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| author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2025-07-07 08:25:07 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2025-07-07 08:25:08 -0700 |
| commit | 6e5cae9ddae7f14f5bffc34d12f45af756f86658 (patch) | |
| tree | d4cda7b8249802c2b1bbbfc7de47889fe4e9ee5d /tools | |
| parent | 03fe01ddd1d8be7799419ea5e5f228a0186ae8c2 (diff) | |
| parent | 68cca81fd57fd9f5b8fd8da0dccd1d00522592f9 (diff) | |
Merge branch 'bpf-additional-use-cases-for-untrusted-ptr_to_mem'
Eduard Zingerman says:
====================
bpf: additional use-cases for untrusted PTR_TO_MEM
This patch set introduces two usability enhancements leveraging
untrusted pointers to mem:
- When reading a pointer field from a PTR_TO_BTF_ID, the resulting
value is now assumed to be PTR_TO_MEM|MEM_RDONLY|PTR_UNTRUSTED
instead of SCALAR_VALUE, provided the pointer points to a primitive
type.
- __arg_untrusted attribute for global function parameters,
allowed for pointer arguments of both structural and primitive
types:
- For structural types, the attribute produces
PTR_TO_BTF_ID|PTR_UNTRUSTED.
- For primitive types, it yields
PTR_TO_MEM|MEM_RDONLY|PTR_UNTRUSTED.
Here are examples enabled by the series:
struct foo {
int *arr;
};
...
p = bpf_core_cast(..., struct foo);
bpf_for(i, 0, ...) {
... p->arr[i] ... // load at any offset is allowed
}
int memcmp(void *a __arg_untrusted, void *b __arg_untrusted, size_t n) {
bpf_for(i, 0, n)
if (a[i] - b[i]) // load at any offset is allowed
return ...;
return 0;
}
The patch-set was inspired by Anrii's series [1]. The goal of that
series was to define a generic global glob_match function, capable to
accept any pointer type:
__weak int glob_match(const char *pat, const char *str);
char filename_glob[32];
void foo(...) {
...
task = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
filename = task->mm->exe_file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
... match_glob(filename_glob, // pointer to map value
filename) ... // scalar
}
At the moment, there is no straightforward way to express such a
function. This patch-set makes it possible to define it as follows:
__weak int glob_match(const char *pat __arg_untrusted,
const char *str __arg_untrusted);
[1] https://github.com/anakryiko/linux/tree/bpf-mem-cast
Changelog:
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250702224209.3300396-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
v1 -> v2:
- Added safety check in btf_prepare_func_args() to ensure that only
struct or primitive types could be combined with __arg_untrusted
(Alexei).
- Removed unnecessary 'continue' btf_check_func_arg_match() (Alexei).
- Added test cases for __arg_untrusted pointers to enum and
__arg_untrusted combined with non-kernel type (Kumar).
- Added acks from Kumar.
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250704230354.1323244-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/lib/bpf/bpf_helpers.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c | 31 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c | 134 |
4 files changed, 167 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf_helpers.h b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf_helpers.h index 76b127a9f24d..80c028540656 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf_helpers.h +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf_helpers.h @@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ enum libbpf_tristate { #define __arg_nonnull __attribute((btf_decl_tag("arg:nonnull"))) #define __arg_nullable __attribute((btf_decl_tag("arg:nullable"))) #define __arg_trusted __attribute((btf_decl_tag("arg:trusted"))) +#define __arg_untrusted __attribute((btf_decl_tag("arg:untrusted"))) #define __arg_arena __attribute((btf_decl_tag("arg:arena"))) #ifndef ___bpf_concat diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c index 5266c7022863..14c5a7ef0e87 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static struct { { "new_null_ret", "R0 invalid mem access 'ptr_or_null_'" }, { "obj_new_acq", "Unreleased reference id=" }, { "use_after_drop", "invalid mem access 'scalar'" }, - { "ptr_walk_scalar", "type=scalar expected=percpu_ptr_" }, + { "ptr_walk_scalar", "type=rdonly_untrusted_mem expected=percpu_ptr_" }, { "direct_read_lock", "direct access to bpf_spin_lock is disallowed" }, { "direct_write_lock", "direct access to bpf_spin_lock is disallowed" }, { "direct_read_head", "direct access to bpf_list_head is disallowed" }, diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c index 8185130ede95..4f94c971ae86 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c @@ -5,6 +5,37 @@ #include "bpf_misc.h" #include "../test_kmods/bpf_testmod_kfunc.h" +SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter") +__success +__log_level(2) +__msg("r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) ; R7_w=ptr_nameidata(off={{[0-9]+}}) R8_w=rdonly_untrusted_mem(sz=0)") +__msg("r9 = *(u8 *)(r8 +0) ; R8_w=rdonly_untrusted_mem(sz=0) R9_w=scalar") +int