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Yi Lai reported an issue ([1]) where the following warning appears
in kernel dmesg:
[ 60.643604] verifier backtracking bug
[ 60.643635] WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 2315 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:4302 __mark_chain_precision+0x3a6c/0x3e10
[ 60.648428] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE)
[ 60.650471] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 2315 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 6.15.0-rc4-gef11287f8289-dirty #327 PREEMPT(full)
[ 60.654385] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[ 60.656682] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 60.660475] RIP: 0010:__mark_chain_precision+0x3a6c/0x3e10
[ 60.662814] Code: 5a 30 84 89 ea e8 c4 d9 01 00 80 3d 3e 7d d8 04 00 0f 85 60 fa ff ff c6 05 31 7d d8 04
01 48 c7 c7 00 58 30 84 e8 c4 06 a5 ff <0f> 0b e9 46 fa ff ff 48 ...
[ 60.668720] RSP: 0018:ffff888116cc7298 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 60.671075] RAX: 54d70e82dfd31900 RBX: ffff888115b65e20 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 60.673659] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[ 60.676241] RBP: 0000000000000400 R08: ffff8881f6f23bd3 R09: 1ffff1103ede477a
[ 60.678787] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed103ede477b R12: ffff888115b60ae8
[ 60.681420] R13: 1ffff11022b6cbc4 R14: 00000000fffffff2 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 60.684030] FS: 00007fc2aedd80c0(0000) GS:ffff88826fa8a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 60.686837] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 60.689027] CR2: 000056325369e000 CR3: 000000011088b002 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
[ 60.691623] Call Trace:
[ 60.692821] <TASK>
[ 60.693960] ? __pfx_verbose+0x10/0x10
[ 60.695656] ? __pfx_disasm_kfunc_name+0x10/0x10
[ 60.697495] check_cond_jmp_op+0x16f7/0x39b0
[ 60.699237] do_check+0x58fa/0xab10
...
Further analysis shows the warning is at line 4302 as below:
4294 /* static subprog call instruction, which
4295 * means that we are exiting current subprog,
4296 * so only r1-r5 could be still requested as
4297 * precise, r0 and r6-r10 or any stack slot in
4298 * the current frame should be zero by now
4299 */
4300 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) {
4301 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt));
4302 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
4303 return -EFAULT;
4304 }
With the below test (also in the next patch):
__used __naked static void __bpf_jmp_r10(void)
{
asm volatile (
"r2 = 2314885393468386424 ll;"
"goto +0;"
"if r2 <= r10 goto +3;"
"if r1 >= -1835016 goto +0;"
"if r2 <= 8 goto +0;"
"if r3 <= 0 goto +0;"
"exit;"
::: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("?raw_tp")
__naked void bpf_jmp_r10(void)
{
asm volatile (
"r3 = 0 ll;"
"call __bpf_jmp_r10;"
"r0 = 0;"
"exit;"
::: __clobber_all);
}
The following is the verifier failure log:
0: (18) r3 = 0x0 ; R3_w=0
2: (85) call pc+2
caller:
R10=fp0
callee:
frame1: R1=ctx() R3_w=0 R10=fp0
5: frame1: R1=ctx() R3_w=0 R10=fp0
; asm volatile (" \ @ verifier_precision.c:184
5: (18) r2 = 0x20202000256c6c78 ; frame1: R2_w=0x20202000256c6c78
7: (05) goto pc+0
8: (bd) if r2 <= r10 goto pc+3 ; frame1: R2_w=0x20202000256c6c78 R10=fp0
9: (35) if r1 >= 0xffe3fff8 goto pc+0 ; frame1: R1=ctx()
10: (b5) if r2 <= 0x8 goto pc+0
mark_precise: frame1: last_idx 10 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
mark_precise: frame1: regs=r2 stack= before 9: (35) if r1 >= 0xffe3fff8 goto pc+0
mark_precise: frame1: regs=r2 stack= before 8: (bd) if r2 <= r10 goto pc+3
mark_precise: frame1: regs=r2,r10 stack= before 7: (05) goto pc+0
mark_precise: frame1: regs=r2,r10 stack= before 5: (18) r2 = 0x20202000256c6c78
mark_precise: frame1: regs=r10 stack= before 2: (85) call pc+2
BUG regs 400
The main failure reason is due to r10 in precision backtracking bookkeeping.
Actually r10 is always precise and there is no need to add it for the precision
backtracking bookkeeping.
One way to fix the issue is to prevent bt_set_reg() if any src/dst reg is
r10. Andrii suggested to go with push_insn_history() approach to avoid
explicitly checking r10 in backtrack_insn().
This patch added push_insn_history() support for cond_jmp like 'rX <op> rY'
operations. In check_cond_jmp_op(), if any of rX or rY is a stack pointer,
push_insn_history() will record such information, and later backtrack_insn()
will do bt_set_reg() properly for those register(s).
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/Z%2F8q3xzpU59CIYQE@ly-workstation/
Reported by: Yi Lai <yi1.lai@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 407958a0e980 ("bpf: encapsulate precision backtracking bookkeeping")
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250524041335.4046126-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
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Throughout the verifier's logic, there are multiple checks for
inconsistent states that should never happen and would indicate a
verifier bug. These bugs are typically logged in the verifier logs and
sometimes preceded by a WARN_ONCE.
This patch reworks these checks to consistently emit a verifier log AND
a warning when CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL is enabled. The consistent use of
WARN_ONCE should help fuzzers (ex. syzkaller) expose any situation
where they are actually able to reach one of those buggy verifier
states.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aCs1nYvNNMq8dAWP@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Instead of hardcoding the list of kfuncs that need prog->aux passed to
them with a combination of fixup_kfunc_call adjustment + __ign suffix,
combine both in __prog suffix, which ignores the argument passed in, and
fixes it up to the prog->aux. This allows kfuncs to have the prog->aux
passed into them without having to touch the verifier.
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250513142812.1021591-1-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Since out-of-order unlocks are unsupported for rqspinlock, and irqsave
variants enforce strict FIFO ordering anyway, make the same change for
normal non-irqsave variants, such that FIFO ordering is enforced.
Two new verifier state fields (active_lock_id, active_lock_ptr) are used
to denote the top of the stack, and prev_id and prev_ptr are ascertained
whenever popping the topmost entry through an unlock.
Take special care to make these fields part of the state comparison in
refsafe.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250316040541.108729-25-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Introduce verifier-side support for rqspinlock kfuncs. The first step is
allowing bpf_res_spin_lock type to be defined in map values and
allocated objects, so BTF-side is updated with a new BPF_RES_SPIN_LOCK
field to recognize and validate.
Any object cannot have both bpf_spin_lock and bpf_res_spin_lock, only
one of them (and at most one of them per-object, like before) must be
present. The bpf_res_spin_lock can also be used to protect objects that
require lock protection for their kfuncs, like BPF rbtree and linked
list.
The verifier plumbing to simulate success and failure cases when calling
the kfuncs is done by pushing a new verifier state to the verifier state
stack which will verify the failure case upon calling the kfunc. The
path where success is indicated creates all lock reference state and IRQ
state (if necessary for irqsave variants). In the case of failure, the
state clears the registers r0-r5, sets the return value, and skips kfunc
processing, proceeding to the next instruction.
When marking the return value for success case, the value is marked as
0, and for the failure case as [-MAX_ERRNO, -1]. Then, in the program,
whenever user checks the return value as 'if (ret)' or 'if (ret < 0)'
the verifier never traverses such branches for success cases, and would
be aware that the lock is not held in such cases.
We push the kfunc state in check_kfunc_call whenever rqspinlock kfuncs
are invoked. We introduce a kfunc_class state to avoid mixing lock
irqrestore kfuncs with IRQ state created by bpf_local_irq_save.
With all this infrastructure, these kfuncs become usable in programs
while satisfying all safety properties required by the kernel.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250316040541.108729-24-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Compute may-live registers before each instruction in the program.
