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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Paolo Abeni:
"Core:
- Implement the Device Memory TCP transmit path, allowing zero-copy
data transmission on top of TCP from e.g. GPU memory to the wire.
- Move all the IPv6 routing tables management outside the RTNL scope,
under its own lock and RCU. The route control path is now 3x times
faster.
- Convert queue related netlink ops to instance lock, reducing again
the scope of the RTNL lock. This improves the control plane
scalability.
- Refactor the software crc32c implementation, removing unneeded
abstraction layers and improving significantly the related
micro-benchmarks.
- Optimize the GRO engine for UDP-tunneled traffic, for a 10%
performance improvement in related stream tests.
- Cover more per-CPU storage with local nested BH locking; this is a
prep work to remove the current per-CPU lock in local_bh_disable()
on PREMPT_RT.
- Introduce and use nlmsg_payload helper, combining buffer bounds
verification with accessing payload carried by netlink messages.
Netfilter:
- Rewrite the procfs conntrack table implementation, improving
considerably the dump performance. A lot of user-space tools still
use this interface.
- Implement support for wildcard netdevice in netdev basechain and
flowtables.
- Integrate conntrack information into nft trace infrastructure.
- Export set count and backend name to userspace, for better
introspection.
BPF:
- BPF qdisc support: BPF-qdisc can be implemented with BPF struct_ops
programs and can be controlled in similar way to traditional qdiscs
using the "tc qdisc" command.
- Refactor the UDP socket iterator, addressing long standing issues
WRT duplicate hits or missed sockets.
Protocols:
- Improve TCP receive buffer auto-tuning and increase the default
upper bound for the receive buffer; overall this improves the
single flow maximum thoughput on 200Gbs link by over 60%.
- Add AFS GSSAPI security class to AF_RXRPC; it provides transport
security for connections to the AFS fileserver and VL server.
- Improve TCP multipath routing, so that the sources address always
matches the nexthop device.
- Introduce SO_PASSRIGHTS for AF_UNIX, to allow disabling SCM_RIGHTS,
and thus preventing DoS caused by passing around problematic FDs.
- Retire DCCP socket. DCCP only receives updates for bugs, and major
distros disable it by default. Its removal allows for better
organisation of TCP fields to reduce the number of cache lines hit
in the fast path.
- Extend TCP drop-reason support to cover PAWS checks.
Driver API:
- Reorganize PTP ioctl flag support to require an explicit opt-in for
the drivers, avoiding the problem of drivers not rejecting new
unsupported flags.
- Converted several device drivers to timestamping APIs.
- Introduce per-PHY ethtool dump helpers, improving the support for
dump operations targeting PHYs.
Tests and tooling:
- Add support for classic netlink in user space C codegen, so that
ynl-c can now read, create and modify links, routes addresses and
qdisc layer configuration.
- Add ynl sub-types for binary attributes, allowing ynl-c to output
known struct instead of raw binary data, clarifying the classic
netlink output.
- Extend MPTCP selftests to improve the code-coverage.
- Add tests for XDP tail adjustment in AF_XDP.
New hardware / drivers:
- OpenVPN virtual driver: offload OpenVPN data channels processing to
the kernel-space, increasing the data transfer throughput WRT the
user-space implementation.
- Renesas glue driver for the gigabit ethernet RZ/V2H(P) SoC.
- Broadcom asp-v3.0 ethernet driver.
- AMD Renoir ethernet device.
- ReakTek MT9888 2.5G ethernet PHY driver.
- Aeonsemi 10G C45 PHYs driver.
