Cc: William Cohen <wcohen@redhat.com>
Cc: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm
Pull follow_pfn() updates from Daniel Vetter:
"Fixes around VM_FPNMAP and follow_pfn:
- replace mm/frame_vector.c by get_user_pages in misc/habana and
drm/exynos drivers, then move that into media as it's sole user
- close race in generic_access_phys
- s390 pci ioctl fix of this series landed in 5.11 already
- properly revoke iomem mappings (/dev/mem, pci files)"
* tag 'topic/iomem-mmap-vs-gup-2021-02-22' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm:
PCI: Revoke mappings like devmem
PCI: Also set up legacy files only after sysfs init
sysfs: Support zapping of binary attr mmaps
resource: Move devmem revoke code to resource framework
/dev/mem: Only set filp->f_mapping
PCI: Obey iomem restrictions for procfs mmap
mm: Close race in generic_access_phys
media: videobuf2: Move frame_vector into media subsystem
mm/frame-vector: Use FOLL_LONGTERM
misc/habana: Use FOLL_LONGTERM for userptr
misc/habana: Stop using frame_vector helpers
drm/exynos: Use FOLL_LONGTERM for g2d cmdlists
drm/exynos: Stop using frame_vector helpers
|
|
MIPS can now use the default uncached_access like other archs.
Signed-off-by: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
|
|
We want all iomem mmaps to consistently revoke ptes when the kernel
takes over and CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM is enabled. This includes the
pci bar mmaps available through procfs and sysfs, which currently do
not revoke mappings.
To prepare for this, move the code from the /dev/kmem driver to
kernel/resource.c.
During review Jason spotted that barriers are used somewhat
inconsistently. Fix that up while we shuffle this code, since it
doesn't have an actual impact at runtime. Otherwise no semantic and
behavioural changes intended, just code extraction and adjusting
comments and names.
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201127164131.2244124-11-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
|
|
When we care about pagecache maintenance, we need to make sure that
both f_mapping and i_mapping point at the right mapping.
But for iomem mappings we only care about the virtual/pte side of
things, so f_mapping is enough. Also setting inode->i_mapping was
confusing me as a driver maintainer, since in e.g. drivers/gpu we
don't do that. Per Dan this seems to be copypasta from places which do
care about pagecache consistency, but not needed. Hence remove it for
slightly less confusion.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201127164131.2244124-10-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
|
|
Reported the cleared bytes in case of a partial clear_user instead
of -EFAULT, and remove a pointless conditional, as cleared must be
non-zero by the time we hit the signal_pending check.
Reported-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200907082700.2057137-1-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Christophe reported a major speedup due to avoiding the iov_iter
overhead, so just add this trivial function. Note that /dev/zero
already implements both an iter and non-iter writes so this just
makes it more symmetric.
Tested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200903155922.1111551-1-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with
the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary
fall-through markings when it is the case.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.7/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
|
|
WRITE_ONCE() isn't the correct way to publish a pointer to a data
structure, since it doesn't include a write memory barrier. Therefore
other tasks may see that the pointer has been set but not see that the
pointed-to memory has finished being initialized yet. Instead a
primitive with "release" semantics is needed.
Use smp_store_release() for this.
The use of READ_ONCE() on the read side is still potentially correct if
there's no control dependency, i.e. if all memory being "published" is
transitively reachable via the pointer itself. But this pairing is
somewhat confusing and error-prone. So just upgrade the read side to
smp_load_acquire() so that it clearly pairs with smp_store_release().
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Fixes: 3234ac664a87 ("/dev/mem: Revoke mappings when a driver claims the region")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200716060553.24618-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Better describe what these functions do.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Close the hole of holding a mapping over kernel driver takeover event of
a given address range.
Commit 90a545e98126 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges")
introduced CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM with the goal of protecting the
kernel against scenarios where a /dev/mem user tramples memory that a
kernel driver owns. However, this protection only prevents *new* read(),
write() and mmap() requests. Established mappings prior to the driver
calling request_mem_region() are left alone.
Especially with persistent memory, and the core kernel metadata that is
stored there, there are plentiful scenarios for a /dev/mem user to
violate the expectations of the driver and cause amplified damage.
Teach request_mem_region() to find and shoot down active /dev/mem
mappings that it believes it has successfully claimed for the exclusive
use of the driver. Effectively a driver call to request_mem_region()
becomes a hole-punch on the /dev/mem device.