The register is live before the instruction I if it is read by I or
some instruction S following I during program execution and is not
overwritten between I and S.
This information would be used in the next patch as a hint in
func_states_equal().
Use a simple algorithm described in [1] to compute this information:
- define the following:
- I.use : a set of all registers read by instruction I;
- I.def : a set of all registers written by instruction I;
- I.in : a set of all registers that may be alive before I execution;
- I.out : a set of all registers that may be alive after I execution;
- I.successors : a set of instructions S that might immediately
follow I for some program execution;
- associate separate empty sets 'I.in' and 'I.out' with each instruction;
- visit each instruction in a postorder and update corresponding
'I.in' and 'I.out' sets as follows:
I.out = U [S.in for S in I.successors]
I.in = (I.out / I.def) U I.use
(where U stands for set union, / stands for set difference)
- repeat the computation while I.{in,out} changes for any instruction.
On implementation side keep things as simple, as possible:
- check_cfg() already marks instructions EXPLORED in post-order,
modify it to save the index of each EXPLORED instruction in a vector;
- represent I.{in,out,use,def} as bitmasks;
- don't split the program into basic blocks and don't maintain the
work queue, instead:
- do fixed-point computation by visiting each instruction;
- maintain a simple 'changed' flag if I.{in,out} for any instruction
change;
Measurements show that even such simplistic implementation does not
add measurable verification time overhead (for selftests, at-least).
Note on check_cfg() ex_insn_beg/ex_done change:
To avoid out of bounds access to env->cfg.insn_postorder array,
it should be guaranteed that instruction transitions to EXPLORED state
only once. Previously this was not the fact for incorrect programs
with direct calls to exception callbacks.
The 'align' selftest needs adjustment to skip computed insn/live
registers printout. Otherwise it matches lines from the live registers
printout.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Live-variable_analysis
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250304195024.2478889-4-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The verifier currently does not permit global subprog calls when a lock
is held, preemption is disabled, or when IRQs are disabled. This is
because we don't know whether the global subprog calls sleepable
functions or not.
In case of locks, there's an additional reason: functions called by the
global subprog may hold additional locks etc. The verifier won't know
while verifying the global subprog whether it was called in context
where a spin lock is already held by the program.
Perform summarization of the sleepable nature of a global subprog just
like changes_pkt_data and then allow calls to global subprogs for
non-sleepable ones from atomic context.
While making this change, I noticed that RCU read sections had no
protection against sleepable global subprog calls, include it in the
checks and fix this while we're at it.
Care needs to be taken to not allow global subprog calls when regular
bpf_spin_lock is held. When resilient spin locks is held, we want to
potentially have this check relaxed, but not for now.
Also make sure extensions freplacing global functions cannot do so
in case the target is non-sleepable, but the extension is. The other
combination is ok.
Tests are included in the next patch to handle all special conditions.
Fixes: 9bb00b2895cb ("bpf: Add kfunc bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock()")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250301151846.1552362-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Compute env->peak_states as a maximum value of sum of
env->explored_states and env->free_list size.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250215110411.3236773-11-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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When fixes from patches 1 and 3 are applied, Patrick Somaru reported
an increase in memory consumption for sched_ext iterator-based
programs hitting 1M instructions limit. For example, 2Gb VMs ran out
of memory while verifying a program. Similar behaviour could be
reproduced on current bpf-next master.
Here is an example of such program:
/* verification completes if given 16G or RAM,
* final env->free_list size is 369,960 entries.
*/
SEC("raw_tp")
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
__success
int free_list_bomb(const void *ctx)
{
volatile char buf[48] = {};
unsigned i, j;
j = 0;
bpf_for(i, 0, 10) {
/* this forks verifier state:
* - verification of current path continues and
* creates a checkpoint after 'if';
* - verification of forked path hits the
* checkpoint and marks it as loop_entry.
*/
if (bpf_get_prandom_u32())
asm volatile ("");
/* this marks 'j' as precise, thus any checkpoint
* created on current iteration would not be matched
* on the next iteration.
*/
buf[j++] = 42;
j %= ARRAY_SIZE(buf);
}
asm volatile (""::"r"(buf));
return 0;
}
Memory consumption increased due to more states being marked as loop
entries and eventually added to env->free_list.
This commit introduces logic to free states from env->free_list during
verification. A state in env->free_list can be freed if:
- it has no child states;
- it is not used as a loop_entry.
This commit:
- updates bpf_verifier_state->used_as_loop_entry to be a counter
that tracks how many states use this one as a loop entry;
- adds a function maybe_free_verifier_state(), which:
- frees a state if its ->branches and ->used_as_loop_entry counters
are both zero;
- if the state is freed, state->loop_entry->used_as_loop_entry is
decremented, and an attempt is made to free state->loop_entry.
In the example above, this approach reduces the maximum number of
states in the free list from 369,960 to 16,223.
However, this approach has its limitations. If the buf size in the
example above is modified to 64, state caching overflows: the state
for j=0 is evicted from the cache before it can be used to stop
traversal. As a result, states in the free list accumulate because
their branch counters do not reach zero.
The effect of this patch on the selftests looks as follows:
File Program Max free list (A) Max free list (B) Max free list (DIFF)
-------------------------------- ------------------------------------ ----------------- ----------------- --------------------
arena_list.bpf.o arena_list_add 17 3 -14 (-82.35%)
bpf_iter_task_stack.bpf.o dump_task_stack 39 9 -30 (-76.92%)
iters.bpf.o checkpoint_states_deletion 265 89 -176 (-66.42%)
iters.bpf.o clean_live_states 19 0 -19 (-100.00%)
profiler2.bpf.o tracepoint__syscalls__sys_enter_kill 102 1 -101 (-99.02%)
profiler3.bpf.o tracepoint__syscalls__sys_enter_kill 144 0 -144 (-100.00%)
pyperf600_iter.bpf.o on_event 15 0 -15 (-100.00%)
pyperf600_nounroll.bpf.o on_event 1170 1158 -12 (-1.03%)
setget_sockopt.bpf.o skops_sockopt 18 0 -18 (-100.00%)
strobemeta_nounroll1.bpf.o on_event 147 83 -64 (-43.54%)
strobemeta_nounroll2.bpf.o on_event 312 209 -103 (-33.01%)
strobemeta_subprogs.bpf.o on_event 124 86 -38 (-30.65%)
test_cls_redirect_subprogs.bpf.o cls_redirect 15 0 -15 (-100.00%)
timer.bpf.o test1 30 15 -15 (-50.00%)
Measured using "do-not-submit" patches from here:
https://github.com/eddyz87/bpf/tree/get-loop-entry-hungup
Reported-by: Patrick Somaru <patsomaru@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250215110411.3236773-10-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The next patch in the set needs the ability to remove individual
states from env->free_list while only holding a pointer to the state.
Which requires env->free_list to be a doubly linked list.
This patch converts env->free_list and struct bpf_verifier_state_list
to use struct list_head for this purpose. The change to
env->explored_states is collateral.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250215110411.3236773-9-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge bpf fixes after downstream PR.
No conflicts.
Adjacent changes in:
Auto-merging include/linux/bpf.h
Auto-merging include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
Auto-merging kernel/bpf/btf.c
Auto-merging kernel/bpf/verifier.c
Auto-merging kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
Auto-merging tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tp_btf_nullable.c
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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When processing calls to certain helpers, verifier invalidates all
packet pointers in a current state. For example, consider the
following program:
__attribute__((__noinline__))
long skb_pull_data(struct __sk_buff *sk, __u32 len)
{
return bpf_skb_pull_data(sk, len);
}
SEC("tc")
int test_invalidate_checks(struct __sk_buff *sk)
{
int *p = (void *)(long)sk->data;
if ((void *)(p + 1) > (void *)(long)sk->data_end) return TCX_DROP;
skb_pull_data(sk, 0);
*p = 42;
return TCX_PASS;
}
After a call to bpf_skb_pull_data() the pointer 'p' can't be used
safely. See function filter.c:bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() for a list
of such helpers.