Drivers:
- Ethernet high-speed NICs:
- nVidia/Mellanox (mlx5):
- refactor the steering table handling to significantly
reduce the amount of memory used
- add support for complex matches in H/W flow steering
- improve flow streeing error handling
- convert to netdev instance locking
- Intel (100G, ice, igb, ixgbe, idpf):
- ice: add switchdev support for LLDP traffic over VF
- ixgbe: add firmware manipulation and regions devlink support
- igb: introduce support for frame transmission premption
- igb: adds persistent NAPI configuration
- idpf: introduce RDMA support
- idpf: add initial PTP support
- Meta (fbnic):
- extend hardware stats coverage
- add devlink dev flash support
- Broadcom (bnxt):
- add support for RX-side device memory TCP
- Wangxun (txgbe):
- implement support for udp tunnel offload
- complete PTP and SRIOV support for AML 25G/10G devices
- Ethernet NICs embedded and virtual:
- Google (gve):
- add device memory TCP TX support
- Amazon (ena):
- support persistent per-NAPI config
- Airoha:
- add H/W support for L2 traffic offload
- add per flow stats for flow offloading
- RealTek (rtl8211): add support for WoL magic packet
- Synopsys (stmmac):
- dwmac-socfpga 1000BaseX support
- add Loongson-2K3000 support
- introduce support for hardware-accelerated VLAN stripping
- Broadcom (bcmgenet):
- expose more H/W stats
- Freescale (enetc, dpaa2-eth):
- enetc: add MAC filter, VLAN filter RSS and loopback support
- dpaa2-eth: convert to H/W timestamping APIs
- vxlan: convert FDB table to rhashtable, for better scalabilty
- veth: apply qdisc backpressure on full ring to reduce TX drops
- Ethernet switches:
- Microchip (kzZ88x3): add ETS scheduler support
- Ethernet PHYs:
- RealTek (rtl8211):
- add support for WoL magic packet
- add support for PHY LEDs
- CAN:
- Adds RZ/G3E CANFD support to the rcar_canfd driver.
- Preparatory work for CAN-XL support.
- Add self-tests framework with support for CAN physical interfaces.
- WiFi:
- mac80211:
- scan improvements with multi-link operation (MLO)
- Qualcomm (ath12k):
- enable AHB support for IPQ5332
- add monitor interface support to QCN9274
- add multi-link operation support to WCN7850
- add 802.11d scan offload support to WCN7850
- monitor mode for WCN7850, better 6 GHz regulatory
- Qualcomm (ath11k):
- restore hibernation support
- MediaTek (mt76):
- WiFi-7 improvements
- implement support for mt7990
- Intel (iwlwifi):
- enhanced multi-link single-radio (EMLSR) support on 5 GHz links
- rework device configuration
- RealTek (rtw88):
- improve throughput for RTL8814AU
- RealTek (rtw89):
- add multi-link operation support
- STA/P2P concurrency improvements
- support different SAR configs by antenna
- Bluetooth:
- introduce HCI Driver protocol
- btintel_pcie: do not generate coredump for diagnostic events
- btusb: add HCI Drv commands for configuring altsetting
- btusb: add RTL8851BE device 0x0bda:0xb850
- btusb: add new VID/PID 13d3/3584 for MT7922
- btusb: add new VID/PID 13d3/3630 and 13d3/3613 for MT7925
- btnxpuart: implement host-wakeup feature"
* tag 'net-next-6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1611 commits)
selftests/bpf: Fix bpf selftest build warning
selftests: netfilter: Fix skip of wildcard interface test
net: phy: mscc: Stop clearing the the UDPv4 checksum for L2 frames
net: openvswitch: Fix the dead loop of MPLS parse
calipso: Don't call calipso functions for AF_INET sk.
selftests/tc-testing: Add a test for HFSC eltree double add with reentrant enqueue behaviour on netem
net_sched: hfsc: Address reentrant enqueue adding class to eltree twice
octeontx2-pf: QOS: Refactor TC_HTB_LEAF_DEL_LAST callback
octeontx2-pf: QOS: Perform cache sync on send queue teardown
net: mana: Add support for Multi Vports on Bare metal
net: devmem: ncdevmem: remove unused variable
net: devmem: ksft: upgrade rx test to send 1K data
net: devmem: ksft: add 5 tuple FS support
net: devmem: ksft: add exit_wait to make rx test pass
net: devmem: ksft: add ipv4 support
net: devmem: preserve sockc_err
page_pool: fix ugly page_pool formatting
net: devmem: move list_add to net_devmem_bind_dmabuf.
selftests: netfilter: nft_queue.sh: include file transfer duration in log message
net: phy: mscc: Fix memory leak when using one step timestamping
...
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DCCP was orphaned in 2021 by commit 054c4610bd05 ("MAINTAINERS: dccp:
move Gerrit Renker to CREDITS"), which noted that the last maintainer
had been inactive for five years.
In recent years, it has become a playground for syzbot, and most changes
to DCCP have been odd bug fixes triggered by syzbot. Apart from that,
the only changes have been driven by treewide or networking API updates
or adjustments related to TCP.
Thus, in 2023, we announced we would remove DCCP in 2025 via commit
b144fcaf46d4 ("dccp: Print deprecation notice.").
