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Diffstat (limited to 'fs/exec.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/exec.c13
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 1f5fdd2e096e..fe895e47f1dd 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ static inline void put_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt)
bool path_noexec(const struct path *path)
{
+ /* If it's an anonymous inode make sure that we catch any shenanigans. */
+ VFS_WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ANON_FILE(d_inode(path->dentry)) &&
+ !(path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NOEXEC));
return (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) ||
(path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NOEXEC);
}
@@ -781,13 +784,15 @@ static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags)
if (IS_ERR(file))
return file;
+ if (path_noexec(&file->f_path))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+
/*
* In the past the regular type check was here. It moved to may_open() in
* 633fb6ac3980 ("exec: move S_ISREG() check earlier"). Since then it is
* an invariant that all non-regular files error out before we get here.
*/
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) ||
- path_noexec(&file->f_path))
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode)))
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
err = exe_file_deny_write_access(file);
@@ -1510,7 +1515,7 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* state is protected by cred_guard_mutex we hold.
*/
n_fs = 1;
- spin_lock(&p->fs->lock);
+ read_seqlock_excl(&p->fs->seq);
rcu_read_lock();
for_other_threads(p, t) {
if (t->fs == p->fs)
@@ -1523,7 +1528,7 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE;
else
p->fs->in_exec = 1;
- spin_unlock(&p->fs->lock);
+ read_sequnlock_excl(&p->fs->seq);
}
static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)