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-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_map_elem.c22
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h22
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_mprog.c30
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_read_xattr.c158
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/compute_live_registers.c16
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c174
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fexit_noreturns.c15
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c277
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c229
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree.c14
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c5
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/read_cgroupfs_xattr.c60
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/security_bpf_map.c69
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/set_global_vars.c56
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/sock_iter_batch.c36
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream.c79
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c33
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c87
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c23
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c37
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack.c2
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_fail.c2
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_recur.c2
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_map_resize.c16
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c4
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ringbuf_write.c4
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c2
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_change_tail.c9
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_ktls.c4
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tc_change_tail.c14
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c2
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow.c8
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tracing_failure.c12
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_and.c8
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena.c106
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena_large.c98
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c360
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds_deduction.c11
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ctx.c25
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_overflow.c4
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c128
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c118
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_movsx.c16
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_precision.c70
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_private_stack.c89
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c2
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_tailcall.c31
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c233
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c38
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_accept.c18
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_reject.c15
51 files changed, 2781 insertions, 112 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_map_elem.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_map_elem.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2f20485e0de3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_map_elem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+__u32 value_sum = 0;
+
+SEC("iter/bpf_map_elem")
+int dump_bpf_map_values(struct bpf_iter__bpf_map_elem *ctx)
+{
+ __u32 value = 0;
+
+ if (ctx->value == (void *)0)
+ return 0;
+
+ bpf_probe_read_kernel(&value, sizeof(value), ctx->value);
+ value_sum += value;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h
index 6e208e24ba3b..530752ddde8e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h
@@ -83,9 +83,11 @@
* expect return value to match passed parameter:
* - a decimal number
* - a hexadecimal number, when starts from 0x
- * - literal INT_MIN
- * - literal POINTER_VALUE (see definition below)
- * - literal TEST_DATA_LEN (see definition below)
+ * - a macro which expands to one of the above
+ * - literal _INT_MIN (expands to INT_MIN)
+ * In addition, two special macros are defined below:
+ * - POINTER_VALUE
+ * - TEST_DATA_LEN
* __retval_unpriv Same, but load program in unprivileged mode.
*
* __description Text to be used instead of a program name for display
@@ -125,8 +127,8 @@
#define __success_unpriv __attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_expect_success_unpriv")))
#define __log_level(lvl) __attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_log_level="#lvl)))
#define __flag(flag) __attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_prog_flags="#flag)))
-#define __retval(val) __attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_retval="#val)))
-#define __retval_unpriv(val) __attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_retval_unpriv="#val)))
+#define __retval(val) __attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_retval="XSTR(val))))
+#define __retval_unpriv(val) __attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_retval_unpriv="XSTR(val))))
#define __auxiliary __attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_auxiliary")))
#define __auxiliary_unpriv __attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_auxiliary_unpriv")))
#define __btf_path(path) __attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_btf_path=" path)))
@@ -155,7 +157,7 @@
#define __imm_insn(name, expr) [name]"i"(*(long *)&(expr))
/* Magic constants used with __retval() */
-#define POINTER_VALUE 0xcafe4all
+#define POINTER_VALUE 0xbadcafe
#define TEST_DATA_LEN 64
#ifndef __used
@@ -231,4 +233,12 @@
#define CAN_USE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL
#endif
+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_arm64) || defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86)
+#define SPEC_V1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86)
+#define SPEC_V4
+#endif
+
#endif
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_mprog.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_mprog.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6a0ea02c4de2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_mprog.c
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+SEC("cgroup/getsockopt")
+int getsockopt_1(struct bpf_sockopt *ctx)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("cgroup/getsockopt")
+int getsockopt_2(struct bpf_sockopt *ctx)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("cgroup/getsockopt")
+int getsockopt_3(struct bpf_sockopt *ctx)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("cgroup/getsockopt")
+int getsockopt_4(struct bpf_sockopt *ctx)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_read_xattr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_read_xattr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..092db1d0435e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_read_xattr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_core_read.h>
+#include "bpf_experimental.h"
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+char value[16];
+
+static __always_inline void read_xattr(struct cgroup *cgroup)
+{
+ struct bpf_dynptr value_ptr;
+
+ bpf_dynptr_from_mem(value, sizeof(value), 0, &value_ptr);
+ bpf_cgroup_read_xattr(cgroup, "user.bpf_test",
+ &value_ptr);
+}
+
+SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(trusted_cgroup_ptr_sleepable)
+{
+ u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+ struct cgroup *cgrp;
+
+ cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+ if (!cgrp)
+ return 0;
+
+ read_xattr(cgrp);
+ bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("lsm/socket_connect")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(trusted_cgroup_ptr_non_sleepable)
+{
+ u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+ struct cgroup *cgrp;
+
+ cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+ if (!cgrp)
+ return 0;
+
+ read_xattr(cgrp);
+ bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("lsm/socket_connect")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(use_css_iter_non_sleepable)
+{
+ u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+ struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
+ struct cgroup *cgrp;
+
+ cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+ if (!cgrp)
+ return 0;
+
+ bpf_for_each(css, css, &cgrp->self, BPF_CGROUP_ITER_ANCESTORS_UP)
+ read_xattr(css->cgroup);
+
+ bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
+__failure __msg("expected an RCU CS")
+int BPF_PROG(use_css_iter_sleepable_missing_rcu_lock)
+{
+ u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+ struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
+ struct cgroup *cgrp;
+
+ cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+ if (!cgrp)
+ return 0;
+
+ bpf_for_each(css, css, &cgrp->self, BPF_CGROUP_ITER_ANCESTORS_UP)
+ read_xattr(css->cgroup);
+
+ bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(use_css_iter_sleepable_with_rcu_lock)
+{
+ u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+ struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
+ struct cgroup *cgrp;
+
+ bpf_rcu_read_lock();
+ cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+ if (!cgrp)
+ goto out;
+
+ bpf_for_each(css, css, &cgrp->self, BPF_CGROUP_ITER_ANCESTORS_UP)
+ read_xattr(css->cgroup);
+
+ bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+out:
+ bpf_rcu_read_unlock();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("lsm/socket_connect")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(use_bpf_cgroup_ancestor)
+{
+ u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+ struct cgroup *cgrp, *ancestor;
+
+ cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+ if (!cgrp)
+ return 0;
+
+ ancestor = bpf_cgroup_ancestor(cgrp, 1);
+ if (!ancestor)
+ goto out;
+
+ read_xattr(cgrp);
+ bpf_cgroup_release(ancestor);
+out:
+ bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("cgroup/sendmsg4")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(cgroup_skb)
+{
+ u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+ struct cgroup *cgrp, *ancestor;
+
+ cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+ if (!cgrp)
+ return 0;
+
+ ancestor = bpf_cgroup_ancestor(cgrp, 1);
+ if (!ancestor)
+ goto out;
+
+ read_xattr(cgrp);
+ bpf_cgroup_release(ancestor);
+out:
+ bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/compute_live_registers.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/compute_live_registers.c
index f3d79aecbf93..6884ab99a421 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/compute_live_registers.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/compute_live_registers.c
@@ -240,6 +240,22 @@ __naked void if2(void)
::: __clobber_all);
}
+/* Verifier misses that r2 is alive if jset is not handled properly */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("2: 012....... (45) if r1 & 0x7 goto pc+1")
+__naked void if3_jset_bug(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = 1;"
+ "r2 = 2;"
+ "if r1 & 0x7 goto +1;"
+ "exit;"
+ "r0 = r2;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
SEC("socket")
__log_level(2)
__msg("0: .......... (b7) r1 = 0")
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c
index a0391f9da2d4..8315273cb900 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
#include "bpf_misc.h"
#include "errno.h"
+#define PAGE_SIZE_64K 65536
+
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
int pid, err, val;
@@ -611,11 +613,12 @@ int test_dynptr_copy_xdp(struct xdp_md *xdp)
struct bpf_dynptr ptr_buf, ptr_xdp;
char data[] = "qwertyuiopasdfghjkl";
char buf[32] = {'\0'};
- __u32 len = sizeof(data);
+ __u32 len = sizeof(data), xdp_data_size;
int i, chunks = 200;
/* ptr_xdp is backed by non-contiguous memory */
bpf_dynptr_from_xdp(xdp, 0, &ptr_xdp);
+ xdp_data_size = bpf_dynptr_size(&ptr_xdp);
bpf_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr(&ringbuf, len * chunks, 0, &ptr_buf);
/* Destination dynptr is backed by non-contiguous memory */
@@ -673,7 +676,7 @@ int test_dynptr_copy_xdp(struct xdp_md *xdp)
goto out;
}
- if (bpf_dynptr_copy(&ptr_xdp, 2000, &ptr_xdp, 0, len * chunks) != -E2BIG)
+ if (bpf_dynptr_copy(&ptr_xdp, xdp_data_size - 3000, &ptr_xdp, 0, len * chunks) != -E2BIG)
err = 1;
out:
@@ -681,6 +684,173 @@ out:
return XDP_DROP;
}
+char memset_zero_data[] = "data to be zeroed";
+
+SEC("?tp/syscalls/sys_enter_nanosleep")
+int test_dynptr_memset_zero(void *ctx)
+{
+ __u32 data_sz = sizeof(memset_zero_data);
+ char zeroes[32] = {'\0'};
+ struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
+
+ err = bpf_dynptr_from_mem(memset_zero_data, data_sz, 0, &ptr);
+ err = err ?: bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr, 0, data_sz, 0);
+ err = err ?: bpf_memcmp(zeroes, memset_zero_data, data_sz);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define DYNPTR_MEMSET_VAL 42
+
+char memset_notzero_data[] = "data to be overwritten";
+
+SEC("?tp/syscalls/sys_enter_nanosleep")
+int test_dynptr_memset_notzero(void *ctx)
+{
+ u32 data_sz = sizeof(memset_notzero_data);
+ struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
+ char expected[32];
+
+ __builtin_memset(expected, DYNPTR_MEMSET_VAL, data_sz);
+
+ err = bpf_dynptr_from_mem(memset_notzero_data, data_sz, 0, &ptr);
+ err = err ?: bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr, 0, data_sz, DYNPTR_MEMSET_VAL);
+ err = err ?: bpf_memcmp(expected, memset_notzero_data, data_sz);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+char memset_zero_offset_data[] = "data to be zeroed partially";
+
+SEC("?tp/syscalls/sys_enter_nanosleep")
+int test_dynptr_memset_zero_offset(void *ctx)
+{
+ char expected[] = "data to \0\0\0\0eroed partially";
+ __u32 data_sz = sizeof(memset_zero_offset_data);
+ struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
+
+ err = bpf_dynptr_from_mem(memset_zero_offset_data, data_sz, 0, &ptr);
+ err = err ?: bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr, 8, 4, 0);
+ err = err ?: bpf_memcmp(expected, memset_zero_offset_data, data_sz);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+char memset_zero_adjusted_data[] = "data to be zeroed partially";
+
+SEC("?tp/syscalls/sys_enter_nanosleep")
+int test_dynptr_memset_zero_adjusted(void *ctx)
+{
+ char expected[] = "data\0\0\0\0be zeroed partially";
+ __u32 data_sz = sizeof(memset_zero_adjusted_data);
+ struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
+
+ err = bpf_dynptr_from_mem(memset_zero_adjusted_data, data_sz, 0, &ptr);
+ err = err ?: bpf_dynptr_adjust(&ptr, 4, 8);
+ err = err ?: bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr, 0, bpf_dynptr_size(&ptr), 0);
+ err = err ?: bpf_memcmp(expected, memset_zero_adjusted_data, data_sz);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+char memset_overflow_data[] = "memset overflow data";
+
+SEC("?tp/syscalls/sys_enter_nanosleep")
+int test_dynptr_memset_overflow(void *ctx)
+{
+ __u32 data_sz = sizeof(memset_overflow_data);
+ struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
+ int ret;
+
+ err = bpf_dynptr_from_mem(memset_overflow_data, data_sz, 0, &ptr);
+ ret = bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr, 0, data_sz + 1, 0);
+ if (ret != -E2BIG)
+ err = 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("?tp/syscalls/sys_enter_nanosleep")
+int test_dynptr_memset_overflow_offset(void *ctx)
+{
+ __u32 data_sz = sizeof(memset_overflow_data);
+ struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
+ int ret;
+
+ err = bpf_dynptr_from_mem(memset_overflow_data, data_sz, 0, &ptr);
+ ret = bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr, 1, data_sz, 0);
+ if (ret != -E2BIG)
+ err = 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("?cgroup_skb/egress")
+int test_dynptr_memset_readonly(struct __sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
+ int ret;
+
+ err = bpf_dynptr_from_skb(skb, 0, &ptr);
+
+ /* cgroup skbs are read only, memset should fail */
+ ret = bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr, 0, bpf_dynptr_size(&ptr), 0);
+ if (ret != -EINVAL)
+ err = 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define min_t(type, x, y) ({ \
+ type __x = (x); \
+ type __y = (y); \
+ __x < __y ? __x : __y; })
+
+SEC("xdp")
+int test_dynptr_memset_xdp_chunks(struct xdp_md *xdp)
+{
+ u32 data_sz, chunk_sz, offset = 0;
+ const int max_chunks = 200;
+ struct bpf_dynptr ptr_xdp;
+ char expected_buf[32];
+ char buf[32];
+ int i;
+
+ __builtin_memset(expected_buf, DYNPTR_MEMSET_VAL, sizeof(expected_buf));
+
+ /* ptr_xdp is backed by non-contiguous memory */
+ bpf_dynptr_from_xdp(xdp, 0, &ptr_xdp);
+ data_sz = bpf_dynptr_size(&ptr_xdp);
+
+ err = bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr_xdp, 0, data_sz, DYNPTR_MEMSET_VAL);
+ if (err) {
+ /* bpf_dynptr_memset() eventually called bpf_xdp_pointer()
+ * where if data_sz is greater than 0xffff, -EFAULT will be
+ * returned. For 64K page size, data_sz is greater than
+ * 64K, so error is expected and let us zero out error and
+ * return success.
