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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-04-14 10:48:51 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-04-14 10:48:51 -0700 |
| commit | 27fd80851dc1e47b2facaa11b5b52c7dbc6b0718 (patch) | |
| tree | 4b04d50328b371793a2070b8cf9f981eb46fbda9 /Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | |
| parent | c748fc3b1f5605c12c8061ffb0c27707597b27b2 (diff) | |
| parent | 7211274fe0ee352332255e41ab5e628b86e83994 (diff) | |
Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2024-04-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull misc x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
- Follow up fixes for the BHI mitigations code
- Fix !SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS bug not turning off mitigations as
expected
- Work around an APIC emulation bug when the kernel is built with Clang
and run as a SEV guest
- Follow up x86 topology fixes
* tag 'x86-urgent-2024-04-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu/amd: Move TOPOEXT enablement into the topology parser
x86/cpu/amd: Make the NODEID_MSR union actually work
x86/cpu/amd: Make the CPUID 0x80000008 parser correct
x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI
x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto
x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isn't a BHI mitigation
x86/bugs: Fix BHI handling of RRSBA
x86/bugs: Rename various 'ia32_cap' variables to 'x86_arch_cap_msr'
x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
x86/bugs: Fix BHI documentation
x86/cpu: Actually turn off mitigations by default for SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n
x86/topology: Don't update cpu_possible_map in topo_set_cpuids()
x86/bugs: Fix return type of spectre_bhi_state()
x86/apic: Force native_apic_mem_read() to use the MOV instruction
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 70046a019d42..902ecd92a29f 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -3444,6 +3444,7 @@ retbleed=off [X86] spec_rstack_overflow=off [X86] spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC] + spectre_bhi=off [X86] spectre_v2_user=off [X86] srbds=off [X86,INTEL] ssbd=force-off [ARM64] @@ -6064,16 +6065,13 @@ See Documentation/admin-guide/laptops/sonypi.rst spectre_bhi= [X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection - (BHI) vulnerability. Syscalls are hardened against BHI - reglardless of this setting. This setting affects the + (BHI) vulnerability. This setting affects the deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. - on - unconditionally enable. - off - unconditionally disable. - auto - (default) enable hardware mitigation - (BHI_DIS_S) if available, otherwise enable - alternate mitigation in KVM. + on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation + as needed. + off - Disable the mitigation. spectre_v2= [X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability. |