At the moment verifier invalidates packet pointers when processing
helper function calls, and does not traverse global sub-programs when
processing calls to global sub-programs. This means that calls to
helpers done from global sub-programs do not invalidate pointers in
the caller state. E.g. the program above is unsafe, but is not
rejected by verifier.
This commit fixes the omission by computing field
bpf_subprog_info->changes_pkt_data for each sub-program before main
verification pass.
changes_pkt_data should be set if:
- subprogram calls helper for which bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data
returns true;
- subprogram calls a global function,
for which bpf_subprog_info->changes_pkt_data should be set.
The verifier.c:check_cfg() pass is modified to compute this
information. The commit relies on depth first instruction traversal
done by check_cfg() and absence of recursive function calls:
- check_cfg() would eventually visit every call to subprogram S in a
state when S is fully explored;
- when S is fully explored:
- every direct helper call within S is explored
(and thus changes_pkt_data is set if needed);
- every call to subprogram S1 called by S was visited with S1 fully
explored (and thus S inherits changes_pkt_data from S1).
The downside of such approach is that dead code elimination is not
taken into account: if a helper call inside global function is dead
because of current configuration, verifier would conservatively assume
that the call occurs for the purpose of the changes_pkt_data
computation.
Reported-by: Nick Zavaritsky <mejedi@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0498CA22-5779-4767-9C0C-A9515CEA711F@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241210041100.1898468-4-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Teach the verifier about IRQ-disabled sections through the introduction
of two new kfuncs, bpf_local_irq_save, to save IRQ state and disable
them, and bpf_local_irq_restore, to restore IRQ state and enable them
back again.
For the purposes of tracking the saved IRQ state, the verifier is taught
about a new special object on the stack of type STACK_IRQ_FLAG. This is
a 8 byte value which saves the IRQ flags which are to be passed back to
the IRQ restore kfunc.
Renumber the enums for REF_TYPE_* to simplify the check in
find_lock_state, filtering out non-lock types as they grow will become
cumbersome and is unecessary.
To track a dynamic number of IRQ-disabled regions and their associated
saved states, a new resource type RES_TYPE_IRQ is introduced, which its
state management functions: acquire_irq_state and release_irq_state,
taking advantage of the refactoring and clean ups made in earlier
commits.
One notable requirement of the kernel's IRQ save and restore API is that
they cannot happen out of order. For this purpose, when releasing reference
we keep track of the prev_id we saw with REF_TYPE_IRQ. Since reference
states are inserted in increasing order of the index, this is used to
remember the ordering of acquisitions of IRQ saved states, so that we
maintain a logical stack in acquisition order of resource identities,
and can enforce LIFO ordering when restoring IRQ state. The top of the
stack is maintained using bpf_verifier_state's active_irq_id.
To maintain the stack property when releasing reference states, we need
to modify release_reference_state to instead shift the remaining array
left using memmove instead of swapping deleted element with last that
might break the ordering. A selftest to test this subtle behavior is
added in late patches.
The logic to detect initialized and unitialized irq flag slots, marking
and unmarking is similar to how it's done for iterators. No additional
checks are needed in refsafe for REF_TYPE_IRQ, apart from the usual
check_id satisfiability check on the ref[i].id. We have to perform the
same check_ids check on state->active_irq_id as well.
To ensure we don't get assigned REF_TYPE_PTR by default after
acquire_reference_state, if someone forgets to assign the type, let's
also renumber the enum ref_state_type. This way any unassigned types
get caught by refsafe's default switch statement, don't assume
REF_TYPE_PTR by default.
The kfuncs themselves are plain wrappers over local_irq_save and
local_irq_restore macros.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241204030400.208005-5-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Currently, state for RCU read locks and preemption is in
bpf_verifier_state, while locks and pointer reference state remains in
bpf_func_state. There is no particular reason to keep the latter in
bpf_func_state. Additionally, it is copied into a new frame's state and
copied back to the caller frame's state everytime the verifier processes
a pseudo call instruction. This is a bit wasteful, given this state is
global for a given verification state / path.
Move all resource and reference related state in bpf_verifier_state
structure in this patch, in preparation for introducing new reference
state types in the future.
Since we switch print_verifier_state and friends to print using vstate,
we now need to explicitly pass in the verifier state from the caller
along with the bpf_func_state, so modify the prototype and callers to do
so. To ensure func state matches the verifier state when we're printing
data, take in frame number instead of bpf_func_state pointer instead and
avoid inconsistencies induced by the caller.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241204030400.208005-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Instead of allocating and copying instruction history each time we
enqueue child verifier state, switch to a model where we use one common
dynamically sized array of instruction history entries across all states.
The key observation for proving this is correct is that instruction
history is only relevant while state is active, which means it either is
a current state (and thus we are actively modifying instruction history
and no other state can interfere with us) or we are checkpointed state
with some children still active (either enqueued or being current).
In the latter case our portion of instruction history is finalized and
won't change or grow, so as long as we keep it immutable until the state
is finalized, we are good.
Now, when state is finalized and is put into state hash for potentially
future pruning lookups, instruction history is not used anymore. This is
because instruction history is only used by precision marking logic, and
we never modify precision markings for finalized states.
So, instead of each state having its own small instruction history, we
keep a global dynamically-sized instruction history, where each state in
current DFS path from root to active state remembers its portion of
instruction history. Current state can append to this history, but
cannot modify any of its parent histories.
Async callback state enqueueing, while logically detached from parent
state, still is part of verification backtracking tree, so has to follow
the same schema as normal state checkpoints.
Because the insn_hist array can be grown through realloc, states don't
keep pointers, they instead maintain two indices, [start, end), into
global instruction history array. End is exclusive index, so
`start == end` means there is no relevant instruction history.
This eliminates a lot of allocations and minimizes overall memory usage.
For instance, running a worst-case test from [0] (but without the
heuristics-based fix [1]), it took 12.5 minutes until we get -ENOMEM.
With the changes in this patch the whole test succeeds in 10 minutes
(very slow, so heuristics from [1] is important, of course).
To further validate correctness, veristat-based comparison was performed for
Meta production BPF objects and BPF selftests objects. In both cases there
were no differences *at all* in terms of verdict or instruction and state
counts, providing a good confidence in the change.
Having this low-memory-overhead solution of keeping dynamic
per-instruction history cheaply opens up some new possibilities, like
keeping extra information for literally every single validated
instruction. This will be used for simplifying precision backpropagation
logic in follow up patches.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241029172641.1042523-2-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241029172641.1042523-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241115001303.277272-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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For struct_ops progs, whether a particular prog uses private stack
depends on prog->aux->priv_stack_requested setting before actual
insn-level verification for that prog. One particular implementation
is to piggyback on struct_ops->check_member(). The next patch has
an example for this. The struct_ops->check_member() sets
prog->aux->priv_stack_requested to be true which enables private stack
usage.
The struct_ops prog follows the same rule as kprobe/tracing progs after
function bpf_enable_priv_stack(). For example, even a struct_ops prog
requests private stack, it could still use normal kernel stack if
the stack size is small (< 64 bytes).
Similar to tracing progs, nested same cpu same prog run will be skipped.
A field (recursion_detected()) is added to bpf_prog_aux structure.
If bpf_prog->aux->recursion_detected is implemented by the struct_ops
subsystem and nested same cpu/prog happens, the function will be
triggered to report an error, collect related info, etc.
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241112163933.2224962-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Private stack will be allocated with percpu allocator in jit time.
To avoid complexity at runtime, only one copy of private stack is
available per cpu per prog. So runtime recursion check is necessary
to avoid stack corruption.
Current private stack only supports kprobe/perf_event/tp/raw_tp
which has recursion check in the kernel, and prog types that use
bpf trampoline recursion check. For trampoline related prog types,
currently only tracing progs have recursion checking.