+ */
+ if (data_sz >= PAGE_SIZE_64K)
+ err = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ bpf_for(i, 0, max_chunks) {
+ offset = i * sizeof(buf);
+ if (offset >= data_sz)
+ goto out;
+ chunk_sz = min_t(u32, sizeof(buf), data_sz - offset);
+ err = bpf_dynptr_read(&buf, chunk_sz, &ptr_xdp, offset, 0);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = bpf_memcmp(buf, expected_buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+out:
+ return XDP_DROP;
+}
+
void *user_ptr;
/* Contains the copy of the data pointed by user_ptr.
* Size 384 to make it not fit into a single kernel chunk when copying
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fexit_noreturns.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fexit_noreturns.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 54654539f550..000000000000
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fexit_noreturns.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-
-#include <linux/bpf.h>
-#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
-#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
-#include "bpf_misc.h"
-
-char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-
-SEC("fexit/do_exit")
-__failure __msg("Attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn functions is rejected.")
-int BPF_PROG(noreturns)
-{
- return 0;
-}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c
index 76adf4a8f2da..7dd92a303bf6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c
@@ -1649,4 +1649,281 @@ int clean_live_states(const void *ctx)
return 0;
}
+SEC("?raw_tp")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__failure __msg("misaligned stack access off 0+-31+0 size 8")
+__naked int absent_mark_in_the_middle_state(void)
+{
+ /* This is equivalent to C program below.
+ *
+ * r8 = bpf_get_prandom_u32();
+ * r6 = -32;
+ * bpf_iter_num_new(&fp[-8], 0, 10);
+ * if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
+ * r6 = -31;
+ * while (bpf_iter_num_next(&fp[-8])) {
+ * if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
+ * *(fp + r6) = 7;
+ * }
+ * bpf_iter_num_destroy(&fp[-8])
+ * return 0
+ */
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "r8 = r0;"
+ "r7 = 0;"
+ "r6 = -32;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r0;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "r2 = 0;"
+ "r3 = 10;"
+ "call %[bpf_iter_num_new];"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 == r8 goto change_r6_%=;"
+ "loop_%=:"
+ "call noop;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call %[bpf_iter_num_next];"
+ "if r0 == 0 goto loop_end_%=;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 == r8 goto use_r6_%=;"
+ "goto loop_%=;"
+ "loop_end_%=:"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call %[bpf_iter_num_destroy];"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ "use_r6_%=:"
+ "r0 = r10;"
+ "r0 += r6;"
+ "r1 = 7;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r0 + 0) = r1;"
+ "goto loop_%=;"
+ "change_r6_%=:"
+ "r6 = -31;"
+ "goto loop_%=;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_iter_num_new),
+ __imm(bpf_iter_num_next),
+ __imm(bpf_iter_num_destroy),
+ __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all
+ );
+}
+
+__used __naked
+static int noop(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ );
+}
+
+SEC("?raw_tp")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__failure __msg("misaligned stack access off 0+-31+0 size 8")
+__naked int absent_mark_in_the_middle_state2(void)
+{
+ /* This is equivalent to C program below.
+ *
+ * r8 = bpf_get_prandom_u32();
+ * r6 = -32;
+ * bpf_iter_num_new(&fp[-8], 0, 10);
+ * if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32())) {
+ * r6 = -31;
+ * jump_into_loop:
+ * goto +0;
+ * goto loop;
+ * }
+ * if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
+ * goto jump_into_loop;
+ * loop:
+ * while (bpf_iter_num_next(&fp[-8])) {
+ * if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
+ * *(fp + r6) = 7;
+ * }
+ * bpf_iter_num_destroy(&fp[-8])
+ * return 0
+ */
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "r8 = r0;"
+ "r7 = 0;"
+ "r6 = -32;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r0;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "r2 = 0;"
+ "r3 = 10;"
+ "call %[bpf_iter_num_new];"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 == r8 goto change_r6_%=;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 == r8 goto jump_into_loop_%=;"
+ "loop_%=:"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call %[bpf_iter_num_next];"
+ "if r0 == 0 goto loop_end_%=;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 == r8 goto use_r6_%=;"
+ "goto loop_%=;"
+ "loop_end_%=:"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call %[bpf_iter_num_destroy];"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ "use_r6_%=:"
+ "r0 = r10;"
+ "r0 += r6;"
+ "r1 = 7;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r0 + 0) = r1;"
+ "goto loop_%=;"
+ "change_r6_%=:"
+ "r6 = -31;"
+ "jump_into_loop_%=: "
+ "goto +0;"
+ "goto loop_%=;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_iter_num_new),
+ __imm(bpf_iter_num_next),
+ __imm(bpf_iter_num_destroy),
+ __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all
+ );
+}
+
+SEC("?raw_tp")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__failure __msg("misaligned stack access off 0+-31+0 size 8")
+__naked int absent_mark_in_the_middle_state3(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * bpf_iter_num_new(&fp[-8], 0, 10)
+ * loop1(-32, &fp[-8])
+ * loop1_wrapper(&fp[-8])
+ * bpf_iter_num_destroy(&fp[-8])
+ */
+ asm volatile (
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "r2 = 0;"
+ "r3 = 10;"
+ "call %[bpf_iter_num_new];"
+ /* call #1 */
+ "r1 = -32;"
+ "r2 = r10;"
+ "r2 += -8;"
+ "call loop1;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call %[bpf_iter_num_destroy];"
+ /* call #2 */
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "r2 = 0;"
+ "r3 = 10;"
+ "call %[bpf_iter_num_new];"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call loop1_wrapper;"
+ /* return */
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call %[bpf_iter_num_destroy];"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_iter_num_new),
+ __imm(bpf_iter_num_destroy),
+ __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all
+ );
+}
+
+__used __naked
+static int loop1(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * int loop1(num, iter) {
+ * r6 = num;
+ * r7 = iter;
+ * while (bpf_iter_num_next(r7)) {
+ * if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
+ * *(fp + r6) = 7;
+ * }
+ * return 0
+ * }
+ */
+ asm volatile (
+ "r6 = r1;"
+ "r7 = r2;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "r8 = r0;"
+ "loop_%=:"
+ "r1 = r7;"
+ "call %[bpf_iter_num_next];"
+ "if r0 == 0 goto loop_end_%=;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 == r8 goto use_r6_%=;"
+ "goto loop_%=;"
+ "loop_end_%=:"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ "use_r6_%=:"
+ "r0 = r10;"
+ "r0 += r6;"
+ "r1 = 7;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r0 + 0) = r1;"
+ "goto loop_%=;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_iter_num_next),
+ __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all
+ );
+}
+
+__used __naked
+static int loop1_wrapper(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * int loop1_wrapper(iter) {
+ * r6 = -32;
+ * r7 = iter;
+ * if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
+ * r6 = -31;
+ * loop1(r6, r7);
+ * return 0;
+ * }
+ */
+ asm volatile (
+ "r6 = -32;"
+ "r7 = r1;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "r8 = r0;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 == r8 goto change_r6_%=;"
+ "loop_%=:"
+ "r1 = r6;"
+ "r2 = r7;"
+ "call loop1;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ "change_r6_%=:"
+ "r6 = -31;"
+ "goto loop_%=;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_iter_num_next),
+ __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all
+ );
+}
+
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4f94c971ae86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_core_read.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+#include "../test_kmods/bpf_testmod_kfunc.h"
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__success
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) ; R7_w=ptr_nameidata(off={{[0-9]+}}) R8_w=rdonly_untrusted_mem(sz=0)")
+__msg("r9 = *(u8 *)(r8 +0) ; R8_w=rdonly_untrusted_mem(sz=0) R9_w=scalar")
+int btf_id_to_ptr_mem(void *ctx)
+{
+ struct task_struct *task;
+ struct nameidata *idata;
+ u64 ret, off;
+
+ task = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
+ idata = task->nameidata;
+ off = bpf_core_field_offset(struct nameidata, pathname);
+ /*
+ * asm block to have reliable match target for __msg, equivalent of:
+ * ret = task->nameidata->pathname[0];
+ */
+ asm volatile (
+ "r7 = %[idata];"
+ "r7 += %[off];"
+ "r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0);"
+ "r9 = *(u8 *)(r8 + 0);"
+ "%[ret] = r9;"
+ : [ret]"=r"(ret)
+ : [idata]"r"(idata),
+ [off]"r"(off)
+ : "r7", "r8", "r9");
+ return ret;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__retval(0)
+int ldx_is_ok_bad_addr(void *ctx)
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ if (!bpf_core_enum_value_exists(enum bpf_features, BPF_FEAT_RDONLY_CAST_TO_VOID))
+ return 42;
+
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+ return p[0x7fff];
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__retval(1)
+int ldx_is_ok_good_addr(void *ctx)
+{
+ int v, *p;
+
+ v = 1;
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(&v, 0);
+ return *p;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+int offset_not_tracked(void *ctx)
+{
+ int *p, i, s;
+
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+ s = 0;
+ bpf_for(i, 0, 1000 * 1000 * 1000) {
+ p++;
+ s += *p;
+ }
+ return s;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__failure
+__msg("cannot write into rdonly_untrusted_mem")
+int stx_not_ok(void *ctx)
+{
+ int v, *p;
+
+ v = 1;
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(&v, 0);
+ *p = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__failure
+__msg("cannot write into rdonly_untrusted_mem")
+int atomic_not_ok(void *ctx)
+{
+ int v, *p;
+
+ v = 1;
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(&v, 0);
+ __sync_fetch_and_add(p, 1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__failure
+__msg("cannot write into rdonly_untrusted_mem")
+int atomic_rmw_not_ok(void *ctx)
+{
+ long v, *p;
+
+ v = 1;
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(&v, 0);
+ return __sync_val_compare_and_swap(p, 0, 42);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__failure
+__msg("invalid access to memory, mem_size=0 off=0 size=4")
+__msg("R1 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+int kfunc_param_not_ok(void *ctx)
+{
+ int *p;
+
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+ bpf_kfunc_trusted_num_test(p);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("?fentry.s/" SYS_PREFIX "sys_getpgid")
+__failure
+__msg("R1 type=rdonly_untrusted_mem expected=")
+int helper_param_not_ok(void *ctx)
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+ /*
+ * Any helper with ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO constraint will do,
+ * the most permissive constraint
+ */
+ bpf_copy_from_user(p, 0, (void *)42);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static __noinline u64 *get_some_addr(void)
+{
+ if (bpf_get_prandom_u32())
+ return bpf_rdonly_cast(0, bpf_core_type_id_kernel(struct sock));
+ else
+ return bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__retval(0)
+int mixed_mem_type(void *ctx)
+{
+ u64 *p;
+
+ /* Try to avoid compiler hoisting load to if branches by using __noinline func. */
+ p = get_some_addr();
+ return *p;
+}
+
+__attribute__((__aligned__(8)))
+u8 global[] = {
+ 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44,
+ 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88,
+ 0x99
+};
+
+__always_inline
+static u64 combine(void *p)
+{
+ u64 acc;
+
+ acc = 0;
+#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__
+ acc |= (*(u64 *)p >> 56) << 24;
+ acc |= (*(u32 *)p >> 24) << 16;
+ acc |= (*(u16 *)p >> 8) << 8;
+ acc |= *(u8 *)p;
+#else
+ acc |= (*(u64 *)p & 0xff) << 24;
+ acc |= (*(u32 *)p & 0xff) << 16;
+ acc |= (*(u16 *)p & 0xff) << 8;
+ acc |= *(u8 *)p;
+#endif
+ return acc;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__retval(0x88442211)
+int diff_size_access(void *ctx)
+{
+ return combine(bpf_rdonly_cast(&global, 0));
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__retval(0x99553322)
+int misaligned_access(void *ctx)
+{
+ return combine(bpf_rdonly_cast(&global, 0) + 1);
+}
+
+__weak int return_one(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__retval(1)
+int null_check(void *ctx)
+{
+ int *p;
+
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+ if (p == 0)
+ /* make this a function call to avoid compiler
+ * moving r0 assignment before check.