Since then, only one individual has contacted the netdev mailing list. [0]
There is ongoing research for Multipath DCCP. The repository is hosted
on GitHub [1], and development is not taking place through the upstream
community. While the repository is published under the GPLv2 license,
the scheduling part remains proprietary, with a LICENSE file [2] stating:
"This is not Open Source software."
The researcher mentioned a plan to address the licensing issue, upstream
the patches, and step up as a maintainer, but there has been no further
communication since then.
Maintaining DCCP for a decade without any real users has become a burden.
Therefore, it's time to remove it.
Removing DCCP will also provide significant benefits to TCP. It allows
us to freely reorganize the layout of struct inet_connection_sock, which
is currently shared with DCCP, and optimize it to reduce the number of
cachelines accessed in the TCP fast path.
Note that we keep DCCP netfilter modules as requested. [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230710182253.81446-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/T/#u #[0]
Link: https://github.com/telekom/mp-dccp #[1]
Link: https://github.com/telekom/mp-dccp/blob/mpdccp_v03_k5.10/net/dccp/non_gpl_scheduler/LICENSE #[2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/Z_VQ0KlCRkqYWXa-@calendula/ #[3]
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM and SELinux)
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250410023921.11307-3-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Reduce the SELinux performance overhead during path walks through the
use of a per-task directory access cache and some minor code
optimizations. The directory access cache is per-task because it allows
for a lockless cache while also fitting well with a common application
pattern of heavily accessing a relatively small number of SELinux
directory labels. The cache is inherited by child processes when the
child runs with the same SELinux domain as the parent, and invalidated
on changes to the task's SELinux domain or the loaded SELinux policy.
A cache of four entries was chosen based on testing with the Fedora
"targeted" policy, a SELinux Reference Policy variant, and
'make allmodconfig' on Linux v6.14.
Code optimizations include better use of inline functions to reduce
function calls in the common case, especially in the inode revalidation
code paths, and elimination of redundant checks between the LSM and
SELinux layers.
As mentioned briefly above, aside from general use and regression
testing with the selinux-testsuite, performance was measured using
'make allmodconfig' with Linux v6.14 as a base reference. As expected,
there were variations from one test run to another, but the measurements
below are a good representation of the test results seen on my test
system.
* Linux v6.14
REF
1.26% [k] __d_lookup_rcu
SELINUX (1.31%)
0.58% [k] selinux_inode_permission
0.29% [k] avc_lookup
0.25% [k] avc_has_perm_noaudit
0.19% [k] __inode_security_revalidate
* Linux v6.14 + patch
REF
1.41% [k] __d_lookup_rcu
SELINUX (0.89%)
0.65% [k] selinux_inode_permission
0.15% [k] avc_lookup
0.05% [k] avc_has_perm_noaudit
0.04% [k] avc_policy_seqno
X.XX% [k] __inode_security_revalidate (now inline)
In both cases the __d_lookup_rcu() function was used as a reference
point to establish a context for the SELinux related functions. On a
unpatched Linux v6.14 system we see the time spent in the combined
SELinux functions exceeded that of __d_lookup_rcu(), 1.31% compared to
1.26%. However, with this patch applied the time spent in the combined
SELinux functions dropped to roughly 65% of the time spent in
__d_lookup_rcu(), 0.89% compared to 1.41%. Aside from the significant
decrease in time spent in the SELinux AVC, it appears that any additional
time spent searching and updating the cache is offset by other code
improvements, e.g. time spent in selinux_inode_permission() +
__inode_security_revalidate() + avc_policy_seqno() is less on the
patched kernel than the unpatched kernel.
It is worth noting that in this patch the use of the per-task cache is
limited to the security_inode_permission() LSM callback,
selinux_inode_permission(), but future work could expand the cache into
inode_has_perm(), likely through consolidation of the two functions.
While this would likely have little to no impact on path walks, it
may benefit other operations.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Currently, genfscon only supports string prefix match to label files.
Thus, labeling numerous dynamic sysfs entries requires many specific
path rules. For example, labeling device paths such as
`/sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:03.1/<...>/0000:04:00.1/wakeup`
requires listing all specific PCI paths, which is challenging to
maintain. While user-space restorecon can handle these paths with
regular expression rules, relabeling thousands of paths under sysfs
after it is mounted is inefficient compared to using genfscon.
