diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 26 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 2 |
5 files changed, 39 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h index 9b96840fb979..83e03abbb2ca 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h @@ -274,6 +274,10 @@ int arm64_ioremap_prot_hook_register(const ioremap_prot_hook_t hook); #define ioremap_np(addr, size) \ ioremap_prot((addr), (size), __pgprot(PROT_DEVICE_nGnRnE)) + +#define ioremap_encrypted(addr, size) \ + ioremap_prot((addr), (size), PAGE_KERNEL) + /* * io{read,write}{16,32,64}be() macros */ @@ -311,7 +315,7 @@ extern bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset, size_t size, static inline bool arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size) { if (unlikely(is_realm_world())) - return __arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr, size); + return arm64_rsi_is_protected(phys_addr, size); return false; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h index b42aeac05340..88b50d660e85 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rsi_present); void __init arm64_rsi_init(void); -bool __arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t base, size_t size); +bool arm64_rsi_is_protected(phys_addr_t base, size_t size); static inline bool is_realm_world(void) { diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c index 4d529ff7ba51..b3195b3b895f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c @@ -357,6 +357,16 @@ void __iomem *acpi_os_ioremap(acpi_physical_address phys, acpi_size size) * as long as we take care not to create a writable * mapping for executable code. */ + fallthrough; + + case EFI_ACPI_MEMORY_NVS: + /* + * ACPI NVS marks an area reserved for use by the + * firmware, even after exiting the boot service. + * This may be used by the firmware for sharing dynamic + * tables/data (e.g., ACPI CCEL) with the OS. Map it + * as read-only. + */ prot = PAGE_KERNEL_RO; break; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c index ce4778141ec7..c64a06f58c0b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c @@ -84,7 +84,25 @@ static void __init arm64_rsi_setup_memory(void) } } -bool __arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t base, size_t size) +/* + * Check if a given PA range is Trusted (e.g., Protected memory, a Trusted Device + * mapping, or an MMIO emulated in the Realm world). + * + * We can rely on the RIPAS value of the region to detect if a given region is + * protected. + * + * RIPAS_DEV - A trusted device memory or a trusted emulated MMIO (in the Realm + * world + * RIPAS_RAM - Memory (RAM), protected by the RMM guarantees. (e.g., Firmware + * reserved regions for data sharing). + * + * RIPAS_DESTROYED is a special case of one of the above, where the host did + * something without our permission and as such we can't do anything about it. + * + * The only case where something is emulated by the untrusted hypervisor or is + * backed by shared memory is indicated by RSI_RIPAS_EMPTY. + */ +bool arm64_rsi_is_protected(phys_addr_t base, size_t size) { enum ripas ripas; phys_addr_t end, top; @@ -101,18 +119,18 @@ bool __arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t base, size_t size) break; if (WARN_ON(top <= base)) break; - if (ripas != RSI_RIPAS_DEV) + if (ripas == RSI_RIPAS_EMPTY) break; base = top; } return base >= end; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arm64_is_protected_mmio); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(arm64_rsi_is_protected); static int realm_ioremap_hook(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size, pgprot_t *prot) { - if (__arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys, size)) + if (arm64_rsi_is_protected(phys, size)) *prot = pgprot_encrypted(*prot); else *prot = pgprot_decrypted(*prot); diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig index 4404d198f3b2..94d88e5da707 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only config EFI_SECRET tristate "EFI secret area securityfs support" - depends on EFI && X86_64 + depends on EFI && (X86_64 || ARM64) select EFI_COCO_SECRET select SECURITYFS help |