The typical usage of unmap_mapping_range() is part of
truncate_pagecache() to punch a hole in a file, but in this case the
implementation is only doing the "first half" of a hole punch. Namely it
is just evacuating current established mappings of the "hole", and it
relies on the fact that /dev/mem establishes mappings in terms of
absolute physical address offsets. Once existing mmap users are
invalidated they can attempt to re-establish the mapping, or attempt to
continue issuing read(2) / write(2) to the invalidated extent, but they
will then be subject to the CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM checking that can
block those subsequent accesses.
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixes: 90a545e98126 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges")
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159009507306.847224.8502634072429766747.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.
From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:
- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/
- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.
The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.
The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:
lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}
Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.
This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.
New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.
The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.
Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"
* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...
|
|
syzbot found that a thread can stall for minutes inside read_mem() or
write_mem() after that thread was killed by SIGKILL [1]. Reading from
iomem areas of /dev/mem can be slow, depending on the hardware.
While reading 2GB at one read() is legal, delaying termination of killed
thread for minutes is bad. Thus, allow reading/writing /dev/mem and
/dev/kmem to be preemptible and killable.
[ 1335.912419][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134565632
[ 1335.943194][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134561536
[ 1335.978280][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134557440
[ 1336.011147][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134553344
[ 1336.041897][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134549248
Theoretically, reading/writing /dev/mem and /dev/kmem can become
"interruptible". But this patch chose "killable". Future patch will make
them "interruptible" so that we can revert to "killable" if some program
regressed.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a0e3436829698d5824231251fad9d8e998f94f5e
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+8ab2d0f39fb79fe6ca40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1566825205-10703-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible
for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions, and
also to steal cryptographic information.
Disallow /dev/mem and /dev/kmem from being opened this when the kernel has
been locked down to prevent this.
Also disallow /dev/port from being opened to prevent raw ioport access and
thus DMA from being used to accomplish the same thing.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc driver updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the bit set of char/misc drivers for 4.19-rc1
There is a lot here, much more than normal, seems like everyone is
writing new driver subsystems these days... Anyway, major things here
are:
- new FSI driver subsystem, yet-another-powerpc low-level hardware
bus
- gnss, finally an in-kernel GPS subsystem to try to tame all of the
crazy out-of-tree drivers that have been floating around for years,
combined with some really hacky userspace implementations. This is
only for GNSS receivers, but you have to start somewhere, and this
is great to see.
Other than that, there are new slimbus drivers, new coresight drivers,
new fpga drivers, and loads of DT bindings for all of these and
existing drivers.
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues"
* tag 'char-misc-4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (255 commits)
android: binder: Rate-limit debug and userspace triggered err msgs
fsi: sbefifo: Bump max command length
fsi: scom: Fix NULL dereference
misc: mic: SCIF Fix scif_get_new_port() error handling
misc: cxl: changed asterisk position
genwqe: card_base: Use true and false for boolean values
misc: eeprom: assignment outside the if statement
uio: potential double frees if __uio_register_device() fails
eeprom: idt_89hpesx: clean up an error pointer vs NULL inconsistency
misc: ti-st: Fix memory leak in the error path of probe()
android: binder: Show extra_buffers_size in trace
firmware: vpd: Fix section enabled flag on vpd_section_destroy
platform: goldfish: Retire pdev_bus
goldfish: Use dedicated macros instead of manual bit shifting
goldfish: Add missing includes to goldfish.h
mux: adgs1408: new driver for Analog Devices ADGS1408/1409 mux
dt-bindings: mux: add adi,adgs1408
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Cleanup synic memory free path
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove use of slow_virt_to_phys()
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Reset the channel callback in vmbus_onoffer_rescind()
...
|
|
vma_is_anonymous() relies on ->vm_ops being NULL to detect anonymous
VMA. This is unreliable as ->mmap may not set ->vm_ops.
