Merge branch 'for-next/cca' into for-next/core

* for-next/cca:
  arm64: acpi: Enable ACPI CCEL support
  arm64: Enable EFI secret area Securityfs support
  arm64: realm: ioremap: Allow mapping memory as encrypted

5 files changed, 39 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h
index 9b96840fb979..83e03abbb2ca 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h
@@ -274,6 +274,10 @@ int arm64_ioremap_prot_hook_register(const ioremap_prot_hook_t hook);
 #define ioremap_np(addr, size)	\
 	ioremap_prot((addr), (size), __pgprot(PROT_DEVICE_nGnRnE))
 
+
+#define ioremap_encrypted(addr, size)	\
+	ioremap_prot((addr), (size), PAGE_KERNEL)
+
 /*
  * io{read,write}{16,32,64}be() macros
  */
@@ -311,7 +315,7 @@ extern bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset, size_t size,
 static inline bool arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size)
 {
 	if (unlikely(is_realm_world()))
-		return __arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr, size);
+		return arm64_rsi_is_protected(phys_addr, size);
 	return false;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h
index b42aeac05340..88b50d660e85 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rsi_present);
 
 void __init arm64_rsi_init(void);
 
-bool __arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t base, size_t size);
+bool arm64_rsi_is_protected(phys_addr_t base, size_t size);
 
 static inline bool is_realm_world(void)
 {
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c
index 4d529ff7ba51..b3195b3b895f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c
@@ -357,6 +357,16 @@ void __iomem *acpi_os_ioremap(acpi_physical_address phys, acpi_size size)
 			 * as long as we take care not to create a writable
 			 * mapping for executable code.
 			 */
+			fallthrough;
+
+		case EFI_ACPI_MEMORY_NVS:
+			/*
+			 * ACPI NVS marks an area reserved for use by the
+			 * firmware, even after exiting the boot service.
+			 * This may be used by the firmware for sharing dynamic
+			 * tables/data (e.g., ACPI CCEL) with the OS. Map it
+			 * as read-only.
+			 */
 			prot = PAGE_KERNEL_RO;
 			break;
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c
index ce4778141ec7..c64a06f58c0b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c
@@ -84,7 +84,25 @@ static void __init arm64_rsi_setup_memory(void)
 	}
 }
 
-bool __arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t base, size_t size)
+/*
+ * Check if a given PA range is Trusted (e.g., Protected memory, a Trusted Device
+ * mapping, or an MMIO emulated in the Realm world).
+ *
+ * We can rely on the RIPAS value of the region to detect if a given region is
+ * protected.
+ *
+ *  RIPAS_DEV - A trusted device memory or a trusted emulated MMIO (in the Realm
+ *		world
+ *  RIPAS_RAM - Memory (RAM), protected by the RMM guarantees. (e.g., Firmware
+ *		reserved regions for data sharing).
+ *
+ *  RIPAS_DESTROYED is a special case of one of the above, where the host did
+ *  something without our permission and as such we can't do anything about it.
+ *
+ * The only case where something is emulated by the untrusted hypervisor or is
+ * backed by shared memory is indicated by RSI_RIPAS_EMPTY.
+ */
+bool arm64_rsi_is_protected(phys_addr_t base, size_t size)
 {
 	enum ripas ripas;
 	phys_addr_t end, top;
@@ -101,18 +119,18 @@ bool __arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t base, size_t size)
 			break;
 		if (WARN_ON(top <= base))
 			break;
-		if (ripas != RSI_RIPAS_DEV)
+		if (ripas == RSI_RIPAS_EMPTY)
 			break;
 		base = top;
 	}
 
 	return base >= end;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arm64_is_protected_mmio);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(arm64_rsi_is_protected);
 
 static int realm_ioremap_hook(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size, pgprot_t *prot)
 {
-	if (__arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys, size))
+	if (arm64_rsi_is_protected(phys, size))
 		*prot = pgprot_encrypted(*prot);
 	else
 		*prot = pgprot_decrypted(*prot);
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig
index 4404d198f3b2..94d88e5da707 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 config EFI_SECRET
 	tristate "EFI secret area securityfs support"
-	depends on EFI && X86_64
+	depends on EFI && (X86_64 || ARM64)
 	select EFI_COCO_SECRET
 	select SECURITYFS
 	help