To avoid complexity, all async_cb subprogs use normal kernel stack
including those subprogs used by both main prog subtree and async_cb
subtree. Any prog having tail call also uses kernel stack.
To avoid jit penalty with private stack support, a subprog stack
size threshold is set such that only if the stack size is no less
than the threshold, private stack is supported. The current threshold
is 64 bytes. This avoids jit penality if the stack usage is small.
A useless 'continue' is also removed from a loop in func
check_max_stack_depth().
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241112163907.2223839-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Logic to prevent callbacks from acquiring new references for the program
(i.e. leaving acquired references), and releasing caller references
(i.e. those acquired in parent frames) was introduced in commit
9d9d00ac29d0 ("bpf: Fix reference state management for synchronous callbacks").
This was necessary because back then, the verifier simulated each
callback once (that could potentially be executed N times, where N can
be zero). This meant that callbacks that left lingering resources or
cleared caller resources could do it more than once, operating on
undefined state or leaking memory.
With the fixes to callback verification in commit
ab5cfac139ab ("bpf: verify callbacks as if they are called unknown number of times"),
all of this extra logic is no longer necessary. Hence, drop it as part
of this commit.
Cc: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241109231430.2475236-3-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
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When bpf_spin_lock was introduced originally, there was deliberation on
whether to use an array of lock IDs, but since bpf_spin_lock is limited
to holding a single lock at any given time, we've been using a single ID
to identify the held lock.
In preparation for introducing spin locks that can be taken multiple
times, introduce support for acquiring multiple lock IDs. For this
purpose, reuse the acquired_refs array and store both lock and pointer
references. We tag the entry with REF_TYPE_PTR or REF_TYPE_LOCK to
disambiguate and find the relevant entry. The ptr field is used to track
the map_ptr or btf (for bpf_obj_new allocations) to ensure locks can be
matched with protected fields within the same "allocation", i.e.
bpf_obj_new object or map value.
The struct active_lock is changed to an int as the state is part of the
acquired_refs array, and we only need active_lock as a cheap way of
detecting lock presence.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241109231430.2475236-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
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Commit 980ca8ceeae6 ("bpf: check bpf_dummy_struct_ops program params for
test runs") does bitwise AND between reg_type and PTR_MAYBE_NULL, which
is correct, but due to type difference the compiler complains:
net/bpf/bpf_dummy_struct_ops.c:118:31: warning: bitwise operation between different enumeration types ('const enum bpf_reg_type' and 'enum bpf_type_flag') [-Wenum-enum-conversion]
118 | if (info && (info->reg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL))
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Workaround the warning by moving the type_may_be_null() helper from
verifier.c into bpf_verifier.h, and reuse it here to check whether param
is nullable.
Fixes: 980ca8ceeae6 ("bpf: check bpf_dummy_struct_ops program params for test runs")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202404241956.HEiRYwWq-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240905055233.70203-1-shung-hsi.yu@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This patch removes the insn_buf array stack usage from the
inline_bpf_loop(). Instead, the env->insn_buf is used. The
usage in inline_bpf_loop() needs more than 16 insn, so the
INSN_BUF_SIZE needs to be increased from 16 to 32.
The compiler stack size warning on the verifier is gone
after this change.
Cc: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240904180847.56947-2-martin.lau@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This patch adds a .gen_epilogue to the bpf_verifier_ops. It is similar
to the existing .gen_prologue. Instead of allowing a subsystem
to run code at the beginning of a bpf prog, it allows the subsystem
to run code just before the bpf prog exit.
One of the use case is to allow the upcoming bpf qdisc to ensure that
the skb->dev is the same as the qdisc->dev_queue->dev. The bpf qdisc
struct_ops implementation could either fix it up or drop the skb.
Another use case could be in bpf_tcp_ca.c to enforce snd_cwnd
has sane value (e.g. non zero).
The epilogue can do the useful thing (like checking skb->dev) if it
can access the bpf prog's ctx. Unlike prologue, r1 may not hold the
ctx pointer. This patch saves the r1 in the stack if the .gen_epilogue
has returned some instructions in the "epilogue_buf".
The existing .gen_prologue is done in convert_ctx_accesses().
The new .gen_epilogue is done in the convert_ctx_accesses() also.
When it sees the (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) instruction, it will be patched
with the earlier generated "epilogue_buf". The epilogue patching is
only done for the main prog.
Only one epilogue will be patched to the main program. When the
bpf prog has multiple BPF_EXIT instructions, a BPF_JA is used
to goto the earlier patched epilogue. Majority of the archs
support (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA): x86, arm, s390, risv64, loongarch,
powerpc and arc. This patch keeps it simple and always
use (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA). A new macro BPF_JMP32_A is added to
generate the (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA) insn.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240829210833.388152-4-martin.lau@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This patch moves the 'struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16]' stack usage
to the bpf_verifier_env. A '#define INSN_BUF_SIZE 16' is also added
to replace the ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) usages.
Both convert_ctx_accesses() and do_misc_fixup() are changed
to use the env->insn_buf.
It is a refactoring work for adding the epilogue_buf[16] in a later patch.
With this patch, the stack size usage decreased.
Before:
./kernel/bpf/verifier.c:22133:5: warning: stack frame size (2584)
After:
./kernel/bpf/verifier.c:22184:5: warning: stack frame size (2264)
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240829210833.388152-2-martin.lau@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge bpf fixes after downstream PR including
important fixes (from bpf-next point of view):
commit 41c24102af7b ("selftests/bpf: Filter out _GNU_SOURCE when compiling test_cpp")
commit fdad456cbcca ("bpf: Fix updating attached freplace prog in prog_array map")
No conflicts.
Adjacent changes in:
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
kernel/bpf/verifier.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240813234307.82773-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Attribute used by LLVM implementation of the feature had been changed
from no_caller_saved_registers to bpf_fastcall (see [1]).
This commit replaces references to nocsr by references to bpf_fastcall
to keep LLVM and Kernel parts in sync.
[1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/105417
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240822084112.3257995-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The commit f7866c358733 ("bpf: Fix null pointer dereference in resolve_prog_type() for BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT")
fixed a NULL pointer dereference panic, but didn't fix the issue that
fails to update attached freplace prog to prog_array map.
Since commit 1c123c567fb1 ("bpf: Resolve fext program type when checking map compatibility"),
freplace prog and its target prog are able to tail call each other.
And the commit 3aac1ead5eb6 ("bpf: Move prog->aux->linked_prog and trampoline into bpf_link on attach")
sets prog->aux->dst_prog as NULL after attaching freplace prog to its
target prog.
After loading freplace the prog_array's owner type is BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS.
Then, after attaching freplace its prog->aux->dst_prog is NULL.
Then, while updating freplace in prog_array the bpf_prog_map_compatible()
incorrectly returns false because resolve_prog_type() returns
BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT instead of BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS.
After this patch the resolve_prog_type() returns BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS
and update to prog_array can succeed.
Fixes: f7866c358733 ("bpf: Fix null pointer dereference in resolve_prog_type() for BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT")
Cc: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240728114612.48486-2-leon.hwang@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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GCC and LLVM define a no_caller_saved_registers function attribute.
This attribute means that function scratches only some of
the caller saved registers defined by ABI.
For BPF the set of such registers could be defined as follows:
- R0 is scratched only if function is non-void;
- R1-R5 are scratched only if corresponding parameter type is defined
in the function prototype.
This commit introduces flag bpf_func_prot->allow_nocsr.
If this flag is set for some helper function, verifier assumes that
it follows no_caller_saved_registers calling convention.
