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authorAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2025-07-07 08:25:07 -0700
committerAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2025-07-07 08:25:08 -0700
commit6e5cae9ddae7f14f5bffc34d12f45af756f86658 (patch)
treed4cda7b8249802c2b1bbbfc7de47889fe4e9ee5d /tools
parent03fe01ddd1d8be7799419ea5e5f228a0186ae8c2 (diff)
parent68cca81fd57fd9f5b8fd8da0dccd1d00522592f9 (diff)
Merge branch 'bpf-additional-use-cases-for-untrusted-ptr_to_mem'
Eduard Zingerman says: ==================== bpf: additional use-cases for untrusted PTR_TO_MEM This patch set introduces two usability enhancements leveraging untrusted pointers to mem: - When reading a pointer field from a PTR_TO_BTF_ID, the resulting value is now assumed to be PTR_TO_MEM|MEM_RDONLY|PTR_UNTRUSTED instead of SCALAR_VALUE, provided the pointer points to a primitive type. - __arg_untrusted attribute for global function parameters, allowed for pointer arguments of both structural and primitive types: - For structural types, the attribute produces PTR_TO_BTF_ID|PTR_UNTRUSTED. - For primitive types, it yields PTR_TO_MEM|MEM_RDONLY|PTR_UNTRUSTED. Here are examples enabled by the series: struct foo { int *arr; }; ... p = bpf_core_cast(..., struct foo); bpf_for(i, 0, ...) { ... p->arr[i] ... // load at any offset is allowed } int memcmp(void *a __arg_untrusted, void *b __arg_untrusted, size_t n) { bpf_for(i, 0, n) if (a[i] - b[i]) // load at any offset is allowed return ...; return 0; } The patch-set was inspired by Anrii's series [1]. The goal of that series was to define a generic global glob_match function, capable to accept any pointer type: __weak int glob_match(const char *pat, const char *str); char filename_glob[32]; void foo(...) { ... task = bpf_get_current_task_btf(); filename = task->mm->exe_file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; ... match_glob(filename_glob, // pointer to map value filename) ... // scalar } At the moment, there is no straightforward way to express such a function. This patch-set makes it possible to define it as follows: __weak int glob_match(const char *pat __arg_untrusted, const char *str __arg_untrusted); [1] https://github.com/anakryiko/linux/tree/bpf-mem-cast Changelog: v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250702224209.3300396-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/ v1 -> v2: - Added safety check in btf_prepare_func_args() to ensure that only struct or primitive types could be combined with __arg_untrusted (Alexei). - Removed unnecessary 'continue' btf_check_func_arg_match() (Alexei). - Added test cases for __arg_untrusted pointers to enum and __arg_untrusted combined with non-kernel type (Kumar). - Added acks from Kumar. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250704230354.1323244-1-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools')
-rw-r--r--tools/lib/bpf/bpf_helpers.h1
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c2
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c31
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c134
4 files changed, 167 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf_helpers.h b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf_helpers.h
index 76b127a9f24d..80c028540656 100644
--- a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf_helpers.h
+++ b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf_helpers.h
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ enum libbpf_tristate {
#define __arg_nonnull __attribute((btf_decl_tag("arg:nonnull")))
#define __arg_nullable __attribute((btf_decl_tag("arg:nullable")))
#define __arg_trusted __attribute((btf_decl_tag("arg:trusted")))
+#define __arg_untrusted __attribute((btf_decl_tag("arg:untrusted")))
#define __arg_arena __attribute((btf_decl_tag("arg:arena")))
#ifndef ___bpf_concat
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c
index 5266c7022863..14c5a7ef0e87 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static struct {
{ "new_null_ret", "R0 invalid mem access 'ptr_or_null_'" },
{ "obj_new_acq", "Unreleased reference id=" },
{ "use_after_drop", "invalid mem access 'scalar'" },
- { "ptr_walk_scalar", "type=scalar expected=percpu_ptr_" },
+ { "ptr_walk_scalar", "type=rdonly_untrusted_mem expected=percpu_ptr_" },
{ "direct_read_lock", "direct access to bpf_spin_lock is disallowed" },
{ "direct_write_lock", "direct access to bpf_spin_lock is disallowed" },
{ "direct_read_head", "direct access to bpf_list_head is disallowed" },
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
index 8185130ede95..4f94c971ae86 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
@@ -5,6 +5,37 @@
#include "bpf_misc.h"
#include "../test_kmods/bpf_testmod_kfunc.h"
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__success
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) ; R7_w=ptr_nameidata(off={{[0-9]+}}) R8_w=rdonly_untrusted_mem(sz=0)")
+__msg("r9 = *(u8 *)(r8 +0) ; R8_w=rdonly_untrusted_mem(sz=0) R9_w=scalar")
+int btf_id_to_ptr_mem(void *ctx)
+{
+ struct task_struct *task;
