diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/overlayfs/namei.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 132 |
1 files changed, 79 insertions, 53 deletions
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c index 5764f91d283e..2043f0369059 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c @@ -14,10 +14,9 @@ #include <linux/exportfs.h> #include "overlayfs.h" -#include "../internal.h" /* for vfs_path_lookup */ - struct ovl_lookup_data { struct super_block *sb; + struct dentry *dentry; const struct ovl_layer *layer; struct qstr name; bool is_dir; @@ -26,6 +25,7 @@ struct ovl_lookup_data { bool stop; bool last; char *redirect; + char *upperredirect; int metacopy; /* Referring to last redirect xattr */ bool absolute_redirect; @@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_lookup_positive_unlocked(struct ovl_lookup_data *d, struct dentry *base, int len, bool drop_negative) { - struct dentry *ret = lookup_one_unlocked(mnt_idmap(d->layer->mnt), name, - base, len); + struct dentry *ret = lookup_one_unlocked(mnt_idmap(d->layer->mnt), + &QSTR_LEN(name, len), base); if (!IS_ERR(ret) && d_flags_negative(smp_load_acquire(&ret->d_flags))) { if (drop_negative && ret->d_lockref.count == 1) { @@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ int ovl_verify_origin_xattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry, struct ovl_fh *fh; int err; - fh = ovl_encode_real_fh(ofs, real, is_upper); + fh = ovl_encode_real_fh(ofs, d_inode(real), is_upper); err = PTR_ERR(fh); if (IS_ERR(fh)) { fh = NULL; @@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ int ovl_get_index_name(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *origin, struct ovl_fh *fh; int err; - fh = ovl_encode_real_fh(ofs, origin, false); + fh = ovl_encode_real_fh(ofs, d_inode(origin), false); if (IS_ERR(fh)) return PTR_ERR(fh); @@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_get_index_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct ovl_fh *fh) if (err) return ERR_PTR(err); - index = lookup_positive_unlocked(name.name, ofs->workdir, name.len); + index = lookup_noperm_positive_unlocked(&name, ofs->workdir); kfree(name.name); if (IS_ERR(index)) { if (PTR_ERR(index) == -ENOENT) @@ -791,8 +791,8 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup_index(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *upper, if (err) return ERR_PTR(err); - index = lookup_one_positive_unlocked(ovl_upper_mnt_idmap(ofs), name.name, - ofs->workdir, name.len); + index = lookup_one_positive_unlocked(ovl_upper_mnt_idmap(ofs), &name, + ofs->workdir); if (IS_ERR(index)) { err = PTR_ERR(index); if (err == -ENOENT) { @@ -961,7 +961,7 @@ static int ovl_maybe_validate_verity(struct dentry *dentry) if (err == 0) ovl_set_flag(OVL_VERIFIED_DIGEST, inode); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); } ovl_inode_unlock(inode); @@ -995,7 +995,7 @@ static int ovl_maybe_lookup_lowerdata(struct dentry *dentry) old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); err = ovl_lookup_data_layers(dentry, redirect, &datapath); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); if (err) goto out_err; @@ -1026,6 +1026,31 @@ int ovl_verify_lowerdata(struct dentry *dentry) return ovl_maybe_validate_verity(dentry); } +/* + * Following redirects/metacopy can have security consequences: it's like a + * symlink into the lower layer without the permission checks. + * + * This is only a problem if the upper layer is untrusted (e.g comes from an USB + * drive). This can allow a non-readable file or directory to become readable. + * + * Only following redirects when redirects are enabled disables this attack + * vector when not necessary. + */ +static bool ovl_check_follow_redirect(struct ovl_lookup_data *d) +{ + struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(d->sb); + + if (d->metacopy && !ofs->config.metacopy) { + pr_warn_ratelimited("refusing to follow metacopy origin for (%pd2)\n", d->dentry); + return false; + } + if ((d->redirect || d->upperredirect) && !ovl_redirect_follow(ofs)) { + pr_warn_ratelimited("refusing to follow redirect for (%pd2)\n", d->dentry); + return false; + } + return true; +} + struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { @@ -1041,7 +1066,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int ctr = 0; struct inode *inode = NULL; bool upperopaque = false; - char *upperredirect = NULL; + bool check_redirect = (ovl_redirect_follow(ofs) || ofs->numdatalayer); struct dentry *this; unsigned int i; int err; @@ -1049,12 +1074,14 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int metacopy_size = 0; struct ovl_lookup_data d = { .sb = dentry->d_sb, + .dentry = dentry, .name = dentry->d_name, .is_dir = false, .opaque = false, .stop = false, - .last = ovl_redirect_follow(ofs) ? false : !ovl_numlower(poe), + .last = check_redirect ? false : !ovl_numlower(poe), .redirect = NULL, + .upperredirect = NULL, .metacopy = 0, }; @@ -1096,8 +1123,8 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, if (d.redirect) { err = -ENOMEM; - upperredirect = kstrdup(d.redirect, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!upperredirect) + d.upperredirect = kstrdup(d.redirect, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!d.upperredirect) goto out_put_upper; if (d.redirect[0] == '/') poe = roe; @@ -1115,7 +1142,12 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, for (i = 0; !d.stop && i < ovl_numlower(poe); i++) { struct ovl_path lower = ovl_lowerstack(poe)[i]; - if (!ovl_redirect_follow(ofs)) + if (!ovl_check_follow_redirect(&d)) { + err = -EPERM; + goto out_put; + } + + if (!check_redirect) d.last = i == ovl_numlower(poe) - 1; else if (d.is_dir || !ofs->numdatalayer) d.last = lower.layer->idx == ovl_numlower(roe); @@ -1128,13 +1160,6 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, if (!this) continue; - if ((uppermetacopy || d.metacopy) && !ofs->config.metacopy) { - dput(this); - err = -EPERM; - pr_warn_ratelimited("refusing to follow metacopy origin for (%pd2)\n", dentry); - goto out_put; - } - /* * If no origin fh is stored in upper of a merge dir, store fh * of lower dir and set upper parent "impure". @@ -1187,23 +1212,6 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, ctr++; } - /* - * Following redirects can have security consequences: it's like - * a symlink into the lower layer without the permission checks. - * This is only a problem if the upper layer is untrusted (e.g - * comes from an USB drive). This can allow a non-readable file - * or directory to become readable. - * - * Only following redirects when redirects are enabled disables - * this attack vector when not necessary. - */ - err = -EPERM; - if (d.redirect && !ovl_redirect_follow(ofs)) { - pr_warn_ratelimited("refusing to follow redirect for (%pd2)\n", - dentry); - goto out_put; - } - if (d.stop) break; @@ -1214,10 +1222,16 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, } } - /* Defer lookup of lowerdata in data-only layers to first access */ + /* + * Defer lookup of lowerdata in data-only layers to first access. + * Don't require redirect=follow and metacopy=on in this case. + */ if (d.metacopy && ctr && ofs->numdatalayer && d.absolute_redirect) { d.metacopy = 0; ctr++; + } else if (!ovl_check_follow_redirect(&d)) { + err = -EPERM; + goto out_put; } /* @@ -1300,20 +1314,26 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, /* * It's safe to assign upperredirect here: the previous - * assignment of happens only if upperdentry is non-NULL, and + * assignment happens only if upperdentry is non-NULL, and * this one only if upperdentry is NULL. */ - upperredirect = ovl_get_redirect_xattr(ofs, &upperpath, 0); - if (IS_ERR(upperredirect)) { - err = PTR_ERR(upperredirect); - upperredirect = NULL; + d.upperredirect = ovl_get_redirect_xattr(ofs, &upperpath, 0); + if (IS_ERR(d.upperredirect)) { + err = PTR_ERR(d.upperredirect); + d.upperredirect = NULL; goto out_free_oe; } + err = ovl_check_metacopy_xattr(ofs, &upperpath, NULL); if (err < 0) goto out_free_oe; - uppermetacopy = err; + d.metacopy = uppermetacopy = err; metacopy_size = err; + + if (!ovl_check_follow_redirect(&d)) { + err = -EPERM; + goto out_free_oe; + } } if (upperdentry || ctr) { @@ -1321,7 +1341,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, .upperdentry = upperdentry, .oe = oe, .index = index, - .redirect = upperredirect, + .redirect = d.upperredirect, }; /* Store lowerdata redirect for lazy lookup */ @@ -1342,7 +1362,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, ovl_dentry_init_reval(dentry, upperdentry, OVL_I_E(inode)); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); if (origin_path) { dput(origin_path->dentry); kfree(origin_path); @@ -1363,10 +1383,10 @@ out_put_upper: kfree(origin_path); } dput(upperdentry); - kfree(upperredirect); + kfree(d.upperredirect); out: kfree(d.redirect); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); return ERR_PTR(err); } @@ -1396,9 +1416,15 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry) struct dentry *this; struct ovl_path *parentpath = &ovl_lowerstack(poe)[i]; + /* + * We need to make a non-const copy of dentry->d_name, + * because lookup_one_positive_unlocked() will hash name + * with parentpath base, which is on another (lower fs). + */ this = lookup_one_positive_unlocked( mnt_idmap(parentpath->layer->mnt), - name->name, parentpath->dentry, name->len); + &QSTR_LEN(name->name, name->len), + parentpath->dentry); if (IS_ERR(this)) { switch (PTR_ERR(this)) { case -ENOENT: @@ -1423,7 +1449,7 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry) dput(this); } } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); return positive; } |