The contract between kernel and clang allows to simultaneously use
such functions and maintain backwards compatibility with old
kernels that don't understand no_caller_saved_registers calls
(nocsr for short):
- clang generates a simple pattern for nocsr calls, e.g.:
r1 = 1;
r2 = 2;
*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;
*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r2;
call %[to_be_inlined]
r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 16);
r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);
r0 = r1;
r0 += r2;
exit;
- kernel removes unnecessary spills and fills, if called function is
inlined by verifier or current JIT (with assumption that patch
inserted by verifier or JIT honors nocsr contract, e.g. does not
scratch r3-r5 for the example above), e.g. the code above would be
transformed to:
r1 = 1;
r2 = 2;
call %[to_be_inlined]
r0 = r1;
r0 += r2;
exit;
Technically, the transformation is split into the following phases:
- function mark_nocsr_patterns(), called from bpf_check()
searches and marks potential patterns in instruction auxiliary data;
- upon stack read or write access,
function check_nocsr_stack_contract() is used to verify if
stack offsets, presumably reserved for nocsr patterns, are used
only from those patterns;
- function remove_nocsr_spills_fills(), called from bpf_check(),
applies the rewrite for valid patterns.
See comment in mark_nocsr_pattern_for_call() for more details.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722233844.1406874-3-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
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Use bpf_verifier_state->jmp_history to track which registers were
updated by find_equal_scalars() (renamed to collect_linked_regs())
when conditional jump was verified. Use recorded information in
backtrack_insn() to propagate precision.
E.g. for the following program:
while verifying instructions
1: r1 = r0 |
2: if r1 < 8 goto ... | push r0,r1 as linked registers in jmp_history
3: if r0 > 16 goto ... | push r0,r1 as linked registers in jmp_history
4: r2 = r10 |
5: r2 += r0 v mark_chain_precision(r0)
while doing mark_chain_precision(r0)
5: r2 += r0 | mark r0 precise
4: r2 = r10 |
3: if r0 > 16 goto ... | mark r0,r1 as precise
2: if r1 < 8 goto ... | mark r0,r1 as precise
1: r1 = r0 v
Technically, do this as follows:
- Use 10 bits to identify each register that gains range because of
sync_linked_regs():
- 3 bits for frame number;
- 6 bits for register or stack slot number;
- 1 bit to indicate if register is spilled.
- Use u64 as a vector of 6 such records + 4 bits for vector length.
- Augment struct bpf_jmp_history_entry with a field 'linked_regs'
representing such vector.
- When doing check_cond_jmp_op() remember up to 6 registers that
gain range because of sync_linked_regs() in such a vector.
- Don't propagate range information and reset IDs for registers that
don't fit in 6-value vector.
- Push a pair {instruction index, linked registers vector}
to bpf_verifier_state->jmp_history.
- When doing backtrack_insn() check if any of recorded linked
registers is currently marked precise, if so mark all linked
registers as precise.
This also requires fixes for two test_verifier tests:
- precise: test 1
- precise: test 2
Both tests contain the following instruction sequence:
19: (bf) r2 = r9 ; R2=scalar(id=3) R9=scalar(id=3)
20: (a5) if r2 < 0x8 goto pc+1 ; R2=scalar(id=3,umin=8)
21: (95) exit
22: (07) r2 += 1 ; R2_w=scalar(id=3+1,...)
23: (bf) r1 = r10 ; R1_w=fp0 R10=fp0
24: (07) r1 += -8 ; R1_w=fp-8
25: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=0
26: (85) call bpf_probe_read_kernel#113
The call to bpf_probe_read_kernel() at (26) forces r2 to be precise.
Previously, this forced all registers with same id to become precise
immediately when mark_chain_precision() is called.
After this change, the precision is propagated to registers sharing
same id only when 'if' instruction is backtracked.
Hence verification log for both tests is changed:
regs=r2,r9 -> regs=r2 for instructions 25..20.
Fixes: 904e6ddf4133 ("bpf: Use scalar ids in mark_chain_precision()")
Reported-by: Hao Sun <sunhao.th@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240718202357.1746514-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzZ0xidVCqB47XnkXcNhkPWF6_nTV7yt+_Lf0kcFEut2Mg@mail.gmail.com/
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When loading a EXT program without specifying `attr->attach_prog_fd`,
the `prog->aux->dst_prog` will be null. At this time, calling
resolve_prog_type() anywhere will result in a null pointer dereference.
Example stack trace:
[ 8.107863] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000004
[ 8.108262] Mem abort info:
[ 8.108384] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 8.108547] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 8.108722] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 8.108827] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 8.108939] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 8.109102] Data abort info:
[ 8.109203] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 8.109399] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 8.109614] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 8.109836] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000101354000
[ 8.110011] [0000000000000004] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
[ 8.112624] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 8.112783] Modules linked in:
[ 8.113120] CPU: 0 PID: 99 Comm: may_access_dire Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3-next-20240613-dirty #1
[ 8.113230] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 8.113390] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 8.113429] pc : may_access_direct_pkt_data+0x24/0xa0
[ 8.113746] lr : add_subprog_and_kfunc+0x634/0x8e8
[ 8.113798] sp : ffff80008283b9f0
[ 8.113813] x29: ffff80008283b9f0 x28: ffff800082795048 x27: 0000000000000001
[ 8.113881] x26: ffff0000c0bb2600 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
[ 8.113897] x23: ffff0000c1134000 x22: 000000000001864f x21: ffff0000c1138000
[ 8.113912] x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffff0000c12b8000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 8.113929] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0720072007200720
[ 8.113944] x14: 0720072007200720 x13: 0720072007200720 x12: 0720072007200720
[ 8.113958] x11: 0720072007200720 x10: 0000000000f9fca4 x9 : ffff80008021f4e4
[ 8.113991] x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 746f72705f6d656d x6 : 000000001e0e0f5f
[ 8.114006] x5 : 000000000001864f x4 : ffff0000c12b8000 x3 : 000000000000001c
[ 8.114020] x2 : 0000000000000002 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 8.114126] Call trace:
[ 8.114159] may_access_direct_pkt_data+0x24/0xa0
[ 8.114202] bpf_check+0x3bc/0x28c0
[ 8.114214] bpf_prog_load+0x658/0xa58
[ 8.114227] __sys_bpf+0xc50/0x2250
[ 8.114240] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x28/0x40
[ 8.114254] invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xf0
[ 8.114273] do_el0_svc+0x4c/0xd8
[ 8.114289] el0_svc+0x3c/0x140
[ 8.114305] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x134/0x150
[ 8.114331] el0t_64_sync+0x168/0x170
[ 8.114477] Code: 7100707f 54000081 f9401c00 f9403800 (b9400403)
[ 8.118672] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
One way to fix it is by forcing `attach_prog_fd` non-empty when
bpf_prog_load(). But this will lead to `libbpf_probe_bpf_prog_type`
API broken which use verifier log to probe prog type and will log
nothing if we reject invalid EXT prog before bpf_check().
Another way is by adding null check in resolve_prog_type().
The issue was introduced by commit 4a9c7bbe2ed4 ("bpf: Resolve to
prog->aux->dst_prog->type only for BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT") which wanted
to correct type resolution for BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING programs. Before
that, the type resolution of BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT prog actually follows
the logic below:
prog->aux->dst_prog ? prog->aux->dst_prog->type : prog->type;
It implies that when EXT program is not yet attached to `dst_prog`,
the prog type should be EXT itself. This code worked fine in the past.
So just keep using it.
Fix this by returning `prog->type` for BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT if `dst_prog`
is not present in resolve_prog_type().
Fixes: 4a9c7bbe2ed4 ("bpf: Resolve to prog->aux->dst_prog->type only for BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT")
Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240711145819.254178-2-wutengda@huaweicloud.com
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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2024-07-08
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
We've added 102 non-merge commits during the last 28 day(s) which contain
a total of 127 files changed, 4606 insertions(+), 980 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Support resilient split BTF which cuts down on duplication and makes BTF
as compact as possible wrt BTF from modules, from Alan Maguire & Eduard Zingerman.
2) Add support for dumping kfunc prototypes from BTF which enables both detecting
as well as dumping compilable prototypes for kfuncs, from Daniel Xu.