False-positive vma_is_anonymous() may lead to crashes:
next ffff8801ce5e7040 prev ffff8801d20eca50 mm ffff88019c1e13c0
prot 27 anon_vma ffff88019680cdd8 vm_ops 0000000000000000
pgoff 0 file ffff8801b2ec2d00 private_data 0000000000000000
flags: 0xff(read|write|exec|shared|mayread|maywrite|mayexec|mayshare)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/memory.c:1422!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 18486 Comm: syz-executor3 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3+ #136
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google
01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:zap_pmd_range mm/memory.c:1421 [inline]
RIP: 0010:zap_pud_range mm/memory.c:1466 [inline]
RIP: 0010:zap_p4d_range mm/memory.c:1487 [inline]
RIP: 0010:unmap_page_range+0x1c18/0x2220 mm/memory.c:1508
Call Trace:
unmap_single_vma+0x1a0/0x310 mm/memory.c:1553
zap_page_range_single+0x3cc/0x580 mm/memory.c:1644
unmap_mapping_range_vma mm/memory.c:2792 [inline]
unmap_mapping_range_tree mm/memory.c:2813 [inline]
unmap_mapping_pages+0x3a7/0x5b0 mm/memory.c:2845
unmap_mapping_range+0x48/0x60 mm/memory.c:2880
truncate_pagecache+0x54/0x90 mm/truncate.c:800
truncate_setsize+0x70/0xb0 mm/truncate.c:826
simple_setattr+0xe9/0x110 fs/libfs.c:409
notify_change+0xf13/0x10f0 fs/attr.c:335
do_truncate+0x1ac/0x2b0 fs/open.c:63
do_sys_ftruncate+0x492/0x560 fs/open.c:205
__do_sys_ftruncate fs/open.c:215 [inline]
__se_sys_ftruncate fs/open.c:213 [inline]
__x64_sys_ftruncate+0x59/0x80 fs/open.c:213
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Reproducer:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#define KCOV_INIT_TRACE _IOR('c', 1, unsigned long)
#define KCOV_ENABLE _IO('c', 100)
#define KCOV_DISABLE _IO('c', 101)
#define COVER_SIZE (1024<<10)
#define KCOV_TRACE_PC 0
#define KCOV_TRACE_CMP 1
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int fd;
unsigned long *cover;
system("mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug");
fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kcov", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KCOV_INIT_TRACE, COVER_SIZE);
cover = mmap(NULL, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long),
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
munmap(cover, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long));
cover = mmap(NULL, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long),
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
memset(cover, 0, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long));
ftruncate(fd, 3UL << 20);
return 0;
}
This can be fixed by assigning anonymous VMAs own vm_ops and not relying
on it being NULL.
If ->mmap() failed to set ->vm_ops, mmap_region() will set it to
dummy_vm_ops. This way we will have non-NULL ->vm_ops for all VMAs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180724121139.62570-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+3f84280d52be9b7083cc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases
where we are expecting to fall through.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Successes in probe_kernel_read() would mask failures in copy_to_user()
during read_mem().
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Fixes: 22ec1a2aea73 ("/dev/mem: Add bounce buffer for copy-out")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
As done for /proc/kcore in
commit df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data")
this adds a bounce buffer when reading memory via /dev/mem. This
is needed to allow kernel text memory to be read out when built with
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY (which refuses to read out kernel text) and
without CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM (which would have refused to read any RAM
contents at all).
Since this build configuration isn't common (most systems with
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY also have CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM), this also tries
to inform Kconfig about the recommended settings.
This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's changes to /dev/mem
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Reported-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
One thing /dev/mem access APIs should verify is that there's no way
that excessively large pfn's can leak into the high bits of the
page table entry.
In particular, if people can use "very large physical page addresses"
through /dev/mem to set the bits past bit 58 - SOFTW4 and permission
key bits and NX bit, that could *really* confuse the kernel.
We had an earlier attempt:
ce56a86e2ade ("x86/mm: Limit mmap() of /dev/mem to valid physical addresses")
... which turned out to be too restrictive (breaking mem=... bootups for example) and
had to be reverted in:
90edaac62729 ("Revert "x86/mm: Limit mmap() of /dev/mem to valid physical addresses"")
This v2 attempt modifies the original patch and makes sure that mmap(/dev/mem)
limits the pfns so that it at least fits in the actual pteval_t architecturally:
- Make sure mmap_mem() actually validates that the offset fits in phys_addr_t
( This may be indirectly true due to some other check, but it's not
entirely obvious. )
- Change valid_mmap_phys_addr_range() to just use phys_addr_valid()
on the top byte
( Top byte is sufficient, because mmap_mem() has already checked that
it cannot wrap. )
- Add a few comments about what the valid_phys_addr_range() vs.
valid_mmap_phys_addr_range() difference is.