+ */
+ return return_one();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree.c
index a3620c15c136..49fe93d7e059 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree.c
@@ -61,19 +61,19 @@ static long __add_three(struct bpf_rb_root *root, struct bpf_spin_lock *lock)
}
m->key = 1;
- bpf_spin_lock(&glock);
- bpf_rbtree_add(&groot, &n->node, less);
- bpf_rbtree_add(&groot, &m->node, less);
- bpf_spin_unlock(&glock);
+ bpf_spin_lock(lock);
+ bpf_rbtree_add(root, &n->node, less);
+ bpf_rbtree_add(root, &m->node, less);
+ bpf_spin_unlock(lock);
n = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*n));
if (!n)
return 3;
n->key = 3;
- bpf_spin_lock(&glock);
- bpf_rbtree_add(&groot, &n->node, less);
- bpf_spin_unlock(&glock);
+ bpf_spin_lock(lock);
+ bpf_rbtree_add(root, &n->node, less);
+ bpf_spin_unlock(lock);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c
index 43637ee2cdcd..3a868a199349 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c
@@ -16,10 +16,11 @@ struct {
__type(value, long);
} map_a SEC(".maps");
-__u32 user_data, key_serial, target_pid;
+__u32 user_data, target_pid;
+__s32 key_serial;
__u64 flags, task_storage_val, cgroup_id;
-struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__u32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
+struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__s32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *key) __ksym;
void bpf_rcu_read_lock(void) __ksym;
void bpf_rcu_read_unlock(void) __ksym;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/read_cgroupfs_xattr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/read_cgroupfs_xattr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..405adbe5e8b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/read_cgroupfs_xattr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_core_read.h>
+#include "bpf_experimental.h"
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+pid_t target_pid = 0;
+
+char xattr_value[64];
+static const char expected_value_a[] = "bpf_selftest_value_a";
+static const char expected_value_b[] = "bpf_selftest_value_b";
+bool found_value_a;
+bool found_value_b;
+
+SEC("lsm.s/file_open")
+int BPF_PROG(test_file_open)
+{
+ u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+ struct cgroup_subsys_state *css, *tmp;
+ struct bpf_dynptr value_ptr;
+ struct cgroup *cgrp;
+
+ if ((bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32) != target_pid)
+ return 0;
+
+ bpf_rcu_read_lock();
+ cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+ if (!cgrp) {
+ bpf_rcu_read_unlock();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ css = &cgrp->self;
+ bpf_dynptr_from_mem(xattr_value, sizeof(xattr_value), 0, &value_ptr);
+ bpf_for_each(css, tmp, css, BPF_CGROUP_ITER_ANCESTORS_UP) {
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = bpf_cgroup_read_xattr(tmp->cgroup, "user.bpf_test",
+ &value_ptr);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (ret == sizeof(expected_value_a) &&
+ !bpf_strncmp(xattr_value, sizeof(expected_value_a), expected_value_a))
+ found_value_a = true;
+ if (ret == sizeof(expected_value_b) &&
+ !bpf_strncmp(xattr_value, sizeof(expected_value_b), expected_value_b))
+ found_value_b = true;
+ }
+
+ bpf_rcu_read_unlock();
+ bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/security_bpf_map.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/security_bpf_map.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7216b3450e96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/security_bpf_map.c
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+#define EPERM 1 /* Operation not permitted */
+
+/* From include/linux/mm.h. */
+#define FMODE_WRITE 0x2
+
+struct map;
+
+struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
+ __type(key, __u32);
+ __type(value, __u32);
+ __uint(max_entries, 1);
+} prot_status_map SEC(".maps");
+
+struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
+ __type(key, __u32);
+ __type(value, __u32);
+ __uint(max_entries, 3);
+} prot_map SEC(".maps");
+
+struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
+ __type(key, __u32);
+ __type(value, __u32);
+ __uint(max_entries, 3);
+} not_prot_map SEC(".maps");
+
+SEC("fmod_ret/security_bpf_map")
+int BPF_PROG(fmod_bpf_map, struct bpf_map *map, int fmode)
+{
+ __u32 key = 0;
+ __u32 *status_ptr = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&prot_status_map, &key);
+
+ if (!status_ptr || !*status_ptr)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (map == &prot_map) {
+ /* Allow read-only access */
+ if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This program keeps references to maps. This is needed to prevent
+ * optimizing them out.
+ */
+SEC("fentry/bpf_fentry_test1")
+int BPF_PROG(fentry_dummy1, int a)
+{
+ __u32 key = 0;
+ __u32 val1 = a;
+ __u32 val2 = a + 1;
+
+ bpf_map_update_elem(&prot_map, &key, &val1, BPF_ANY);
+ bpf_map_update_elem(&not_prot_map, &key, &val2, BPF_ANY);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/set_global_vars.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/set_global_vars.c
index 90f5656c3991..ebaef28b2cb3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/set_global_vars.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/set_global_vars.c
@@ -7,22 +7,30 @@
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-enum Enum { EA1 = 0, EA2 = 11 };
+typedef __s32 s32;
+typedef s32 i32;
+typedef __u8 u8;
+
+enum Enum { EA1 = 0, EA2 = 11, EA3 = 10 };
enum Enumu64 {EB1 = 0llu, EB2 = 12llu };
enum Enums64 { EC1 = 0ll, EC2 = 13ll };
const volatile __s64 var_s64 = -1;
const volatile __u64 var_u64 = 0;
-const volatile __s32 var_s32 = -1;
+const volatile i32 var_s32 = -1;
const volatile __u32 var_u32 = 0;
const volatile __s16 var_s16 = -1;
const volatile __u16 var_u16 = 0;
const volatile __s8 var_s8 = -1;
-const volatile __u8 var_u8 = 0;
+const volatile u8 var_u8 = 0;
const volatile enum Enum var_ea = EA1;
const volatile enum Enumu64 var_eb = EB1;
const volatile enum Enums64 var_ec = EC1;
const volatile bool var_b = false;
+const volatile i32 arr[32];
+const volatile enum Enum enum_arr[32];
+const volatile i32 three_d[47][19][17];
+const volatile i32 *ptr_arr[32];
struct Struct {
int:16;
@@ -35,34 +43,38 @@ struct Struct {
volatile struct {
const int:1;
union {
- const volatile __u8 var_u8;
+ const volatile u8 var_u8[3];
const volatile __s16 filler3;
const int:1;
+ s32 mat[7][5];
} u;
};
- } struct2;
+ } struct2[2][4];
};
const volatile __u32 stru = 0; /* same prefix as below */
-const volatile struct Struct struct1 = {.struct2 = {.u = {.var_u8 = 1}}};
+const volatile struct Struct struct1[3];
+const volatile struct Struct struct11[11][7];
-union Union {
- __u16 var_u16;
- struct Struct3 {
- struct {
- __u8 var_u8_l;
- };
+struct Struct3 {
+ struct {
+ u8 var_u8_l;
+ };
+ struct {
struct {
- struct {
- __u8 var_u8_h;
- };
+ u8 var_u8_h;
};
- } struct3;
+ };
};
-const volatile union Union union1 = {.var_u16 = -1};
+typedef struct Struct3 Struct3_t;
-char arr[4] = {0};
+union Union {
+ __u16 var_u16;
+ Struct3_t struct3;
+};
+
+const volatile union Union union1 = {.var_u16 = -1};
SEC("socket")
int test_set_globals(void *ctx)
@@ -81,8 +93,14 @@ int test_set_globals(void *ctx)
a = var_eb;
a = var_ec;
a = var_b;
- a = struct1.struct2.u.var_u8;
+ a = struct1[2].struct2[1][2].u.var_u8[2];
a = union1.var_u16;
+ a = arr[3];
+ a = arr[EA2];
+ a = enum_arr[EC2];
+ a = three_d[31][7][EA2];
+ a = struct1[2].struct2[1][2].u.mat[5][3];
+ a = struct11[7][5].struct2[0][1].u.mat[3][0];
return a;
}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/sock_iter_batch.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/sock_iter_batch.c
index 8f483337e103..77966ded5467 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/sock_iter_batch.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/sock_iter_batch.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static bool ipv4_addr_loopback(__be32 a)
}
volatile const unsigned int sf;
+volatile const unsigned int ss;
volatile const __u16 ports[2];
unsigned int bucket[2];
@@ -42,16 +43,18 @@ int iter_tcp_soreuse(struct bpf_iter__tcp *ctx)
sock_cookie = bpf_get_socket_cookie(sk);
sk = bpf_core_cast(sk, struct sock);
if (sk->sk_family != sf ||
- sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN ||
- sk->sk_family == AF_INET6 ?
+ (ss && sk->sk_state != ss) ||
+ (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6 ?
!ipv6_addr_loopback(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr) :
- !ipv4_addr_loopback(sk->sk_rcv_saddr))
+ !ipv4_addr_loopback(sk->sk_rcv_saddr)))
return 0;
if (sk->sk_num == ports[0])
idx = 0;
else if (sk->sk_num == ports[1])
idx = 1;
+ else if (!ports[0] && !ports[1])
+ idx = 0;
else
return 0;
@@ -67,6 +70,27 @@ int iter_tcp_soreuse(struct bpf_iter__tcp *ctx)
return 0;
}
+volatile const __u64 destroy_cookie;
+
+SEC("iter/tcp")
+int iter_tcp_destroy(struct bpf_iter__tcp *ctx)
+{
+ struct sock_common *sk_common = (struct sock_common *)ctx->sk_common;
+ __u64 sock_cookie;
+
+ if (!sk_common)
+ return 0;
+
+ sock_cookie = bpf_get_socket_cookie(sk_common);
+ if (sock_cookie != destroy_cookie)
+ return 0;
+
+ bpf_sock_destroy(sk_common);
+ bpf_seq_write(ctx->meta->seq, &sock_cookie, sizeof(sock_cookie));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
#define udp_sk(ptr) container_of(ptr, struct udp_sock, inet.sk)
SEC("iter/udp")
@@ -83,15 +107,17 @@ int iter_udp_soreuse(struct bpf_iter__udp *ctx)
sock_cookie = bpf_get_socket_cookie(sk);
sk = bpf_core_cast(sk, struct sock);
if (sk->sk_family != sf ||
- sk->sk_family == AF_INET6 ?