3) Batch of s390x BPF JIT improvements to add support for BPF arena and to implement
support for BPF exceptions, from Ilya Leoshkevich.
4) Batch of riscv64 BPF JIT improvements in particular to add 12-argument support
for BPF trampolines and to utilize bpf_prog_pack for the latter, from Pu Lehui.
5) Extend BPF test infrastructure to add a CHECKSUM_COMPLETE validation option
for skbs and add coverage along with it, from Vadim Fedorenko.
6) Inline bpf_get_current_task/_btf() helpers in the arm64 BPF JIT which gives
a small 1% performance improvement in micro-benchmarks, from Puranjay Mohan.
7) Extend the BPF verifier to track the delta between linked registers in order
to better deal with recent LLVM code optimizations, from Alexei Starovoitov.
8) Fix bpf_wq_set_callback_impl() kfunc signature where the third argument should
have been a pointer to the map value, from Benjamin Tissoires.
9) Extend BPF selftests to add regular expression support for test output matching
and adjust some of the selftest when compiled under gcc, from Cupertino Miranda.
10) Simplify task_file_seq_get_next() and remove an unnecessary loop which always
iterates exactly once anyway, from Dan Carpenter.
11) Add the capability to offload the netfilter flowtable in XDP layer through
kfuncs, from Florian Westphal & Lorenzo Bianconi.
12) Various cleanups in networking helpers in BPF selftests to shave off a few
lines of open-coded functions on client/server handling, from Geliang Tang.
13) Properly propagate prog->aux->tail_call_reachable out of BPF verifier, so
that x86 JIT does not need to implement detection, from Leon Hwang.
14) Fix BPF verifier to add a missing check_func_arg_reg_off() to prevent an
out-of-bounds memory access for dynpointers, from Matt Bobrowski.
15) Fix bpf_session_cookie() kfunc to return __u64 instead of long pointer as
it might lead to problems on 32-bit archs, from Jiri Olsa.
16) Enhance traffic validation and dynamic batch size support in xsk selftests,
from Tushar Vyavahare.
bpf-next-for-netdev
* tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (102 commits)
selftests/bpf: DENYLIST.aarch64: Remove fexit_sleep
selftests/bpf: amend for wrong bpf_wq_set_callback_impl signature
bpf: helpers: fix bpf_wq_set_callback_impl signature
libbpf: Add NULL checks to bpf_object__{prev_map,next_map}
selftests/bpf: Remove exceptions tests from DENYLIST.s390x
s390/bpf: Implement exceptions
s390/bpf: Change seen_reg to a mask
bpf: Remove unnecessary loop in task_file_seq_get_next()
riscv, bpf: Optimize stack usage of trampoline
bpf, devmap: Add .map_alloc_check
selftests/bpf: Remove arena tests from DENYLIST.s390x
selftests/bpf: Add UAF tests for arena atomics
selftests/bpf: Introduce __arena_global
s390/bpf: Support arena atomics
s390/bpf: Enable arena
s390/bpf: Support address space cast instruction
s390/bpf: Support BPF_PROBE_MEM32
s390/bpf: Land on the next JITed instruction after exception
s390/bpf: Introduce pre- and post- probe functions
s390/bpf: Get rid of get_probe_mem_regno()
...
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240708221438.10974-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Compilers can generate the code
r1 = r2
r1 += 0x1
if r2 < 1000 goto ...
use knowledge of r2 range in subsequent r1 operations
So remember constant delta between r2 and r1 and update r1 after 'if' condition.
Unfortunately LLVM still uses this pattern for loops with 'can_loop' construct:
for (i = 0; i < 1000 && can_loop; i++)
The "undo" pass was introduced in LLVM
https://reviews.llvm.org/D121937
to prevent this optimization, but it cannot cover all cases.
Instead of fighting middle end optimizer in BPF backend teach the verifier
about this pattern.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240613013815.953-3-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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Juan reported that after doing some changes to buzzer [0] and implementing
a new fuzzing strategy guided by coverage, they noticed the following in
one of the probes:
[...]
13: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) ; R0=map_value(ks=4,vs=8) R6_w=scalar()
14: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0
15: (b4) w0 = -1 ; R0_w=0xffffffff
16: (74) w0 >>= 1 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff
17: (5c) w6 &= w0 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff R6_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff))
18: (44) w6 |= 2 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd))
19: (56) if w6 != 0x7ffffffd goto pc+1
REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (true_reg2): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0)
REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg1): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0)
REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg2): const tnum out of sync with range bounds u64=[0x0, 0xffffffffffffffff] s64=[0x8000000000000000, 0x7fffffffffffffff] u32=[0x0, 0xffffffff] s32=[0x80000000, 0x7fffffff] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0)
19: R6_w=0x7fffffff
20: (95) exit
from 19 to 21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
21: (14) w6 -= 2147483632 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=14,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd))
22: (76) if w6 s>= 0xe goto pc+1 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=13,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd))
23: (95) exit
from 22 to 24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
24: (14) w6 -= 14 ; R6_w=0
[...]
What can be seen here is a register invariant violation on line 19. After
the binary-or in line 18, the verifier knows that bit 2 is set but knows
nothing about the rest of the content which was loaded from a map value,
meaning, range is [2,0x7fffffff] with var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd). When in
line 19 the verifier analyzes the branch, it splits the register states
in reg_set_min_max() into the registers of the true branch (true_reg1,
true_reg2) and the registers of the false branch (false_reg1, false_reg2).
Since the test is w6 != 0x7ffffffd, the src_reg is a known constant.
Internally, the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized as scalar
to the value of 0x7ffffffd, and then passes it onto reg_set_min_max(). Now,
for line 19, it is mathematically impossible to take the false branch of
this program, yet the verifier analyzes it. It is impossible because the
second bit of r6 will be set due to the prior or operation and the
constant in the condition has that bit unset (hex(fd) == binary(1111 1101).
When the verifier first analyzes the false / fall-through branch, it will
compute an intersection between the var_off of r6 and of the constant. This
is because the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized to the value
of the constant. The intersection result later refines both registers in
regs_refine_cond_op():
[...]
t = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_subreg(reg2->var_off));
reg1->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg1->var_off, t);
reg2->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg2->var_off, t);
[...]
Since the verifier is analyzing the false branch of the conditional jump,
reg1 is equal to false_reg1 and reg2 is equal to false_reg2, i.e. the reg2
is the "fake" register that was meant to hold a constant value. The resulting
var_off of the intersection says that both registers now hold a known value
of var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) or in other words: this operation manages to
make the verifier think that the "constant" value that was passed in the
jump operation now holds a different value.
Normally this would not be an issue since it should not influence the true
branch, however, false_reg2 and true_reg2 are pointers to the same "fake"
register. Meaning, the false branch can influence the results of the true
branch. In line 24, the verifier assumes R6_w=0, but the actual runtime
value in this case is 1. The fix is simply not passing in the same "fake"
register location as inputs to reg_set_min_max(), but instead making a
copy. Moving the fake_reg into the env also reduces stack consumption by
120 bytes. With this, the verifier successfully rejects invalid accesses
from the test program.
[0] https://github.com/google/buzzer
Fixes: 67420501e868 ("bpf: generalize reg_set_min_max() to handle non-const register comparisons")
Reported-by: Juan José López Jaimez <jjlopezjaimez@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613115310.25383-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Introduce two new BPF kfuncs, bpf_preempt_disable and
bpf_preempt_enable. These kfuncs allow disabling preemption in BPF
programs. Nesting is allowed, since the intended use cases includes
building native BPF spin locks without kernel helper involvement. Apart
from that, this can be used to per-CPU data structures for cases where
programs (or userspace) may preempt one or the other. Currently, while
per-CPU access is stable, whether it will be consistent is not
guaranteed, as only migration is disabled for BPF programs.