This commit adds wildcard matching to genfscon to make rules more
efficient and expressive. This new behavior is enabled by
genfs_seclabel_wildcard capability. With this capability, genfscon does
wildcard matching instead of prefix matching. When multiple wildcard
rules match against a path, then the longest rule (determined by the
length of the rule string) will be applied. If multiple rules of the
same length match, the first matching rule encountered in the given
genfscon policy will be applied. Users are encouraged to write longer,
more explicit path rules to avoid relying on this behavior.
This change resulted in nice real-world performance improvements. For
example, boot times on test Android devices were reduced by 15%. This
improvement is due to the elimination of the "restorecon -R /sys" step
during boot, which takes more than two seconds in the worst case.
Signed-off-by: Takaya Saeki <takayas@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The network namespace is not modified.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The network address, either an IPv4 or IPv6 one, is not modified.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add additional SELinux access controls for kernel file reads/loads
The SELinux kernel file read/load access controls were never updated
beyond the initial kernel module support, this pull request adds
support for firmware, kexec, policies, and x.509 certificates.
- Add support for wildcards in network interface names
There are a number of userspace tools which auto-generate network
interface names using some pattern of <XXXX>-<NN> where <XXXX> is a
fixed string, e.g. "podman", and <NN> is a increasing counter.
Supporting wildcards in the SELinux policy for network interfaces
simplifies the policy associted with these interfaces.
- Fix a potential problem in the kernel read file SELinux code
SELinux should always check the file label in the
security_kernel_read_file() LSM hook, regardless of if the file is
being read in chunks. Unfortunately, the existing code only
considered the file label on the first chunk; this pull request fixes
this problem.
There is more detail in the individual commit, but thankfully the
existing code didn't expose a bug due to multi-stage reads only
taking place in one driver, and that driver loading a file type that
isn't targeted by the SELinux policy.
- Fix the subshell error handling in the example policy loader
Minor fix to SELinux example policy loader in scripts/selinux due to
an undesired interaction with subshells and errexit.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20250323' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: get netif_wildcard policycap from policy instead of cache
selinux: support wildcard network interface names
selinux: Chain up tool resolving errors in install_policy.sh
selinux: add permission checks for loading other kinds of kernel files
selinux: always check the file label in selinux_kernel_read_file()
selinux: fix spelling error
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Various minor updates to the LSM Rust bindings
Changes include marking trivial Rust bindings as inlines and comment
tweaks to better reflect the LSM hooks.
- Add LSM/SELinux access controls to io_uring_allowed()
Similar to the io_uring_disabled sysctl, add a LSM hook to
io_uring_allowed() to enable LSMs a simple way to enforce security
policy on the use of io_uring. This pull request includes SELinux
support for this new control using the io_uring/allowed permission.
- Remove an unused parameter from the security_perf_event_open() hook
The perf_event_attr struct parameter was not used by any currently
supported LSMs, remove it from the hook.
- Add an explicit MAINTAINERS entry for the credentials code
We've seen problems in the past where patches to the credentials code
sent by non-maintainers would often languish on the lists for
multiple months as there was no one explicitly tasked with the
responsibility of reviewing and/or merging credentials related code.
Considering that most of the code under security/ has a vested
interest in ensuring that the credentials code is well maintained,
I'm volunteering to look after the credentials code and Serge Hallyn
has also volunteered to step up as an official reviewer. I posted the
MAINTAINERS update as a RFC to LKML in hopes that someone else would
jump up with an "I'll do it!", but beyond Serge it was all crickets.
- Update Stephen Smalley's old email address to prevent confusion
This includes a corresponding update to the mailmap file.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20250323' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
mailmap: map Stephen Smalley's old email addresses
lsm: remove old email address for Stephen Smalley
MAINTAINERS: add Serge Hallyn as a credentials reviewer
MAINTAINERS: add an explicit credentials entry
cred,rust: mark Credential methods inline
lsm,rust: reword "destroy" -> "release" in SecurityCtx
lsm,rust: mark SecurityCtx methods inline
perf: Remove unnecessary parameter of security check
lsm: fix a missing security_uring_allowed() prototype
io_uring,lsm,selinux: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()
io_uring: refactor io_uring_allowed()
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Add support for wildcard matching of network interface names. This is
useful for auto-generated interfaces, for example podman creates network
interfaces for containers with the naming scheme podman0, podman1,
podman2, ...
To maintain backward compatibility guard this feature with a new policy
capability 'netif_wildcard'.
Netifcon definitions are compared against in the order given by the
policy, so userspace tools should sort them in a reasonable order.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Watching mount namespaces for changes (mount, umount, move mount) was added
by previous patches.
