1 files changed, 172 insertions, 71 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 2fbdebf79fbb..0835c664fbfd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@
 #include "trace.h"
 
 #define GHCB_VERSION_MAX	2ULL
-#define GHCB_VERSION_DEFAULT	2ULL
 #define GHCB_VERSION_MIN	1ULL
 
 #define GHCB_HV_FT_SUPPORTED	(GHCB_HV_FT_SNP | GHCB_HV_FT_SNP_AP_CREATION)
@@ -59,6 +58,9 @@ static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
 module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444);
 static u64 sev_supported_vmsa_features;
 
+static unsigned int nr_ciphertext_hiding_asids;
+module_param_named(ciphertext_hiding_asids, nr_ciphertext_hiding_asids, uint, 0444);
+
 #define AP_RESET_HOLD_NONE		0
 #define AP_RESET_HOLD_NAE_EVENT		1
 #define AP_RESET_HOLD_MSR_PROTO		2
@@ -85,6 +87,10 @@ static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock);
 unsigned int max_sev_asid;
 static unsigned int min_sev_asid;
+static unsigned int max_sev_es_asid;
+static unsigned int min_sev_es_asid;
+static unsigned int max_snp_asid;
+static unsigned int min_snp_asid;
 static unsigned long sev_me_mask;
 static unsigned int nr_asids;
 static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
@@ -147,6 +153,14 @@ static bool sev_vcpu_has_debug_swap(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	return sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
 }
 
+static bool snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(kvm);
+
+	return (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC) &&
+	       !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_snp_guest(kvm));
+}
+
 /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
 static bool __sev_recycle_asids(unsigned int min_asid, unsigned int max_asid)
 {
@@ -173,20 +187,34 @@ static void sev_misc_cg_uncharge(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
 	misc_cg_uncharge(type, sev->misc_cg, 1);
 }
 
-static int sev_asid_new(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
+static int sev_asid_new(struct kvm_sev_info *sev, unsigned long vm_type)
 {
 	/*
 	 * SEV-enabled guests must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid.
 	 * SEV-ES-enabled guest can use from 1 to min_sev_asid - 1.
-	 * Note: min ASID can end up larger than the max if basic SEV support is
-	 * effectively disabled by disallowing use of ASIDs for SEV guests.
 	 */
-	unsigned int min_asid = sev->es_active ? 1 : min_sev_asid;
-	unsigned int max_asid = sev->es_active ? min_sev_asid - 1 : max_sev_asid;
-	unsigned int asid;
+	unsigned int min_asid, max_asid, asid;
 	bool retry = true;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (vm_type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM) {
+		min_asid = min_snp_asid;
+		max_asid = max_snp_asid;
+	} else if (sev->es_active) {
+		min_asid = min_sev_es_asid;
+		max_asid = max_sev_es_asid;
+	} else {
+		min_asid = min_sev_asid;
+		max_asid = max_sev_asid;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The min ASID can end up larger than the max if basic SEV support is
+	 * effectively disabled by disallowing use of ASIDs for SEV guests.
+	 * Similarly for SEV-ES guests the min ASID can end up larger than the
+	 * max when ciphertext hiding is enabled, effectively disabling SEV-ES
+	 * support.
+	 */
 	if (min_asid > max_asid)
 		return -ENOTTY;
 
@@ -406,6 +434,7 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
 	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(kvm);
 	struct sev_platform_init_args init_args = {0};
 	bool es_active = vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_VM;
+	bool snp_active = vm_type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM;
 	u64 valid_vmsa_features = es_active ? sev_supported_vmsa_features : 0;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -415,12 +444,26 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
 	if (data->flags)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!snp_active)
+		valid_vmsa_features &= ~SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
+
 	if (data->vmsa_features & ~valid_vmsa_features)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (data->ghcb_version > GHCB_VERSION_MAX || (!es_active && data->ghcb_version))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/*
+	 * KVM supports the full range of mandatory features defined by version
+	 * 2 of the GHCB protocol, so default to that for SEV-ES guests created
+	 * via KVM_SEV_INIT2 (KVM_SEV_INIT forces version 1).
+	 */
+	if (es_active && !data->ghcb_version)
+		data->ghcb_version = 2;
+
+	if (snp_active && data->ghcb_version < 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (unlikely(sev->active))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -429,18 +472,10 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
 	sev->vmsa_features = data->vmsa_features;
 	sev->ghcb_version = data->ghcb_version;
 