Global functions are disallowed from being called, but support for them
will be added as a follow up not just preempt kfuncs, but rcu_read_lock
kfuncs as well. Static subprog calls are permitted. Sleepable helpers
and kfuncs are disallowed in non-preemptible regions.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424031315.2757363-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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To support sleepable async callbacks, we need to tell push_async_cb()
whether the cb is sleepable or not.
The verifier now detects that we are in bpf_wq_set_callback_impl and
can allow a sleepable callback to happen.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420-bpf_wq-v2-13-6c986a5a741f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Currently, bpf_insn_aux_data->map_ptr_state is used to store either
map_ptr or its poison state (i.e., BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON). Thus
BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON must be checked before reading map_ptr. In certain
cases, we may need valid map_ptr even in case of poison state.
This will be explained in next patch with bpf_for_each_map_elem()
helper.
This patch changes map_ptr_state into a new struct including both map
pointer and its state (poison/unpriv). It's in the same union with
struct bpf_loop_inline_state, so there is no extra memory overhead.
Besides, macros BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV/BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON/BPF_MAP_PTR are no
longer needed.
This patch does not change any existing functionality.
Signed-off-by: Philo Lu <lulie@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240405025536.18113-2-lulie@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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rY = addr_space_cast(rX, 0, 1) tells the verifier that rY->type = PTR_TO_ARENA.
Any further operations on PTR_TO_ARENA register have to be in 32-bit domain.
The verifier will mark load/store through PTR_TO_ARENA with PROBE_MEM32.
JIT will generate them as kern_vm_start + 32bit_addr memory accesses.
rY = addr_space_cast(rX, 1, 0) tells the verifier that rY->type = unknown scalar.
If arena->map_flags has BPF_F_NO_USER_CONV set then convert cast_user to mov32 as well.
Otherwise JIT will convert it to:
rY = (u32)rX;
if (rY)
rY |= arena->user_vm_start & ~(u64)~0U;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240308010812.89848-6-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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Introduce may_goto instruction that from the verifier pov is similar to
open coded iterators bpf_for()/bpf_repeat() and bpf_loop() helper, but it
doesn't iterate any objects.
In assembly 'may_goto' is a nop most of the time until bpf runtime has to
terminate the program for whatever reason. In the current implementation
may_goto has a hidden counter, but other mechanisms can be used.
For programs written in C the later patch introduces 'cond_break' macro
that combines 'may_goto' with 'break' statement and has similar semantics:
cond_break is a nop until bpf runtime has to break out of this loop.
It can be used in any normal "for" or "while" loop, like
for (i = zero; i < cnt; cond_break, i++) {
The verifier recognizes that may_goto is used in the program, reserves
additional 8 bytes of stack, initializes them in subprog prologue, and
replaces may_goto instruction with:
aux_reg = *(u64 *)(fp - 40)
if aux_reg == 0 goto pc+off
aux_reg -= 1
*(u64 *)(fp - 40) = aux_reg
may_goto instruction can be used by LLVM to implement __builtin_memcpy,
__builtin_strcmp.
may_goto is not a full substitute for bpf_for() macro.
bpf_for() doesn't have induction variable that verifiers sees,
so 'i' in bpf_for(i, 0, 100) is seen as imprecise and bounded.
But when the code is written as:
for (i = 0; i < 100; cond_break, i++)
the verifier see 'i' as precise constant zero,
hence cond_break (aka may_goto) doesn't help to converge the loop.
A static or global variable can be used as a workaround:
static int zero = 0;
for (i = zero; i < 100; cond_break, i++) // works!
may_goto works well with arena pointers that don't need to be bounds
checked on access. Load/store from arena returns imprecise unbounded
scalar and loops with may_goto pass the verifier.
Reserve new opcode BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND for may_goto insn.
JCOND stands for conditional pseudo jump.
Since goto_or_nop insn was proposed, it may use the same opcode.
may_goto vs goto_or_nop can be distinguished by src_reg:
code = BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND
src_reg = 0 - may_goto
src_reg = 1 - goto_or_nop
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Tested-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240306031929.42666-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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When the width of a fill is smaller than the width of the preceding
spill, the information about scalar boundaries can still be preserved,
as long as it's coerced to the right width (done by coerce_reg_to_size).
Even further, if the actual value fits into the fill width, the ID can
be preserved as well for further tracking of equal scalars.
Implement the above improvements, which makes narrowing fills behave the
same as narrowing spills and MOVs between registers.
Two tests are adjusted to accommodate for endianness differences and to
take into account that it's now allowed to do a narrowing fill from the
least significant bits.
reg_bounds_sync is added to coerce_reg_to_size to correctly adjust
umin/umax boundaries after the var_off truncation, for example, a 64-bit
value 0xXXXXXXXX00000000, when read as a 32-bit, gets umin = 0, umax =
0xFFFFFFFF, var_off = (0x0; 0xffffffff00000000), which needs to be
synced down to umax = 0, otherwise reg_bounds_sanity_check doesn't pass.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxim@isovalent.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240127175237.526726-4-maxtram95@gmail.com
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Add support for passing PTR_TO_BTF_ID registers to global subprogs.
Currently only PTR_TRUSTED flavor of PTR_TO_BTF_ID is supported.
Non-NULL semantics is assumed, so caller will be forced to prove
PTR_TO_BTF_ID can't be NULL.
Note, we disallow global subprogs to destroy passed in PTR_TO_BTF_ID
arguments, even the trusted one. We achieve that by not setting
ref_obj_id when validating subprog code. This basically enforces (in
Rust terms) borrowing semantics vs move semantics. Borrowing semantics
seems to be a better fit for isolated global subprog validation
approach.
Implementation-wise, we utilize existing logic for matching
user-provided BTF type to kernel-side BTF type, used by BPF CO-RE logic
and following same matching rules. We enforce a unique match for types.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240130000648.2144827-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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To ensure that a module remains accessible whenever a struct_ops object of
a struct_ops type provided by the module is still in use.
struct bpf_struct_ops_map doesn't hold a refcnt to btf anymore since a
module will hold a refcnt to it's btf already. But, struct_ops programs are
different. They hold their associated btf, not the module since they need
only btf to assure their types (signatures).
However, verifier holds the refcnt of the associated module of a struct_ops
type temporarily when verify a struct_ops prog. Verifier needs the help
from the verifier operators (struct bpf_verifier_ops) provided by the owner
module to verify data access of a prog, provide information, and generate
code.
This patch also add a count of links (links_cnt) to bpf_struct_ops_map. It
avoids bpf_struct_ops_map_put_progs() from accessing btf after calling
module_put() in bpf_struct_ops_map_free().
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-10-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Adjust the check in bpf_get_spilled_reg to take into account spilled
registers narrower than 64 bits. That allows find_equal_scalars to
properly adjust the range of all spilled registers that have the same
ID. Before this change, it was possible for a register and a spilled
register to have the same IDs but different ranges if the spill was
narrower than 64 bits and a range check was performed on the register.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxim@isovalent.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240108205209.838365-5-maxtram95@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Subprog call logic in btf_check_subprog_call() currently has both a lot
of BTF parsing logic (which is, presumably, what justified putting it
into btf.c), but also a bunch of register state checks, some of each
utilize deep verifier logic helpers, necessarily exported from
verifier.c: check_ptr_off_reg(), check_func_arg_reg_off(),
and check_mem_reg().
Going forward, btf_check_subprog_call() will have a minimum of
BTF-related logic, but will get more internal verifier logic related to
register state manipulation. So move it into verifier.c to minimize
amount of verifier-specific logic exposed to btf.c.
We do this move before refactoring btf_check_func_arg_match() to
preserve as much history post-refactoring as possible.
No functional changes.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231215011334.2307144-5-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Generalize btf_prepare_func_args() to support both global and static
subprogs. We are going to utilize this property in the next patch,
reusing btf_prepare_func_args() for subprog call logic instead of
reparsing BTF information in a completely separate implementation.
btf_prepare_func_args() now detects whether subprog is global or static
makes slight logic adjustments for static func cases, like not failing
fatally (-EFAULT) for conditions that are allowable for static subprogs.