This patch adds the file/watch_mountns permission that can be applied to
nsfs files (/proc/$$/ns/mnt), making it possible to allow or deny watching
a particular namespace for changes.
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHC9VhTOmCjCSE2H0zwPOmpFopheexVb6jyovz92ZtpKtoVv6A@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250224154836.958915-1-mszeredi@redhat.com
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Although the LSM hooks for loading kernel modules were later generalized
to cover loading other kinds of files, SELinux didn't implement
corresponding permission checks, leaving only the module case covered.
Define and add new permission checks for these other cases.
Signed-off-by: Cameron K. Williams <ckwilliams.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kipp N. Davis <kippndavis.work@gmx.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, line length, and spacing fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring
because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So,
add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[PM: merge fuzz due to changes in preceding patches, subj tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Extended permissions supported in conditional policy
The SELinux extended permissions, aka "xperms", allow security admins
to target individuals ioctls, and recently netlink messages, with
their SELinux policy. Adding support for conditional policies allows
admins to toggle the granular xperms using SELinux booleans, helping
pave the way for greater use of xperms in general purpose SELinux
policies. This change bumps the maximum SELinux policy version to 34.
- Fix a SCTP/SELinux error return code inconsistency
Depending on the loaded SELinux policy, specifically it's
EXTSOCKCLASS support, the bind(2) LSM/SELinux hook could return
different error codes due to the SELinux code checking the socket's
SELinux object class (which can vary depending on EXTSOCKCLASS) and
not the socket's sk_protocol field. We fix this by doing the obvious,
and looking at the sock->sk_protocol field instead of the object
class.
- Makefile fixes to properly cleanup av_permissions.h
Add av_permissions.h to "targets" so that it is properly cleaned up
using the kbuild infrastructure.
- A number of smaller improvements by Christian Göttsche
A variety of straightforward changes to reduce code duplication,
reduce pointer lookups, migrate void pointers to defined types,
simplify code, constify function parameters, and correct iterator
types.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20250121' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: make more use of str_read() when loading the policy
selinux: avoid unnecessary indirection in struct level_datum
selinux: use known type instead of void pointer
selinux: rename comparison functions for clarity
selinux: rework match_ipv6_addrmask()
selinux: constify and reconcile function parameter names
selinux: avoid using types indicating user space interaction
selinux: supply missing field initializers
selinux: add netlink nlmsg_type audit message
selinux: add support for xperms in conditional policies
selinux: Fix SCTP error inconsistency in selinux_socket_bind()
selinux: use native iterator types
selinux: add generated av_permissions.h to targets
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Align the parameter names between declarations and definitions, and
constify read-only parameters.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: tweak the subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Please clang by supplying the missing field initializers in the
secclass_map variable and sel_fill_super() function.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: tweak subj and commit description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In commit d1d991efaf34 ("selinux: Add netlink xperm support") a new
extended permission was added ("nlmsg"). This was the second extended
permission implemented in selinux ("ioctl" being the first one).
Extended permissions are associated with a base permission. It was found
that, in the access vector cache (avc), the extended permission did not
keep track of its base permission. This is an issue for a domain that is
using both extended permissions (i.e., a domain calling ioctl() on a
netlink socket). In this case, the extended permissions were
overlapping.
Keep track of the base permission in the cache. A new field "base_perm"
is added to struct extended_perms_decision to make sure that the
extended permission refers to the correct policy permission. A new field
"base_perms" is added to struct extended_perms to quickly decide if
extended permissions apply.
While it is in theory possible to retrieve the base permission from the
access vector, the same base permission may not be mapped to the same
bit for each class (e.g., "nlmsg" is mapped to a different bit for
"netlink_route_socket" and "netlink_audit_socket"). Instead, use a
constant (AVC_EXT_IOCTL or AVC_EXT_NLMSG) provided by the caller.
Fixes: d1d991efaf34 ("selinux: Add netlink xperm support")
Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add support for extended permission rules in conditional policies.
Currently the kernel accepts such rules already, but evaluating a
security decision will hit a BUG() in
services_compute_xperms_decision(). Thus reject extended permission
rules in conditional policies for current policy versions.
Add a new policy version for this feature.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
"Thirteen patches, all focused on moving away from the current 'secid'
LSM identifier to a richer 'lsm_prop' structure.