+ (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6 ?
!ipv6_addr_loopback(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr) :
- !ipv4_addr_loopback(sk->sk_rcv_saddr))
+ !ipv4_addr_loopback(sk->sk_rcv_saddr)))
return 0;
if (sk->sk_num == ports[0])
idx = 0;
else if (sk->sk_num == ports[1])
idx = 1;
+ else if (!ports[0] && !ports[1])
+ idx = 0;
else
return 0;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..35790897dc87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+#include "bpf_experimental.h"
+
+struct arr_elem {
+ struct bpf_res_spin_lock lock;
+};
+
+struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
+ __uint(max_entries, 1);
+ __type(key, int);
+ __type(value, struct arr_elem);
+} arrmap SEC(".maps");
+
+#define ENOSPC 28
+#define _STR "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
+
+int size;
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int stream_exhaust(void *ctx)
+{
+ /* Use global variable for loop convergence. */
+ size = 0;
+ bpf_repeat(BPF_MAX_LOOPS) {
+ if (bpf_stream_printk(BPF_STDOUT, _STR) == -ENOSPC && size == 99954)
+ return 0;
+ size += sizeof(_STR) - 1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int stream_cond_break(void *ctx)
+{
+ while (can_loop)
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int stream_deadlock(void *ctx)
+{
+ struct bpf_res_spin_lock *lock, *nlock;
+
+ lock = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&arrmap, &(int){0});
+ if (!lock)
+ return 1;
+ nlock = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&arrmap, &(int){0});
+ if (!nlock)
+ return 1;
+ if (bpf_res_spin_lock(lock))
+ return 1;
+ if (bpf_res_spin_lock(nlock)) {
+ bpf_res_spin_unlock(lock);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ bpf_res_spin_unlock(nlock);
+ bpf_res_spin_unlock(lock);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int stream_syscall(void *ctx)
+{
+ bpf_stream_printk(BPF_STDOUT, "foo");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b4a0d0cc8ec8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_core_read.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed")
+int stream_vprintk_null_arg(void *ctx)
+{
+ bpf_stream_vprintk(BPF_STDOUT, "", NULL, 0, NULL);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__failure __msg("R3 type=scalar expected=")
+int stream_vprintk_scalar_arg(void *ctx)
+{
+ bpf_stream_vprintk(BPF_STDOUT, "", (void *)46, 0, NULL);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__failure __msg("arg#1 doesn't point to a const string")
+int stream_vprintk_string_arg(void *ctx)
+{
+ bpf_stream_vprintk(BPF_STDOUT, ctx, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..53af438bd998
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc.*/
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+#include "errno.h"
+
+char *user_ptr = (char *)1;
+char *invalid_kern_ptr = (char *)-1;
+
+/*
+ * When passing userspace pointers, the error code differs based on arch:
+ * -ERANGE on arches with non-overlapping address spaces
+ * -EFAULT on other arches
+ */
+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_arm) || defined(__TARGET_ARCH_loongarch) || \
+ defined(__TARGET_ARCH_powerpc) || defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86)
+#define USER_PTR_ERR -ERANGE
+#else
+#define USER_PTR_ERR -EFAULT
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * On s390, __get_kernel_nofault (used in string kfuncs) returns 0 for NULL and
+ * user_ptr (instead of causing an exception) so the below two groups of tests
+ * are not applicable.
+ */
+#ifndef __TARGET_ARCH_s390
+
+/* Passing NULL to string kfuncs (treated as a userspace ptr) */
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strcmp_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp(NULL, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strcmp_null2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp("hello", NULL); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strchr_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchr(NULL, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strchrnul_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchrnul(NULL, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strnchr_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnchr(NULL, 1, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strrchr_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strrchr(NULL, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strlen_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strlen(NULL); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strnlen_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnlen(NULL, 1); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strspn_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn(NULL, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strspn_null2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn("hello", NULL); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strcspn_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn(NULL, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strcspn_null2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn("hello", NULL); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strstr_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(NULL, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strstr_null2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr("hello", NULL); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strnstr_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(NULL, "hello", 1); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strnstr_null2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr("hello", NULL, 1); }
+
+/* Passing userspace ptr to string kfuncs */
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strcmp_user_ptr1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp(user_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strcmp_user_ptr2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp("hello", user_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strchr_user_ptr(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchr(user_ptr, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strchrnul_user_ptr(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchrnul(user_ptr, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strnchr_user_ptr(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnchr(user_ptr, 1, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strrchr_user_ptr(void *ctx) { return bpf_strrchr(user_ptr, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strlen_user_ptr(void *ctx) { return bpf_strlen(user_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strnlen_user_ptr(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnlen(user_ptr, 1); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strspn_user_ptr1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn(user_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strspn_user_ptr2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn("hello", user_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strcspn_user_ptr1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn(user_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strcspn_user_ptr2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn("hello", user_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strstr_user_ptr1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(user_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strstr_user_ptr2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr("hello", user_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strnstr_user_ptr1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(user_ptr, "hello", 1); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strnstr_user_ptr2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr("hello", user_ptr, 1); }
+
+#endif /* __TARGET_ARCH_s390 */
+
+/* Passing invalid kernel ptr to string kfuncs should always return -EFAULT */
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strcmp_pagefault1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp(invalid_kern_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strcmp_pagefault2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp("hello", invalid_kern_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strchr_pagefault(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchr(invalid_kern_ptr, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strchrnul_pagefault(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchrnul(invalid_kern_ptr, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strnchr_pagefault(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnchr(invalid_kern_ptr, 1, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strrchr_pagefault(void *ctx) { return bpf_strrchr(invalid_kern_ptr, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strlen_pagefault(void *ctx) { return bpf_strlen(invalid_kern_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strnlen_pagefault(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnlen(invalid_kern_ptr, 1); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strspn_pagefault1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn(invalid_kern_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strspn_pagefault2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn("hello", invalid_kern_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strcspn_pagefault1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn(invalid_kern_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strcspn_pagefault2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn("hello", invalid_kern_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strstr_pagefault1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(invalid_kern_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strstr_pagefault2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr("hello", invalid_kern_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strnstr_pagefault1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(invalid_kern_ptr, "hello", 1); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strnstr_pagefault2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr("hello", invalid_kern_ptr, 1); }
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..89fb4669b0e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc.*/
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+
+char long_str[XATTR_SIZE_MAX + 1];
+
+SEC("syscall") int test_strcmp_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp(long_str, long_str); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strchr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchr(long_str, 'b'); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strchrnul_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchrnul(long_str, 'b'); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strnchr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnchr(long_str, sizeof(long_str), 'b'); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strrchr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strrchr(long_str, 'b'); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strlen_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strlen(long_str); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strnlen_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnlen(long_str, sizeof(long_str)); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strspn_str_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn(long_str, "a"); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strspn_accept_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn("b", long_str); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strcspn_str_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn(long_str, "b"); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strcspn_reject_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn("b", long_str); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strstr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(long_str, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strnstr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(long_str, "hello", sizeof(long_str)); }
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..46697f381878
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc.*/
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+#include "errno.h"
+
+char str[] = "hello world";
+
+#define __test(retval) SEC("syscall") __success __retval(retval)
+
+/* Functional tests */
+__test(0) int test_strcmp_eq(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp(str, "hello world"); }
+__test(1) int test_strcmp_neq(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp(str, "hello"); }
+__test(1) int test_strchr_found(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchr(str, 'e'); }
+__test(11) int test_strchr_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchr(str, '\0'); }
+__test(-ENOENT) int test_strchr_notfound(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchr(str, 'x'); }
+__test(1) int test_strchrnul_found(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchrnul(str, 'e'); }
+__test(11) int test_strchrnul_notfound(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchrnul(str, 'x'); }
+__test(1) int test_strnchr_found(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnchr(str, 5, 'e'); }
+__test(11) int test_strnchr_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnchr(str, 12, '\0'); }
+__test(-ENOENT) int test_strnchr_notfound(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnchr(str, 5, 'w'); }
+__test(9) int test_strrchr_found(void *ctx) { return bpf_strrchr(str, 'l'); }
+__test(11) int test_strrchr_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strrchr(str, '\0'); }
+__test(-ENOENT) int test_strrchr_notfound(void *ctx) { return bpf_strrchr(str, 'x'); }
+__test(11) int test_strlen(void *ctx) { return bpf_strlen(str); }
+__test(11) int test_strnlen(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnlen(str, 12); }
+__test(5) int test_strspn(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn(str, "ehlo"); }
+__test(2) int test_strcspn(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn(str, "lo"); }
+__test(6) int test_strstr_found(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(str, "world"); }
+__test(-ENOENT) int test_strstr_notfound(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(str, "hi"); }
+__test(0) int test_strstr_empty(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(str, ""); }
+__test(0) int test_strnstr_found(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(str, "hello", 6); }
+__test(-ENOENT) int test_strnstr_notfound(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(str, "hi", 10); }
+__test(0) int test_strnstr_empty(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(str, "", 1); }
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack.c
index 0e4d2ff63ab8..dbe646013811 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86)
+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86) || defined(__TARGET_ARCH_arm64)
bool skip __attribute((__section__(".data"))) = false;
#else
bool skip = true;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_fail.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_fail.c
index 58d5d8dc2235..3d89ad7cbe2a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_fail.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_fail.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86)
+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86) || defined(__TARGET_ARCH_arm64)
bool skip __attribute((__section__(".data"))) = false;
#else
bool skip = true;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_recur.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_recur.c
index 31e58389bb8b..b1f6d7e5a8e5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_recur.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_recur.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86)
+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86) || defined(__TARGET_ARCH_arm64)
bool skip __attribute((__section__(".data"))) = false;
#else
bool skip = true;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_map_resize.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_map_resize.c
index a3f220ba7025..ee65bad0436d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_map_resize.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_map_resize.c
@@ -32,6 +32,16 @@ int my_int_last SEC(".data.array_not_last");
int percpu_arr[1] SEC(".data.percpu_arr");
+/* at least one extern is included, to ensure that a specific
+ * regression is tested whereby resizing resulted in a free-after-use
+ * bug after type information is invalidated by the resize operation.
+ *
+ * There isn't a particularly good API to test for this specific condition,
+ * but by having externs for the resizing tests it will cover this path.