+ struct nameidata *idata;
+ u64 ret, off;
+
+ task = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
+ idata = task->nameidata;
+ off = bpf_core_field_offset(struct nameidata, pathname);
+ /*
+ * asm block to have reliable match target for __msg, equivalent of:
+ * ret = task->nameidata->pathname[0];
+ */
+ asm volatile (
+ "r7 = %[idata];"
+ "r7 += %[off];"
+ "r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0);"
+ "r9 = *(u8 *)(r8 + 0);"
+ "%[ret] = r9;"
+ : [ret]"=r"(ret)
+ : [idata]"r"(idata),
+ [off]"r"(off)
+ : "r7", "r8", "r9");
+ return ret;
+}
+
SEC("socket")
__success
__retval(0)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c
index 4ab0ef18d7eb..b346f669d159 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c
@@ -179,4 +179,138 @@ int BPF_PROG(trusted_acq_rel, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
return subprog_trusted_acq_rel(task);
}
+__weak int subprog_untrusted_bad_tags(struct task_struct *task __arg_untrusted __arg_nullable)
+{
+ return task->pid;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__failure
+__msg("arg#0 untrusted cannot be combined with any other tags")
+int untrusted_bad_tags(void *ctx)
+{
+ return subprog_untrusted_bad_tags(0);
+}
+
+struct local_type_wont_be_accepted {};
+
+__weak int subprog_untrusted_bad_type(struct local_type_wont_be_accepted *p __arg_untrusted)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__failure
+__msg("arg#0 reference type('STRUCT local_type_wont_be_accepted') has no matches")
+int untrusted_bad_type(void *ctx)
+{
+ return subprog_untrusted_bad_type(bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0));
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_untrusted(const volatile struct task_struct *restrict task __arg_untrusted)
+{
+ return task->pid;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__success
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("r1 = {{.*}}; {{.*}}R1_w=trusted_ptr_task_struct()")
+__msg("Func#1 ('subprog_untrusted') is global and assumed valid.")
+__msg("Validating subprog_untrusted() func#1...")
+__msg(": R1=untrusted_ptr_task_struct")
+int trusted_to_untrusted(void *ctx)
+{
+ return subprog_untrusted(bpf_get_current_task_btf());
+}
+
+char mem[16];
+u32 off;
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__success
+int anything_to_untrusted(void *ctx)
+{
+ /* untrusted to untrusted */
+ subprog_untrusted(bpf_core_cast(0, struct task_struct));
+ /* wrong type to untrusted */
+ subprog_untrusted((void *)bpf_core_cast(0, struct bpf_verifier_env));
+ /* map value to untrusted */
+ subprog_untrusted((void *)mem);
+ /* scalar to untrusted */
+ subprog_untrusted(0);
+ /* variable offset to untrusted (map) */
+ subprog_untrusted((void *)mem + off);
+ /* variable offset to untrusted (trusted) */
+ subprog_untrusted((void *)bpf_get_current_task_btf() + off);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_untrusted2(struct task_struct *task __arg_untrusted)
+{
+ return subprog_trusted_task_nullable(task);
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__failure
+__msg("R1 type=untrusted_ptr_ expected=ptr_, trusted_ptr_, rcu_ptr_")
+__msg("Caller passes invalid args into func#{{.*}} ('subprog_trusted_task_nullable')")
+int untrusted_to_trusted(void *ctx)
+{
+ return subprog_untrusted2(bpf_get_current_task_btf());
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_void_untrusted(void *p __arg_untrusted)
+{
+ return *(int *)p;
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_char_untrusted(char *p __arg_untrusted)
+{
+ return *(int *)p;
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_enum_untrusted(enum bpf_attach_type *p __arg_untrusted)
+{
+ return *(int *)p;
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_enum64_untrusted(enum scx_public_consts *p __arg_untrusted)
+{
+ return *(int *)p;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__success
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("r1 = {{.*}}; {{.*}}R1_w=trusted_ptr_task_struct()")
+__msg("Func#1 ('subprog_void_untrusted') is global and assumed valid.")
+__msg("Validating subprog_void_untrusted() func#1...")
+__msg(": R1=rdonly_untrusted_mem(sz=0)")
+int trusted_to_untrusted_mem(void *ctx)
+{
+ return subprog_void_untrusted(bpf_get_current_task_btf());
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__success
+int anything_to_untrusted_mem(void *ctx)
+{
+ /* untrusted to untrusted mem */
+ subprog_void_untrusted(bpf_core_cast(0, struct task_struct));
+ /* map value to untrusted mem */
+ subprog_void_untrusted(mem);
+ /* scalar to untrusted mem */
+ subprog_void_untrusted(0);
+ /* variable offset to untrusted mem (map) */
+ subprog_void_untrusted((void *)mem + off);
+ /* variable offset to untrusted mem (trusted) */
+ subprog_void_untrusted(bpf_get_current_task_btf() + off);
+ /* variable offset to untrusted char/enum/enum64 (map) */
+ subprog_char_untrusted(mem + off);
+ subprog_enum_untrusted((void *)mem + off);
+ subprog_enum64_untrusted((void *)mem + off);
+ return 0;
+}
+
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";