-	/*
-	 * Currently KVM supports the full range of mandatory features defined
-	 * by version 2 of the GHCB protocol, so default to that for SEV-ES
-	 * guests created via KVM_SEV_INIT2.
-	 */
-	if (sev->es_active && !sev->ghcb_version)
-		sev->ghcb_version = GHCB_VERSION_DEFAULT;
-
-	if (vm_type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM)
+	if (snp_active)
 		sev->vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE;
 
-	ret = sev_asid_new(sev);
+	ret = sev_asid_new(sev, vm_type);
 	if (ret)
 		goto e_no_asid;
 
@@ -455,7 +490,7 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
 	}
 
 	/* This needs to happen after SEV/SNP firmware initialization. */
-	if (vm_type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM) {
+	if (snp_active) {
 		ret = snp_guest_req_init(kvm);
 		if (ret)
 			goto e_free;
@@ -569,8 +604,6 @@ static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	if (copy_from_user(&params, u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), sizeof(params)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	sev->policy = params.policy;
-
 	memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
 
 	dh_blob = NULL;
@@ -618,6 +651,7 @@ static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 		goto e_free_session;
 	}
 
+	sev->policy = params.policy;
 	sev->handle = start.handle;
 	sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
 
@@ -719,13 +753,6 @@ static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
 static void sev_writeback_caches(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	/*
-	 * Note, the caller is responsible for ensuring correctness if the mask
-	 * can be modified, e.g. if a CPU could be doing VMRUN.
-	 */
-	if (cpumask_empty(to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->have_run_cpus))
-		return;
-
-	/*
 	 * Ensure that all dirty guest tagged cache entries are written back
 	 * before releasing the pages back to the system for use.  CLFLUSH will
 	 * not do this without SME_COHERENT, and flushing many cache lines
@@ -739,6 +766,9 @@ static void sev_writeback_caches(struct kvm *kvm)
 	 * serializing multiple calls and having responding CPUs (to the IPI)
 	 * mark themselves as still running if they are running (or about to
 	 * run) a vCPU for the VM.
+	 *
+	 * Note, the caller is responsible for ensuring correctness if the mask
+	 * can be modified, e.g. if a CPU could be doing VMRUN.
 	 */
 	wbnoinvd_on_cpus_mask(to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->have_run_cpus);
 }
@@ -1972,7 +2002,7 @@ static void sev_migrate_from(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
 	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, dst_vcpu, dst_kvm) {
 		dst_svm = to_svm(dst_vcpu);
 
-		sev_init_vmcb(dst_svm);
+		sev_init_vmcb(dst_svm, false);
 
 		if (!dst->es_active)
 			continue;
@@ -2184,7 +2214,12 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	if (!(params.policy & SNP_POLICY_MASK_RSVD_MBO))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	sev->policy = params.policy;
+	if (snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(kvm)) {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		start.desired_tsc_khz = kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz;
+	}
 
 	sev->snp_context = snp_context_create(kvm, argp);
 	if (!sev->snp_context)
@@ -2192,6 +2227,7 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 
 	start.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
 	start.policy = params.policy;
+
 	memcpy(start.gosvw, params.gosvw, sizeof(params.gosvw));
 	rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_START, &start, &argp->error);
 	if (rc) {
@@ -2200,6 +2236,7 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 		goto e_free_context;
 	}
 
+	sev->policy = params.policy;
 	sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
 	rc = snp_bind_asid(kvm, &argp->error);
 	if (rc) {
@@ -2333,7 +2370,7 @@ static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	pr_debug("%s: GFN start 0x%llx length 0x%llx type %d flags %d\n", __func__,
 		 params.gfn_start, params.len, params.type, params.flags);
 
-	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(params.len) || params.flags ||
+	if (!params.len || !PAGE_ALIGNED(params.len) || params.flags ||
 	    (params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL &&
 	     params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO &&
 	     params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED &&
@@ -2365,7 +2402,7 @@ static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
 
 	memslot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, params.gfn_start);
-	if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(memslot)) {
+	if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem(memslot)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -3042,6 +3079,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 	if (min_sev_asid == 1)
 		goto out;
 