+ */
+extern int LINUX_KERNEL_VERSION __kconfig;
+long version_sink;
+
SEC("tp/syscalls/sys_enter_getpid")
int bss_array_sum(void *ctx)
{
@@ -44,6 +54,9 @@ int bss_array_sum(void *ctx)
for (size_t i = 0; i < bss_array_len; ++i)
sum += array[i];
+ /* see above; ensure this is not optimized out */
+ version_sink = LINUX_KERNEL_VERSION;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -59,6 +72,9 @@ int data_array_sum(void *ctx)
for (size_t i = 0; i < data_array_len; ++i)
sum += my_array[i];
+ /* see above; ensure this is not optimized out */
+ version_sink = LINUX_KERNEL_VERSION;
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c
index cdbbb12f1491..1f7e1e59b073 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c
@@ -14,11 +14,11 @@
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
__u32 monitored_pid;
-__u32 key_serial;
+__s32 key_serial;
__u32 key_id;
__u64 flags;
-extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__u32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
+extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__s32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_system_key(__u64 id) __ksym;
extern void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *key) __ksym;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ringbuf_write.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ringbuf_write.c
index 350513c0e4c9..f063a0013f85 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ringbuf_write.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ringbuf_write.c
@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ int test_ringbuf_write(void *ctx)
if (cur_pid != pid)
return 0;
- sample1 = bpf_ringbuf_reserve(&ringbuf, 0x3000, 0);
+ sample1 = bpf_ringbuf_reserve(&ringbuf, 0x30000, 0);
if (!sample1)
return 0;
/* first one can pass */
- sample2 = bpf_ringbuf_reserve(&ringbuf, 0x3000, 0);
+ sample2 = bpf_ringbuf_reserve(&ringbuf, 0x30000, 0);
if (!sample2) {
bpf_ringbuf_discard(sample1, 0);
__sync_fetch_and_add(&discarded, 1);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c
index 8ef6b39335b6..34b30e2603f0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ char digest[MAGIC_SIZE + SIZEOF_STRUCT_FSVERITY_DIGEST + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
__u32 monitored_pid;
char sig[MAX_SIG_SIZE];
__u32 sig_size;
-__u32 user_keyring_serial;
+__s32 user_keyring_serial;
SEC("lsm.s/file_open")
int BPF_PROG(test_file_open, struct file *f)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_change_tail.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_change_tail.c
index 2796dd8545eb..1c7941a4ad00 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_change_tail.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_change_tail.c
@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/* Copyright (c) 2024 ByteDance */
-#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include "vmlinux.h"
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#ifndef PAGE_SIZE
+#define PAGE_SIZE __PAGE_SIZE
+#endif
+#define BPF_SKB_MAX_LEN (PAGE_SIZE << 2)
+
struct {
__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP);
__uint(max_entries, 1);
@@ -31,7 +36,7 @@ int prog_skb_verdict(struct __sk_buff *skb)
change_tail_ret = bpf_skb_change_tail(skb, skb->len + 1, 0);
return SK_PASS;
} else if (data[0] == 'E') { /* Error */
- change_tail_ret = bpf_skb_change_tail(skb, 65535, 0);
+ change_tail_ret = bpf_skb_change_tail(skb, BPF_SKB_MAX_LEN, 0);
return SK_PASS;
}
return SK_PASS;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_ktls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_ktls.c
index 8bdb9987c0c7..83df4919c224 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_ktls.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_ktls.c
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ int cork_byte;
int push_start;
int push_end;
int apply_bytes;
+int pop_start;
+int pop_end;
struct {
__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP);
@@ -22,6 +24,8 @@ int prog_sk_policy(struct sk_msg_md *msg)
bpf_msg_cork_bytes(msg, cork_byte);
if (push_start > 0 && push_end > 0)
bpf_msg_push_data(msg, push_start, push_end, 0);
+ if (pop_start >= 0 && pop_end > 0)
+ bpf_msg_pop_data(msg, pop_start, pop_end, 0);
return SK_PASS;
}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tc_change_tail.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tc_change_tail.c
index 28edafe803f0..fcba8299f0bc 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tc_change_tail.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tc_change_tail.c
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include "vmlinux.h"
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
-#include <linux/if_ether.h>
-#include <linux/in.h>
-#include <linux/ip.h>
-#include <linux/udp.h>
-#include <linux/pkt_cls.h>
+
+#ifndef PAGE_SIZE
+#define PAGE_SIZE __PAGE_SIZE
+#endif
+#define BPF_SKB_MAX_LEN (PAGE_SIZE << 2)
long change_tail_ret = 1;
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ int change_tail(struct __sk_buff *skb)
bpf_skb_change_tail(skb, len, 0);
return TCX_PASS;
} else if (payload[0] == 'E') { /* Error */
- change_tail_ret = bpf_skb_change_tail(skb, 65535, 0);
+ change_tail_ret = bpf_skb_change_tail(skb, BPF_SKB_MAX_LEN, 0);
return TCX_PASS;
} else if (payload[0] == 'Z') { /* Zero */
change_tail_ret = bpf_skb_change_tail(skb, 0, 0);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c
index e96d09e11115..ff8d755548b9 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
#define MAX_SIG_SIZE 1024
__u32 monitored_pid;
-__u32 user_keyring_serial;
+__s32 user_keyring_serial;
__u64 system_keyring_id;
struct data {
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow.c
index dc74d8cf9e3f..5904f45cfbc4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow.c
@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ int _xdp_adjust_tail_grow(struct xdp_md *xdp)
/* Data length determine test case */
if (data_len == 54) { /* sizeof(pkt_v4) */
- offset = 4096; /* test too large offset */
+ offset = 4096; /* test too large offset, 4k page size */
+ } else if (data_len == 53) { /* sizeof(pkt_v4) - 1 */
+ offset = 65536; /* test too large offset, 64k page size */
} else if (data_len == 74) { /* sizeof(pkt_v6) */
offset = 40;
} else if (data_len == 64) {
@@ -31,6 +33,10 @@ int _xdp_adjust_tail_grow(struct xdp_md *xdp)
offset = 10;
} else if (data_len == 9001) {
offset = 4096;
+ } else if (data_len == 90000) {
+ offset = 10; /* test a small offset, 64k page size */
+ } else if (data_len == 90001) {
+ offset = 65536; /* test too large offset, 64k page size */
} else {
return XDP_ABORTED; /* No matching test */
}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tracing_failure.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tracing_failure.c
index d41665d2ec8c..65e485c4468c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tracing_failure.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tracing_failure.c
@@ -18,3 +18,15 @@ int BPF_PROG(test_spin_unlock, struct bpf_spin_lock *lock)
{
return 0;
}
+
+SEC("?fentry/__rcu_read_lock")
+int BPF_PROG(tracing_deny)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("?fexit/do_exit")
+int BPF_PROG(fexit_noreturns)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_and.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_and.c
index e97e518516b6..2b4fdca162be 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_and.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_and.c
@@ -85,8 +85,14 @@ l0_%=: r0 = r0; \
SEC("socket")
__description("check known subreg with unknown reg")
-__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 !read_ok")
+__success __success_unpriv
__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if w0 < 0x1 goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R1 !read_ok'` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* `r1 = *(u32*)(r1 + 512)`, sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("r0 = 0")
+#endif
__naked void known_subreg_with_unknown_reg(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena.c
index 67509c5d3982..7f4827eede3c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#define BPF_NO_KFUNC_PROTOTYPES
#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <errno.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
#include "bpf_misc.h"
@@ -114,6 +115,111 @@ int basic_alloc3(void *ctx)
return 0;
}
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int basic_reserve1(void *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
+ char __arena *page;
+ int ret;
+
+ page = bpf_arena_alloc_pages(&arena, NULL, 1, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0);
+ if (!page)
+ return 1;
+
+ page += __PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /* Reserve the second page */
+ ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, page, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ return 2;
+
+ /* Try to explicitly allocate the reserved page. */
+ page = bpf_arena_alloc_pages(&arena, page, 1, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0);
+ if (page)
+ return 3;
+
+ /* Try to implicitly allocate the page (since there's only 2 of them). */
+ page = bpf_arena_alloc_pages(&arena, NULL, 1, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0);
+ if (page)
+ return 4;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int basic_reserve2(void *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
+ char __arena *page;
+ int ret;
+
+ page = arena_base(&arena);
+ ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, page, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ return 1;
+
+ page = bpf_arena_alloc_pages(&arena, page, 1, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0);
+ if ((u64)page)
+ return 2;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Reserve the same page twice, should return -EBUSY. */
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int reserve_twice(void *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
+ char __arena *page;
+ int ret;
+
+ page = arena_base(&arena);
+
+ ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, page, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ return 1;
+
+ ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, page, 1);
+ if (ret != -EBUSY)
+ return 2;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Try to reserve past the end of the arena. */
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int reserve_invalid_region(void *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
+ char __arena *page;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Try a NULL pointer. */
+ ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, NULL, 3);
+ if (ret != -EINVAL)
+ return 1;
+
+ page = arena_base(&arena);
+
+ ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, page, 3);
+ if (ret != -EINVAL)
+ return 2;
+
+ ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, page, 4096);
+ if (ret != -EINVAL)
+ return 3;
+
+ ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, page, (1ULL << 32) - 1);
+ if (ret != -EINVAL)
+ return 4;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
SEC("iter.s/bpf_map")
__success __log_level(2)
int iter_maps1(struct bpf_iter__bpf_map *ctx)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena_large.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena_large.c
index f94f30cf1bb8..9dbdf123542d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena_large.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena_large.c
@@ -67,6 +67,104 @@ int big_alloc1(void *ctx)
return 0;
}
+/* Try to access a reserved page. Behavior should be identical with accessing unallocated pages. */
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int access_reserved(void *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
+ volatile char __arena *page;
+ char __arena *base;
+ const size_t len = 4;
+ int ret, i;
+
+ /* Get a separate region of the arena. */
+ page = base = arena_base(&arena) + 16384 * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, base, len);
+ if (ret)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Try to dirty reserved memory. */
+ for (i = 0; i < len && can_loop; i++)
+ *page = 0x5a;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len && can_loop; i++) {
+ page = (volatile char __arena *)(base + i * PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * Error out in case either the write went through,
+ * or the address has random garbage.
+ */
+ if (*page == 0x5a)
+ return 2 + 2 * i;
+
+ if (*page)
+ return 2 + 2 * i + 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Try to allocate a region overlapping with a reservation. */
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int request_partially_reserved(void *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
+ volatile char __arena *page;
+ char __arena *base;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Add an arbitrary page offset. */
+ page = base = arena_base(&arena) + 4096 * __PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, base + 3 * __PAGE_SIZE, 4);
+ if (ret)
+ return 1;
+
+ page = bpf_arena_alloc_pages(&arena, base, 5, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0);
+ if ((u64)page != 0ULL)
+ return 2;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int free_reserved(void *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
+ char __arena *addr;
+ char __arena *page;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Add an arbitrary page offset. */
+ addr = arena_base(&arena) + 32768 * __PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ page = bpf_arena_alloc_pages(&arena, addr, 2, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0);
+ if (!page)
+ return 1;
+
+ ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, addr + 2 * __PAGE_SIZE, 2);
+ if (ret)
+ return 2;
+
+ /*
+ * Reserved and allocated pages should be interchangeable for
+ * bpf_arena_free_pages(). Free a reserved and an allocated
+ * page with a single call.