Somewhat subtle (but major!) difference is the handling of pointer arguments.
Both global and static functions need to handle special context
arguments (which are pointers to predefined type names), but static
subprogs give up on any other pointers, falling back to marking subprog
as "unreliable", disabling the use of BTF type information altogether.
For global functions, though, we are assuming that such pointers to
unrecognized types are just pointers to fixed-sized memory region (or
error out if size cannot be established, like for `void *` pointers).
This patch accommodates these small differences and sets up a stage for
refactoring in the next patch, eliminating a separate BTF-based parsing
logic in btf_check_func_arg_match().
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231215011334.2307144-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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btf_prepare_func_args() is used to understand expectations and
restrictions on global subprog arguments. But current implementation is
hard to extend, as it intermixes BTF-based func prototype parsing and
interpretation logic with setting up register state at subprog entry.
Worse still, those registers are not completely set up inside
btf_prepare_func_args(), requiring some more logic later in
do_check_common(). Like calling mark_reg_unknown() and similar
initialization operations.
This intermixing of BTF interpretation and register state setup is
problematic. First, it causes duplication of BTF parsing logic for global
subprog verification (to set up initial state of global subprog) and
global subprog call sites analysis (when we need to check that whatever
is being passed into global subprog matches expectations), performed in
btf_check_subprog_call().
Given we want to extend global func argument with tags later, this
duplication is problematic. So refactor btf_prepare_func_args() to do
only BTF-based func proto and args parsing, returning high-level
argument "expectations" only, with no regard to specifics of register
state. I.e., if it's a context argument, instead of setting register
state to PTR_TO_CTX, we return ARG_PTR_TO_CTX enum for that argument as
"an argument specification" for further processing inside
do_check_common(). Similarly for SCALAR arguments, PTR_TO_MEM, etc.
This allows to reuse btf_prepare_func_args() in following patches at
global subprog call site analysis time. It also keeps register setup
code consistently in one place, do_check_common().
Besides all this, we cache this argument specs information inside
env->subprog_info, eliminating the need to redo these potentially
expensive BTF traversals, especially if BPF program's BTF is big and/or
there are lots of global subprog calls.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231215011334.2307144-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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We have a bunch of bool flags for each subprog. Instead of wasting bytes
for them, use bitfields instead.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204233931.49758-5-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Add comments to the datastructure tracking the stack state, as the
mapping between each stack slot and where its state is stored is not
entirely obvious.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231208032519.260451-2-andreimatei1@gmail.com
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Use instruction (jump) history to record instructions that performed
register spill/fill to/from stack, regardless if this was done through
read-only r10 register, or any other register after copying r10 into it
*and* potentially adjusting offset.
To make this work reliably, we push extra per-instruction flags into
instruction history, encoding stack slot index (spi) and stack frame
number in extra 10 bit flags we take away from prev_idx in instruction
history. We don't touch idx field for maximum performance, as it's
checked most frequently during backtracking.
This change removes basically the last remaining practical limitation of
precision backtracking logic in BPF verifier. It fixes known
deficiencies, but also opens up new opportunities to reduce number of
verified states, explored in the subsequent patches.
There are only three differences in selftests' BPF object files
according to veristat, all in the positive direction (less states).
File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) States (A) States (B) States (DIFF)
-------------------------------------- ------------- --------- --------- ------------- ---------- ---------- -------------
test_cls_redirect_dynptr.bpf.linked3.o cls_redirect 2987 2864 -123 (-4.12%) 240 231 -9 (-3.75%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_tc 82848 82661 -187 (-0.23%) 5107 5073 -34 (-0.67%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_xdp 85116 84964 -152 (-0.18%) 5162 5130 -32 (-0.62%)
Note, I avoided renaming jmp_history to more generic insn_hist to
minimize number of lines changed and potential merge conflicts between
bpf and bpf-next trees.
Notice also cur_hist_entry pointer reset to NULL at the beginning of
instruction verification loop. This pointer avoids the problem of
relying on last jump history entry's insn_idx to determine whether we
already have entry for current instruction or not. It can happen that we
added jump history entry because current instruction is_jmp_point(), but
also we need to add instruction flags for stack access. In this case, we
don't want to entries, so we need to reuse last added entry, if it is
present.
Relying on insn_idx comparison has the same ambiguity problem as the one
that was fixed recently in [0], so we avoid that.
[0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20231110002638.4168352-3-andrii@kernel.org/
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Tao Lyu <tao.lyu@epfl.ch>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205184248.1502704-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Instead of relying on potentially imprecise tnum representation of
expected return value range for callbacks and subprogs, validate that
smin/smax range satisfy exact expected range of return values.
E.g., if callback would need to return [0, 2] range, tnum can't
represent this precisely and instead will allow [0, 3] range. By
checking smin/smax range, we can make sure that subprog/callback indeed
returns only valid [0, 2] range.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231202175705.885270-5-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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It's a trivial rearrangement saving 8 bytes. We have 4 bytes of padding
at the end which can be filled with another field without increasing
struct bpf_func_state.
copy_func_state() logic remains correct without any further changes.
BEFORE
======
struct bpf_func_state {
struct bpf_reg_state regs[11]; /* 0 1320 */
/* --- cacheline 20 boundary (1280 bytes) was 40 bytes ago --- */
int callsite; /* 1320 4 */
u32 frameno; /* 1324 4 */
u32 subprogno; /* 1328 4 */
u32 async_entry_cnt; /* 1332 4 */
bool in_callback_fn; /* 1336 1 */
/* XXX 7 bytes hole, try to pack */
/* --- cacheline 21 boundary (1344 bytes) --- */
struct tnum callback_ret_range; /* 1344 16 */
bool in_async_callback_fn; /* 1360 1 */
bool in_exception_callback_fn; /* 1361 1 */
/* XXX 2 bytes hole, try to pack */
int acquired_refs; /* 1364 4 */
struct bpf_reference_state * refs; /* 1368 8 */
int allocated_stack; /* 1376 4 */
/* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */
struct bpf_stack_state * stack; /* 1384 8 */
/* size: 1392, cachelines: 22, members: 13 */
/* sum members: 1379, holes: 3, sum holes: 13 */
/* last cacheline: 48 bytes */
};
AFTER
=====
struct bpf_func_state {
struct bpf_reg_state regs[11]; /* 0 1320 */
/* --- cacheline 20 boundary (1280 bytes) was 40 bytes ago --- */
int callsite; /* 1320 4 */
u32 frameno; /* 1324 4 */
u32 subprogno; /* 1328 4 */
u32 async_entry_cnt; /* 1332 4 */
struct tnum callback_ret_range; /* 1336 16 */
/* --- cacheline 21 boundary (1344 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */
bool in_callback_fn; /* 1352 1 */
bool in_async_callback_fn; /* 1353 1 */
bool in_exception_callback_fn; /* 1354 1 */
/* XXX 1 byte hole, try to pack */
int acquired_refs; /* 1356 4 */
struct bpf_reference_state * refs; /* 1360 8 */
struct bpf_stack_state * stack; /* 1368 8 */
int allocated_stack; /* 1376 4 */
/* size: 1384, cachelines: 22, members: 13 */
/* sum members: 1379, holes: 1, sum holes: 1 */
/* padding: 4 */
/* last cacheline: 40 bytes */
};
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231202175705.885270-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c
c9663f79cd82 ("ice: adjust switchdev rebuild path")
7758017911a4 ("ice: restore timestamp configuration after device reset")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231121211259.3348630-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com/
Adjacent changes:
kernel/bpf/verifier.c
bb124da69c47 ("bpf: keep track of max number of bpf_loop callback iterations")
5f99f312bd3b ("bpf: add register bounds sanity checks and sanitization")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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