+	min_sev_es_asid = min_snp_asid = 1;
+	max_sev_es_asid = max_snp_asid = min_sev_asid - 1;
+
 	sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count));
 	sev_es_supported = true;
@@ -3050,10 +3090,32 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 out:
 	if (sev_enabled) {
 		init_args.probe = true;
+
+		if (sev_is_snp_ciphertext_hiding_supported())
+			init_args.max_snp_asid = min(nr_ciphertext_hiding_asids,
+						     min_sev_asid - 1);
+
 		if (sev_platform_init(&init_args))
 			sev_supported = sev_es_supported = sev_snp_supported = false;
 		else if (sev_snp_supported)
 			sev_snp_supported = is_sev_snp_initialized();
+
+		if (sev_snp_supported)
+			nr_ciphertext_hiding_asids = init_args.max_snp_asid;
+
+		/*
+		 * If ciphertext hiding is enabled, the joint SEV-ES/SEV-SNP
+		 * ASID range is partitioned into separate SEV-ES and SEV-SNP
+		 * ASID ranges, with the SEV-SNP range being [1..max_snp_asid]
+		 * and the SEV-ES range being (max_snp_asid..max_sev_es_asid].
+		 * Note, SEV-ES may effectively be disabled if all ASIDs from
+		 * the joint range are assigned to SEV-SNP.
+		 */
+		if (nr_ciphertext_hiding_asids) {
+			max_snp_asid = nr_ciphertext_hiding_asids;
+			min_sev_es_asid = max_snp_asid + 1;
+			pr_info("SEV-SNP ciphertext hiding enabled\n");
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
@@ -3064,12 +3126,14 @@ out:
 			min_sev_asid, max_sev_asid);
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES))
 		pr_info("SEV-ES %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
-			str_enabled_disabled(sev_es_supported),
-			min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1);
+			sev_es_supported ? min_sev_es_asid <= max_sev_es_asid ? "enabled" :
+										"unusable" :
+										"disabled",
+			min_sev_es_asid, max_sev_es_asid);
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
 		pr_info("SEV-SNP %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
 			str_enabled_disabled(sev_snp_supported),
-			min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1);
+			min_snp_asid, max_snp_asid);
 
 	sev_enabled = sev_supported;
 	sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
@@ -3082,6 +3146,9 @@ out:
 	sev_supported_vmsa_features = 0;
 	if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled)
 		sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
+
+	if (sev_snp_enabled && tsc_khz && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
+		sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
 }
 
 void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
@@ -3197,7 +3264,7 @@ skip_vmsa_free:
 		kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
 }
 
-static u64 kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(struct vmcb_control_area *control)
+static u64 kvm_get_cached_sw_exit_code(struct vmcb_control_area *control)
 {
 	return (((u64)control->exit_code_hi) << 32) | control->exit_code;
 }
@@ -3223,7 +3290,7 @@ static void dump_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	 */
 	pr_err("GHCB (GPA=%016llx) snapshot:\n", svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa);
 	pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_code",
-	       kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(control), kvm_ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(svm));
+	       kvm_get_cached_sw_exit_code(control), kvm_ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(svm));
 	pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_1",
 	       control->exit_info_1, kvm_ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(svm));
 	pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_2",
@@ -3276,26 +3343,27 @@ static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(svm->sev_es.valid_bitmap) != sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
 	memcpy(&svm->sev_es.valid_bitmap, &ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
 
-	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rax_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
-	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rbx_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
-	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rcx_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
-	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rdx_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
-	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI] = kvm_ghcb_get_rsi_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rax_if_valid(svm);
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rbx_if_valid(svm);
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rcx_if_valid(svm);
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rdx_if_valid(svm);
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI] = kvm_ghcb_get_rsi_if_valid(svm);
 
-	svm->vmcb->save.cpl = kvm_ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
+	svm->vmcb->save.cpl = kvm_ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid(svm);
 
-	if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(svm)) {
-		vcpu->arch.xcr0 = ghcb_get_xcr0(ghcb);
-		vcpu->arch.cpuid_dynamic_bits_dirty = true;
-	}
+	if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(svm))
+		__kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, 0, kvm_ghcb_get_xcr0(svm));
+
+	if (kvm_ghcb_xss_is_valid(svm))
+		__kvm_emulate_msr_write(vcpu, MSR_IA32_XSS, kvm_ghcb_get_xss(svm));
 
 	/* Copy the GHCB exit information into the VMCB fields */
-	exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
+	exit_code = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(svm);
 	control->exit_code = lower_32_bits(exit_code);
 	control->exit_code_hi = upper_32_bits(exit_code);
-	control->exit_info_1 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb);
-	control->exit_info_2 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb);
-	svm->sev_es.sw_scratch = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_scratch_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
+	control->exit_info_1 = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(svm);
+	control->exit_info_2 = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_2(svm);
+	svm->sev_es.sw_scratch = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_scratch_if_valid(svm);
 