+ */
+ bpf_arena_free_pages(&arena, addr + __PAGE_SIZE , 2);
+
+ /* The free call above should have succeeded, so this allocation should too. */
+ page = bpf_arena_alloc_pages(&arena, addr + __PAGE_SIZE, 2, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0);
+ if (!page)
+ return 3;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
#if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
#define PAGE_CNT 100
__u8 __arena * __arena page[PAGE_CNT]; /* occupies the first page */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
index 0eb33bb801b5..87a2c60d86e6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
/* Converted from tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c */
#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <../../../include/linux/filter.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
#include "bpf_misc.h"
@@ -620,8 +621,14 @@ l1_%=: exit; \
SEC("socket")
__description("bounds check mixed 32bit and 64bit arithmetic. test1")
-__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
+__success __success_unpriv
__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("exit")
+#endif
__naked void _32bit_and_64bit_arithmetic_test1(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -643,8 +650,14 @@ l1_%=: exit; \
SEC("socket")
__description("bounds check mixed 32bit and 64bit arithmetic. test2")
-__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
+__success __success_unpriv
__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("exit")
+#endif
__naked void _32bit_and_64bit_arithmetic_test2(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -691,9 +704,14 @@ l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
SEC("socket")
__description("bounds check for reg = 0, reg xor 1")
-__success __failure_unpriv
-__msg_unpriv("R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+__success __success_unpriv
__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if r1 != 0x0 goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("r0 = 0")
+#endif
__naked void reg_0_reg_xor_1(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -719,9 +737,14 @@ l1_%=: r0 = 0; \
SEC("socket")
__description("bounds check for reg32 = 0, reg32 xor 1")
-__success __failure_unpriv
-__msg_unpriv("R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+__success __success_unpriv
__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if w1 != 0x0 goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("r0 = 0")
+#endif
__naked void reg32_0_reg32_xor_1(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -747,9 +770,14 @@ l1_%=: r0 = 0; \
SEC("socket")
__description("bounds check for reg = 2, reg xor 3")
-__success __failure_unpriv
-__msg_unpriv("R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+__success __success_unpriv
__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if r1 > 0x0 goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("r0 = 0")
+#endif
__naked void reg_2_reg_xor_3(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -829,9 +857,14 @@ l1_%=: r0 = 0; \
SEC("socket")
__description("bounds check for reg > 0, reg xor 3")
-__success __failure_unpriv
-__msg_unpriv("R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+__success __success_unpriv
__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if r1 >= 0x0 goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("r0 = 0")
+#endif
__naked void reg_0_reg_xor_3(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -858,9 +891,14 @@ l1_%=: r0 = 0; \
SEC("socket")
__description("bounds check for reg32 > 0, reg32 xor 3")
-__success __failure_unpriv
-__msg_unpriv("R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+__success __success_unpriv
__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if w1 >= 0x0 goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("r0 = 0")
+#endif
__naked void reg32_0_reg32_xor_3(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -1028,7 +1066,7 @@ l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
SEC("xdp")
__description("bound check with JMP_JSLT for crossing 64-bit signed boundary")
__success __retval(0)
-__flag(!BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS) /* known invariants violation */
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS)
__naked void crossing_64_bit_signed_boundary_2(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -1334,4 +1372,300 @@ __naked void mult_sign_ovf(void)
__imm(bpf_skb_store_bytes)
: __clobber_all);
}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("64-bit addition, all outcomes overflow")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("5: (0f) r3 += r3 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar(umin=0x4000000000000000,umax=0xfffffffffffffffe)")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void add64_full_overflow(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "r4 = r0;"
+ "r3 = 0xa000000000000000 ll;"
+ "r3 |= r4;"
+ "r3 += r3;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("64-bit addition, partial overflow, result in unbounded reg")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("4: (0f) r3 += r3 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar()")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void add64_partial_overflow(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "r4 = r0;"
+ "r3 = 2;"
+ "r3 |= r4;"
+ "r3 += r3;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("32-bit addition overflow, all outcomes overflow")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("4: (0c) w3 += w3 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=0x40000000,smax=umax=umax32=0xfffffffe,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void add32_full_overflow(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "w4 = w0;"
+ "w3 = 0xa0000000;"
+ "w3 |= w4;"
+ "w3 += w3;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("32-bit addition, partial overflow, result in unbounded u32 bounds")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("4: (0c) w3 += w3 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0xffffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void add32_partial_overflow(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "w4 = w0;"
+ "w3 = 2;"
+ "w3 |= w4;"
+ "w3 += w3;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("64-bit subtraction, all outcomes underflow")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("6: (1f) r3 -= r1 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar(umin=1,umax=0x8000000000000000)")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void sub64_full_overflow(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "r1 = r0;"
+ "r2 = 0x8000000000000000 ll;"
+ "r1 |= r2;"
+ "r3 = 0;"
+ "r3 -= r1;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("64-bit subtraction, partial overflow, result in unbounded reg")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("3: (1f) r3 -= r2 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar()")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void sub64_partial_overflow(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "r3 = r0;"
+ "r2 = 1;"
+ "r3 -= r2;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("32-bit subtraction overflow, all outcomes underflow")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("5: (1c) w3 -= w1 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=1,smax=umax=umax32=0x80000000,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void sub32_full_overflow(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "w1 = w0;"
+ "w2 = 0x80000000;"
+ "w1 |= w2;"
+ "w3 = 0;"
+ "w3 -= w1;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("32-bit subtraction, partial overflow, result in unbounded u32 bounds")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("3: (1c) w3 -= w2 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0xffffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void sub32_partial_overflow(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "w3 = w0;"
+ "w2 = 1;"
+ "w3 -= w2;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("dead branch on jset, does not result in invariants violation error")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__retval(0) __flag(BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS)
+__naked void jset_range_analysis(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ call %[bpf_get_netns_cookie]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ if r0 & 0xffffffff goto +0; \
+l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_netns_cookie)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* This test covers the bounds deduction on 64bits when the s64 and u64 ranges
+ * overlap on the negative side. At instruction 7, the ranges look as follows:
+ *
+ * 0 umin=0xfffffcf1 umax=0xff..ff6e U64_MAX
+ * | [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] |
+ * |----------------------------|------------------------------|
+ * |xxxxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxxxxxxx|
+ * 0 smax=0xeffffeee smin=-655 -1
+ *
+ * We should therefore deduce the following new bounds:
+ *
+ * 0 u64=[0xff..ffd71;0xff..ff6e] U64_MAX
+ * | [xxx] |
+ * |----------------------------|------------------------------|
+ * | [xxx] |
+ * 0 s64=[-655;-146] -1
+ *
+ * Without the deduction cross sign boundary, we end up with an invariant
+ * violation error.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__description("bounds deduction cross sign boundary, negative overlap")
+__success __log_level(2) __flag(BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS)
+__msg("7: (1f) r0 -= r6 {{.*}} R0=scalar(smin=smin32=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,umin32=0xfffffd71,umax32=0xffffff6e,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffc00; 0x3ff))")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void bounds_deduct_negative_overlap(void)
+{
+ asm volatile(" \
+ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
+ w3 = w0; \
+ w6 = (s8)w0; \
+ r0 = (s8)r0; \
+ if w6 >= 0xf0000000 goto l0_%=; \
+ r0 += r6; \
+ r6 += 400; \
+ r0 -= r6; \
+ if r3 < r0 goto l0_%=; \
+l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* This test covers the bounds deduction on 64bits when the s64 and u64 ranges
+ * overlap on the positive side. At instruction 3, the ranges look as follows:
+ *
+ * 0 umin=0 umax=0xffffffffffffff00 U64_MAX
+ * [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] |
+ * |----------------------------|------------------------------|
+ * |xxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxxx|
+ * 0 smax=127 smin=-128 -1
+ *
+ * We should therefore deduce the following new bounds:
+ *
+ * 0 u64=[0;127] U64_MAX
+ * [xxxxxxxx] |
+ * |----------------------------|------------------------------|
+ * [xxxxxxxx] |
+ * 0 s64=[0;127] -1
+ *
+ * Without the deduction cross sign boundary, the program is rejected due to
+ * the frame pointer write.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__description("bounds deduction cross sign boundary, positive overlap")
+__success __log_level(2) __flag(BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS)
+__msg("3: (2d) if r0 > r1 {{.*}} R0_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=127,var_off=(0x0; 0x7f))")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void bounds_deduct_positive_overlap(void)
+{
+ asm volatile(" \
+ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
+ r0 = (s8)r0; \
+ r1 = 0xffffffffffffff00; \
+ if r0 > r1 goto l0_%=; \
+ if r0 < 128 goto l0_%=; \
+ r10 = 0; \
+l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* This test is the same as above, but the s64 and u64 ranges overlap in two
+ * places. At instruction 3, the ranges look as follows:
+ *
+ * 0 umin=0 umax=0xffffffffffffff80 U64_MAX
+ * [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] |
+ * |----------------------------|------------------------------|
+ * |xxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxxx|
+ * 0 smax=127 smin=-128 -1
+ *
+ * 0xffffffffffffff80 = (u64)-128. We therefore can't deduce anything new and
+ * the program should fail due to the frame pointer write.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__description("bounds deduction cross sign boundary, two overlaps")
+__failure __flag(BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS)
+__msg("3: (2d) if r0 > r1 {{.*}} R0_w=scalar(smin=smin32=-128,smax=smax32=127,umax=0xffffffffffffff80)")
+__msg("frame pointer is read only")
+__naked void bounds_deduct_two_overlaps(void)
+{
+ asm volatile(" \
+ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
+ r0 = (s8)r0; \
+ r1 = 0xffffffffffffff80; \
+ if r0 > r1 goto l0_%=; \
+ if r0 < 128 goto l0_%=; \
+ r10 = 0; \
+l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds_deduction.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds_deduction.c
index c506afbdd936..260a6df264e3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds_deduction.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds_deduction.c
@@ -159,13 +159,16 @@ __failure_unpriv
__naked void deducing_bounds_from_const_10(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
+ r6 = r1; \
r0 = 0; \
if r0 s<= 0 goto l0_%=; \
-l0_%=: /* Marks reg as unknown. */ \
- r0 = -r0; \
- r0 -= r1; \
+l0_%=: /* Marks r0 as unknown. */ \
+ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
+ r0 -= r6; \
exit; \
-" ::: __clobber_all);
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ctx.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ctx.c
index a83809a1dbbf..0450840c92d9 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ctx.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ctx.c
@@ -218,4 +218,29 @@ __naked void null_check_8_null_bind(void)
: __clobber_all);
}
+#define narrow_load(type, ctx, field) \
+ SEC(type) \
+ __description("narrow load on field " #field " of " #ctx) \
+ __failure __msg("invalid bpf_context access") \
+ __naked void invalid_narrow_load##ctx##field(void) \
+ { \
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + %[off]); \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit;" \
+ : \
+ : __imm_const(off, offsetof(struct ctx, field) + 4) \
+ : __clobber_all); \
+ }
+
+narrow_load("cgroup/getsockopt", bpf_sockopt, sk);
+narrow_load("cgroup/getsockopt", bpf_sockopt, optval);
+narrow_load("cgroup/getsockopt", bpf_sockopt, optval_end);
+narrow_load("tc", __sk_buff, sk);
+narrow_load("cgroup/bind4", bpf_sock_addr, sk);
+narrow_load("sockops", bpf_sock_ops, sk);
+narrow_load("sockops", bpf_sock_ops, skb_data);
+narrow_load("sockops", bpf_sock_ops, skb_data_end);
+narrow_load("sockops", bpf_sock_ops, skb_hwtstamp);
+
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_overflow.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_overflow.c
index 458984da804c..34e0c012ee76 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_overflow.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_overflow.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ l0_%=: exit; \
SEC("tc")
__description("MOD32 overflow, check 1")
-__success __retval(INT_MIN)
+__success __retval(_INT_MIN)
__naked void mod32_overflow_check_1(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ __naked void mod32_overflow_check_1(void)
SEC("tc")
__description("MOD32 overflow, check 2")
-__success __retval(INT_MIN)
+__success __retval(_INT_MIN)
__naked void mod32_overflow_check_2(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c
index 4ab0ef18d7eb..181da86ba5f0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c
@@ -179,4 +179,132 @@ int BPF_PROG(trusted_acq_rel, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
return subprog_trusted_acq_rel(task);
}
+__weak int subprog_untrusted_bad_tags(struct task_struct *task __arg_untrusted __arg_nullable)
+{
+ return task->pid;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__failure
+__msg("arg#0 untrusted cannot be combined with any other tags")
+int untrusted_bad_tags(void *ctx)
+{
+ return subprog_untrusted_bad_tags(0);
+}
+
+struct local_type_wont_be_accepted {};
+
+__weak int subprog_untrusted_bad_type(struct local_type_wont_be_accepted *p __arg_untrusted)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__failure
+__msg("arg#0 reference type('STRUCT local_type_wont_be_accepted') has no matches")
+int untrusted_bad_type(void *ctx)
+{
+ return subprog_untrusted_bad_type(bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0));
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_untrusted(const volatile struct task_struct *restrict task __arg_untrusted)
+{
+ return task->pid;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__success
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("r1 = {{.*}}; {{.*}}R1_w=trusted_ptr_task_struct()")
+__msg("Func#1 ('subprog_untrusted') is global and assumed valid.")
+__msg("Validating subprog_untrusted() func#1...")