Signed-off-by: Craig Bergstrom <craigb@google.com>
[ Fixed the checks and added comments. ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[ Collected the discussion and patches into a commit. ]
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Cc: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFyEcOMb657vWSmrM13OxmHxC-XxeBmNis=DwVvpJUOogQ@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
A recent fix to /dev/mem prevents mappings from wrapping around the end
of physical address space. However, the check was written in a way that
also prevents a mapping reaching just up to the end of physical address
space, which may be a valid use case (especially on 32-bit systems).
This patch fixes it by checking the last mapped address (instead of the
first address behind that) for overflow.
Fixes: b299cde245 ("drivers: char: mem: Check for address space wraparound with mmap()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Nico Huber <nico.h@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
/dev/mem currently allows mmap() mappings that wrap around the end of
the physical address space, which should probably be illegal. It
circumvents the existing STRICT_DEVMEM permission check because the loop
immediately terminates (as the start address is already higher than the
end address). On the x86_64 architecture it will then cause a panic
(from the BUG(start >= end) in arch/x86/mm/pat.c:reserve_memtype()).
This patch adds an explicit check to make sure offset + size will not
wrap around in the physical address type.
Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
|
When borrowing the pfn_valid() check from mmap_kmem(), somebody managed
to get physical and virtual addresses spectacularly muddled up, such
that we've ended up with checks for one being the other. Whilst this
does indeed prevent out-of-bounds accesses crashing, on most systems
it also prevents the more desirable use-case of working at all ever.
Check the *virtual* offset correctly for what it is. Furthermore, do
so in the right place - a read or write may span multiple pages, so a
single up-front check is insufficient. High memory accesses already
have a similar validity check just before the copy_to_user() call, so
just make the low memory path fully consistent with that.
Reported-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 148a1bc84398 ("drivers: char: mem: Check {read,write}_kmem() addresses")
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Arriving at read_kmem() with an offset representing a bogus kernel
address (e.g. 0 from a simple "cat /dev/kmem") leads to copy_to_user
faulting on the kernel-side read.
x86_64 happens to get away with this since the optimised implementation
uses "rep movs*", thus the user write (which is allowed to fault) and
the kernel read are the same instruction, the kernel-side fault falls
into the user-side fixup handler and the chain of events which
transpires ends up returning an error as one might expect, even if it's
an inappropriate -EFAULT. On other architectures, though, the read is
not covered by the fixup entry for the write, and we get a big scary
"Unable to hande kernel paging request..." dump.
The more typical use-case of mmap_kmem() has always (within living
memory at least) returned -EIO for addresses which don't satisfy
pfn_valid(), so let's make that consistent across {read,write}_kem()
too.
Reported-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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Provide a shmem_get_unmapped_area method in file_operations, called at
mmap time to decide the mapping address. It could be conditional on
CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE, but save #ifdefs in other places by making
it unconditional.
shmem_get_unmapped_area() first calls the usual mm->get_unmapped_area
(which we treat as a black box, highly dependent on architecture and
config and executable layout). Lots of conditions, and in most cases it
just goes with the address that chose; but when our huge stars are
rightly aligned, yet that did not provide a suitable address, go back to
ask for a larger arena, within which to align the mapping suitably.
There have to be some direct calls to shmem_get_unmapped_area(), not via
the file_operations: because of the way shmem_zero_setup() is called to
create a shmem object late in the mmap sequence, when MAP_SHARED is
requested with MAP_ANONYMOUS or /dev/zero. Though this only matters
when /proc/sys/vm/shmem_huge has been set.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466021202-61880-29-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Currently it's possible for broken (or malicious) userspace to flood a
kernel log indefinitely with messages a-la
Program dmidecode tried to access /dev/mem between f0000->100000
because range_is_allowed() is case of CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM being turned on
dumps this information each and every time devmem_is_allowed() fails.
Reportedly userspace that is able to trigger contignuous flow of these
messages exists.
It would be possible to rate limit this message, but that'd have a
questionable value; the administrator wouldn't get information about all
the failing accessess, so then the information would be both superfluous
and incomplete at the same time :)
Returning EPERM (which is what is actually happening) is enough indication
for userspace what has happened; no need to log this particular error as
some sort of special condition.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LNX.2.00.1607081137020.24757@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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IS_ERR_VALUE macro should be used only with unsigned long type.
Specifically it works incorrectly with longer types.
The patch follows conclusion from discussion on LKML [1][2].
[1]: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/2120927
[2]: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/2150581
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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