This move will help reduce the translation that is necessary in many
LSMs, offering better performance, and make it easier to support
different LSMs in the future"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20241112' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: remove lsm_prop scaffolding
netlabel,smack: use lsm_prop for audit data
audit: change context data from secid to lsm_prop
lsm: create new security_cred_getlsmprop LSM hook
audit: use an lsm_prop in audit_names
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_inode_getsecid
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecid
audit: update shutdown LSM data
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_ipc_getsecid
audit: maintain an lsm_prop in audit_context
lsm: add lsmprop_to_secctx hook
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_audit_rule_match
lsm: add the lsm_prop data structure
|
|
Add a new hook security_lsmprop_to_secctx() and its LSM specific
implementations. The LSM specific code will use the lsm_prop element
allocated for that module. This allows for the possibility that more
than one module may be called upon to translate a secid to a string,
as can occur in the audit code.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsm_prop structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsm_prop structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsm_prop instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmprop_init()
fills the structure with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the lsm_prop structure later in the series.
At that point the use of lsmprop_init() is dropped.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Reuse the existing extended permissions infrastructure to support
policies based on the netlink message types.
A new policy capability "netlink_xperm" is introduced. When disabled,
the previous behaviour is preserved. That is, netlink_send will rely on
the permission mappings defined in nlmsgtab.c (e.g, nlmsg_read for
RTM_GETADDR on NETLINK_ROUTE). When enabled, the mappings are ignored
and the generic "nlmsg" permission is used instead.
The new "nlmsg" permission is an extended permission. The 16 bits of the
extended permission are mapped to the nlmsg_type field.
Example policy on Android, preventing regular apps from accessing the
device's MAC address and ARP table, but allowing this access to
privileged apps, looks as follows:
allow netdomain self:netlink_route_socket {
create read getattr write setattr lock append connect getopt
setopt shutdown nlmsg
};
allowxperm netdomain self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg ~{
RTM_GETLINK RTM_GETNEIGH RTM_GETNEIGHTBL
};
allowxperm priv_app self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg {
RTM_GETLINK RTM_GETNEIGH RTM_GETNEIGHTBL
};
The constants in the example above (e.g., RTM_GETLINK) are explicitly
defined in the policy.
It is possible to generate policies to support kernels that may or
may not have the capability enabled by generating a rule for each
scenario. For instance:
allow domain self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg_read;
allow domain self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg;
allowxperm domain self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg { AUDIT_GET };
The approach of defining a new permission ("nlmsg") instead of relying
on the existing permissions (e.g., "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_readpriv" or
"nlmsg_tty_audit") has been preferred because:
1. This is similar to the other extended permission ("ioctl");
2. With the new extended permission, the coarse-grained mapping is not
necessary anymore. It could eventually be removed, which would be
impossible if the extended permission was defined below these.
3. Having a single extra extended permission considerably simplifies
the implementation here and in libselinux.
Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Bram Bonné <brambonne@google.com>
[PM: manual merge fixes for sock_skip_has_perm()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
The header, security/selinux/include/classmap.h, is included not only
from kernel space but also from host programs.
It includes <linux/capability.h> and <linux/socket.h>, which pull in
more <linux/*.h> headers. This makes the host programs less portable,
specifically causing build errors on macOS.
Those headers are included for the following purposes:
- <linux/capability.h> for checking CAP_LAST_CAP
- <linux/socket.h> for checking PF_MAX
These checks can be guarded by __KERNEL__ so they are skipped when
building host programs. Testing them when building the kernel should
be sufficient.
The header, security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h, includes
<linux/stddef.h> for the NULL definition, but this is not portable
either. Instead, <stddef.h> should be included for host programs.
Reported-by: Daniel Gomez <da.gomez@samsung.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240807-macos-build-support-v1-6-4cd1ded85694@samsung.com/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240807-macos-build-support-v1-7-4cd1ded85694@samsung.com/
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Move the LSM framework to static calls
This transitions the vast majority of the LSM callbacks into static
calls. Those callbacks which haven't been converted were left as-is
due to the general ugliness of the changes required to support the
static call conversion; we can revisit those callbacks at a future
date.
- Add the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM
This adds a new LSM, Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE). There is
plenty of documentation about IPE in this patches, so I'll refrain
from going into too much detail here, but the basic motivation behind
IPE is to provide a mechanism such that administrators can restrict
execution to only those binaries which come from integrity protected
storage, e.g. a dm-verity protected filesystem. You will notice that
IPE requires additional LSM hooks in the initramfs, dm-verity, and
fs-verity code, with the associated patches carrying ACK/review tags
from the associated maintainers. We couldn't find an obvious
maintainer for the initramfs code, but the IPE patchset has been
widely posted over several years.