+__msg(": R1=untrusted_ptr_task_struct")
+int trusted_to_untrusted(void *ctx)
+{
+ return subprog_untrusted(bpf_get_current_task_btf());
+}
+
+char mem[16];
+u32 off;
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__success
+int anything_to_untrusted(void *ctx)
+{
+ /* untrusted to untrusted */
+ subprog_untrusted(bpf_core_cast(0, struct task_struct));
+ /* wrong type to untrusted */
+ subprog_untrusted((void *)bpf_core_cast(0, struct bpf_verifier_env));
+ /* map value to untrusted */
+ subprog_untrusted((void *)mem);
+ /* scalar to untrusted */
+ subprog_untrusted(0);
+ /* variable offset to untrusted (map) */
+ subprog_untrusted((void *)mem + off);
+ /* variable offset to untrusted (trusted) */
+ subprog_untrusted((void *)bpf_get_current_task_btf() + off);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_untrusted2(struct task_struct *task __arg_untrusted)
+{
+ return subprog_trusted_task_nullable(task);
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__failure
+__msg("R1 type=untrusted_ptr_ expected=ptr_, trusted_ptr_, rcu_ptr_")
+__msg("Caller passes invalid args into func#{{.*}} ('subprog_trusted_task_nullable')")
+int untrusted_to_trusted(void *ctx)
+{
+ return subprog_untrusted2(bpf_get_current_task_btf());
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_void_untrusted(void *p __arg_untrusted)
+{
+ return *(int *)p;
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_char_untrusted(char *p __arg_untrusted)
+{
+ return *(int *)p;
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_enum_untrusted(enum bpf_attach_type *p __arg_untrusted)
+{
+ return *(int *)p;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__success
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("r1 = {{.*}}; {{.*}}R1_w=trusted_ptr_task_struct()")
+__msg("Func#1 ('subprog_void_untrusted') is global and assumed valid.")
+__msg("Validating subprog_void_untrusted() func#1...")
+__msg(": R1=rdonly_untrusted_mem(sz=0)")
+int trusted_to_untrusted_mem(void *ctx)
+{
+ return subprog_void_untrusted(bpf_get_current_task_btf());
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__success
+int anything_to_untrusted_mem(void *ctx)
+{
+ /* untrusted to untrusted mem */
+ subprog_void_untrusted(bpf_core_cast(0, struct task_struct));
+ /* map value to untrusted mem */
+ subprog_void_untrusted(mem);
+ /* scalar to untrusted mem */
+ subprog_void_untrusted(0);
+ /* variable offset to untrusted mem (map) */
+ subprog_void_untrusted((void *)mem + off);
+ /* variable offset to untrusted mem (trusted) */
+ subprog_void_untrusted(bpf_get_current_task_btf() + off);
+ /* variable offset to untrusted char/enum (map) */
+ subprog_char_untrusted(mem + off);
+ subprog_enum_untrusted((void *)mem + off);
+ return 0;
+}
+
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
index 7d088ba99ea5..16b761e510f0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
@@ -139,4 +139,122 @@ __naked void on_the_inner_map_pointer(void)
: __clobber_all);
}
+SEC("socket")
+__description("map_ptr is never null")
+__success
+__naked void map_ptr_is_never_null(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ r1 = %[map_in_map] ll; \
+ if r1 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r10 = 42; \
+l0_%=: exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_in_map)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("map_ptr is never null inner")
+__success
+__naked void map_ptr_is_never_null_inner(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u32*)(r10 - 4) = r1; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -4; \
+ r1 = %[map_in_map] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r10 = 42; \
+l0_%=: exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_in_map)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("map_ptr is never null inner spill fill")
+__success
+__naked void map_ptr_is_never_null_inner_spill_fill(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u32*)(r10 - 4) = r1; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -4; \
+ r1 = %[map_in_map] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ exit; \
+l0_%=: *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0; \
+ r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16); \
+ if r1 == 0 goto l1_%=; \
+ exit; \
+l1_%=: r10 = 42; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_in_map)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS);
+ __uint(max_entries, 1);
+ __type(key, int);
+ __type(value, int);
+ __array(values, struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF);
+ __uint(max_entries, 64 * 1024);
+ });
+} rb_in_map SEC(".maps");
+
+struct rb_ctx {
+ void *rb;
+ struct bpf_dynptr dptr;
+};
+
+static __always_inline struct rb_ctx __rb_event_reserve(__u32 sz)
+{
+ struct rb_ctx rb_ctx = {};
+ void *rb;
+ __u32 cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id();
+ __u32 rb_slot = cpu & 1;
+
+ rb = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&rb_in_map, &rb_slot);
+ if (!rb)
+ return rb_ctx;
+
+ rb_ctx.rb = rb;
+ bpf_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr(rb, sz, 0, &rb_ctx.dptr);
+
+ return rb_ctx;
+}
+
+static __noinline void __rb_event_submit(struct rb_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ if (!ctx->rb)
+ return;
+
+ /* If the verifier (incorrectly) concludes that ctx->rb can be
+ * NULL at this point, we'll get "BPF_EXIT instruction in main
+ * prog would lead to reference leak" error
+ */
+ bpf_ringbuf_submit_dynptr(&ctx->dptr, 0);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+int map_ptr_is_never_null_rb(void *ctx)
+{
+ struct rb_ctx event_ctx = __rb_event_reserve(256);
+ __rb_event_submit(&event_ctx);
+ return 0;
+}
+
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_movsx.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_movsx.c
index 994bbc346d25..a4d8814eb5ed 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_movsx.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_movsx.c
@@ -245,7 +245,13 @@ l0_%=: \
SEC("socket")
__description("MOV32SX, S8, var_off not u32_max, positive after s8 extension")
__success __retval(0)
-__failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("frame pointer is read only")
+__success_unpriv
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("w0 = 0")
+__xlated_unpriv("exit")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `frame pointer is read only` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1")
+#endif
__naked void mov64sx_s32_varoff_2(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -267,7 +273,13 @@ l0_%=: \
SEC("socket")
__description("MOV32SX, S8, var_off not u32_max, negative after s8 extension")
__success __retval(0)
-__failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("frame pointer is read only")
+__success_unpriv
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("w0 = 0")
+__xlated_unpriv("exit")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `frame pointer is read only` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1")
+#endif
__naked void mov64sx_s32_varoff_3(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_precision.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_precision.c
index 9fe5d255ee37..73fee2aec698 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_precision.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_precision.c
@@ -231,4 +231,74 @@ __naked void bpf_cond_op_not_r10(void)
::: __clobber_all);
}
+SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=1")
+__msg("1: (84) w0 = -w0 ; R0_w=0xffffffff")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 2 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 1: (84) w0 = -w0")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 0: (b7) r0 = 1")
+__naked int bpf_neg_2(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * lsm.s/socket_connect requires a return value within [-4095, 0].
+ * Returning -1 is allowed
+ */
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = 1;"
+ "w0 = -w0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
+__failure __msg("At program exit the register R0 has")
+__naked int bpf_neg_3(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * lsm.s/socket_connect requires a return value within [-4095, 0].
+ * Returning -10000 is not allowed.
+ */
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = 10000;"
+ "w0 = -w0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=1")
+__msg("1: (87) r0 = -r0 ; R0_w=-1")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 2 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 1: (87) r0 = -r0")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 0: (b7) r0 = 1")
+__naked int bpf_neg_4(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * lsm.s/socket_connect requires a return value within [-4095, 0].
+ * Returning -1 is allowed
+ */
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = 1;"
+ "r0 = -r0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
+__failure __msg("At program exit the register R0 has")
+__naked int bpf_neg_5(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * lsm.s/socket_connect requires a return value within [-4095, 0].
+ * Returning -10000 is not allowed.
+ */
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = 10000;"
+ "r0 = -r0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_private_stack.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_private_stack.c
index fc91b414364e..1ecd34ebde19 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_private_stack.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_private_stack.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
/* From include/linux/filter.h */
#define MAX_BPF_STACK 512
-#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86)
+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86) || defined(__TARGET_ARCH_arm64)
struct elem {
struct bpf_timer t;
@@ -30,6 +30,18 @@ __jited(" movabsq $0x{{.*}}, %r9")
__jited(" addq %gs:{{.*}}, %r9")
__jited(" movl $0x2a, %edi")
__jited(" movq %rdi, -0x100(%r9)")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited(" stp x25, x27, [sp, {{.*}}]!")
+__jited(" mov x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited(" movk x27, {{.*}}, lsl #16")
+__jited(" movk x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited(" mrs x10, TPIDR_EL{{[0-1]}}")
+__jited(" add x27, x27, x10")
+__jited(" add x25, x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited(" mov x0, #0x2a")
+__jited(" str x0, [x27]")
+__jited("...")
+__jited(" ldp x25, x27, [sp], {{.*}}")
__naked void private_stack_single_prog(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -45,6 +57,9 @@ __description("No private stack")
__success
__arch_x86_64
__jited(" subq $0x8, %rsp")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited(" mov x25, sp")
+__jited(" sub sp, sp, #0x10")
__naked void no_private_stack_nested(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -81,6 +96,19 @@ __jited(" pushq %r9")
__jited(" callq 0x{{.*}}")
__jited(" popq %r9")
__jited(" xorl %eax, %eax")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited(" stp x25, x27, [sp, {{.*}}]!")
+__jited(" mov x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited(" movk x27, {{.*}}, lsl #16")
+__jited(" movk x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited(" mrs x10, TPIDR_EL{{[0-1]}}")
+__jited(" add x27, x27, x10")
+__jited(" add x25, x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited(" mov x0, #0x2a")
+__jited(" str x0, [x27]")
+__jited(" bl {{.*}}")
+__jited("...")
+__jited(" ldp x25, x27, [sp], {{.*}}")
__naked void private_stack_nested_1(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -131,6 +159,24 @@ __jited(" movq %rdi, -0x200(%r9)")
__jited(" pushq %r9")
__jited(" callq")
__jited(" popq %r9")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited("func #1")
+__jited("...")
+__jited(" stp x25, x27, [sp, {{.*}}]!")