 	/* Clear the valid entries fields */
 	memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
@@ -3312,7 +3380,7 @@ static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	 * Retrieve the exit code now even though it may not be marked valid
 	 * as it could help with debugging.
 	 */
-	exit_code = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(control);
+	exit_code = kvm_get_cached_sw_exit_code(control);
 
 	/* Only GHCB Usage code 0 is supported */
 	if (svm->sev_es.ghcb->ghcb_usage) {
@@ -3884,7 +3952,7 @@ next_range:
 /*
  * Invoked as part of svm_vcpu_reset() processing of an init event.
  */
-void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
 	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
@@ -3892,9 +3960,6 @@ void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	kvm_pfn_t pfn;
 	gfn_t gfn;
 
-	if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm))
-		return;
-
 	guard(mutex)(&svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_mutex);
 
 	if (!svm->sev_es.snp_ap_waiting_for_reset)
@@ -4320,7 +4385,7 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	svm_vmgexit_success(svm, 0);
 
-	exit_code = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(control);
+	exit_code = kvm_get_cached_sw_exit_code(control);
 	switch (exit_code) {
 	case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
 		ret = setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, true, control->exit_info_2);
@@ -4452,6 +4517,9 @@ void sev_es_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 					  !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) &&
 					  !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID));
 
+	svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ, MSR_TYPE_R,
+				  !snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(vcpu->kvm));
+
 	/*
 	 * For SEV-ES, accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS should not be intercepted if
 	 * the host/guest supports its use.
@@ -4480,7 +4548,7 @@ void sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 		vcpu->arch.reserved_gpa_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f));
 }
 
-static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool init_event)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(svm->vcpu.kvm);
 	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
@@ -4541,10 +4609,21 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 
 	/* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
 	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the GHCB MSR value as per the GHCB specification when emulating
+	 * vCPU RESET for an SEV-ES guest.
+	 */
+	if (!init_event)
+		set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO((__u64)sev->ghcb_version,
+						    GHCB_VERSION_MIN,
+						    sev_enc_bit));
 }
 
-void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool init_event)
 {
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+
 	svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE;
 	clr_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
 
@@ -4554,24 +4633,36 @@ void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	 */
 	clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
 
-	if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
-		sev_es_init_vmcb(svm);
+	if (init_event && sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(vcpu);
+
+	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		sev_es_init_vmcb(svm, init_event);
 }
 
-void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+int sev_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(vcpu->kvm);
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct page *vmsa_page;
+
+	mutex_init(&svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_mutex);
+
+	if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		return 0;
 
 	/*
-	 * Set the GHCB MSR value as per the GHCB specification when emulating
-	 * vCPU RESET for an SEV-ES guest.
+	 * SEV-ES guests require a separate (from the VMCB) VMSA page used to
+	 * contain the encrypted register state of the guest.
 	 */
-	set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO((__u64)sev->ghcb_version,
-					    GHCB_VERSION_MIN,
-					    sev_enc_bit));
+	vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page();
+	if (!vmsa_page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	mutex_init(&svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_mutex);
+	svm->sev_es.vmsa = page_address(vmsa_page);
+
+	vcpu->arch.guest_tsc_protected = snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
@@ -4622,6 +4713,16 @@ void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct sev_es_save_are
 		hostsa->dr2_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(2);
 		hostsa->dr3_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(3);
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * TSC_AUX is always virtualized for SEV-ES guests when the feature is
+	 * available, i.e. TSC_AUX is loaded on #VMEXIT from the host save area.
+	 * Set the save area to the current hardware value, i.e. the current
+	 * user return value, so that the correct value is restored on #VMEXIT.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX) &&
+	    !WARN_ON_ONCE(tsc_aux_uret_slot < 0))
+		hostsa->tsc_aux = kvm_get_user_return_msr(tsc_aux_uret_slot);
 }
 
 void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
@@ -4719,7 +4820,7 @@ void sev_handle_rmp_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code)
 	}
 
 	slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
-	if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot)) {
+	if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem(slot)) {
 		pr_warn_ratelimited("SEV: Unexpected RMP fault, non-private slot for GPA 0x%llx\n",
 				    gpa);
 		return;
@@ -4947,7 +5048,7 @@ next_pfn:
 	}
 }
 
-int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool is_private)
 {
 	int level, rc;
 	bool assigned;