Both Deven Bowers and Fan Wu have contributed to IPE's development
over the past several years, with Fan Wu agreeing to serve as the IPE
maintainer moving forward. Once IPE is accepted into your tree, I'll
start working with Fan to ensure he has the necessary accounts, keys,
etc. so that he can start submitting IPE pull requests to you
directly during the next merge window.
- Move the lifecycle management of the LSM blobs to the LSM framework
Management of the LSM blobs (the LSM state buffers attached to
various kernel structs, typically via a void pointer named "security"
or similar) has been mixed, some blobs were allocated/managed by
individual LSMs, others were managed by the LSM framework itself.
Starting with this pull we move management of all the LSM blobs,
minus the XFRM blob, into the framework itself, improving consistency
across LSMs, and reducing the amount of duplicated code across LSMs.
Due to some additional work required to migrate the XFRM blob, it has
been left as a todo item for a later date; from a practical
standpoint this omission should have little impact as only SELinux
provides a XFRM LSM implementation.
- Fix problems with the LSM's handling of F_SETOWN
The LSM hook for the fcntl(F_SETOWN) operation had a couple of
problems: it was racy with itself, and it was disconnected from the
associated DAC related logic in such a way that the LSM state could
be updated in cases where the DAC state would not. We fix both of
these problems by moving the security_file_set_fowner() hook into the
same section of code where the DAC attributes are updated. Not only
does this resolve the DAC/LSM synchronization issue, but as that code
block is protected by a lock, it also resolve the race condition.
- Fix potential problems with the security_inode_free() LSM hook
Due to use of RCU to protect inodes and the placement of the LSM hook
associated with freeing the inode, there is a bit of a challenge when
it comes to managing any LSM state associated with an inode. The VFS
folks are not open to relocating the LSM hook so we have to get
creative when it comes to releasing an inode's LSM state.
Traditionally we have used a single LSM callback within the hook that
is triggered when the inode is "marked for death", but not actually
released due to RCU.
Unfortunately, this causes problems for LSMs which want to take an
action when the inode's associated LSM state is actually released; so
we add an additional LSM callback, inode_free_security_rcu(), that is
called when the inode's LSM state is released in the RCU free
callback.
- Refactor two LSM hooks to better fit the LSM return value patterns
The vast majority of the LSM hooks follow the "return 0 on success,
negative values on failure" pattern, however, there are a small
handful that have unique return value behaviors which has caused
confusion in the past and makes it difficult for the BPF verifier to
properly vet BPF LSM programs. This includes patches to
convert two of these"special" LSM hooks to the common 0/-ERRNO pattern.
- Various cleanups and improvements
A handful of patches to remove redundant code, better leverage the
IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper, add missing "static" markings, and do some
minor style fixups.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (40 commits)
security: Update file_set_fowner documentation
fs: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies
lsm: Use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper function
lsm: remove LSM_COUNT and LSM_CONFIG_COUNT
ipe: Remove duplicated include in ipe.c
lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
lsm: count the LSMs enabled at compile time
kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling
init/main.c: Initialize early LSMs after arch code, static keys and calls.
MAINTAINERS: add IPE entry with Fan Wu as maintainer
documentation: add IPE documentation
ipe: kunit test for parser
scripts: add boot policy generation program
ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider
fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs
lsm: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook
ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider
dm-verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices
ipe: add permissive toggle
...
|
|
Remove the needless indent in the function comment header blocks.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Move management of the perf_event->security blob out of the individual
security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of
allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the
infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated
there. There are no longer any modules that require the perf_event_free()
hook. The hook definition has been removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Move management of the infiniband security blob out of the individual
security modules and into the LSM infrastructure. The security modules
tell the infrastructure how much space they require at initialization.
There are no longer any modules that require the ib_free() hook.
The hook definition has been removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak, selinux style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Move management of the dev_tun security blob out of the individual
security modules and into the LSM infrastructure. The security modules
tell the infrastructure how much space they require at initialization.
There are no longer any modules that require the dev_tun_free hook.