+__jited(" mov x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited(" movk x27, {{.*}}, lsl #16")
+__jited(" movk x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited(" mrs x10, TPIDR_EL{{[0-1]}}")
+__jited(" add x27, x27, x10")
+__jited(" add x25, x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited(" bl 0x{{.*}}")
+__jited(" add x7, x0, #0x0")
+__jited(" mov x0, #0x2a")
+__jited(" str x0, [x27]")
+__jited(" bl 0x{{.*}}")
+__jited(" add x7, x0, #0x0")
+__jited(" mov x7, #0x0")
+__jited(" ldp x25, x27, [sp], {{.*}}")
__naked void private_stack_callback(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -154,6 +200,28 @@ __arch_x86_64
__jited(" pushq %r9")
__jited(" callq")
__jited(" popq %r9")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited(" stp x29, x30, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited(" mov x29, sp")
+__jited(" stp xzr, x26, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited(" mov x26, sp")
+__jited(" stp x19, x20, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited(" stp x21, x22, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited(" stp x23, x24, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited(" stp x25, x26, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited(" stp x27, x28, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited(" mov x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited(" movk x27, {{.*}}, lsl #16")
+__jited(" movk x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited(" mrs x10, TPIDR_EL{{[0-1]}}")
+__jited(" add x27, x27, x10")
+__jited(" add x25, x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited(" mov x0, #0x2a")
+__jited(" str x0, [x27]")
+__jited(" mov x0, #0x0")
+__jited(" bl 0x{{.*}}")
+__jited(" add x7, x0, #0x0")
+__jited(" ldp x27, x28, [sp], #0x10")
int private_stack_exception_main_prog(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -179,6 +247,19 @@ __jited(" movq %rdi, -0x200(%r9)")
__jited(" pushq %r9")
__jited(" callq")
__jited(" popq %r9")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited(" stp x27, x28, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited(" mov x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited(" movk x27, {{.*}}, lsl #16")
+__jited(" movk x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited(" mrs x10, TPIDR_EL{{[0-1]}}")
+__jited(" add x27, x27, x10")
+__jited(" add x25, x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited(" mov x0, #0x2a")
+__jited(" str x0, [x27]")
+__jited(" bl 0x{{.*}}")
+__jited(" add x7, x0, #0x0")
+__jited(" ldp x27, x28, [sp], #0x10")
int private_stack_exception_sub_prog(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -220,6 +301,10 @@ __description("Private stack, async callback, not nested")
__success __retval(0)
__arch_x86_64
__jited(" movabsq $0x{{.*}}, %r9")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited(" mrs x10, TPIDR_EL{{[0-1]}}")
+__jited(" add x27, x27, x10")
+__jited(" add x25, x27, {{.*}}")
int private_stack_async_callback_1(void)
{
struct bpf_timer *arr_timer;
@@ -241,6 +326,8 @@ __description("Private stack, async callback, potential nesting")
__success __retval(0)
__arch_x86_64
__jited(" subq $0x100, %rsp")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited(" sub sp, sp, #0x100")
int private_stack_async_callback_2(void)
{
struct bpf_timer *arr_timer;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c
index 683a882b3e6d..910365201f68 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ struct bpf_key {} __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
extern void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *key) __ksym;
extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_system_key(__u64 id) __ksym;
-extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__u32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
+extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__s32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
/* BTF FUNC records are not generated for kfuncs referenced
* from inline assembly. These records are necessary for
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_tailcall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_tailcall.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b4acce60fb9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_tailcall.c
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+
+struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
+ __uint(max_entries, 1);
+ __type(key, __u32);
+ __type(value, __u32);
+} map_array SEC(".maps");
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("invalid map type for tail call")
+__failure __msg("expected prog array map for tail call")
+__failure_unpriv
+__naked void invalid_map_for_tail_call(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r2 = %[map_array] ll; \
+ r3 = 0; \
+ call %[bpf_tail_call]; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_tail_call),
+ __imm_addr(map_array)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
index a4a5e2071604..28b4f7035ceb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
@@ -572,8 +572,14 @@ l0_%=: exit; \
SEC("socket")
__description("alu32: mov u32 const")
-__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R7 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
+__success __success_unpriv
__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R7 invalid mem access 'scalar'` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("exit")
+#endif
__naked void alu32_mov_u32_const(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -619,12 +625,11 @@ __naked void pass_pointer_to_tail_call(void)
SEC("socket")
__description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero")
-__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison")
+__success __success_unpriv
__retval(0)
__naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_zero(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
- r1 = 0; \
r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
if r1 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
@@ -635,6 +640,22 @@ l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
}
SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with const")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison prohibited")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_const(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ if r1 == 0x0000beef goto l0_%=; \
+l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
__description("unpriv: write into frame pointer")
__failure __msg("frame pointer is read only")
__failure_unpriv
@@ -723,4 +744,210 @@ l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
" ::: __clobber_all);
}
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: Spectre v1 path-based type confusion of scalar as stack-ptr")
+__success __success_unpriv __retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if r0 != 0x1 goto pc+2")
+/* This nospec prevents the exploit because it forces the mispredicted (not
+ * taken) `if r0 != 0x0 goto l0_%=` to resolve before using r6 as a pointer.
+ * This causes the CPU to realize that `r6 = r9` should have never executed. It
+ * ensures that r6 always contains a readable stack slot ptr when the insn after
+ * the nospec executes.
+ */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+__xlated_unpriv("r9 = *(u8 *)(r6 +0)")
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_spec_v1_type_confusion(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l2_%=; \
+ /* r0: pointer to a map array entry */ \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ /* r1, r2: prepared call args */ \
+ r6 = r10; \
+ r6 += -8; \
+ /* r6: pointer to readable stack slot */ \
+ r9 = 0xffffc900; \
+ r9 <<= 32; \
+ /* r9: scalar controlled by attacker */ \
+ r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0); /* cache miss */ \
+ if r0 != 0x0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r6 = r9; \
+l0_%=: if r0 != 0x1 goto l1_%=; \
+ r9 = *(u8 *)(r6 + 0); \
+l1_%=: /* leak r9 */ \
+ r9 &= 1; \
+ r9 <<= 9; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r9; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l2_%=; \
+ /* leak secret into is_cached(map[0|512]): */ \
+ r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0); \
+l2_%=: \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: ldimm64 before Spectre v4 barrier")
+__success __success_unpriv
+__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V4
+__xlated_unpriv("r1 = 0x2020200005642020") /* should not matter */
+__xlated_unpriv("*(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_ldimm64_spectre_v4(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = 0x2020200005642020 ll; \
+ *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: Spectre v1 and v4 barrier")
+__success __success_unpriv
+__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+#ifdef SPEC_V4
+/* starts with r0 == r8 == r9 == 0 */
+__xlated_unpriv("if r8 != 0x0 goto pc+1")
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("if r9 == 0x0 goto pc+4")
+__xlated_unpriv("r2 = r0")
+/* Following nospec required to prevent following dangerous `*(u64 *)(NOT_FP -64)
+ * = r1` iff `if r9 == 0 goto pc+4` was mispredicted because of Spectre v1. The
+ * test therefore ensures the Spectre-v4--induced nospec does not prevent the
+ * Spectre-v1--induced speculative path from being fully analyzed.
+ */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* Spectre v1 */
+__xlated_unpriv("*(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1") /* could be used to leak r2 */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* Spectre v4 */
+#endif
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_spectre_v1_and_v4(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ r8 = r0; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ r9 = r0; \
+ r0 = r10; \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ if r8 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ if r9 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+l0_%=: if r8 != 0 goto l1_%=; \
+ goto l2_%=; \
+l1_%=: if r9 == 0 goto l3_%=; \
+ r2 = r0; \
+l2_%=: *(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1; \
+l3_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: Spectre v1 and v4 barrier (simple)")
+__success __success_unpriv
+__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+#ifdef SPEC_V4
+__xlated_unpriv("if r8 != 0x0 goto pc+1")
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* if r9 == 0 goto l3_%= */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* r2 = r0 */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+__xlated_unpriv("*(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+#endif
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_spectre_v1_and_v4_simple(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r8 = 0; \
+ r9 = 0; \
+ r0 = r10; \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ if r8 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ if r9 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+l0_%=: if r8 != 0 goto l1_%=; \
+ goto l2_%=; \
+l1_%=: if r9 == 0 goto l3_%=; \
+ r2 = r0; \
+l2_%=: *(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1; \
+l3_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: ldimm64 before Spectre v1 and v4 barrier (simple)")
+__success __success_unpriv
+__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+#ifdef SPEC_V4
+__xlated_unpriv("if r8 != 0x0 goto pc+1")
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc+4")
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* if r9 == 0 goto l3_%= */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* r2 = r0 */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* r1 = 0x2020200005642020 ll */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* second part of ldimm64 */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+__xlated_unpriv("*(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+#endif
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_ldimm64_spectre_v1_and_v4_simple(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r8 = 0; \
+ r9 = 0; \
+ r0 = r10; \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ if r8 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ if r9 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r0 = 0; \
+l0_%=: if r8 != 0 goto l1_%=; \
+ goto l2_%=; \
+l1_%=: if r9 == 0 goto l3_%=; \
+ r2 = r0; \
+ r1 = 0x2020200005642020 ll; \
+l2_%=: *(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1; \
+l3_%=: r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c
index 5ba6e53571c8..af7938ce56cb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c
@@ -231,6 +231,10 @@ __retval(1)
__naked void ptr_unknown_vs_unknown_lt(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
+ r8 = r1; \
+ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
+ r9 = r0; \
+ r1 = r8; \
r0 = *(u32*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_len]); \
r1 = 0; \
*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
@@ -245,11 +249,11 @@ l1_%=: call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
r4 = *(u8*)(r0 + 0); \
if r4 == 1 goto l3_%=; \
r1 = 6; \
- r1 = -r1; \
+ r1 = r9; \
r1 &= 0x3; \
goto l4_%=; \
l3_%=: r1 = 6; \
- r1 = -r1; \
+ r1 = r9; \
r1 &= 0x7; \
l4_%=: r1 += r0; \
r0 = *(u8*)(r1 + 0); \
@@ -259,7 +263,8 @@ l2_%=: r0 = 1; \
: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
__imm_addr(map_array_48b),
__imm_addr(map_hash_16b),
- __imm_const(__sk_buff_len, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, len))
+ __imm_const(__sk_buff_len, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, len)),
+ __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
: __clobber_all);
}
@@ -271,6 +276,10 @@ __retval(1)
__naked void ptr_unknown_vs_unknown_gt(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
+ r8 = r1; \
+ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
+ r9 = r0; \
+ r1 = r8; \
r0 = *(u32*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_len]); \
r1 = 0; \
*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
@@ -285,11 +294,11 @@ l1_%=: call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
r4 = *(u8*)(r0 + 0); \
if r4 == 1 goto l3_%=; \
r1 = 6; \
- r1 = -r1; \
+ r1 = r9; \
r1 &= 0x7; \
goto l4_%=; \
l3_%=: r1 = 6; \
- r1 = -r1; \
+ r1 = r9; \
r1 &= 0x3; \
l4_%=: r1 += r0; \
r0 = *(u8*)(r1 + 0); \
@@ -299,7 +308,8 @@ l2_%=: r0 = 1; \
: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
__imm_addr(map_array_48b),
__imm_addr(map_hash_16b),
- __imm_const(__sk_buff_len, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, len))
+ __imm_const(__sk_buff_len, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, len)),
+ __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
: __clobber_all);
}
@@ -398,7 +408,8 @@ l2_%=: r0 = 1; \
SEC("socket")
__description("map access: mixing value pointer and scalar, 1")
-__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R2 pointer comparison prohibited")
+__success __failure_unpriv
+__msg_unpriv("R2 tried to add from different maps, paths or scalars, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root")
__retval(0)
__naked void value_pointer_and_scalar_1(void)
{
@@ -433,6 +444,7 @@ l2_%=: /* common instruction */ \
l3_%=: /* branch B */ \
r0 = 0x13371337; \
/* verifier follows fall-through */ \
+ /* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent `R2 pointer comparison prohibited`) */\
if r2 != 0x100000 goto l4_%=; \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
@@ -450,7 +462,8 @@ l4_%=: /* fake-dead code; targeted from branch A to \
SEC("socket")
__description("map access: mixing value pointer and scalar, 2")
-__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
+__success __failure_unpriv
+__msg_unpriv("R2 tried to add from different maps, paths or scalars, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root")
__retval(0)
__naked void value_pointer_and_scalar_2(void)
{
@@ -492,6 +505,7 @@ l4_%=: /* fake-dead code; targeted from branch A to \
* prevent dead code sanitization, rejected \
* via branch B however \
*/ \
+ /* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent `R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'`) */\
r0 = *(u8*)(r0 + 0); \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
@@ -1296,9 +1310,13 @@ l0_%=: r0 = 1; \
SEC("socket")
__description("map access: value_ptr -= unknown scalar, 2")
-__success __failure_unpriv
-__msg_unpriv("R0 pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range")
+__success __success_unpriv
__retval(1)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("r1 &= 7")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range` */
+__xlated_unpriv("r0 -= r1")
+#endif
__naked void value_ptr_unknown_scalar_2_2(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_accept.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_accept.c
index a7c0a553aa50..3e2d76ee8050 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_accept.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_accept.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2024 Google LLC. */
#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <errno.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
@@ -82,4 +83,21 @@ int BPF_PROG(path_d_path_from_file_argument, struct file *file)
return 0;
}
+SEC("lsm.s/inode_rename")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(inode_rename, struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = new_dentry->d_inode;
+ ino_t ino;
+
+ if (!inode)
+ return 0;
+ ino = inode->i_ino;
+ if (ino == 0)
+ return -EACCES;
+ return 0;
+}
+
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_reject.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_reject.c
index d6d3f4fcb24c..4b392c6c8fc4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_reject.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_reject.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2024 Google LLC. */
#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <errno.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
#include <linux/limits.h>
@@ -158,4 +159,18 @@ int BPF_PROG(path_d_path_kfunc_non_lsm, struct path *path, struct file *f)
return 0;
}
+SEC("lsm.s/inode_rename")
+__failure __msg("invalid mem access 'trusted_ptr_or_null_'")
+int BPF_PROG(inode_rename, struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = new_dentry->d_inode;
+ ino_t ino;
+
+ ino = inode->i_ino;
+ if (ino == 0)
+ return -EACCES;
+ return 0;
+}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";