btf_id_to_ptr_mem(void *ctx) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + struct nameidata *idata; + u64 ret, off; + + task = bpf_get_current_task_btf(); + idata = task->nameidata; + off = bpf_core_field_offset(struct nameidata, pathname); + /* + * asm block to have reliable match target for __msg, equivalent of: + * ret = task->nameidata->pathname[0]; + */ + asm volatile ( + "r7 = %[idata];" + "r7 += %[off];" + "r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0);" + "r9 = *(u8 *)(r8 + 0);" + "%[ret] = r9;" + : [ret]"=r"(ret) + : [idata]"r"(idata), + [off]"r"(off) + : "r7", "r8", "r9"); + return ret; +} + SEC("socket") __success __retval(0) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c index 4ab0ef18d7eb..b346f669d159 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c @@ -179,4 +179,138 @@ int BPF_PROG(trusted_acq_rel, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) return subprog_trusted_acq_rel(task); } +__weak int subprog_untrusted_bad_tags(struct task_struct *task __arg_untrusted __arg_nullable) +{ + return task->pid; +} + +SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter") +__failure +__msg("arg#0 untrusted cannot be combined with any other tags") +int untrusted_bad_tags(void *ctx) +{ + return subprog_untrusted_bad_tags(0); +} + +struct local_type_wont_be_accepted {}; + +__weak int subprog_untrusted_bad_type(struct local_type_wont_be_accepted *p __arg_untrusted) +{ + return 0; +} + +SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter") +__failure +__msg("arg#0 reference type('STRUCT local_type_wont_be_accepted') has no matches") +int untrusted_bad_type(void *ctx) +{ + return subprog_untrusted_bad_type(bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0)); +} + +__weak int subprog_untrusted(const volatile struct task_struct *restrict task __arg_untrusted) +{ + return task->pid; +} + +SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter") +__success +__log_level(2) +__msg("r1 = {{.*}}; {{.*}}R1_w=trusted_ptr_task_struct()") +__msg("Func#1 ('subprog_untrusted') is global and assumed valid.") +__msg("Validating subprog_untrusted() func#1...") +__msg(": R1=untrusted_ptr_task_struct") +int trusted_to_untrusted(void *ctx) +{ + return subprog_untrusted(bpf_get_current_task_btf()); +} + +char mem[16]; +u32 off; + +SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter") +__success +int anything_to_untrusted(void *ctx) +{ + /* untrusted to untrusted */ + subprog_untrusted(bpf_core_cast(0, struct task_struct)); + /* wrong type to untrusted */ + subprog_untrusted((void *)bpf_core_cast(0, struct bpf_verifier_env)); + /* map value to untrusted */ + subprog_untrusted((void *)mem); + /* scalar to untrusted */ + subprog_untrusted(0); + /* variable offset to untrusted (map) */ + subprog_untrusted((void *)mem + off); + /* variable offset to untrusted (trusted) */ + subprog_untrusted((void *)bpf_get_current_task_btf() + off); + return 0; +} + +__weak int subprog_untrusted2(struct task_struct *task __arg_untrusted) +{ + return subprog_trusted_task_nullable(task); +} + +SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter") +__failure +__msg("R1 type=untrusted_ptr_ expected=ptr_, trusted_ptr_, rcu_ptr_") +__msg("Caller passes invalid args into func#{{.*}} ('subprog_trusted_task_nullable')") +int untrusted_to_trusted(void *ctx) +{ + return subprog_untrusted2(bpf_get_current_task_btf()); +} + +__weak int subprog_void_untrusted(void *p __arg_untrusted) +{ + return *(int *)p; +} + +__weak int subprog_char_untrusted(char *p __arg_untrusted) +{ + return *(int *)p; +} + +__weak int subprog_enum_untrusted(enum bpf_attach_type *p __arg_untrusted) +{ + return *(int *)p; +} + +__weak int subprog_enum64_untrusted(enum scx_public_consts *p __arg_untrusted) +{ + return *(int *)p; +} + +SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter") +__success +__log_level(2) +__msg("r1 = {{.*}}; {{.*}}R1_w=trusted_ptr_task_struct()") +__msg("Func#1 ('subprog_void_untrusted') is global and assumed valid.") +__msg("Validating subprog_void_untrusted() func#1...") +__msg(": R1=rdonly_untrusted_mem(sz=0)") +int trusted_to_untrusted_mem(void *ctx) +{ + return subprog_void_untrusted(bpf_get_current_task_btf()); +} + +SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter") +__success +int anything_to_untrusted_mem(void *ctx) +{ + /* untrusted to untrusted mem */ + subprog_void_untrusted(bpf_core_cast(0, struct task_struct)); + /* map value to untrusted mem */ + subprog_void_untrusted(mem); + /* scalar to untrusted mem */ + subprog_void_untrusted(0); + /* variable offset to untrusted mem (map) */ + subprog_void_untrusted((void *)mem + off); + /* variable offset to untrusted mem (trusted) */ + subprog_void_untrusted(bpf_get_current_task_btf() + off); + /* variable offset to untrusted char/enum/enum64 (map) */ + subprog_char_untrusted(mem + off); + subprog_enum_untrusted((void *)mem + off); + subprog_enum64_untrusted((void *)mem + off); + return 0; +} + char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; |