The hook definition has been removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak, selinux style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Move management of the key->security blob out of the individual security
modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the
blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how
much space is required, and the space is allocated there. There are
no existing modules that require a key_free hook, so the call to it and
the definition for it have been removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
A panic happens in ima_match_policy:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
PGD 42f873067 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh
Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450
Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39
7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d
f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea
44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f
RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200
RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739
R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970
R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000)
GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
ima_get_action+0x22/0x30
process_measurement+0xb0/0x830
? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170
? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0
? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140
? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0
? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0
ima_file_check+0x64/0x90
path_openat+0x571/0x1720
do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0
? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60
? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250
? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by
ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a
RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL.
This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side
critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems.
Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause
synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a
UAF to happen.
The root cause of this issue could be described as follows:
| Thread A | Thread B |
| |ima_match_policy |
| | rcu_read_lock |
|ima_lsm_update_rule | |
| synchronize_rcu | |
| | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)|
| | sleep |
==> synchronize_rcu returns early
| kfree(entry) | |
| | entry = entry->next|
==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything).
| | entry->action |
==> Accessing entry might cause panic.
To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within
RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC.
Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
A trivial correction to convert an 'unsigned' parameter into an
'unsigned int' parameter so the prototype matches the function
definition.
I really thought that someone submitted a patch for this a few years
ago but sadly I can't find it now.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and
provide more tools for individual developers to validate their
patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code
"clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our
style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their
patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their
changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Currently, SELinux doesn't allow distinguishing between kernel threads
and userspace processes that are started before the policy is first
loaded - both get the label corresponding to the kernel SID. The only
way a process that persists from early boot can get a meaningful label
is by doing a voluntary dyntransition or re-executing itself.
Reusing the kernel label for userspace processes is problematic for
several reasons:
1. The kernel is considered to be a privileged domain and generally
needs to have a wide range of permissions allowed to work correctly,
which prevents the policy writer from effectively hardening against
early boot processes that might remain running unintentionally after
the policy is loaded (they represent a potential extra attack surface
that should be mitigated).
2. Despite the kernel being treated as a privileged domain, the policy
writer may want to impose certain special limitations on kernel
threads that may conflict with the requirements of intentional early
boot processes. For example, it is a good hardening practice to limit
what executables the kernel can execute as usermode helpers and to
confine the resulting usermode helper processes. However, a
(legitimate) process surviving from early boot may need to execute a
different set of executables.
3. As currently implemented, overlayfs remembers the security context of
the process that created an overlayfs mount and uses it to bound
subsequent operations on files using this context. If an overlayfs
mount is created before the SELinux policy is loaded, these "mounter"
checks are made against the kernel context, which may clash with
restrictions on the kernel domain (see 2.).
To resolve this, introduce a new initial SID (reusing the slot of the
former "init" initial SID) that will be assigned to any userspace
process started before the policy is first loaded. This is easy to do,
as we can simply label any process that goes through the
bprm_creds_for_exec LSM hook with the new init-SID instead of
propagating the kernel SID from the parent.
To provide backwards compatibility for existing policies that are
unaware of this new semantic of the "init" initial SID, introduce a new
policy capability "userspace_initial_context" and set the "init" SID to
the same context as the "kernel" SID unless this capability is set by
the policy.
Another small backwards compatibility measure is needed in
security_sid_to_context_core() for before the initial SELinux policy
load - see the code comment for explanation.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: edited comments based on feedback/discussion]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
This commit reverts 5b0eea835d4e ("selinux: introduce an initial SID
for early boot processes") as it was found to cause problems on
distros with old SELinux userspace tools/libraries, specifically
Ubuntu 16.04.
Hopefully we will be able to re-add this functionality at a later
date, but let's revert this for now to help ensure a stable and
backwards compatible SELinux tree.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/87edkseqf8.fsf@mail.lhotse
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Use u32 as the output parameter type in security_get_classes() and
security_get_permissions(), based on the type of the symtab nprim
member.
Declare the read-only class string parameter of
security_get_permissions() const.
Avoid several implicit conversions by using the identical type for the
destination.
Use the type identical to the source for local variables.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: cleanup extra whitespace in subject]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Update my email address; MAINTAINERS was updated some time ago.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Change "NSA SELinux" to just "SELinux" in Kconfig help text and
comments. While NSA was the original primary developer and continues to
help maintain SELinux, SELinux has long since transitioned to a wide
community of developers and maintainers. SELinux has been part of the
mainline Linux kernel for nearly 20 years now [1] and has received
contributions from many individuals and organizations.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Pine.LNX.4.44.0308082228470.1852-100000@home.osdl.org/
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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